By
Nadeem F. Paracha
30 Aug 2020
The
combined share of votes for religio-political parties in the 2018 elections in
Pakistan was 9.58 percent. This percentage is slightly lower than what it was
in the 2013 elections, and certainly lower than the 11 percent of the total
votes that the ‘religious’ parties received in the 2002 election. The 2002
tally still stands to be the highest the Islamist parties have ever received in
elections in Pakistan.
Illustration by Abro
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In an
analysis of the 2018 elections, Indian author Tilak Devasher and researcher
Shruti Punia, assessed the performance of religio-political parties in the elections
as weak because, this time, there were a lot more Islamist parties competing in
the Pakistani elections. Apart from the established parties, two new
religio-political outfits emerged to compete in the polls: The Milli Muslim
League (MML) and Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). According to Devasher and
Punia, the entry of the last two into electoral politics was encouraged by the
‘establishment’ as a way to usurp the ‘religious vote’ of the centre-right
PML-N so that Imran Khan’s centre-right PTI could benefit. None of the new
religio-political parties could win any significant number of seats, but that
was never the ‘plan.’
Most
Pakistani analysts agree. Whereas the MML could not perform in the manner in
which some expected it to, the radical Barelvi TLP not only succeeded in
largely usurping PML-N’s Barelvi vote, but also gobbled up the secular MQM’s
lower-middle-class Barelvi votes in Karachi. This certainly aided PTI in
challenging the PML-N in Punjab and the MQM in Karachi.
Historically,
Islamist outfits in South Asia are not built as electoral parties. They emerge
as evangelical groups or residues of movements. But even when they do convert
into electoral outfits, they struggle to exhibit any significant traction for
the voters. Apart from the fact that they are usually evangelical groups which
take time to evolve an electoral character, another reason that they struggle
to do well in elections is because of the manner in which the
non-religion-based mainstream parties in Pakistan pragmatically co-opt certain
causes and the rhetoric championed by the ‘religious’ outfits.
Another
factor is that religio-political parties are closely associated with one
Islamic sect/sub-sect or the other. This limits their appeal to voters from
other denominations. Some are even understood to have developed a sect of their
own, as the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) was once accused of doing. According to the
late sociologist Hamza Alavi, Islamist groups (in South Asia) developing
political interests is a 20th century phenomenon rooted in the Khilafat
Movement (1919-1924). The political anthropologist Irfan Ahmad agrees but adds
that, when the European theory of the state began to attract centrist and
leftist groups in South Asia in the early 20th century, Islamist groups too began
to be attracted by it and therefore started to theorise the possibility of
creating an ‘Islamic state.’
But since
most of these Islamist groups had emerged as evangelical outfits that had then
plunged into agitational politics, they could not find the means or the need to
devise any electoral tools to achieve such a state. They often saw electoral
politics as contrary to their Islamist dispositions. That’s why the demand for
a Muslim-majority state (Pakistan) arose from a centrist and quasi-secular All India
Muslim League (AIML).
What’s
more, almost all major Islamist parties opposed this demand on one pretext or
the other. But they could not neutralise AIML’s plans because, by the 1940s, it
had not only become an experienced electoral entity, but it was also able to
juxtapose its ‘modernist’ Muslim nationalism with rhetoric from their Islamist
opponents. These opponents had no plan to stall the League through electoral
means.
The
Islamist parties remained in an electoral limbo during the first 20 years of
Pakistan. However, they did retain their evangelical and agitational
disposition, in an attempt to influence the ideological character of the new
country. But even during the years of indirect elections (1957-58), and hybrid
democracy (1962-69), the religio-political parties could not devise any
effective electoral tools. They largely failed to send members to the country’s
first two constituent assemblies, and the two assemblies that came into being
during the Ayub Khan dictatorship.
Yet, just
before the country’s first direct elections in 1970, parties such as JI were
claiming that they would sweep the polls. The opposite happened. The
religio-political parties could not bag more than 4 percent of the total vote
and were routed by secular parties, most of whose senior members had been
involved in electoral politics since the 1950s.
In an
August 15, 2016 essay in the Asian Journal of Political Science, the research
scholar Mudasir Nazar writes that, from 1947 till 1972, Islamist parties
operated from outside the assemblies and, therefore, had no significant
influence on the policy-making process, other than through the threat to
agitate. But despite the fact that just 18 members from three religio-political
parties managed to enter the parliament that came into being in 1972, this was
actually the first time so many members from Islamist outfits had become
parliamentarians.
Their
new-found romance with electoral politics was no match, however, against the
experience of mainstream electoral parties. That’s why, in 1974 and then again
in 1977, Islamist parties once again banked on their penchant for agitational
politics to undermine a regime. They initially welcomed Gen Ziaul Haq’s
reactionary military coup in 1977. With the side-lining of some major parties
during this period, the religio-political parties were given ample space to develop
their electoral skills and expand their constituencies. Even separate
electorates were introduced to favour the Islamist parties. But the idea, on
the part of the military regime, was to manoeuvre these parties in a manner
that would help the dictatorship sustain itself and ward off challenges posed
to it by the opposition parties.
Apart from
squabbling among themselves over sectarian and theological issues, most of the
religio-political parties became willing tools of the ‘establishment’, without
whose ‘backing’ they believed they could not become effective electoral
entities. In the 1990s, less overtly religious centre-right parties, such as
the PML-N, continued to co-opt religious rhetoric and the ‘programmes’ of the
Islamist parties while (when in government) bouncing between eliminating newer
sectarian groups or allying with them during elections.
However, at
the turn of the century, the self-proclaimed ‘enlightened moderate’ Gen
Musharraf decided to aggressively sideline the PML-N and the PPP during the
2002 elections, by creating the conditions required for the religio-political
parties to win in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then NWFP). This was when these parties
bagged 11 percent of the total vote. But this could not halt the return of the
PPP and the PML-N after the 2008 elections.
In the eyes
of the establishment, the mutable utility of the old religio-political parties
has been exhausted. With growing mistrust between the PML-N/PPP and the
establishment, the latter ‘allowed’ the growth of new religion-based groups
such as the TLP and the MML. In an environment where the state was at war with
religious militancy and with the sword of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) still hanging over the country’s head, the idea was to quietly nurture
new religious groups, not to help them win, but to aid the ‘pro-establishment’
PTI by way of scattering PML-N’s religious vote-bank and constituency.
The fate of
the religio-political parties in electoral politics is thus likely to continue
being dependent on their individual utility to the establishment.
Original
Headline: THE POLITICS OF THE
‘RELIGIOUS’ PARTIES
Source: The Dawn, Pakistan
URL: https://newageislam.com/radical-islamism-jihad/islamist-outfits-south-asia-built/d/122809
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