Deradicalisation Programs in Indonesia less Effective in Mitigating Radicalization
By
Kazi Abedur Rahman and Abdullah Alfarisi
March 4,
2021
Prisons in
Indonesia have become a recruitment platform for local terrorist networks.
According to a recent analysis by researchers from the University of Indonesia,
one member from a terrorist network like Jamaah Ansharut Daulah can recruit, on
average, four to five people during the country-run deradicalisation program.
As this policy has failed to provide any tangible results, will the Indonesian
government scrap it?
The Desistance and Disengagement Programme is aimed at all terrorism and
terrorism-related offenders released from prison or those returning from
war-zones. Economic Times
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In recent
years, several Indonesian churches have been attacked in the name of religious
fanaticism. For instance, both the culprits of a church attack in Surabaya and
an arson attack on churches in Lembantongoa were linked to Jamaah Ansharut
Daulah and the East Indonesia Mujahideen. It must be stressed that these groups
are small in number and do not have any direct connection with any major
religious organizations in Indonesia.
Those who
were involved in these terrorist attacks did not have any formal religious
education. If we examine the most recent terrorist attacks and suspects behind
those attacks, the attackers were mostly educated in non-religious
institutions. The lack of formal religious education among those who carried
out these attacks is not a coincidence. It is because of a lack of formal
religious background that these individuals were more vulnerable and became
easy prey for recruiters. Since education is a common factor behind those who
are radicalized, the government in Indonesia must bridge this gap.
There are
significant challenges in Indonesia regarding religious education. While in
other Muslim majority countries like Bangladesh, the mosques and religious
institutions that provide religious education are affiliated with religious
scholars, in Indonesia, the majority of religious institutions are divided into
two major Islamic organizations; the Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. Given
this division, it is more challenging for the Indonesian government to
cooperate with these organizations to reach the masses in terms of providing
religious education that lacks fundamentalism.
The
Surabaya church attack illustrates how the lack of formal religious education
feeds a distinct type of radicalization process. The bombing of three churches
in Surabaya was carried out not by a band of known terrorist groups, but by
three different families. Several sources mention that those families were
linked to Jamaah Ansharut Daulah and underwent a series of religious
indoctrination sessions. For instance, all three fathers of those families attended
sermons of radical religious groups where they occasionally brought their
family members. A more radicalized form of Islam was taught to those families,
in particular, their misunderstanding of what jihad means to secular and
non-radicalized Muslims.
The
Indonesian government adopted a policy to denounce jihad as part of its
counter-terrorism agenda. The government invited both of the largest groups
involved in formal religious education to get involved in countering extreme
teachings of Islam. However, many scholars raised concerns about this process
on the grounds that it contradicts fundamental religious principles. This is
the reason that Muhammadiyah refused to join the government’s deradicalisation
program. Under these fractured circumstances, radical ideologies have gained a
new pace to develop their influence among vulnerable Muslims. In the long run,
not only is the general public puzzled by these circumstances but also,
Indonesia’s counter-terrorism policies face resistance from large segments of
the population.
On the
other hand, if we examine the case of Bangladesh, after an attack on a cafe in
Dhaka, the Bangladeshi government was able to mobilize the Qawmi Ulama in its
counter-terrorism policy thereby making progress in countering the message
being put out by fundamentalists. Until 2017, educational degrees awarded by
religious institutions in the country that are affiliated with Qawmi scholars
were not recognized by the government. As a result, a considerable segment of
the population who studied in the Qawmi madrasas were excluded from Bangladesh
society and its economy. Sheikh Hasina’s government recognized this failure and
brought religious communities into the counter-terrorism discussion.
At the
beginning of 2017, the government recognized the Dawra degree of Qawmi madrasas
as equivalent to a Master’s degree. These sudden changes by the government
towards these religious educators paved the way for the government to gain
support from these religious institutions. Long before the Dhaka cafe attack,
these scholars have been vocal against the misuses of the term jihad by local
terrorist groups and publicly denounced terrorist ideologies. These continuous
efforts from the majority religious educators in the country were one of the
key factors that helped the government to gain public trust in countering
extreme beliefs.
Indonesia
faces a different set of challenges. The deradicalization programs in Indonesia
are less effective in mitigating radicalization. The program’s coverage is
limited to rehabilitation programs for terrorism suspects in prisons. Unlike in
Bangladesh, there is no preventative educational focus to prevent
radicalization in the first place. The Indonesian government has focused more
on fighting terrorism, instead of radical ideologies. What Joko Widodo’s
government failed to realize is that countering radical ideologies is also
equally important as killing a supposed terrorist.
Original
Headline: How Indonesia Failed in
Countering Religious Extremism
Source: The International Policy Digest
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