By New Age Islam Edit
Desk
28 November
2020
•
Rumours Of Recognising Israel Keep Recurring
By Asad Rahim Khan
• Safeguarding The Witness
By Jawaid Akhtar
• Negotiating The Afghan Constitution
By Raja Hamza Anwar
• Pakistan Democratic Movement Examined
By Shakeel Ahmed Shah
• Pakistan Democratic Movement May Head Towards
Breakdown
By Mohsin Hassan
• The Eastern Question - Part II
By Fahd Humayun
• Elections In Myanmar
By Khalid Bhatti
-----
Rumours Of Recognising Israel Keep Recurring
By Asad Rahim Khan
28 Nov 2020
“I WAS
standing and he came in a group and shook hands with me,” remembered Gen Pervez
Musharraf. “…He asked me how I was, I asked him how he was. That’s very good.”
The script
wasn’t quite Nixon in China, but we take what we can get. In the fall of 2005,
Pakistan’s generalissimo went to New York and shook hands with Israel’s Ariel
Sharon — soldier, statesman and blood-sodden war criminal.
The romance
may even have taken off but for the general’s dwindling capital. Over the next
three years, Musharraf would drive Balochistan to disaster, persecute judges,
ramp up missing persons, and escort Asif Zardari out of prison and into the
presidency.
Mr Sharon,
for his part, sank into a coma, the kind of end he had never afforded the women
and children his militias had hacked to death in Sabra and Shatila, their
bodies arranged in garbage piles. The Musharraf-Sharon meeting proved little
more than a sly handshake, if between two of America’s most beloved dependents.
Yet here we
are again: every 20 years or so, the deepest parts of our deep state call for
fresh thinking. True believers take up the cause of the state of Israel — if
‘state’ can be taken to mean the world’s most ferocious apartheid project.
While every green passport dubs Israel the forbidden land, rumours of
recognising it recur.
Rumours of
recognising Israel keep recurring.
“There is
pressure,” the prime minister told an interviewer some two weeks ago, “because
Israel has a large impact on America,” but that he’d never recognise it (the
source of the said pressure was left unsaid). There then followed a series of
trial balloons, almost exclusively by pro-establishment voices, urging
recognition.
Their
reasons remain hollow. First, there’s the loopy notion, advanced more by
Orientalist romantics than scholars at home, that Pakistan and Israel are
long-lost twins: promised lands built on religion and threatened by enemies.
They
aren’t. Pakistan was a mass movement for the subcontinent’s Muslims to breathe
free, and it became the world’s largest Muslim-majority state at birth.
“Pakistan was of course nothing like Israel in this particular respect,” wrote
historian David Gilmartin, “for the areas that became Pakistan were already
occupied by tens of millions of the Muslims in whose name the state was
created.” Zafrullah Khan, the Quaid’s foreign minister, opposed Palestine’s
partition for the same reasons at the UN.
By
contrast, Israel was the result of a settler militia driving out 700,000
Palestinians from their homes, and cleansing many more from the adjoining areas
— Mr Sharon participated by lobbing grenades and getting shot in the groin and
stomach. The cry of ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’ is a
Zionist fairytale; just as calling Pakistan a ‘Muslim Zion’ is, in the words of
Mr Gilmartin, an act of historical erasure.
Next comes
that saying as old as death: ‘nations have no permanent enemies, only
interests’. Our sages wrongly credit this to Henry Kissinger, a man whose
brilliant realism enabled death squads in Chile and rivers of napalm in Vietnam
(the quote is actually from the long-forgotten Lord Palmerston). But even
leaving aside how perverse the Kissinger school has been, it may be best to
examine what interests stand to benefit and where.
Some
suggest greater closeness to Washington, though this has been a placebo at the
best of times. Others point to the UAE and Bahrain’s push for recognition,
driven in part by the Arab states’ opposition to Iran. But Pakistan has nothing
to gain and everything to lose from siding with either Riyadh or Tehran:
Islamabad shares strategic ties with one country, and a massive land border
with the other. Winking at Israel would upset Iran, to no great gratitude from
the Gulf.
Finally,
recognition would tear Pakistan’s single-most salient cause to pieces: the
right to self-determination for the Kashmiri people. Not for nothing are Modi’s
crimes in India-held Kashmir most likened to a West Bank formula, in tribute to
Israel dropping white phosphorous on screaming civilians. If Hindutva was
directly inspired by the Nazi dream, Israel has proven its most ironic mirror.
In sum,
Pakistan will win no new friends, risk losing the ones it already has, enrage
its people, condemn the Palestinians to oblivion, and cede the Kashmiris to
their occupiers, all to recognise a settler colony that only ever expressed
interest in bombing Kahuta in 1984. Until the emergence of a viable Palestinian
state — loath to happen anyway under Netanyahu’s coalition of maniacs —
Pakistan has no business weeping for Zion.
As is so
often the answer, it would be best to return to the ideals of Mr Jinnah
instead. It was soon after Israel’s declaration of independence that its
founder, David Ben-Gurion, reportedly fired off a telegram to establish
diplomatic relations with Pakistan. The Quaid didn’t reply; nor did he have to.
Mr Jinnah
knew the difference between oppressed and oppressor.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1592819/weeping-for-zion
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Safeguarding The Witness
By Jawaid Akhtar
28 Nov 2020
THERE is
frequent reference to and comment on witness protection, or more accurately the
lack thereof, but one is often left wondering whether the issue is properly
understood in the first place. In an editorial published on Nov 20, this paper
has rightly highlighted the need for witnesses to be protected in order for
justice to be better served.
It is a
truism that the criminal justice system needs the participation of witnesses
for justice to be administered. Witnesses must feel secure and confident in
order to give the best evidence. Sadly, while it is true for other
jurisdictions also, the prevalence of witness intimidation, coercion and murder
in Pakistan is at a level where the criminal justice system cannot function
effectively. When witnesses are murdered within court precincts, even in
courtrooms as in one recent case, it is time to worry.
Solutions
proffered are churned out — new identity, relocation, etc — as though they
provide a magic solution, with little thought being given to practicalities,
financial and human resources, not to mention the impact on the protected
witnesses and their families. In Pakistani culture, where the concept of family
goes well beyond the immediate family, the problems are multiplied many times.
Imagine the implications of relocating a family far from their home without the
proper support, financial or practical, that serves not only their daily
requirements but also their emotional and psychological needs.
Something
is seriously wrong when channels broadcast footage shot in police lock-ups and
give details of victims.
So if that
is the problem, what is the solution? It is neither simple nor cheap, is the
answer.
Many
law-enforcement agencies around the world recognise that there is a serious
threat to the security of their information, and this, as much as anything
else, can compromise the safety of victims and witnesses. This threat is not
always external — arguably the internal threat is much more serious. For
example, it is quite common to note both in print and electronic media the details
of victims, witnesses and even informants — with a total disregard not only for
due process and legal proceedings but also the safety of the witnesses
involved. One has to ask how the media acquired that information, and even more
importantly, why and how the law-enforcement agency revealed that information.
One knows there is something seriously wrong when television channels are
broadcasting footage shot in police lock-ups and giving details of victims,
including in sexual offence cases.
Rather than
thinking in terms of witness-protection programmes involving new identities and
relocation (which may be necessary in some cases) it is more beneficial to
think in terms of witness safeguarding which would include witness protection.
All elements of the criminal justice system must identify the points of
vulnerability for the witness as they make their journey through the process
from the start of the investigation to the post-conviction period. This then
allows witness needs to be identified, which in turn are required to be
addressed by the most relevant agency.
Whilst
there is existing legislation that is specifically designed for the protection
of witnesses, the reality is it is not much more than a paper law whose
implementation is virtually non-existent due to lack of budgetary provisions,
operational procedures and training.
Some basics
security measures can be implemented at little cost and they may suffice in
most cases. This can include basic security advice and some target hardening of
the witnesses’ places of business and residences. However, even before these
measures are considered, there is a need to identify what other measures can be
taken by the criminal justice system to safeguard witnesses. For example,
giving evidence from behind screens or via video link, thus not revealing the
identity of the witness, are measures that can help to mitigate risks. If the
legislation does not provide for these measures, then the legislature needs to
take urgent action.
So, what if
that isn’t enough? The more complex, resource-intensive measures necessary in
the more serious cases where the threat cannot be mitigated by the foregoing
measures also need to be available. However, these measures require a national
agency to take ownership, supported by the relevant legislation and appropriate
budgetary provisions, to coordinate the work of local witness-protection units.
None of this will be of any use if the security measures in place are not
sufficiently robust to safeguard the information. If agencies are not seen to
be capable of keeping secure the personal information of victims and witnesses
(or worse still, are unable to do so due to corrupt practices) then no
witness-protection programme can succeed.
Of course,
for any such scheme to work the witness has to agree to participate and enter
into a contract with the responsible agency. For their part the agencies
involved — from law enforcement to the prosecutors to the judiciary — have to
play their part and be open and honest with the witness as to what is
available, achievable and in what circumstances. False or misleading promises will
benefit no one and only serve to discredit the agencies and endanger lives.
In order to
address the issues highlighted it is suggested that the following actions be
taken:
— Develop a
national witness-safeguarding strategy, which includes a specific witness-protection
scheme.
— Develop
an operational framework and policy guidance that meets the strategic aims of
the witness-safeguarding strategy.
— Legislate
as necessary to meet the aims of the witness-safeguarding strategy and support
the associated policy guidance.
— Make
reasonable budgetary provisions to implement the witness-safeguarding strategy.
There is
plenty of good practice on how this can be achieved but it is not simple or
cheap. But then neither is life.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1592816/safeguarding-the-witness
-----
Negotiating The Afghan Constitution
By Raja Hamza Anwar
November
28, 2020
The recent
diplomatic exchanges between Pakistan, Taliban and the Afghan government have
marked a savoury start right from Abdullah Abdullah’s visit to Pakistan this
year that was followed by Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Afghanistan. The
United States on the other hand is in a haste to put a lid on the simmering
squabble they have connived to create. Until now, America has bypassed the
Afghan government in the brokering of a peace agreement by unilaterally
initiating negotiations with the Taliban. America’s handling of the
negotiations serves to exude a strong sense of dominance that the Taliban have
at the negotiating table, due to their unmatched appetite for violence.
The
inevitable scenario would be a constitutional arrangement where the Taliban’s
idea of an ultra-conservative national identity is likely to be imposed on all
Afghan stakeholders. In such a constitutional set-up, the rights of the
minorities to freely profess their faith as well as women to have the basic
right to education or, at the least, the freedom to move without being
accompanied by a male family member, may not be embraced by the Taliban.
In the
Afghan context, constitution-making will be a particularly sensitive issue as
debates and negotiations will be heavily polarised and torn between ideological
lines. No constitution is a self-executory instrument and it depends on the
people for its enforcement. Therefore, the development of consensus is a
pre-requisite of constitution-making, as it represents being legitimated by the
people. With a lack of shared values that would naturally play a cohesive role
in the constitutional dialogue in Afghanistan, the initiation of any intra-peace
dialogue can potentially conflagrate the differences that would risk turning
constitutional debates into battle zones. Then, instead of fostering compromise
between the government and the Taliban, the constitution-making will become a
source of exacerbating tensions which, in Afghanistan’s scenario, would skid
the state back into violence.
To avoid
the Talibanisation of the negotiation process, Afghan constitution makers
should avoid making decisions about certain fundamental rights and values at this
critical juncture. Deliberate omission and avoiding reaching a conclusive
judgment regarding contentious issues will avoid the possibility of an overt
conflict. Postponing controversial decisions in Afghanistan’s context, such as
determining the rights of minorities and women at the start of the
constitution-making process, would create an environment for continuous
political interactions between the Taliban and the government that may
eventually mature into the dispensation of these rights.
Proponents
of the neo-liberal idea would certainly be exasperated by this incremental
process for tightening the noose around fundamental rights that have become the
hallmark of progressiveness. On the contrary, incremental constitutional
development rests on the evolution of societal norms and values that will
eventually force political actors to recognise these rights through the
political process. Thus, it paves a smooth way for state institutions to
operate without having to destroy the entire edifice on which the system of
peace and cooperation is built.
The
American experience is a testament to the success of incremental development of
rights and values. During the American constitution-making phase, there was an
intense debate over the rights of the American citizens to legally own and
trade slaves. The significance of this issue was such that, had the framers
abolished slave trade during the negotiation process, they would have failed to
negotiate the US Constitution as it stands now. Instead, the framers agreed to
defer the question of slave trade till the year 1808 so the people of that era
would deliberate on the provision of slave trade. Coming to the present, not
only does the American Constitution not bear the scars of its illiberal past.
By contrast, it has taken over the role as the flag bearer of freedom and
equality throughout the world.
Decades of
turmoil that have wreaked havoc on the people of Afghanistan have also engulfed
the entire region into conflict. For an enduring Afghan peace settlement, it is
imperative to maximise on the commonalities instead of conflagrating the issues
that may potentially rupture the peace process. As Americans withdraw and the
Taliban gain an edge in the negotiations, the Afghan government must adhere to
the process of incremental development instead of ramming the Taliban with
recognising liberal and progressive rights. It is a unique irony that the use
of the proverbial haste makes waste candidly applies to the Afghan intra-peace
dialogue. Though the diplomatic prelude between Pakistan, Taliban and the
Afghan government sounds like an optimistic chapter yet, exorbitant compromises
will have to be made for any party to go home victorious.
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2273831/negotiating-the-afghan-constitution
------
Pakistan Democratic Movement Examined
By Shakeel Ahmed Shah
November
28, 2020
Ross
Douthat, while analysing the political history of alliances in the 20th
century, observed that there are “plenty of examples from twentieth-century
history where, out of fear of liberalism or Communism, religious conservatives
made alliances with secular populists and nationalists, and it ended going
pretty badly for everybody.” Not sure if it is the fear of liberalism or
Communism but a number of conspicuous and non-conspicuous fears have tied the
liberals, nationalists and conservatives together in the shape of the 11-party
alliance called Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM).
But who
fears what? It is difficult to establish but easy to guess. A common conjecture
made by those who disagree with the PDM is that the major comprising parties
fear accountability which has and is likely to expose more of their corruption
scandals. But meanwhile the PDM has an important agenda of reforming the
accountability process and making it more effective. Who knows what it actually
means.
A
meticulous observation of the resolutions and narratives coming out of the PDM
and its leadership indicates some disconnect. On one side Maulana Fazlur Rahman
is keen about ousting the incumbent government — he resonated this narrative
during and after September’s multi-party conference hosted by the PPP. On the
other hand, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi was reported saying that Nawaz Sharif’s
objective is to “change the system and not the removal of the present government”.
Apart from
these gaps in the narratives, intentions and objectives, elections in
Gilgit-Baltistan played a very crucial role to determine the strength of the
alliance. Not all PDM parties participated in the election but those leading
the PDM were definitely active in G-B. Out of the major PDM parties, the PML-N,
PPP and JUI-F participated in the electoral process by fielding their
candidates in various constituencies.
Had there
been a true alliance, they would have bargained on seats by fielding and supporting
common candidates in different constituencies, but this did not happen. Instead
each party supported its own candidate in each constituency resulting in the
loss of many votes. For example, in GBLA-II, two of the strongest candidates
were from PPP and PML-N running against each other. This did nothing but divide
their vote bank. By joining hands in G-B, the PDM could have proved its
strength by forming a PDM-led government in the region, but it didn’t. It
relied on conventional political slogans and moves, including the allegation of
rigging and mass protests, and Gilgit saw violence recently.
The
scenario of G-B speaks loudly that the member parties of PDM want to play as a
team, but wish to be recognised individually as well. This attitude is lethal,
particularly for alliances which are formed by parties with ideological
differences.
The
opposition parties in Pakistan are older than the governing party. It is the
time that being more politically sound, these parties show political sanity. It
is known to all these parties and politicians that their role is to serve as an
alternative for the discontented voters and not just wait for another election
to set their emblem on the ballot paper.
Rather than
engaging in politically misaligned ventures, opposition parties should focus on
public demands and devise more non-aggressive political ways to translate
public interests and demands into policy. Yes, there are those in the
opposition who already do their best, but for some, PDM is just a shield to
hide their own political incapacity.
In sum, PDM
can become a strong opposition force but only if its course is corrected.
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2273829/pdm-examined
-----
Pakistan Democratic Movement May Head Towards
Breakdown
By Mohsin Hassan
November 27,
2020
Is PDM
heading towards breakdown? A detailed and critical analysis of the sessions,
meetings and rallies by the opposition parities’ leaders of the newly formed
Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) leads to the conclusion that the alliance
negated its core agenda adopted at the very outset of it launch or adopted
during their own terms of government or share in it. The creation of National
Accountability Bureau (NAB), the charges against Asif Ali Zardari and blames on
each other are a few examples.
Further
dents are visibly appearing as PTM’s Mohsin Dawar has announced that he is not
affiliated with the PDM, because he has continuously been ignored. Whereas Gen
(retd) Abdul Baldir and former Chief Minister of Balochistan Sanaullah Zehri
have already left the alliance. It is now clear that the PML-N leadership,
despite an opportunity arising out of the sad demise of the Nawaz Sharif’s
mother, is not returning to Pakistan; this has caused a major psychological and
moral dent to the PML-N Quaid in particular and the PDM in general. “Nothing
can be more sacred and important for a man than his parents”, they observe, but
by not accompanying with her body, he has almost alienated himself from
political arena of future.
Likewise,
Bilawal Bhutto has contracted coronavirus, right at a time when his sister was
going to wed and he has just come back from a busy election campaign in
Gilgit-Baltistan. The fact that the PDM had defied all requests and SOPs to
save the leaders and their followers from the deadly demon, which has now
resulted in many contracting Covid-19 positive. This has left a resentful mark
in the eyes of general public.
Fazlur
Rehman of JUI, Zardari of PPP, Maryam Nawaz of PML-N, Asfandyar of ANP, Mehmood
Achakzai of PKMAP and six other opposition parties forming the PDM are the most
seasoned and experienced politicians of our country. But, together they have
made a serious political blunder by continuing adamantly holding public
gatherings at the cost of lives of the general public amid the vast and wide
spread of deadly coronavirus. This is something which they shouldn’t have
insisted upon only in defiance of the government. Somebody in the PDM should
have told them that coronavirus is neither political nor does relate to PTI. It
is threat to everybody’s life. It attacks lethally at gatherings and inflicts
heavy casualties like it did in Italy and Iran. Same has happened with Bilawal
Bhutto, and one wishes that he may recover soon, come healthy and sound.
The second
wave of coronavirus is spreading at intense pace due to which more than 50
deaths are being recorded daily, averagely. It may take more than six months to
receive the vaccine and only solution left is the safety measures which the PDM
is adamantly ignoring. Yes, they may not accept it because it’s against their
political ego, but they must kindly understand that the common sense directly
relates to the lives of innocent people. Their gathering in large numbers, at
your call, for your vested interests, will put their life at risk of death as
the resurge of coronavirus is already playing havoc due to mishandlings by the
government. This is like going insane to fulfilling venomous objectives.
Playing with people’s life is a deliberate attempt to obliterate masses – for
the sake of no return. If PDM continues to doing so, and the cases of
coronavirus contract increase manifold, the public sentiment will vote against
them, which will obviously be a political death of PDM.
This
‘happy’ marriage of convenience by opposition’s political parties finds it
difficult to proceed further under Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose agenda is to
talk against the state institutions only. All the political parties are losing
their vote banks due to the statements of Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who is said to
have close relations with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Moreover, the
opposition parties have accepted Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s leadership for a
political convenience, they are cashing in on Fazlur Rehman’s grievances as
well sentiments against the government. Fazlur Rehman also knows it – so there
stays lack of trust in between everyone. Maulana Fazlur Rehman may have a
political clout because of his acumen in the affairs, but he has not a
leadership quality as such. The leaders of Nawaz Sharif team and Zardari-led
PPP understand this fact but they might be using him as the PDM head for their
own political convenience.
On the
other hand, however, a foreign news service, which has a record of accurate,
impartial, independent journalism, has in its one of the articles on Maulana
Fazl-led PDM surprisingly given a view that seems contrary to its tradition;
there are so many factual mistakes and outright misstatements. While writing
about the arrest of NS’s son-in-law the article forgets to mention that he did
violate law by disrespecting the Quaid’s mausoleum. It also deplores
‘censorship’ on Mohsin Dawar’s speeches, but misses that the PML-N had itself
not invited him to the rally, while Fazlur Rehman stops him from attending PDM
meetings. Regarding banning NS’s speeches live, why not the same can be
questioned about Trump’s allegations, which Twitter and TV have stopped to cover
live? Why should there be double standards when the content of NS’ allegations
against 2018 elections is almost the same as Trump’s? On NS disqualification,
the article obfuscates the context; he was disqualified by a 5-member bench of
the apex court in July 2017, a year before the elections, in Panama leaks case
and he was convicted in graft cases involving his London flats.
Whatever
the fate may be of the PDM, it is yet to be seen but it is in the interest of
general public that the opposition parties must stop holding rallies and public
gatherings in order to save lives of their leaders and followers. The
opposition parties are really pulling crowd but at the risk of their lives. If
one man catches the coronavirus from a public gathering, imagine he will spread
it not only in his family or office or mosque, but everywhere, multiplying the
coronavirus positive cases. If this continues, the people would reject PDM and
the opposition may head towards an obvious breakdown.
https://dailytimes.com.pk/694343/pdm-may-head-towards-breakdown/
------
The Eastern Question - Part II
By Fahd Humayun
November
28, 2020
Will peace
with India ever be possible? Before the ascent of Narendra Modi, there were
certainly a greater number of optimists in Pakistan who believed that not only
was peace between the two countries possible, but that it was in Pakistan’s
long-term interests to have better relations with its eastern neighbour.
Almost
seven years on, the relationship between the two countries is perhaps the worst
it has been at least descriptively speaking since the dark events of 1971. This
is because even in moments of acute crisis since, there had always existed,
normatively at least, an elite-understanding that total rupture was
diplomatically and militarily cost-prohibitive. But notably, and for reasons
and events undeniably linked to the BJP’s populist resurgence after the
Manmohan Singh era, today both India and Pakistan find themselves at a point
where that consensus no longer holds.
This raises
a number of important legacy questions around the attempts made by Islamabad’s
leaders this last decade in reaching out to New Delhi and trying to move the
relationship forward. Were they wrong in trying to appease a regime whose
considered opinion was to revise its territorial boundaries? Should Pakistan
not have extended as many olive branches as they did, often at political cost
to the figures extending them?
These are
incredibly difficult questions to answer, in part because for one they
presuppose the amount of agency Pakistan had in dealing with a post-26/11 India
that was transforming in ways we perhaps didn’t fully understand. These
questions also discount a chronology of events – such as the eruption of
widespread anti-India sentiment in the Valley in 2016, and the arrest of
Kulbhushan Jadhav that same year that came pass not due to Pakistan’s attempts
to build equity with the BJP, but despite them. But setting these problems
aside for a moment, it may be slightly unfair to suggest that even if our
leaders could go back in time, they ought to have behaved differently.
For one,
the sowing of the seeds of the BJP’s maximalist intentions South Asia predates
the events of the past 20 years. Two, for a country that has cyclically
experienced democracy and dictatorship, one thing that Pakistan has done rather
well is maintain some semblance of mainstream political consensus on the
overarching tone and tenor of our relationship with India. This is of course a
byproduct of the fact that foreign policy with India has always been heavily
securitized and that, barring the Musharraf dictatorship, policy formulation on
India has necessitated buy-in from political stakeholders, both democratic and
institutional, before being implemented.
The
greatest domestic friction to occur over India since 2008 was arguably during
PM Nawaz Sharif’s third premiership when, by initially retaining key security
portfolios (foreign affairs and defence) the then-prime minister fueled a
widely held belief that the Sharifs were placing a premium on individualizing
and privatizing diplomacy with India, rather than resorting to an
institutionalized search for pathways forward. The Sharif-Jindal episode that
led to a ruckus in parliament added to an unfortunate impression that Nawaz
Sharif was a lone ranger on a mission to improve relations with India.
The reason
this was unfortunate was because it was simply not true. Until August 5, 2019,
there was actually fairly little disagreement in any center in Pakistan on the
importance of turning a page and starting afresh, should India reciprocate. And
for all the apparent dysfunction in civil-military relations between 2013 and
2018, even the military it seemed was invested in a regional future embedded in
trade, regional stability and dialogue. And so when disagreement did surface
over Mian Sahib’s going out on a limb on India, the nature of the disagreement
by and large tended to be procedural rather than substantive: detractors took
issue with pace, timing and sequencing, as opposed to the logic of outreach
itself. Let it be remembered that while the BJP’s sweeping victory in 2014 was
symbolic, so was the unanimity of support in Islamabad for Sharif’s decision to
attend his counterpart’s swearing-in.
That said,
there is also an argument to be made that after 2014, as India steadily became
more and more self-assured and imbibed in its regional demagoguery, Pakistan
should have become less and less sanguine about the possibility of a viable
peace between the two countries. When it came to power six years ago, the BJP had
already signaled in its manifesto the intention to unilaterally revoke the
special status of Jammu & Kashmir.
The party’s
anti-Muslim bonafides were hardly new. Within months of its ascent, Modi and
Doval began endorsing an incremental increase in the number of violations along
both the Line of Control and Working Boundary resulting in the loss of civilian
lives. By the time Pathankot and then Uri rolled around, followed by India’s
systematic downgrading of relations and cancellation of talks, the absence of
any institutional desire in New Delhi to improve ties had been made amply
clear.
What then
does this say about first PM Sharif, and later Prime Minister Imran Khan, who
both risked strategic space for diminishing returns by reaching out to India?
Here the answer is simple, and should go to both leaders’ credit as statesmen
looking to build bridges. They overestimated India’s own rationality and the
desire of India’s new ruling elite to work towards a better collective future
for South Asia. And they underestimated the appetite India’s new rulers had for
a relationship characterised by structural incompatibility.
These
conclusions are important because there is a lot for Pakistan’s present leaders
and political classes to learn, especially folks prone to reflexively
politicising memory of the last decade of Indo-Pak relations, and associated
outreach to India, for domestic gain. There are also lessons here on how
Pakistan can and should talk about India on the international stage – that is,
if India has reaffirmed its own strategic pre-eminence as Pakistan’s principal
external threat, there should be no ambiguity in who bears responsibility for
making that choice.
Concluded
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/750239-the-eastern-question-part-ii
-----
Elections in Myanmar
By Khalid Bhatti
November
28, 2020
Myanmar’s
parliamentary elections took place on November 8, but Rohingya Muslims and some
other ethnic groups were not allowed to participate in them. This was the first
election after the genocide of the Rohingya in the Rakhine state in 2017.
It was the
second election since the power-sharing agreement between the military junta
and the National League for Democracy. As expected, the NLD won with a
landslide and the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
suffered a humiliating defeat.
According
to the results announced by Myanmar Union Election Commission, the NLD led by
Aung San Suu Kyi won 396 seats to form government for a second term. The party
increased its majority in both houses of parliament. The NLD had won the
previous elections and formed government after signing a power-sharing deal
with the military junta.
The
military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party, the main opposition
party, won 26 seats, and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy,
representing the ethnic Shan minority, won 15 seats. The Shan, whose homeland
is in eastern Myanmar, are the country's largest ethnic minority. The USDP has
called the election unfair and refused to accept the election results, but the
election commission has rejected its claim as well as its demand for a fresh
vote.
Having the
majority control of parliament does not give the NLD full control of
government, though. The army-drafted constitution of 2008 grants the military
25 percent of the total seats, enough to block constitutional changes. Several
key ministerial positions are also reserved for military appointees.
The
civilian led Union Election Commission cited the dangers of the ongoing combat
between government forces and ethnic minority guerrillas, but independent
journalists and human rights groups believe that the decision to cancel
elections in certain areas was political and seems to be to keep parties
hostile to the current government out of parliament.
One of the
guerrilla groups, the Arakan Army, has said that it will extend a unilateral
ceasefire to December 31 to allow by-elections to be held in areas of Rakhine
province where voting had been cancelled.
This
election once again shows that, despite problems of consolidating power and
solving long-standing issues of the economy and ethnic nationalist conflicts in
the last five years, the support base of Suu Kyi and the NLD is still
widespread and strong.
Despite
their tarnished image, Suu Kyi and the NLD are the only ones with grassroots
outreach across Myanmar. The NLD played a leading role against the military
junta and for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. Thousands of NLD workers
and leaders were put in prison and thousands forced into exile.
People still
relate to it as a historic opposition, as a bulwark against military rule.
Despite the failures of the peace process and the rising anger towards the
party in some ethnic minority regions, it has been able to maintain its support
base not only in the Buddhist population but also in some other regions.
The NLD and
Suu Kyi’s government came under severe criticism after failing to protect the
Rohingya from a genocide in which state forces and extremist Buddhist groups
were involved. Aung San even failed to condemn the genocide in clear terms.
It will be
interesting to see how the NLD uses its increased majority in parliament to
assert itself. The party will potentially have the opportunity to follow
through on promised reforms that would reduce the power of the military junta.
So, a major power struggle seems to be on the cards. This struggle between a
more confident NLD and the powerful military junta will determine the future
course of Myanmar. This struggle will decide whether democracy will flourish or
the military will continue to call shots under the power-sharing agreement.
Myanmar suffered nearly 50 years of isolation and decay under a strict military
rule, and Aung San Suu Kyi herself spent many years under house arrest before
the generals began to loosen their hold on power and the first elections were
held in 2011.
This time,
though, the ballot was seen as a referendum on Aung San Suu Kyi’s government,
which maintained its popularity at home even as the Rohingya crisis damaged its
international reputation. Polling was cancelled in conflict areas within the
country, affecting some 1.5 million people.
International
and domestic observers said the vote went smoothly and without major
irregularities, but there has been criticism of the commission’s lack of
transparency and its cancellation of the polls across many ethnic minority
areas, which sparked more outrage in already restive areas.
There is
some relief among a few ethnic minority communities after the crushing defeat
of the Union Solidarity and Development Party -- the military’s political proxy
which openly promotes Islamophobia, xenophobia, and racism against the Rohingya
community.
There is
systemic denial of basic human rights and citizenship for the Rohingya as a
Myanmar-based national community with its own linguistic and ethnic identity. A
Los Angeles Times’s editorial dated November 14 correctly pointed out that,
“nothing has tarnished Suu Kyi’s international reputation and disillusioned her
admirers more than her refusal to protect Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims, one of
the most oppressed populations in the world. Sadly, many human rights activists
who once revered her now believe she is a Myanmar Buddhist who simply does not
recognize the rights of the Rohingya to be full citizens.”
The hybrid
regime in Myanmar has shown no sign of reversing its genocidal policies towards
this protected group. One Myanmar journalist Ben Dunant brilliantly described
the situation in Myanmar in a national daily: “Journalists and activists who
dare to criticize a popular government have reported regular abuse from
outraged members of the public, and demonstrations in favour of press freedom
have not attracted more than a few dozen participants. The outcome of the
election suggests there is little electoral cost to the government [in] putting
its critics in jail because few voters have sympathy for them. It exposes the
vast gulf that exists between human rights discourse and popular sentiment.”
This
election has shown that the majority of the Burmese electorate did not seem to
be overly concerned about the fact that the Union Election Commission
established by Suu Kyi’s puppet-president Win Myint canceled elections, either
wholly or partially, in over 50 predominantly minority townships and villages,
on grounds of security.
https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/750237-elections-in-myanmar
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