By
Shmuel Bar
June 1,
2004
While
terrorism — even in the form of suicide attacks — is not an Islamic phenomenon
by definition, it cannot be ignored that the lion’s share of terrorist acts and
the most devastating of them in recent years have been perpetrated in the name
of Islam. This fact has sparked a fundamental debate both in the West and
within the Muslim world regarding the link between these acts and the teachings
of Islam. Most Western analysts are hesitant to identify such acts with the
bona fide teachings of one of the world’s great religions and prefer to view
them as a perversion of a religion that is essentially peace-loving and tolerant.
Western leaders such as George W. Bush and Tony Blair have reiterated time and
again that the war against terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. It is a war
against evil.
The
non-Islamic etiologies of this phenomenon include political causes (the Israeli-Arab
conflict); cultural causes (rebellion against Western cultural colonialism);
and social causes (alienation, poverty). While no public figure in the West
would deny the imperative of fighting the war against terrorism, it is equally
politically correct to add the codicil that, for the war to be won, these
(justified) grievances pertaining to the root causes of terrorism should be
addressed. A sceptic may note that many societies can put claim to similar
grievances but have not given birth to religious-based ideologies that justify
no-holds-barred terrorism. Nevertheless, an interpretation which places the
blame for terrorism on religious and cultural traits runs the risk of being
branded as bigoted and Islamophobic.
The
political motivation of the leaders of Islamist jihadist-type movements is not
in doubt. A glance at the theatres where such movements flourished shows that
most fed off their political — and usually military — encounter with the West.
This was the case in India and in the Sudan in the nineteenth century and in
Egypt and Palestine in the twentieth. The moral justification and levers of
power for these movements, however, were for the most part not couched in
political terms, but based on Islamic religious sources of authority and religious
principles. By using these levers and appealing to deeply ingrained religious
beliefs, the radical leaders succeed in motivating the Islamist terrorist,
creating for him a social environment that provides approbation and a religious
environment that provides moral and legal sanction for his actions. The success
of radical Islamic organizations in the recruitment, posting, and ideological
maintenance of sleeper activists (the 9-11 terrorists are a prime example)
without their defecting or succumbing to the lure of Western civilization
proves the deep ideological nature of the phenomenon.
Therefore,
to treat Islamic terrorism as the consequence of political and socioeconomic
factors alone would not do justice to the significance of the religious culture
in which this phenomenon is rooted and nurtured. In order to comprehend the
motivation for these acts and to draw up an effective strategy for a war
against terrorism, it is necessary to understand the religious-ideological
factors — which are deeply embedded in Islam.
The
Weltanschauung Of Radical Islam
Modern
international Islamist terrorism is a natural offshoot of twentieth-century
Islamic fundamentalism. The “Islamic Movement” emerged in the Arab world and
British-ruled India as a response to the dismal state of Muslim society in
those countries: social injustice, rejection of traditional mores, acceptance
of foreign domination and culture. It perceives the malaise of modern Muslim
societies as having strayed from the “straight path” (as-sirat al-mustaqim) and
the solution to all ills in a return to the original mores of Islam. The
problems addressed may be social or political: inequality, corruption, and
oppression. But in traditional Islam — and certainly in the worldview of the
Islamic fundamentalist — there is no separation between the political and the
religious. Islam is, in essence, both religion and regime (din wa-dawla) and no
area of human activity is outside its remit. Be the nature of the problem as it
may, “Islam is the solution.”
The
underlying element in the radical Islamist worldview is ahistoric and
dichotomist: Perfection lies in the ways of the Prophet and the events of his
time; therefore, religious innovations, philosophical relativism, and
intellectual or political pluralism are anathema. In such a worldview, there
can exist only two camps — Dar al-Islam (“The House of Islam” — i.e., the
Muslim countries) and Dar al-Harb (“The House of War” — i.e., countries ruled
by any regime but Islam) — which are pitted against each other until the final
victory of Islam. These concepts are carried to their extreme conclusion by the
radicals; however, they have deep roots in mainstream Islam.
While the
trigger for “Islamic awakening” was frequently the meeting with the West,
Islamic-motivated rebellions against colonial powers rarely involved
individuals from other Muslim countries or broke out of the confines of the
territories over which they were fighting. Until the 1980s, most fundamentalist
movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan Muslimun) were inward-looking;
Western superiority was viewed as the result of Muslims having forsaken the
teachings of the Prophet. Therefore, the remedy was, first, “re-Islamization”
of Muslim society and restoration of an Islamic government, based on Islamic law
(shari’ah). In this context, jihad was aimed mainly against “apostate” Muslim
governments and societies, while the historic offensive jihad of the Muslim
world against the infidels was put in abeyance (at least until the restoration
of the caliphate).
Until the
1980s, attempts to mobilize Muslims all over the world for a jihad in one area
of the world (Palestine, Kashmir) were unsuccessful. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan was a watershed event, as it revived the concept of participation
in jihad to evict an “infidel” occupier from a Muslim country as a “personal
duty” (fard ’ein) for every capable Muslim. The basis of this duty derives from
the “irreversibility” of Islamic identity both for individual Muslims (thus,
capital punishment for “apostates” — e.g., Salman Rushdie) and for Muslim
territories. Therefore, any land (Afghanistan, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya,
Spain) that had once been under the sway of Islamic law may not revert to
control by any other law. In such a case, it becomes the “personal duty” of all
Muslims in the land to fight a jihad to liberate it.
If they do
not succeed, it becomes incumbent on any Muslim in a certain perimeter from
that land to join the jihad and so forth. Accordingly, given the number of
Muslim lands under “infidel occupation” and the length of time of those
occupations, it is argued that it has become a personal duty for all Muslims to
join the jihad. This duty — if taken seriously — is no less a religious
imperative than the other five pillars of Islam (the statement of belief or
shahadah, prayer, fasting, charity, and haj). It becomes a de facto (and in the
eyes of some a de jure) sixth pillar; a Muslim who does not perform it will
inherit hell.
Such a
philosophy attributing centrality to the duty of jihad is not an innovation of
modern radical Islam. The seventh-century Kharijite sect, infamous in Islamic
history as a cause of Muslim civil war, took this position and implemented it.
But the Kharijite doctrine was rejected as a heresy by medieval Islam. The
novelty is the tacit acceptance by mainstream Islam of the basic building
blocks of this “neo-Kharijite” school.
The Soviet
defeat in Afghanistan and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union were
perceived as an eschatological sign, adumbrating the renewal of the jihad
against the infidel world at large and the apocalyptical war between Islam and
heresy which will result in the rule of Islam in the world. Along with the
renewal of the jihad, the Islamist Weltanschauung, which emerged from the
Afghani crucible, developed a Thanatophile ideology
in which
death is idealized as a desired goal and not a necessary evil in war.
An offshoot
of this philosophy poses a dilemma for theories of deterrence. The Islamic
traditions of war allow the Muslim forces to retreat if their numerical
strength is less than half that of the enemy. Other traditions go further and
allow retreat only in the face of a tenfold superiority of the enemy. The
reasoning is that the act of jihad is, by definition, an act of faith in Allah.
By fighting a weaker or equal enemy, the Muslim is relying on his own strength
and not on Allah; by entering the fray against all odds, the mujahed is proving
his utter faith in Allah and will be rewarded accordingly.
The
politics of Islamist radicalism has also bred a mentality of bello ergo sum (I
fight, therefore I exist) — Islamic leaders are in constant need of popular
jihads to boost their leadership status. Nothing succeeds like success: The
attacks in the United States gave birth to a second wave of mujahidin who want
to emulate their heroes. The perception of resolve on the part of the West is a
critical factor in shaping the mood of the Muslim population toward radical
ideas. Therefore, the manner by which the United States deals with the present
crisis in Iraq is not unconnected to the future of the radical Islamic
movement. In these circles, the American occupation of Iraq is likened to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; a sense of American failure would feed the
apocalyptical ideology of jihad.
The
Legality of Jihad
These
beliefs are commonly viewed as typical of radical Islamic ideology, but few
orthodox Islamic scholars would deny that they are deeply rooted in orthodox
Islam or would dismiss the very ideology of jihad as a military struggle as
foreign to the basic tenets of Islam.
Hence, much
of the debate between radicals and nonradicals is not over the religious
principles themselves, but over their implication for actual behavior as based
on the detailed legal interpretation of those principles. This legal
interpretation is the soul of the debate. Even among moderate Islamic scholars
who condemn acts of terrorism (albeit with reservation so as not to include
acts perpetrated against Israel in such a category), there is no agreement on
why they should be condemned: Many modernists acknowledge the existence of a
duty of jihad in Islam but call for an “Islamic Protestantism” that would
divest Islam of vestiges of anachronistic beliefs; conservative moderates find
in traditional Islamic jurisprudence (shari’ah) legal justification to put the
imperative of jihad in abeyance; others use linguistic analysis to point out
that the etymology of the word jihad (jahada) actually means “to strive,” does
not mean “holy war,” and does not necessarily have a military connotation.
The
legalistic approach is not a barren preoccupation of scholars. The ideal
Islamic regime is a nomocracy: The law is given and immutable, and it remains
for the leaders of the ummah (the Islamic nation) to apply it on a day-to-day
basis. Islam is not indifferent to any facet of human behavior; all possible
acts potentially have a religious standing, ranging between “duty” (Fard,
Pl. Fara’id); “recommended” (mandub); “optional” (jaiz); “permitted”
(mubah); “reprehensible” (makruh); and “forbidden” (haram). This taxonomy of
human behavior has far-reaching importance for the believer: By performing all
his religious duties, he will inherit paradise; by failing to do so (“sins of
omission”) or doing that which is forbidden (“sins of commission”), he will be
condemned to hell. Therefore, such issues as the legitimacy of jihad —
ostensibly deriving from the roots of Islam — cannot be decided by abstract
morality
or by
politics, but by meticulous legal analysis and ruling (fatwa) according to the shari’ah,
performed by an authoritative Islamic scholar (’alem, pl. ’ulama).
The use of
fatwas to call for violent action first became known in the West as a result of
Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie, and again after Osama bin
Laden’s 1998 fatwa against the United States and Israel. But as a genuine
instrument of religious deliberation, it has not received the attention it
deserves. Analysts have frequently interpreted fatwas as no more than the
cynical use of religious terminology in political propaganda. This
interpretation does not do justice to the painstaking process of legal
reasoning invested in these documents and the importance that their authors and
their target audience genuinely accord to the religious truthfulness of their
rulings.
The
political strength of these fatwas has been time-tested in Muslim political
society by rebels and insurgents from the Arabian Peninsula to Sudan, India,
and Indonesia. At the same time, they have been used by Muslim regimes to
bolster their Islamic credentials against external and domestic enemies and to
legitimize their policies. This was done by the Sudanese mahdi in his rebellion
against the British (1881-85); by the Ottoman caliphate (December 1914) in
World War i; by the Syrian regime against the rebellion in northern Syria
(1981); and, mutatis mutandis, by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to legitimize
his peace policies toward Israel.
The fatwas
promulgated by sheikhs and ’ulama who stipulate that jihad is a “personal duty”
play, therefore, a pivotal role in encouraging radicalism and in building the
support infrastructure for radicals within the traditional Islamic community.
While one may find many fatwas, which advocate various manifestations of
terrorism, fatwas which rule that those who perform these acts do not go to
paradise but inherit hell are few and far between.
The
Questions Relating to Jihad Which Are Referred to The Religious Scholars
Relate
to A Number of Issues:
The very
definition, current existence, and area of application of the state of jihad.
Is jihad one of the “pillars” (arkan) or “roots” (usul) of Islam? Does it
necessarily imply military war, or can it be perceived as a duty to spread
Islam through preaching or even the moral struggle between one’s soul and
Satan?
If the
former, then what are the necessary conditions for jihad? Does a state of jihad
currently exist between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb? And how can one define
Dar al-Islam today, in the absence of a caliphate? Is the rest of the world
automatically defined as Dar al-Harb with which a state of jihad exists, or do
the treaties and diplomatic relations which exist between Muslim countries and
“infidel” countries (including the charter of the United Nations) change this?
Who must
participate in jihad, and how? Is jihad a personal duty (Fard ’Ein) for
each and every Muslim under all circumstances or a collective duty (Fard
Kiffaya) that can be performed only under the leadership of a leader of all
Muslims (Imam, Khalifa, Amir Al-Mu’aminin)? Is it incumbent on women? On
minors? (According to Islamic law, in the case of a defensive jihad for the
liberation of Islamic territory from infidel occupation, “a woman need not ask
permission of her husband nor a child of his parents nor a slave of his
master.”) May a Muslim refrain from supporting his attacked brethren or obey a
non-Muslim secular law which prohibits him from supporting other Muslims in
their struggle?
How should
the jihad be fought (jus in bellum)? The questions in this area relate, inter
alia, to: (a) Is jihad by definition an act of conflict against the actual
“infidels” or can it be defined as a spiritual struggle against the “evil
inclination”? If it is the former, must it take the form of war (jihad fi-sabil
Allah) or can it be performed by way of preaching and proselytization
(da’awah)? (b) Who is a legitimate target? Is it permissible to kill
non-combatant civilians — women, children, elderly, and clerics; “protected”
non-Muslims in Muslim countries — local non-Muslims or tourists whose visas may
be interpreted as Islamic guarantees of passage (aman); Muslim bystanders? (c)
The legitimacy of suicide attacks (Istishhad) as a form of jihad in the light
of the severe prohibition on a Muslim taking his own life, on one hand, and the
promise of rewards in the afterlife for the shahid who falls in a jihad on the
other hand.
(d) The
weapons which may be used. For example, may a hijacked plane be used as a
weapon as in the attacks of September 11 in the light of Islamic prohibitions
on killing prisoners? (e) The status of a Muslim who aids the “infidels”
against other Muslims. (f) The authority to implement capital punishment in the
absence of a caliph.
How should
jihad be funded? “Pocketbook jihad” is deeply entrenched in Islamic tradition.
It is based on the injunction that one must fight jihad with his soul or with
his tongue (jihad al-lissan or da’awah) or with his money (jihad fi-mal).
Therefore, financial support of jihad is politically correct and even good for
business for the wealthy supporter. The transfer of zakat (almsgiving) raised
in a community for jihad fi-sabil Allah (i.e., jihad on Allah’s path or
military jihad) has wide religious and social legitimacy.
The
precepts of “war booty” (ghaneema or fay’) call for a fifth (khoms) to be
rendered to the mujahidin. Acts that would otherwise be considered religiously
prohibited are thus legitimized by the payment of such a “tax” for the sake of
jihad. While there have been attempts to bring Muslim clerics to denounce acts
of terrorism, none, to date, have condemned the donation of money for jihad.
The
Dilemma Of The Moderate Muslim
It can be
safely assumed that the great majority of Muslims in the world have no desire
to join a jihad or to politicize their religion. However, it is also true that
insofar as religious establishments in most of the Arabian Peninsula, in Iran,
and in much of Egypt and North Africa are concerned, the radical ideology does
not represent a marginal and extremist perversion of Islam but rather a genuine
and increasingly mainstream interpretation. Even after 9-11, the sermons
broadcast from Mecca cannot be easily distinguished from those of al Qaeda.
Facing the
radical Weltanschauung, the moderate but orthodox Muslim has to grapple with
two main dilemmas: the difficulty of refuting the legal-religious arguments of
the radical interpretation and the aversion to — or even prohibition of —
inciting an Islamic Kulturkampf which would split the ranks of the ummah.
The first
dilemma is not uniquely Islamic. It is characteristic of revelation-based
religions that the less observant or less orthodox will hesitate to challenge
fundamental dogmas out of fear of being branded slack or lapsed in their faith.
They will prefer to pay their dues to the religious establishment, hoping that
by doing so they are also buying their own freedom from coercion. On a deeper
level, many believers who are not strict in observance may see their own
lifestyle as a matter of convenience and not principle, while the extreme
orthodox is the true believer to whom they defer.
This
phenomenon is compounded in Islam by the fact that “Arab” Sunni Islam never
went through a reform.
Since the
tenth century, Islam has lacked an accepted mechanism for relegating a tenet or
text to ideological obsolescence. Until that time, such a mechanism — ijtihad —
existed; ijtihad is the authorization of scholars to reach conclusions not only
from existing interpretations and legal precedents, but from their own perusal
of the texts. In the tenth century, the “gates of ijtihad” were closed for most
of the Sunni world. It is still practiced in Shiite Islam and in Southeast
Asia. Reformist traditions did appear in non-Arab Middle Eastern Muslim
societies (Turkey, Iran) and in Southeast Asian Islam. Many Sufi (mystical)
schools also have traditions of syncretism, reformism, and moderation. These
traditions, however, have always suffered from a lack of wide legitimacy due to
their non-Arab origins and have never been able to offer themselves as an
acceptable alternative to ideologies born in the heartland of Islam and
expressed in the tongue of the Prophet. In recent years, these societies have
undergone a transformation and have adopted much of the Middle Eastern brand of
Islamic orthodoxy and have become, therefore, more susceptible to radical
ideologies under the influence of Wahhabi missionaries, Iranian export of
Islam, and the cross-pollination resulting from the globalization of ideas in
the information age.
The second
dilemma — the disinclination of moderates to confront the radicals — has
frequently been attributed to violent intimidation (which, no doubt, exists),
but it has an additional religious dimension. While the radicals are not averse
to branding their adversaries as apostates, orthodox and moderate Muslims
rarely resort to this weapon. Such an act (takfir — accusing another Muslim of
heresy [kufr] by falsifying the roots of Islam, allowing that which is
prohibited or forbidding that which is allowed) is not to be taken lightly; it
contradicts the deep-rooted value that Islam places on unity among the
believers and its aversion to Fitna (communal discord). It is ironic that a
religious mechanism which seems to have been created as a tool to preserve
pluralism and prevent internal debates from deteriorating into civil war and
mutual accusations of heresy (as occurred in Christian Europe) has become a
tool in the hands of the radicals to drown out any criticism of them.
Consequently,
even when pressure is put on Muslim communities, there exists a political
asymmetry in favor of the radicals. Moderates are reluctant to come forward and
to risk being accused of apostasy. For this very reason, many Muslim regimes in
the Middle East and Asia are reluctant to crack down on the religious aspects
of radical Islam and satisfy themselves with dealing with the political
violence alone. By way of appeasement politics, they trade tolerance of jihad
elsewhere for local calm. Thus, they lose ground to radicals in their
societies.
The
Western Dilemma
It is a
tendency in politically oriented Western society to assume that there is a
rational pragmatic cause for acts of terrorism and that if the political
grievance is addressed properly, the phenomenon will fade. However, when the
roots are not political, it is naïve to expect political gestures to change the
hearts of radicals. Attempts to deal with the terrorist threat as if it were
divorced from its intellectual, cultural, and religious fountainheads are
doomed to failure. Counterterrorism begins on the religious-ideological level
and must adopt appropriate methods. The cultural and religious sources of
radical Islamic ideology must be addressed in order to develop a long-range
strategy for coping with the terrorist threat to which they give birth.
However, in
addressing this phenomenon, the West is at a severe disadvantage. Western
concepts of civil rights along with legal, political, and cultural constraints
preclude government intervention in the internal matters of organized
religions; they make it difficult to prohibit or punish inflammatory sermons of
imams in mosques (as Muslim regimes used to do on a regular basis) or to punish
clerics for fatwas justifying terrorism. Furthermore, the legacy of colonialism
deters Western governments from taking steps that may be construed as
anti-Muslim or as signs of lingering colonialist ideology. This exposes the
Western country combating the terrorist threat to criticism from within. Even
most of the new and stringent terrorism prevention legislation that has been
enacted in some counties leans mainly on investigatory powers (such as allowing
for unlimited administrative arrests, etc.) and does not deal with prohibition
of religion-based “ideological crimes” (as opposed to anti-Nazi and anti-racism
laws, which are in force in many countries in Europe).
The regimes
of the Middle East have proven their mettle in coercing religious
establishments and even radical sheikhs to rule in a way commensurate with
their interests. However, most of them show no inclination to join a global
(i.e., “infidel”) war against radical Islamic ideology. Hence, the prospect of
enlisting Middle Eastern allies in the struggle against Islamic radicalism is
bleak. Under these conditions, it will be difficult to curb the conversion of
young Muslims in the West to the ideas of radicalism emanating from the safe
houses of the Middle East. Even those who are not in direct contact with Middle
Eastern sources of inspiration may absorb the ideology second-hand through
interaction of Muslims from various origins in schools and on the internet.
Fighting
Hellfire with Hellfire
Taking into
account the above, is it possible — within the bounds of Western democratic
values — to implement a comprehensive strategy to combat Islamic terrorism at
its ideological roots? First, such a strategy must be based on an acceptance of
the fact that for the first time since the Crusades, Western civilization finds
itself involved in a religious war; the conflict has been defined by the
attacking side as such with the eschatological goal of the destruction of
Western civilization. The goal of the West cannot be defense alone or military
offense or democratization of the Middle East as a panacea. It must include a
religious-ideological dimension: active pressure for religious reform in the
Muslim world and pressure on the orthodox Islamic establishment in the West and
the Middle East not only to disengage itself clearly from any justification of
violence, but also to pit itself against the radical camp in a clear
demarcation of boundaries.
Such
disengagement cannot be accomplished by Western-style declarations of
condemnation. It must include clear and binding legal rulings by religious
authorities which contradict the axioms of the radical worldview and virtually
“excommunicate” the radicals. In essence, the radical narrative, which promises
paradise to those who perpetrate acts of terrorism, must be met by an equally
legitimate religious force which guarantees hellfire for the same acts. Some
elements of such rulings should be, inter alia:
• A call
for renewal of ijtihad as the basis to reform Islamic dogmas and to relegate
old dogmas to historic contexts.
• That
there exists no state of jihad between Islam and the rest of the world (hence,
jihad is not a personal duty).
• That the
violation of the physical safety of a non-Muslim in a Muslim country is
prohibited (haram).
• That
suicide bombings are clear acts of suicide, and therefore, their perpetrators
are condemned to eternal hellfire.
• That
moral or financial support of acts of terrorism is also haram.
• That a
legal ruling claiming jihad is a duty derived from the roots of Islam is a
falsification of the roots of Islam, and therefore, those who make such
statements have performed acts of heresy.
Only by
setting up a clear demarcation between orthodox and radical Islam can the
radical elements be exorcized. The priority of solidarity within the Islamic
world plays into the hands of the radicals. Only an Islamic Kulturkampf can
redraw the boundaries between radical and moderate in favour of the latter.
Such a struggle must be based on an in-depth understanding of the religious
sources for justification of Islamist terrorism and a plan for the creation of
a legitimate moderate counterbalance to the radical narrative in Islam. Such an
alternative narrative should have a sound base in Islamic teachings, and its
proponents should be Islamic scholars and leaders with wide legitimacy and
accepted credentials.
The
“Middle-Easternization” Of Asian Muslim Communities Should Also Be Checked.
A strategy
to cope with radical Islamic ideology cannot take shape without a
reinterpretation of Western concepts of the boundaries of the freedoms of
religion and speech, definitions of religious incitement, and criminal culpability
of religious leaders for the acts of their flock as a result of their spiritual
influence. Such a reinterpretation impinges on basic principles of Western
civilization and law. Under the circumstances, it is the lesser evil.
“If the
disbelievers occupy a territory belonging to the Muslims, it is incumbent upon
the Muslims to drive them out, and to restore the land back to themselves;
Spain had been a Muslim territory for more than eight hundred years, before it
was captured by the Christians. They [i.e., the Christians] literally, and
practically wiped out the whole Muslim population. And now, it is our duty to
restore Muslim rule to this land of ours. The whole of India, including
Kashmir, Hyderabad, Assam, Nepal, Burma, Behar, and Junagadh was once a Muslim
territory. But we lost this vast territory, and it fell into the hands of the
disbelievers simply because we abandoned Jihad. And Palestine, as is
well-known, is currently under the occupation of the Jews. Even our First
Qibla, Bait-ul-Muqaddas is under their illegal possession.” — Jihaad
ul-Kuffaari wal-Munaafiqeen.
This is
characterized by the emphasis on verses in the Koran and stories extolling
martyrdom (“Why do you cling to this world when the next world is better?”) and
praising the virtues of paradise as a real and even sensual existence.
This is a
rather specious argument. In all occurrences of the concept in traditional
Islamic texts — and more significantly in the accepted meaning for the great
majority of modern Muslims — the term means a divinely ordained war.
A
frequently quoted verse “proving” the inadequacy of human conscience in regard
to matters of jihad is Koran 2:216: “Fighting is ordered for you even though
you dislike it and it may be that you dislike a thing that is good for you and
like a thing that is bad for you. Allah knows but you do not know.”
The
following list of questions has been gleaned from a large corpus of fatwas
collected by the author over recent years. The fatwas represent the questions
of lay Muslims and responses of scholars from different countries. Some of the
fatwas were written and published in mosques, others in the open press, and
others in dedicated sites on the internet.
This claim,
a favorite of modernists and moderates, comes from a unique and unconfirmed
hadith which states: “The Prophet returned from one of his battles, and
thereupon told us, ‘You have arrived with an excellent arrival, you have come
from the Lesser Jihad to the Greater Jihad — the striving of a servant [of
Allah] against his desires.’’
Some
Islamic judicial schools add to the Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Harb dichotomy a third
category: Dar al-’Ahad, countries which have peace treaties with Muslims and
therefore are not to be attacked. The basis for discerning whether or not a
country belongs to Dar al-Islam is not agreed upon. Some scholars claim that as
long as a Muslim can practice his faith openly, the country is not Dar al-Harb.
It should
be noted that in the historic paradigms of “suicide” terror, which are used as
authority for justification of such attacks, the martyr did not kill himself
but rather placed himself in a situation in which he would most likely be
killed. Technically, therefore, he did not violate the Koranic prohibition on a
Muslim taking his own life. The targets of the suicide terrorist of ancient
times were also quite different — officials of the ruling class and armed
(Muslim) enemies. The modern paradigm of suicide bombing called for renewed
consideration of this aspect.
The
prominent fundamentalist Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, for example, gave a fatwa
obliging Muslims to fund jihad out of money collected for charity (zakat).
(Fatwa from April 11, 2002 in Islamonline.)
True,
religions are naturally conservative and slow to change. Religious reforms are
born and legitimized through the authority of a supreme spiritual leader (a
pope or imam), an accepted mechanism of scholarly consensus (Talmud, the ijma’
of the schools of jurisprudence in early Islam), internal revolution
(Protestantism), or external force (the destruction of the Second Temple in
Judaism). Islam canonized itself in the tenth century and therefore did not go
through any of these “reforms.”
Here the
pessimist may inject that, today, all the leading Islamic scholars in the
Middle East who enjoy such prestige are in the radical camp. But there have
been cases of “repentant” radicals (in Egypt) who have retracted (albeit in
jail and after due “convincing”) their declarations of takfir against the
regime. In Indonesia, the moderate Nahdlatul Ulama led by former President
Abdurahman Wahid represents a genuine version of moderate Islam.
Original
Headline: The Religious Sources of
Islamic Terrorism
Source: The Hoover Institution
URl: https://newageislam.com/radical-islamism-jihad/a-moderate,-western-view-ideological/d/122667