By Aijaz Hajini
28 Sep 2013
In June 2011, President Obama announced his plan to begin the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. After that, President Obama declared “our troops will continue to coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead and our mission will change from combat to support.
By 2014, this process of transition will be complete, and the Afghan people will be responsible for their own security.” As their mission in Afghanistan will end by 2014, only that it will cease to be a "combat" mission and become a "support" mission, but it has been also expressed that they will leave till the end of 2014 and the security of the region will be left on its fate whatever is on the tinder box it will be the concern of the people of Afghanistan and none else. As per the past experiences of the region are concern there is the fear of spreading the tribal wars which were existent before the establishment of Taliban and the US will use its covert operation to left the region divided in an environment of civil war the best example of which is the Iraq but if Taliban succeed in having a grip over the region it will cost many neighboring countries who were attempting with west to contain the elements of Islamic Radicalism.
Also the Indian government which is the ally of US against the war on terror and at present is helping the American backed Karzai regime to consolidate its roots to which Indian Special Forces are training the Afghani government militia and also providing them with weaponry will cost India in the in the long run because the resurgence of Islamic radicalism which according to many will not bode well for many neighboring countries of Afghanistan among which the India will be a prime target because of above stated argument and of being a persecutor of their brethren in Kashmir valley, though ideological exigencies are the for most priorities for the survival of any insurgent group and Afghanistan Taliban is not having the ideology to invade foreign countries as is of al-Qaeda but it can also be said that contrary to their ideology during the 1990 they infiltrated fighters in Kashmir to clash with Indian forces till America invaded the Afghanistan and they become concerned about their own security, but their fate is leading them two decades back as after defeating the world’s most sophisticated armed forces Talibans moral is reviving more so every day and in the near future they can reestablish their Islamic regime which will not bode well for the Indian security apparatus in Jammu and Kashmir as expressed by Indian intelligence agencies.
Ever since the Kashmiri insurgency began in mid-1988 -89, it has been variously described by outside observers as an Islamic insurgency, an instance of Islamic militancy or more recently as a manifestation of Islamic jihad. One justification offered for such characterizations is that the insurgent’s ―themselves defined their project in this fashion. While self-descriptions of their struggle by reference to Islam or Muslim identity might be true even of insurgent groups like the JKLF, even though it aims to establish a secular state, the failure to contextualize the reasons for the use of these idioms and instead reduce them to a caricatured understanding of jihad is unsatisfactory. Rather than enabling any understanding of the nature of the long-lasting popularly backed resistance in Kashmir, it produces hackneyed accusations of the illegitimacy of protest.
This is particularly true in the increasingly securitized climate of the post 9/11 world, when such labels as ― jihad or ― according to west Islamic terrorism have become readily available to discredit rather than comprehend all manner of struggles being waged by Muslims, such as the Kashmiris ‘struggle.
Such perspectives discount the particular processes through which politics and religion became intertwined within a Kashmiri discourse of struggle. Whatever will be the accusation on but one must be clear about the concern of relating the popular backed resistance of armed struggle by local militants with the growing frustration borne out of force, intimidation and bullying tactics and to which they got support from outside militant outfits and intelligence agencies. Also the success of Afghan jihad against the Soviet empire inspired the Kashmiri youth to take arms and training across the border and at present the reeling trend of suicide bombings would also act as an inspiration for militants of Kashmir to create maximum causalities on the opposite side.
The withdrawal of international militias from the war torn soil of Afghanistan have been viewed by the pundits of security on south Asian region that after a decade long battle with the faraway enemy their (Talibans) next mission will be to infiltrate necessarily their volunteers if not altogether to add-on the already existent armed struggle in the Indian occupied Kashmir in order to combat with Indian forces. As infiltration attempts and ceasefire violations along the LOC/international border with Pakistan register a spurt, the Indian security agencies are worried that Pakistan's ISI may now try to increasingly push battle-hardened Afghan Taliban into Jammu & Kashmir. The trend is expected to grow further by the next year.
It has been revealed that the staunch anti-India elements within the ISI are supposedly keen to open fronts on both the western and eastern borders of Pakistan. In recent past, the Indian consulate at Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan was attacked, though there they did not suffer any casualties but the real worry is that ISI and insurgent groups may have begun to divert Taliban fighters to stoke the militancy fires in Jammu and Kashmir.
Agencies here fear that unlike Kashmiri rebels who join militancy soon after training in insurgent camps across a POK and lack the commitment and conditioning to sustain the fight against the Indian security forces both on the border and in the J&K hinterland, the Afghan fighters are more committed and battle-trained. “The purpose behind sending these "professional fighters" is to ensure better success rates of infiltration attempts and use them to trigger a direct confrontation with the Indian security forces deployed in Jammu & Kashmir”. With pro-active operations lately on the slow-burner, the civilian casualties have been minimal and “by engaging the forces, these war-ready Taliban elements aim to provoke the security forces into intensifying active operations which could lead to a rise in collateral damage and civilian casualties, and revive the popular angst against the Indian security establishment," an intelligence official pointed out.
Unlike the Kashmiri militants, the Afghan element can sustain themselves for much longer. The security establishment fears that Pakistani elements may try to push in more militants into J&K over the next couple of months, before infiltration routes get inaccessible due to snow. The aim is to send enough jihadis to ensure an eventful summer next year, said intelligence sources.
The meeting of the Premiers of two countries in the US will yield no fruits unless they indulge seriously in addressing the issue of Kashmir or Kashmiri and not of the bus, trade and train, also it will be the only way-out to deal with the danger of not only of Talibanisation of Kashmir conflict but it can wipe out the conflict altogether for which no bomb or bullet is needed and the lives of all the pro-Indian Pro-Kashmiri and Pro-Pakistani could be protected otherwise if the basic and fundamental issue remains unaddressed and the innocent valite remained in the ongoing state trauma and trouble then it would be same to remaining in the fool’s paradise to think of establishing peace out of purposeless meetings and the day is not far when the world’s foremost nuclear flashpoint will be near to Armageddon and no other but the stake holders will lost their existence in the rubble which are the inevitable fruits of coercion, discrimination and exploitation.
Aijaz Hajini is a research scholar at the department of political science R D University Jabalpur (India).