Islamisation and Islamism: Ongoing Process of Islamisation of Indonesia
Indonesia
Investment
1 January
2021
Over the
past two decades Indonesia has made global headlines - on several occasions -
due to vicious terrorist attacks and the presence of terrorist networks
(including training camps) that are believed to be connected to either the
militant Sunni Islamist Al-Qaeda group, the Southeast Asian militant Islamist
organization Jemaah Islamiyah, or terrorist militant group Islamic State (IS).
It illustrates the existence of a radical Muslim community in Indonesia; one
that not only believes Islam should be the sole guidance in life (thereby
opposing and undermining the secular government and pluralist society) but also
one that is willing to use extreme measures (including vicious violence) to
reform and uproot established conditions.
With more
than 230 million Muslim inhabitants, Indonesia is home to the largest Muslim
population in the world. Not less impressive, around 13 percent of the total
number of Muslims in the world, today, live within the borders of Indonesia.
Hence, it needs little imagination to understand that the influence of Islamic
principles and ethics on Indonesian society, politics, and the economy is huge.
Ongoing
Process of Islamisation of Indonesia
In fact, a
process of Islamisation has been ongoing in Indonesia ever since this religion
first arrived in the archipelago many centuries ago. There probably has been an
Islamic presence in maritime Southeast Asia from early on in the Islamic era
when Muslim traders came to the Archipelago, made settlements on the coastal
areas, married local women and enjoyed respect due to the wealth they acquired
through trade. Those were the early days of the Islamisation of Indonesia.
In a later
stage (possibly starting from the 13th century) Islamic kingdoms started to be
established by local (indigenous) rulers in the Archipelago (mainly in the
western part of the Archipelago, such as on the islands of Sumatra, Java and
Kalimantan). It is assumed that – after indigenous kings converted – most of
their subjects also converted to Islam, thereby strengthening the role of Islam
in local societies. However, these local forms of Islam were mixed with
preexisting local cultural elements and preexisting local belief-systems (and
thus the forms of Islam that were practiced in these indigenous Islamic
kingdoms were quite different from, for example, the forms of Islam that were
practiced in Mecca, Medina or anywhere else around the same period).
This
process of Islamisation has not ceased in the contemporary era. Even in recent
decades we can clearly detect examples of the ongoing process of Islamisation
in Indonesia. For instance, the number of Indonesian women who wear the Islamic
headscarf (in Indonesian: kerudung or jilbab) has risen rapidly over the past
20-25 years (having become a common sight on the streets of Indonesia today).
Another example is that Indonesian government officials – even those who are
not Muslim themselves – now always tend to open their speeches or statements
using the Arabic phrase As-salāmuʿalaykum (in English: Peace be upon you).
Important
to Separate Islamisation from Islamism
It is
important to emphasize here that this process of Islamisation should not be
confused with Islamism or radicalism. With the term Islamisation we refer to
the process of society's (peaceful) shift towards a more Islam-oriented society
(which allows room for specific minorities to co-exist, in harmony, in the
pluralist society). The terms Islamism or radicalism (or Islamic militancy or
fundamentalism), on the other hand, refer to the desire of a specific group
(usually a small group that lacks political power) to impose their conservative
version of Islam onto society and politics, often using (the threat of)
violence to achieve their goal.
Although
around 88 percent of the Indonesian population is Muslim, Indonesia is not an
Islamic country ruled by Islamic law. Most Indonesian Muslims can in fact be
labelled 'moderate Muslims', meaning that the majority approves of a secular
democracy and a pluralist society. This attitude is visible in the results of
recent legislative elections as those political parties that stress the
importance of a dominating and stricter form of Islam within governance and
society receive relatively few votes. Meanwhile, the secular political parties
that support a moderate and tolerant Islamic democracy and pluralist society
always win the elections in Indonesia (by a clear distance).
Nonetheless,
it is true that the country's traditional 'secular parties' (such as PDI-P and
Golkar) have also been experiencing the process of Islamisation. Hence, the
chairpersons of these parties will now often be heard using the Arabic phrase
As-salāmuʿalaykum when opening a statement or speech. This in fact implies that
these parties are not truly secular as they are not neutral in terms of
religion.
On other
occasions, however, we still detect the desire of high-profile politicians to
maintain a secular stance. For example, Indonesian President Joko Widodo often
opens his speeches with the following words of greeting (addressing the
followers of all of the country's main religions):
Assalamu’Alaikum W Rahmatullahi W Barakatuh (to
Muslims)
Salam Sejahtera Bagi Kita Semua (to
Christians/Catholics)
Om Swastyastu (to Hindus)
Namo Buddhaya (to Buddhists)
Salam Kebajikan (to Confucianists)
Varieties
of Indonesian Islam
This group
of 230 million Indonesian Muslims does not represent a homogeneous group. In
fact, much variety can be found in Indonesian Islam as well as in Indonesian
Muslims' perceptions regarding the role that Islam should play within
Indonesian politics and society.
A
significant number of Indonesian Muslims can be labeled ‘cultural Muslim’,
locally known as Muslim KTP, meaning they do not practice Islam but do retain
an attachment to elements of Islamic culture due to their family background or
the social and cultural environment in which they were raised, or, in which
they are living (similarly, there are also ‘cultural Christians’, 'cultural
Catholics', ‘cultural Hindus’, and ‘cultural Buddhists’ in Indonesia).
On the
other hand, there is also a big – and growing – number of Indonesian Muslims
who choose to strengthen their Muslim identity, for example by deciding to
start wearing the headscarf or other Islamic clothing. Particularly, since 2014
we have detected a boost in Islamisation in Indonesia which made many
Indonesian Muslims (consciously or unconsciously) strengthen their Muslim
identity. This big wave of Islamisation has its roots in specific political
developments, both at home and abroad.
There is
actually a wide array of Muslims in Indonesia, ranging from Muslim KTP to pious
and conservative Muslims. But the varieties are even wider as some regions
still exhibit traces of Hinduism and Buddhism in their local versions of Islam
(while others are much more oriented towards Mecca).
Meanwhile,
there is also a group that goes beyond the conservative type of Muslim, namely
the radical Muslim. With this term we not only refer to those who use extreme
measures (such as violence) to uproot established conditions but also those who
silently agree with such measures (although they do not carry those actions out
themselves).
In
Indonesia, radical Muslims only constitute a small minority. However, they are
the ones who are loudest on the streets (often engaging in demonstrations) and
- sometimes - willing to take violent action. Moreover, there is concern that
this small radical community is growing in number and strength. Indeed, at the
fringes of Islamisation, there is a process of Islamism that is bound to grow
along accordingly. Therefore, it is important for Indonesian authorities to
carefully monitor the situation and engage in effective deradicalization
programs.
Rising
Religious Tensions in Indonesia
The process
of Islamisation is not a process that goes evenly across time and space.
Instead, there are periods when this process gets a sudden boost. A recent
example is the 2014-2019 period.
When
Jakarta governor Joko Widodo decided to pursue his successful run for
president, he was (by law) replaced by the deputy governor of Jakarta. However,
this deputy was a Christian, ethnic Chinese man: Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (better
known as Ahok). For many Muslims, in particular the conservative Muslims, it
was unacceptable to have a non-Muslim rule a Muslim-majority city.
It resulted
in a boost in religious tensions that also spread to other parts of Indonesia.
When Ahok, during campaigning in the context of Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial
election, made a "blasphemous slip-off-the-tongue" when he stated
that a specific Koranic verse should not be used to manipulate voters for
political gain. While few would consider this blasphemous speech, Islamic
hardline groups started to organize demonstrations, demanding for the arrest of
Ahok.
A series of
massive demonstrations were organized by hardliners on the streets of Jakarta
(labelled the '212 Action' which refers to the 2nd of December 2016 when the
first demonstration was held), where up to 200,000 people gathered to protest
against Ahok (with many people traveling to Jakarta to join the
demonstrations).
These
hardline demonstrations put severe pressure on Indonesian society. Under the
threat of being labeled anti-Islam, many people felt the need to display their
Muslim identity more strongly. For example, people who used to have a profile
picture on social media wearing Western style clothes, would suddenly replace
this picture by one where they are seen sitting in front of a mosque wearing
Islamic clothes; people who previously never used (Islamic) Arabic phrases
would suddenly start using those phrases; women who did not wear the headscarf
would start wearing one in the public domain.
Hardliners
not only successfully put pressure on society, but they also succeeded in
preventing Ahok from winning Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election. While Ahok
had favorable ratings at first, his popularity declined heavily once Jakarta
felt the pressure of the massive demonstrations. Moreover, he was later
sentenced to two years in prison in a very controversial blasphemy case (it is
assumed that the judges were also under pressure).
The
tensions in Jakarta spread to the national level. President Widodo, who is seen
as an ally of Ahok, became the next target of these hardline groups. In the
campaign period for the 2019 presidential election the influence of these
hardliners would in fact become big. Defeated presidential candidate Prabowo
Subianto embraced the hardline forces as they were a tool to defeat Widodo. It
is assumed Subianto was eager to ignite religious tensions in order to repeat the
developments of Jakarta in 2017.
However,
Widodo made a sudden and unsuspected 'act of self-defense' when he nominated
renowned and conservative Muslim cleric Ma'ruf Amin (Chairman of the Ulema
Council of Indonesia, or MUI) as his running mate for the 2019 election. Amin
has issued various conservative fatwas (non-binding legal opinions) as MUI
Chairman, is well respected within hardline circles, and had even testified
against Ahok in the blasphemy case. The decision to select Amin as running mate
was a great strategic move because it was suddenly impossible for Widodo's
political enemies to label him 'anti-Islam' or 'enemy of Islam'. As a result
religious tensions ceased.
However,
all happenings related to Jakarta's 2017 gubernatorial election and Indonesia's
2019 legislative and presidential elections did have one important side-effect,
it caused a boost in the country's Islamisation process because those women who
suddenly felt the social pressure to start wearing headscarves during the
period of religious tensions, did not suddenly stop wearing the headscarf after
religious tensions ceased.
In that
sense, it is interesting to point out that Ahok's period as Jakarta governor
essentially backfired completely. While many Christians and other minorities
applauded the fact that Jakarta, a Muslim-majority city, could be governed by a
non-Muslim person (claiming it to be a victory for Indonesian pluralism), in
the end it would trigger a big wave of Islamisation. One could in fact argue
that the presence of a conservative Muslim cleric as the country's
vice-president (Ma'ruf Amin in the 2019-2024 period) can be attributed to
Ahok's period as governor of Jakarta.
Why Do
Some Muslims Radicalize?
The
underlying reasons for a Muslim to radicalize can be (a mixture of) feelings of
political exclusion, feelings that great injustice has been done towards the
Muslim community, or, feelings of western domination (which results in the
resentment of the West). In addition to that, radical feelings can be nurtured
when radical Muslims clump together and arouse each other's sentiments; either
horizontally when adults meet to ventilate their feelings of resentment (for
example about the secular central government) and watch ISIS videos, or,
vertically when children are indoctrinated in, for example, a radical Islamic
boarding school (in Indonesian: pesantren). Meanwhile, isolation from pluralist
society and from other viewpoints help to strengthen their radical sentiments
although such isolation is not always a prerequisite to nurture radical
sentiments.
According
to a survey that was conducted by the Wahid Institute and Indonesia Survey
Circle, social groups that are more susceptible to radical ideologies share
several of the following characteristics:
• Believe
in a literalist understanding of the concept of jihad as a struggle with
violence
• Justify
and show verbal support to radical groups
• Deny or
oppose the rights of citizenship of other groups that are not favored
• Are
highly exposed to religious preaching which contains suspicion and hatred
towards other religious or ethnic groups
Although no
direct correlation between radicalization and education and/or economic status
has been determined, it is true that those who have enjoyed limited education
(only primary and/or secondary school) and obtain limited monthly income are
more prone to become influenced by radical ideology.
Meanwhile,
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia conducted a
study concluding that the inability of an individual to find meaning in his/her
life and to pose reflective questions related to the meaning and purpose of
life or death, is a contributing reason for people to radicalize (this is not
confined to Islamism but to any kind of radicalization). This situation is
called the 'saturation point' where matters such as boredom (at work or in
life) trigger the individual to move towards a deeper understanding of religion
in search of a meaningful life purpose and/or identity.
What is
also mentioned by many ex-terrorists is the strong social bond in terrorist
groups. The sense that it is "them against the world" causes a deep
bond between the radicals, and therefore also attractive to join such groups
(in case the individuals have been lacking such affective ties in their lives).
Indonesia's
Radical Link to the Middle East
To
understand today's context, we need to go back into history a bit because
radical Islamic movements in Indonesia are not a new phenomenon but have been
present since the colonial era. And one very important characteristic is that
all radical Muslim movements in Indonesia - those that exist today or existed
in the past - have their roots in reform movements in the Middle East.
Wahhabism,
a very strict interpretation that aims for a return to the true nature of Islam
as it was practiced during the days of prophet Muhammad, was founded by
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Saudi Arabia in the mid-18th century. The
purification of Islam would strengthen the position of Islam vis-a-vis the
growing western powers across the world. Around 1800, Indonesian hajji's
(Muslims who have successfully completed the Hajj to Mecca) arriving back in
the archipelago after the pilgrimage, brought with them this Wahhabi ideology
and aimed for reviving Indonesian Islam. Not coincidentally Wahhabism was
spread through the Archipelago in a period when the Dutch began to expand their
political role in this area.
Another
radical movement that would gain much influence in Indonesia is the
Salafi-movement that stems from Egypt at the end of the 19th century (as a
response to Western European imperialism). Its ideology is essentially very
similar to Wahhabism, advocating a return to the traditions of the salaf (the
first three generations of Muslims, including the Islamic prophet Muhammad) in
search of the pure form of Islam.
Salafist
ideology rejects religious innovation and supports the implementation of sharia
(Islamic law). The movement is often divided into three categories: (1) purists
who avoid politics, (2) activists who get involved in politics, and (3)
jihadists who advocate armed struggle to restore the early Islamic movement.
While these jihadists actually form a minority, they are the ones that get most
attention in media.
Contact
with the Middle East was key in spreading stricter forms of Islam to Indonesia.
When the Suez Canal opened in 1869 not only did journeys to Europe quicken
significantly but contact with religious centers in the Middle East also
intensified. There was not only an increase in the number of Indonesian hajji's,
but also many more Indonesians went to study in Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Vice
versa migrants from Arabia founded Salafi-influenced organizations in the
archipelago, for example Al-Irsyad (Union for Reformation and Guidance) and
Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) in West Java, both promoting the purification
of Islam.
Today,
these links to the Middle East are still very important for contemporary
radical movements in Indonesia (which is discussed further below), both for
ideological support and in terms of funding.
Continued
Suppression in Independent Indonesia
When
Indonesia became an independent country, the nation's more conservative Muslim
groups were to become disappointed. In Soekarno's secular government there was
no room for an Islamic state. Part of the radical Indonesian Muslim community
joined the Darul Islam rebellion which aimed for the establishment of an
Islamic state in Indonesia. This movement started in the 1940s but was
eventually crushed by the Indonesian military in 1962. However, segments of the
Darul Islam went underground and would produce and inspire other radical
movements.
During
Suharto's New Order government radical Muslim voices and organizations were
pushed underground even more severely as Muslim activists and militants were
imprisoned, often without trial. They were considered a threat to Suharto's
political power. Some, such as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (leaders
of the Jema'ah Islamiyah), fled the country to seek a living in Malaysia. The
radical religious groups that stayed in Indonesia kept underground and were
mostly concentrated around the university campuses in the bigger cities.
Indonesian
Radicalism Comes to the Surface
When
President Suharto was forced to leave office in 1998, implying the start of the
Reformation period, there were suddenly no more political restrictions on the
establishment of (radical-inspired) Muslim organizations. Many Indonesian
Muslim activists were released from prison and those radicals that had fled the
country during the Suharto regime, returned home.
While at
the start the Reformation era seemed to become a promising period for these
hardliners, they would soon be disappointed, again. In Indonesia's 1999
legislative election, those Islamic political parties that aimed at turning
Indonesia into an Islamic country suffered a big defeat, only receiving a
relative small amount of the votes. Therefore, just like during the New Order
period, the Reformation period would continue to be led by a secular
government, thereby not being fertile soil for political Islam, and thus
forcing radicals to use extreme tactics to try to make a difference. This
explains why terrorist incidents peaked in the early years of Reformation.
Religious
Terrorist Incidents in the First Decade of Reformation:
Date and
Description
14
September 2000 A car bomb in the
basement of the Jakarta Stock Exchange kills in South Jakarta, kills 15 people.
Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to be behind this terrorist attack.
24 December
2000 A series of coordinated bombings
of churches in eight Indonesian cities kill 18 people. Jemaah Islamiyah is
believed to be behind this terrorist attack.
12 October
2002 Coordinated bomb attacks
occurred in the tourist district of Kuta (Bali) killing 202 people, mostly
foreign tourists. Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to be behind this terrorist
attack. The attack has become known as the deadliest act of terrorism in the
history of Indonesia.
26 April
2003 A bomb explodes at a Kentucky Fried
Chicken restaurant in Indonesia's main airport (Soekarno-Hatta International
Airport, located just outside Jakarta). Eleven people were injured. Jemaah
Islamiyah is believed to be behind this terrorist attack.
5 August
2003 A bomb detonated outside the lobby of
the JW Marriott Hotel in South Jakarta, killing twelve people. Jemaah Islamiyah
is believed to be behind this terrorist attack.
10 January
2004 A bomb in a cafe in Palopo
(Central Sulawesi) kills four people. The perpetrators are believed to have
been participants of a Laskar Jihad-run training camp in Poso (Central
Sulawesi)
9 September
2004 A car bomb exploded outside the
Australian embassy in South Jakarta, killing nine people. Jemaah Islamiyah
claimed responsibility for the attack
28 May 2005 Two bombs detonated at a market in Tentena
(Central Sulawesi), killing 22. Local Islamic militants with purported links to
Jemaah Islamiyah are believed to be behind the terrorist attack
31 December
2005 A suicide bomb and a series of car
bombs exploded in Bali (at the Jimbaran Beach Resort and in Kuta), killing 20
people. Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to be behind this terrorist attack
31 December
2005 A bomb detonated in a market in
Palu (Central Sulawesi), killing eight people. Jemaah Islamiyah is believed to
be behind this terrorist attack
17 July
2009 Suicide bombs explode at the JW
Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels in Jakarta, killing nine people. Jemaah
Islamiyah is believed to be behind this terrorist attack
Various
Sources
Some
contemporary radical and/or militant organizations that have been in the
spotlight after 1998 are the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian
Jihad Fighters), the Front Pembela Islam (Front of Islam Defenders), the Jemaah
Islamiyah (Islamic Congregation), the (already disbanded) Laskar Jihad
(Warriors of Jihad), and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD). All these organizations
share the aim for the implementation of shariah law, are anti-western, while
its members do not refrain from using violence to achieve their goals. Another
feature these radical organizations share is either the Arab background of the
founder(s) or the fact that they are inspired by radical movements in the
Middle East.
Jemaah
Islamiyah
The Jemaah
Islamiyah is behind some of the most vicious attacks in the last 20 years (as
can be seen in the table above) and they have used one key method: the bomb
attack. For example, on 24 December 2000, various bombs exploded at 11 churches
across several cities in Indonesia, killing 18 people. But most notorious is
probably the 2002 Bali bombings when two bombs exploded (almost simultaneously)
in a night club in Kuta, killing 202 people. Most of the victims were foreign
tourists.
Jemaah
Islamiyah, which has its roots in the radical Darul Islam movement, was
established by Abu Bakar Bashir, Abdullah Sungkar and Shahrul Nizam. Bashir and
Sungkar are among those radical Muslims who were imprisoned by Suharto's New
Order administration. After spending several years in prison both men moved to
Malaysia (in 1982) where they recruited people from Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, and the Philippines. Around that time the group started to name
itself Jemaah Islamiyah. After the fall of Suharto in 1998, they returned to
Indonesia where Jemaah Islamiyah would soon start to engage in terrorist
attacks. Meanwhile, through Sungkar contact with Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda
network had been established.
Islamic
State (IS) Connection
A terrorist
group that became quite well-known over the past decade due to vicious acts
(including beheadings of hostages) is the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic
State (IS). This terrorist militant group, which was founded in 1999 by
Jordanian Salafi jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, follows a fundamentalist,
Salafi jihadist doctrine of Sunni Islam, and thus promotes religious violence.
IS became world news in 2014 after it drove Iraqi government forces out of key
cities in its Western Iraq offensive, followed by its capture of Mosul, and the
Sinjar massacre. It then also proclaimed a worldwide caliphate (an Islamic
state under the leadership of an Islamic steward with the title of caliph, a
person considered a political-religious successor to the Islamic prophet
Muhammad and a leader of the entire ummah).
For several
Indonesian terrorist groups, the peak of IS' power was a source of inspiration.
In fact, some of these groups sent people to fight with IS in Syria. This
includes the Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam (Islam Sharia Activists Forum, or
FAKSI) and Jema'ah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), which is a splinter cell of the
Jemaah Islamiyah.
Also the
Tauhid Wal Jihad, an unstructured pro-IS group headed by Aman Abdurrahman, is
noteworthy. Abdurrahman was later, in 2018, sentenced to death by the South
Jakarta District Court as he was found guilty of masterminding terrorist
attacks in Indonesia, including the Thamrin (Central Jakarta) suicide bombings
and shootings in early 2016 as well as the Kampung Melayu bombing in East
Jakarta in 2017.
In 2015,
Tauhid Wal Jihad, JAT, and the Lamongan branch of the Front Pembela Islam (FPI)
merged into one terrorist group, the Jamaah Anshar Daulah (JAD) with Aman
Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as the spirituals leaders. JAD too is
affiliated with IS. JAD, which is currently one of the most active and
threatening Indonesian terrorist organizations, is not believed to be a
coherent organization. Instead, it seems to form an umbrella organization
consisting of various cells.
Abu Bakar
Ba'asyir and Aman Abdurrahman had also teamed up to organize a joint terrorist
training camp in Aceh, in 2010, amassing various local terrorist groups that
are active across the Archipelago. Densus 88 discovered this paramilitary
training camp in the jungles of Aceh where - allegedly - attacks were being
prepared against the Indonesian president, against foreigners and against other
'infidels'.
New
Phenomenon in Terrorism: the Family Suicide Attack
The JAD is
also behind a new vicious phenomenon: the family suicide attack. On 13 May
2018, a six-member family - with suicide bombs - struck nearly simultaneously
at three churches in Surabaya (East Java) when Sunday morning services were
about to start, or were ongoing. Police said this family was part of the JAD.
In fact, the father of the family, Dita Oepriarto, was named the leader of the
Surabaya branch of JAD.
That
evening, a self-made bomb went off prematurely in an apartment in Sidoarjo
(East Java). Indonesian police assumed the bomb was meant to be used in a
terrorist attack, similar to the church attacks earlier that day. And just like
the case of the church bombings, a six-member family was involved in this
premature apartment explosion.
Police see
a clear link between the Sidoarjo apartment explosion and the Surabaya church
bombings because similar types of explosives were used. Moreover, both families
knew each other as they were part of a study group that frequently met to study
the Al-Qur’an and watch IS-related movie clips (such as suicide attacks and
decapitations).
Before
Surabaya (and Indonesia) had time to recover, another explosion occurred, on 14
May 2018, at the entrance of Surabaya’s police headquarters. Two motorcycles
carrying a local family (five members) blew themselves up at the entrance. Just
like the other incidents that happened on the preceding day it was – again – a
family that performed this attack and they were also linked to the same study
group.
In the
aftermath of these attacks, Indonesia’s special counter-terrorism squad Densus
88 arrested dozens of suspected militants in East Java, including Syamsul Arif
(also known as Abu Umar) who is suspected of being the leader of JAD’s East
Java chapter. However, opinions vary whether this arrest will have a
significant impact. Considering JAD is assumed to consist of a cell system network,
it should not destabilize the JAD organization too much.
It is
important to emphasize that the family suicides in Surabaya is a new
phenomenon. In earlier terrorist attacks in Indonesia it were usually young men
who committed the crime by themselves or in small groups (but also in cases of
small groups the terrorists would blow themselves up individually or
separately; not together in pairs or in a group).
What is
behind this change of tactic? Firstly, planning and organizing attacks
internally within the family reduces chances of being caught because the more
external communication, the better chances Densus 88 has in detecting the
plots. Secondly, children are easy “soldiers” to recruit (there is ample room
for brainwashing), especially when it involves terrorists’ own children (and
some of the children involved in these attacks were indeed kept away from
schools). Considering Indonesia’s patriarchal society, children have very
limited room to rebel against the father’s wishes. Thirdly, it may require less
courage to conduct a terrorist act when it is in cooperation with your loved
ones (wife and children) than it would if the act is committed by oneself or
with radical friends. After all, in terrorists’ minds they are doing a good
deed and will meet their loved ones again in heaven.
These
Surabaya attacks could also have been motivated by the arrest and conviction of
prominent JAD members, including Abdurrahman and Zaenal Anshari (JAD’s
second-in-command and the leader of JAD's East Java chapter). Anshari was
convicted for smuggling weapons to Indonesian militants in the southern
Philippines.
Indonesian
Islamic State (IS) Fighters
In
Southeast Asia, Indonesia and Malaysia have been the main sources of foreign
fighters. It is estimated more than 700 Indonesians have traveled to Syria to
join the war and fight for IS.
In February
2020, the Indonesian government announced that it had decided not to repatriate
689 Indonesian citizens who have been stranded in Syria and Turkey (many of
whom being women and children). After Indonesian President Joko Widodo had
already ventilated his personal objection to the repatriation, his cabinet
would later also object to the repatriation (with the exception of children
aged below 10 years) as they may spread their radical ideas among the
Indonesian population. This case is particularly interesting because there a
decision needed to be made between, on the one hand, protecting citizens'
rights, and, on the other hand, protecting national security.
Indonesian
Coordinating Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Minister Mahfud MD said
returnees from Syria could pose social and security threats, specifically as
the country's existing deradicalization programs are often unsuccessful at
reintegrating former terrorists and terrorist sympathizers back into society.
Government
Efforts to Combat Radical Groups
Over the
past two decades more than 100 terror suspects have been killed and more than
1,000 have been arrested. It is among the Indonesian government's top
priorities to detect radical Islamic groups, monitor their activities, and
intervene once they cross the line in terms of terrorist activities.
Indonesia
has been working together closely with the United States and the Australian
Federal Police to catch terrorists. In 2003 a special counter-terrorism squad,
called Densus 88, was established (and is part of the Indonesian National
Police). Densus 88 is funded by the American government and is trained by the
CIA, FBI and US Secret Service. This unit has had considerable success in weakening
terrorist networks, including the Jema'ah Islamiyah. The success of Densus 88
has led a change of tactic by terrorist networks that we explain below.
First, it
is important to mention that in May 2018 - after two years of deliberation -
Indonesian parliament unanimously approved an anti-terrorism law (which revises
Indonesia's 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law). The process of approving the law was sped
up significantly after the Surabaya attacks in 2018 as no political party or
faction wanted to be seen as obstructing the process. This allowed the
legislature and the cabinet to set aside their differences and work quickly
toward a compromise.
Indonesia’s
2003 Anti-Terrorism law was regarded a weak tool in the battle against
terrorism because in essence police “had to wait for the terrorist to make
victims before they could arrest the terrorist or others that could be linked
to the perpetrator”. The new law, on the contrary, enables law enforcers to use
terrorism prevention measures.
For
example, the revised law allows law enforcers to preemptively detain suspects
for a longer period. The detention periods are lengthened up to 21 days
(without needing any charges at all) and up to 200 days (with official
charges). It also allows the prosecution of those who join - or recruit for -
militant groups. And those who import explosives or components such as
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or radioactive weapons with the
purpose to use these for terrorist activities - or make, receive or possess
them - can be charged under Article 10a of the law, which carries a maximum
sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. Furthermore, people can be charged who
mastermind terror attacks, partake in paramilitary training with the purpose of
launching terror attacks or join overseas wars related to terrorism, with
maximum terms ranging from 12 years, 15 years, 20 years to life sentence and
the death penalty.
Amnesty
International Indonesia responded to the passing of the bill as follows: “the
newly-passed law contains a number of draconian articles that threaten to
undermine human rights in Indonesia. The law erodes safeguards against
arbitrary detention and against torture and other ill-treatment, as well as
expanding the scope of the application of the death penalty. Plans to deploy
the military in counter-terrorism operations are also deeply concerning”.
Another
(controversial) point is that through the revised law the Indonesian military
is now involved in counter-terrorism activities. Previously, this was the task
of police. But as there exists rivalry in Indonesia between the police and the
army, not everyone is happy to see the army becoming involved in this field.
The passing
of the law coincides with the establishment of the Indonesian army's Joint
Special Operations Command (in Indonesian: Komando Operasi Khusus Gabungan, or
Koopsusgab), which takes charge of the military's involvement in Indonesia's
war on terror. Critics are concerned seeing an expanded role for the army in
society because of memories of the military-backed Suharto regime. In the era
of Reformation (after 1998) many successful efforts were made in order to
reduce the role of the army in Indonesian politics and society. This process is
now slightly reversed.
Recent
Developments in Indonesia's Radical Islam
The various
existing terrorist cells that exist in Indonesia today seem to operate rather
independently from each other, forming splinter groups. This is a big change
from the past; radical Muslims now prefer to operate in smaller networks
instead of bigger ones (on a national scale) as it is much more difficult for
the authorities to trace such smaller networks. Another difference with the
past is that all these terrorist cells seem to have changed tactics regarding
the target of their attacks. Previously, targets consisted mainly of western or
foreign people and symbols of the western world, such as embassies and certain
nightclubs or hotels that are frequently visited or owned by westerners. Since
2010, however, more and more attacks are directed towards symbols of the
Indonesian state, particularly Indonesian police officers (probably in reaction
to the many arrests made by Densus 88).
Recent
Religious Terrorist Incidents in Indonesia:
Date and
Description
15 April
2011 A suicide bomber detonated a bomb in
a mosque in a police compound in Cirebon (West Java) during Friday prayer. The
bomber was killed and at least 28 people were injured.
25
September 2011 A suicide bomb exploded
in a church in Solo (Central Java) killing the terrorist and injuring 14
people.
14 January
2016 At least three militants
detonated explosives in and near a Starbucks in central Jakarta. Four civilians
were killed. IS claimed responsibility.
24 May 2017 Two explosions occurred at a bus terminal in Kampung
Melayu (East Jakarta), killing 5 people, 3 policemen and 2 attackers, while
injuring 11 people. IS claimed responsibility.
25 June
2017 Two terrorists stabbed a police
officer to death at his post in Medan (North Sumatra). IS claimed
responsibility.
8-10 May
2018 Terrorist inmates in a
heavily guarded compound of the local headquarters of the Mobile Brigade Corps
(a detention center) staged a riot resulting in the death of 5 police officers
and one inmate.
13 May 2018 Three suicide bombs exploded in three churches
in Surabaya (East Java). The blasts killed all 13 of the bombers, 15 citizens
and injured 57 people. The terrorists, a family, were linked to JAD.
13 May 2018 A bomb went off prematurely in an apartment in
Sidoarjo (East Java) where a family lived that was linked to JAD. The mother
and son died by the blast, while the father was killed by police. It was
suspected the family was making suicide bombs for a future attack.
14 May 2018 A police station in Surabaya (East Java) was
attacked by a family of suicide bombers on two motorcycles. Four of the suicide
bombers were killed. The family was linked to JAD.
16 May 2018 A police station in Pekanbaru (Riau) was
attacked by five terrorists with swords, injuring two police officers. The
attack was linked to JAD.
10 October
2019 Indonesian Chief Security
Minister Wiranto was stabbed by an assailant using a sharp weapon during a
working visit to Menes (Banten). Following the incident, police arrested two
perpetrators; a married couple. The perpetrators had allegedly been exposed to
radical teachings and also an alleged Islamic State member that led them to
perform the attack. The attack was linked to JAD.
13 November
2019 Six people were injured in a
suicide bombing at Medan Police headquarters (North Sumatra), while the
perpetrator was killed in the blast. The attack was linked to JAD.
Various
sources
Original
Headline: Radical Islam in Indonesia
Source: Indonesia Investment
New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in
America, Muslim Women in
West, Islam Women and
Feminism