By New Age Islam Edit Desk
27 December 2024
Pillars of Türkiye’s Syria policy
Syria's Future: Lessons to learn from Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon
What next for Lebanon?
Palestinian Antisemitism Is Now Spreading Across The US
The Syrian Refugees In A Post-Assad Era
------
Pillars Of Türkiye’s Syria Policy
By Murat Yeşiltaş
Dec 27, 2024
Türkiye is preparing for a paradigmatic shift in its Syria policy after the collapse of the Bashar Assad regime. Before Dec. 8, Türkiye’s approach to Syria centred on the fight against terrorism and the refugee problem. Preserving Syria's territorial integrity through normalization with the Assad regime, weakening the PKK's Syrian wing YPG, facilitating the return of refugees to Syria and a political solution within the framework of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 were the main pillars of Ankara’s Syria policy. In addition, while adjusting its Syria policy with Russia and Iran within the framework of the Astana format, it was also seeking to solve the YPG problem with the U.S.
However, after the fall of the Assad regime on Dec. 8, Türkiye revised its policy in Syria and created a new strategic framework in line with the realities of the new era. While President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s administration had a compartmentalized approach to Syria before Assad, it is now building a holistic Syria strategy. The main goal of Ankara’s holistic Syria strategy is to stabilize all of Syria.
Türkiye’s strategic advantages
Türkiye sees post-Assad Syria as an opportunity for regional stabilization. Caution, balance and a pragmatic approach are the key elements shaping Ankara’s new Syria strategy.
Many opportunities can be seen as Türkiye’s strategic advantages in Syria in the new era. First and foremost, among these is the fall of the Assad regime. Türkiye does not have to continue with a strategy that must take into account Assad and the Baath regime to stabilize Syria. This allows Türkiye to develop a more flexible approach and creates a ground where it can directly contribute to Syria’s political future. On the other hand, Ankara has long been working in coordination with opposition forces on maintaining the de-escalation environment in Syria, preventing the Assad regime's attacks on Idlib, operating local governance mechanisms in Idlib, limiting the movement of refugees and fighting against radical terrorist elements. This allows Ankara to exert a certain influence on Syria in the transitional period.
In the new Syria, Iran’s distancing from the Syrian stage also stands out as one of Ankara’s important advantages. Iran no longer maintains militias in Syria and lacks political and ideological influence over the Damascus government. Therefore, Iran does not have the power it once had at the new Syrian table. A similar situation seems to apply to Russia. Russia’s priority is the ongoing war in Ukraine, which forces Moscow to shift its attention from Syria to Ukraine.
The current strategic landscape is also one of Türkiye’s strategic advantages. Between 2016 and 2020, Türkiye had to develop its policy in a highly competitive security environment due to Syria and was engaged in fierce competition with its regional rivals. After 2020, Ankara, which had been at odds with Arab countries holding direct and indirect interests in Syria, eased its foreign policy tensions by dismantling the anti-Türkiye bloc through a strategy of regional normalization.
Türkiye’s critical role in post-Assad Syria unfolds in a new strategic environment where the Iranian axis is weakening and the Turkish-Arab alliance is strengthening. This gives Türkiye an advantage in stabilizing Syria, where it can count on the support of Arab countries and work in coordination with them.
Trump’s likely Syria policy and strong signals to cut ties with the PKK/YPG are also among Türkiye’s most important advantages. The possibility of a coordinated and planned U.S. withdrawal from Syria in coordination with Ankara and Damascus allows Türkiye to approach the YPG problem from a Damascus-centered perspective. The new relationship model between Türkiye and Europe, based on new dynamics, also provides an opportunity for Ankara to use international diplomacy more flexibly during Syria's transition period.
New paradigm, new tools
In reshaping its Syria policy, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's administration has built a proactive policy. One of the most important pillars of the proactive policy is the establishment of centralized authority to ensure security and stability. For this reason, Türkiye is working closely with the new Damascus administration to build an inclusive government, guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms, secure religious and ethnic minorities, fight against all terrorist elements and create a facilitative ground for refugees to return to Syria.
The second pillar of Ankara’s strategic priorities is building a united Syria. To achieve this goal, Ankara argues that a territorially unified Syria, whose borders are protected by a single authority, is the only solution. To this end, Ankara supports the formation of a unified Syrian army, consolidating security and defense under a single command, and establishing a democratic system where political sovereignty resides with a central government. This goal has emerged as a red line for the new Damascus administration and enjoys strong support from Ankara.
The third pillar of Türkiye’s proactive policy is effective regional diplomacy. Ankara is working in close coordination with all Arab countries to reconstruct the political, economic and security of the new Syria. Developing bilateral and multilateral diplomacy models for this purpose, Ankara acts together for Syria's territorial integrity and stability with Arab countries that have direct and indirect interests in Syria. Ankara has been in intensive diplomatic contact with the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Organization and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to urge them to support the new government in Damascus.
Activating multilateral international diplomacy to refocus the international community on Syria is also an important pillar of Ankara’s Syria policy. Although Security Council Resolution 2254 is one of the main sources of reference, Ankara argues that it should be adapted to the new field conditions. In this sense, 2254 is seen as a document that sheds light on the transition process and the roadmap for Syria’s reconstruction. At the same time, Ankara calls on the international community to engage diplomatically with the new Damascus administration and to lift the U.N. embargo on Syria.
Threat of PKK/YPG
Türkiye recognizes the need to manage geopolitical balances in the emerging Syria by adopting a balanced and pragmatic approach. Fully aware of the risks, Ankara is prioritizing its foreign policy efforts in Syria in the coming months to mitigate the challenges.
Foremost among these risks is the potential for armed conflict stemming from disagreements within and between military factions. Therefore, achieving de-conflict between military factions is among Türkiye’s top priorities. Although Ankara sees the YPG issue as an important security threat, it believes that this issue is the responsibility of the new Damascus administration in the post-Assad period. Indeed, the new Damascus administration calls on all armed groups to lay down their arms and contribute as political actors in the transition period.
The meaning of this is quite clear for the YPG: In the new Syria, the YPG no longer has the tools it had before. It lacks the demographic weight to control northeastern Syria, it lacks sufficient military power, and it is powerless against the Arabs who want to hold the new Syria together. More importantly, the Trump administration realizes that the new Damascus government will continue the fight against Daesh unabated and wants to withdraw from Syria. However, this does not mean that the YPG problem will be solved quickly. For this reason, Ankara is closely monitoring Syria's internal dynamics, the potential stances of regional countries and the positions of international actors regarding the YPG issue.
Threat of Israel
One of the most critical issues in Syria is Israel’s policy over the Golan Heights. Israel considers it a strategic victory to weaken Iran in Syria. It will shape its strategy in the new period according to the goal of consolidating this strategic success and will try to legitimize its policy by securitizing Iran.
The new Damascus administration, Türkiye and the Arab countries want Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights occupied after Dec. 8. Therefore, Ankara must work closely with Arab countries by directing regional diplomacy towards the goal of preserving Syria’s territorial integrity. The new Damascus administration’s declaration that Syria will not pose a threat to neighboring countries, that it will protect border security, and that there will be no attacks from Syria against neighboring countries is expected to cause Israel to change its policy.
Nevertheless, if Israel continues with its aggressive security policy, Türkiye and Israel may come face to face in Syria. This poses the risk of a new, unprecedented conflict and increases the likelihood that Syria will once again descend into internal conflict. To prevent the Iran-Türkiye rivalry in Syria from turning into a Türkiye-Israel rivalry, Israel’s adoption of a position that supports rather than destabilizes stability in Syria could positively affect Ankara-Israel relations in the new period.
Ankara recognizes that Iran’s influence in Syria has diminished but views Tehran’s diplomatic support as valuable in shaping a new Syria. However, this approach does not imply that Iran will retain the same level of influence as it did in the past. Meanwhile, Russia continues to be an important actor for Ankara.
The new Syria has emerged as one of Ankara’s most pressing foreign policy priorities. Thirteen years of experience and lessons learned underscore the need for a pragmatic approach. Recent diplomatic efforts have demonstrated that Ankara has embraced this pragmatism.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/pillars-of-turkiyes-syria-policy
----
Syria's Future: Lessons To Learn From Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon
By Muhittin Ataman
Dec 26, 2024
The collapse of the 61-year-long Baath regime initiated a new political process for the Syrian state. The Syrian opposition led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) overthrew Bashar Assad's regime on Dec. 8 when they took control of the capital city of Damascus. The opposition took over the administration from the Assad-era prime minister. There are many discussions going on about the future of the state. At the same time, some claim that the despotic regime is over and a bright future awaits the Syrian people. Some others have concerns about the future of the state since there are different parameters that can change the course of the developments. Many observers expect difficulties and challenges for Syria, mainly based on previous examples such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. Therefore, we have to ask the question, “What awaits Syria in the future?” and answer it by briefly explaining the possibility of several scenarios.
What happened in Afghanistan?
We may compare Syria with the case of Afghanistan. After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, different resistance groups began to fight with one another. The state structure failed and eventually, the Taliban took control of the country in the mid-1990s. The 20 years of U.S. invasion followed that. After that 20-year interval, the Taliban came to power for the second time in 2021 after the withdrawal of the American troops from the country.
The developments of the last two weeks in Syria show us that the opposition groups will not repeat the mistakes made in Afghanistan. The new Syrian government has agreed with other opposition factions to dissolve them all and merge them under the Defense Ministry. The government officials have stated that military officers who defected from the Assad regime’s army will also be able to join the new ministry. The government is careful to avoid clashes with other armed groups. Furthermore, the new Syrian government has repeatedly declared that they will not seek revenge against the former regime and suppress ethnic and religious minorities living in the country, such as Sunni Kurds, Shiite Arabs, the Druze community and Greek and Armenian Orthodox Christians.
Will Syria become Iraq?
Another example that we should look at is the Iraqi case. After the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the collapse of the Saddam regime, the state largely came under the control of the Shiite majority. However, the country was politically divided into two spheres of influence, namely American and Iranian. The Iraqi state faced four problems. One was the new state structure based on ethnic divisions, while on the one hand, the central government was restructured based on ethnic divisions. According to the new system, the main executive body, the Prime Ministry, is under the control of Shiite Arabs, while the passive Presidency is under the control of the Kurds. On the other hand, a federal structure was established. They face difficulties in terms of keeping a balance between the two systems.
Also, Iraq largely came under the control of the "two liberators," namely the U.S. and Iran. The new Iraqi governments have been trying to liberate the state from these “liberators” and struggling for absolute national sovereignty and political independence. For now, it is still largely dependent on these two states. There are also alternative armed groups within the country. The existence of the Hashd al-Shaabi militia groups has greatly influenced the state system. Furthermore, the Iraqi sects took revenge on other ethnic and religious groups, which led to mistrust among different ethnic and religious groups living in the country.
In that sense, the new Syrian government cannot turn into the Iraqi case since the Syrian national context is quite different. First of all, the Syrian regime was overthrown by the Syrian armed groups, not by external powers. Second, the main supporter of the Syrian opposition, Türkiye, has a different perspective on the Syrian state. Türkiye supports the territorial integrity of the state. It does not follow a sectarian policy toward Syria. Its inclusive perspective will help the new government to consolidate the national state system. Third, the new government is determined not to allow the Syrian opposition groups to keep their arms. They have a firm position to form a united government.
Dysfunctional system of Lebanon
The third scenario is the Lebanese system, in which the state system is constitutionally designed according to ethnic and religious populations. For instance, the president of the country must come from a Maronite Christian background, the speaker of Parliament from Shiite Muslims and the prime minister from Sunni Muslims. With the change in the ratio of the population, the state system has become dysfunctional. For different reasons, the Maronites are no longer the largest religious group.
The Lebanese case cannot be implemented in Syria since it did not work for Lebanon either. Mainly due to this volatile system, the Lebanese government is unable to secure political stability. Moreover, the historical legacy of the Syrian people is quite different. The Syrian people have been living in peaceful coexistence for centuries. For example, Aleppo is known for its real cosmopolitan nature.
Completely new case
The last scenario is the establishment of a central government, which is the best scenario for Syria and its people. The new Syrian leadership has to establish a central government since quotas for ethnic and religious groups create problems. The Syrian people have a long tradition of peaceful coexistence and a central government is the best scenario for the Syrian state. The new constitution must be all-inclusive and based on equal citizenship, not on group identities. Equal citizenship is important, especially for the Kurds, since, until very recently, thousands of Kurds were denied citizenship in Syria by the Baath regime. I am sure that if external powers do not interfere in the domestic affairs of Syria, the Syrian people will successfully establish a unified government and consolidate the national sovereignty of their state.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/syrias-future-lessons-to-learn-from-afghanistan-iraq-lebanon
----
What Next For Lebanon?
Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib
December 27, 2024
This has been a terrible year for Lebanon. Many of the country’s problems had been accumulating for years; they most notably started with the financial crash in 2019, followed by the Beirut port explosion in August 2020 and then the deadlock in electing a president since 2022. The Gaza war has also had a spillover effect on Lebanon, as skirmishes erupted between Hezbollah and Israel on Oct. 8, 2023. In September, however, the dynamic of the conflict changed and Israel began an all-out war on Lebanon, targeting all areas of the country, not just Hezbollah strongholds. Lebanon has reached the abyss. The question now is: will there be a way out in 2025?
This year has been mainly marked by a political deadlock, which reflects a highly polarized society, and by the Israeli war.
When the mandate of President Michel Aoun expired at the end of October 2022, the political class could not agree on a replacement. Hezbollah insisted on their candidate, Suleiman Frangieh, while the anti-Hezbollah camp categorically rejected him. As a result, no president was elected and the country was run by a caretaker government. One year later, the Gaza war started and Hezbollah opened a “support front.” The group found in this conflict another excuse to defer the issue of electing a president.
The war in Gaza was a threat to Hezbollah. It knew that, if Israel was successful, it would be next. This is why Hezbollah opened its support front. While it was portrayed as a war of solidarity, for the group it was a security need. Prior to the war on Gaza, the group was under scrutiny for not abiding by UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The international community was exerting a lot of pressure to push the group to comply with it. The solidarity front was a gamble that Hezbollah took.
The bet was on an early ceasefire, which the group could use to claim victory and cash in on it politically. In September, however, the tide of the conflict changed. It is likely Israel had been preparing for this war for years. In its 2006 war on Lebanon, Israel realized the deficiency it had on the intelligence front. So, it started focusing on gathering intelligence.
Hezbollah also became a business empire, from having its own bank to multiple other businesses. It has also been accused of being involved in the Captagon trade. The group became porous. Top Hezbollah commanders became known to Israel. Tel Aviv used sophisticated technology to identify and target them. This led the group to rely on pagers, which are more basic and hence more difficult to trace.
Then came September’s attack on Hezbollah’s pagers. This attack changed the tide of the war. In a highly effective operation, Israel was able to tamper with the pagers used by Hezbollah members. It was able to target important operatives in the group. Afterward, Israel went on a bombing and assassination spree in Lebanon. All this was happening while Lebanon had no president and no real government or any effective diplomacy. In the 2006 war, Lebanese diplomacy worked to find an end to the war, with then-Prime Minister Fouad Siniora dispatching the highly qualified Dr. Tarek Mitri. Today, Lebanese diplomacy is at best numb.
On Nov. 22, Lebanon marked its worst independence day since the civil war. Four days later, a ceasefire deal was signed. Can Lebanon now resurrect itself or will it linger as a failing state for the next 30 years? Which option is more likely? The renowned Emirati academic Abdulkhaleq Abdulla asked me two days before writing this piece: What is next for Lebanon, is it scenario one or scenario two?
I personally think the situation will improve. It might get worse before it gets better. But it cannot get much worse because, as I said, we have reached the abyss. A quarter of the buildings in the south of Lebanon have been damaged or destroyed.
So, what is next? What should happen so that we can have a better future?
Unlike 2006, when Arab countries donated money for the country’s reconstruction with no strings attached, this time any aid will be conditional on three elements. Firstly, the Arab states and the wider international community will not accept the dominance of an armed faction in Lebanon. Secondly, they will want a credible government to handle the reconstruction process. Thirdly, they will want a transparent process. They will not compromise on good governance for the sake of stability like they did before.
Hence, Hezbollah will, on Jan. 9, be pushed to elect a consensual president, who will then appoint a credible government that can garner the trust of the Arab world and the international community. This credible government will probably be a government of technocrats that is focused on elevating Lebanon. This is unlike previous governments, in which the different ministers were busy dividing the pie among the various members of the political class. The donor community should insist on a government of technocrats that is focused on governance, not political polarization.
The good news is that there is a nucleus of good governance. The calamity that has been inflicted on Lebanon has brought with it an opportunity: the country established a government emergency committee that came up with a transparent, efficient and effective process to handle 1.2 million displaced people. This process includes the management and monitoring of aid deliveries. It could be replicated in different government departments and developed to manage Lebanon’s recovery and reconstruction.
The other positive element is the fact that Lebanon is a small country. A few billion dollars would be enough to rebuild infrastructure and jumpstart the economy. The country has human capital and the Lebanese are known for their entrepreneurial spirit. Recovery can happen quicker than we might expect. Also, members of the diaspora will come back and invest if they see that there is a credible government and that the country is stable and no longer controlled by a corrupt political class.
However, this is all speculation and maybe my analysis has been influenced by my own wishful thinking. However, deep down, I have a conviction that my country, like the phoenix, will rise from the ashes.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2584412
-----
Palestinian Antisemitism Is Now Spreading Across The Us
By Tamar Sternthal
December 26, 2024
In 2023, the American Jewish community, which accounts for less than 3% of the nation’s total population, has been on the receiving end of two-thirds of all religion-based hate crimes in the country (1,832 out of 2,699), the Federal Bureau of Investigation revealed in September.
This month, the USA Today news network contributed to the seething cesspool of anti-Jewish bigotry by peddling classic antisemitic tropes.
The nearly 3,000-word article – “‘No one ever asks a Palestinian’: Ohio residents reacting with grief and anger over carnage in the Middle East,” in Ohio’s Canton Repository – appeared December 1 in more than a dozen newspapers across the country, from The Register Guard in Eugene, Oregon to the Palm Beach Post in Florida.
Beyond grief and anger, interviewees unleashed unabashed antisemitism, with one invoking the age-old anti-Jewish myth straight out of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion alleging a Jewish cabal controlling the media, economy, government, and other societal institutions.
“If you have Google behind you, if you have Microsoft behind you, if you have Intel behind you, if you have Lockheed-Martin and Boeing behind you, yeah, of course you’re going to be able to prop yourself up for 76 years,” reporter Charita M. Goshay quoted Hasan Mueheisen without providing further comment. The Palestinian-American interviewee was alluding to alleged Jewish – or perhaps Israeli – control of business and tech giants to sustain the Jewish state.
If Jews really wielded that much power, then presumably they could do something about the itty problem of being the insanely disproportionate target of US hate crimes.
But neither critical thought, nor rigorous journalism, were strong points in the Canton Repository article, which enjoyed national exposure thanks to the USA Today news network.
“We will seek to promote understanding of complex issues,” USA Today network pledges in its “Principles of Ethical Conduct for Newsrooms.” Yet Goshay allows Mueheisan’s antisemitism to pass without comment or challenge, literally giving him the last word.
Goshay extends this deferential treatment to the full roster of her truth-defying interviewees. The anti-Israel accusers freely lob historic and present-day vilification of the “settler-colonialist” State of Israel, bandying about fabricated charges of “genocide, dehumanization, dispossession, and apartheid.”
At no point does the local Ohio reporter, with an out-sized national reach, make clear that the US government has repeatedly rejected the “genocide” smear and repudiated the “apartheid” canard as “absurd.”
In another stroke of ludicrousness, Palestinian-American Rima Rafidi-Kern is quoted without challenge: “We’re the original Christians.” That’s a bald-faced lie. The original Christians were converted Jews. Jesus himself was a Jew, an inconvenient reality of ancient Jewish indigeneity belying the “settler-colonialist” canard.
GOSHAY, A reporter of local Midwestern affairs, loses her way in Mideast coverage, flailing even with basic nomenclature. “Palestine – also known as Israel,” she confounds the no-longer existent Palestine Mandate with Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
She bungles the 1947 United Nations plan as “partitioning the territory between the new State of Israel, the kingdom of Jordan and Egypt, and the exclusively Palestinian Gaza Strip.” In fact, the Partition Plan had nothing to do with Jordan or Egypt. As the UN explained: “The plan envisages the division of Palestine into three parts: a Jewish state, an Arab State, and the city of Jerusalem, to be placed under an international trusteeship system.”
The proposed Arab state included not only the Gaza Strip but also the West Bank and a huge chunk of what is now central and even southern Israel (including the city of Beersheba), along with a significant patch of land in the north, encompassing Acre and Nahariya.
But in a colossal misjudgment that sealed their people’s unfortunate fate for generations, the Palestinian Arab leadership rejected the seminal Partition Plan and the surrounding Arab countries attacked the nascent Jewish state. Arab leadership in Haifa, Jerusalem, Tiberias, and other locations encouraged residents to flee, resulting in the Palestinian refugee crisis.
Goshay neglects to mention these key historical events, choosing not to intrude on her interviewees’ uninterrupted soliloquy of singular Israeli culpability for Palestinian displacement.
Moreover, Goshay piles on in her own voice: “Palestinians argue that Israel’s Zionist government has trampled on” Balfour Declaration concerns for protection of Palestinian-owned land and religious rights. “They point to the more than 700,000 Palestinians who were displaced in 1948, with many ending up in refugee camps.”
The journalist’s exoneration of Palestinians for any responsibility reaches the reductio ad absurdum in her depiction of Hamas as thwarted peace activists forced into violence by Israel. Rami Hamdan said, “Hamas began with peaceful demonstrations,” intones the credulous reporter about an organization whose antisemitic founding charter calls “to fight the Jews and kill them.”
“The Palestinian people tried the Martin Luther King way, the way of no violence; they tried it,” Goshay quotes Hamdan of Canton. Apparently, the untold early MLK chapter of Palestinian history has mysteriously been erased from all historical memory and archives, wrongly replaced instead with a bloody trail of hijackings, bombings, and terror at the Olympics.
In this alternate reality, “Benjamin Netanyahu encouraged Hamas to begin because he did not want the PLO.” So talented was the young Netanyahu that he apparently pulled off this feat from New York where he served as ambassador to the United Nations during the time of the Hamas terror organization’s founding.
Goshay’s grasp of present-day reality is equally tenuous. Apparently unaware that more than 90% of West Bank Palestinians live under their own Palestinian Authority government, Goshay broadcasts her ignorance: “Palestinians cannot purchase property in the West Bank. Palestinian vehicles are required to display special license plates, and drivers are restricted to certain roads.”
Palestinians maintain rights in the West Bank
Palestinians, of course, are free to purchase property in Areas A and B of the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority rules and where most live. Likewise, they may display flags, and Palestinian flags proudly and prominently appear at demonstrations, in funerals, on school buildings, and government institutions.
As for “special license plates,” these are what are otherwise known as Palestinian license plates. The Palestinian Authority issues Palestinian license plates to its citizens and the Israeli authorities likewise issues Israeli plates to its citizens.
While Palestinians are restricted from entering Israeli communities in the West Bank, Israeli citizens are forbidden from entering the Palestinian Authority-ruled Area A. Israelis who nevertheless enter Area A, either because they are lost or because they defy the prohibition in search of shopping or other services, often do not make it home alive.
Rafidi-Kern’s unchallenged fabrication, therefore, that Israeli settlers “can come to the houses of the Palestinians, and they claim this is theirs” is as inspired as her “original Christians” lie of biblical proportions.
SO THOROUGH is the USA Today network article’s denial of any Palestinian agency that it blames the Jewish state for Palestinian antisemitism.
“I have yet to meet a single Palestinian in my entire life who has been taught to hate Jews or anybody for their religious faith, or lack of faith for that matter. That was never taught to us as children. The only time you see someone go to that extreme is if they have faced the brutality of the occupation, which can lead somebody to escalate to that level and target specific people,” said Hamdan, without being challenged.
In fact, Palestinian children in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are systematically indoctrinated to hate Jews from a young age. Government-controlled Palestinian television teaches anti-Jewish hatred and violence. Nahoul, a giant bee on Hamas TV, urged children to shoot Jews. Assud, the Hamas rabbit, promised to eat Jews. Schools and summer camps carry the names of terrorists who slaughtered Israeli civilians; textbooks treat subjects like physics and math as an opportunity to teach Jew-hatred.
An Anti-Defamation League survey in 2014 found the world’s highest concentration of antisemitic sentiment in the West Bank and Gaza, with 93% of those surveyed embracing anti-Jewish views.
“Hate and the blame culture go hand in hand, for they are both strategies of denial,” wrote the late Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. “’It wasn’t me, it was them, I acted in self-defense, I am the victim, not the perpetrator.’ The murder of the innocent then becomes a holy deed.”
Does USA Today’s news network really want to export the unholy nexus of hate, blame, and violence to communities across America, lending a hand to the most ancient bigotry and supplying perceived justifications for the next hate crime perpetrator?
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-834875
---
The Syrian Refugees In A Post-Assad Era
Dr. Majid Rafizadeh
December 27, 2024
The Syrian refugee crisis is one of the most harrowing humanitarian catastrophes of the 21st century.
Triggered by a civil war that erupted in 2011, the conflict displaced more than 13 million Syrians, half of the country’s pre-war population. Among these, approximately 6.8 million sought refuge abroad, primarily in neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, as well as in Europe and beyond. Their plight became a symbol of human suffering, resilience, and the challenges of global solidarity.
Now, with the fall of Bashar Assad, some Western countries have initiated efforts to repatriate Syrian refugees, citing changing conditions on the ground. However, the complexities of Syria’s devastated economy, crumbled infrastructure, and societal scars warrant a more cautious approach to repatriation.
During the civil war, many Syrians risked perilous journeys across the Mediterranean to seek safety in Europe. Images of overcrowded boats and tragic drownings stirred global attention, yet responses varied widely. Some countries opened their doors, while others closed borders or erected barriers to limit the influx.
The refugee crisis underscored profound challenges: the strain on host countries’ resources; the difficulty of integrating large refugee populations; and the enduring trauma faced by those who fled. Syrians struggled to find stable employment, access to healthcare, and secure education for their children. Despite these hardships, many often clung to the hope of returning home.
While the fall of Assad marks a significant turning point, Syria appears to be far from ready to accommodate the return of millions of its displaced citizens. The war’s toll on the country’s economy and infrastructure is staggering. Entire cities lie in ruins, with essential services like water, electricity, and healthcare severely compromised. According to estimates, rebuilding Syria could take hundreds of billions of dollars and decades of effort. Roads, schools, hospitals and homes must be reconstructed before large-scale returns can be viable.
The economic landscape is equally dire. Syria’s GDP has contracted sharply since the war began, and industries that once provided livelihoods for millions have collapsed. Agriculture, a cornerstone of the pre-war economy, has been devastated by conflict and climate change. Many factories and businesses have been destroyed or abandoned, leaving a vacuum of employment opportunities. Inflation and currency devaluation have rendered basic goods unaffordable for much of the population.
For those who do return, the challenges are formidable. Housing is one of the most immediate and pressing issues. Many refugees’ homes have been destroyed, seized, or occupied by others. Legal disputes over property rights are likely to be widespread, particularly in a country where documentation was lost or destroyed during the war.
Economic reintegration poses another major hurdle. With high unemployment and limited job opportunities, returnees may struggle to support themselves and their families. Skilled workers may find that their professions are no longer viable due to the destruction of infrastructure or shifts in the economy. Farmers returning to rural areas may face land that has been rendered infertile by neglect or conflict. In urban areas, small businesses that once thrived may no longer have a customer base or the resources to restart operations.
Access to basic services is another significant concern. Healthcare facilities are scarce and overwhelmed, with shortages of staff, equipment, and medicine. Schools have been destroyed or repurposed. Refugees returning to such conditions may find that their quality of life is no better — and perhaps worse — than in the countries where they sought asylum.
In addition, the psychological toll of return cannot be overlooked. Many refugees have endured profound trauma, from witnessing violence to losing loved ones. Returning to a country that still bears the scars of war may exacerbate these mental health challenges. Support systems, such as counseling and community networks, are limited or non-existent in many parts of Syria.
Despite these challenges, many Syrians hope that Syria can one day reclaim stability, security, and prosperity. After 13 years of relentless conflict, the prospect of peace may offer a glimmer of possibility for millions of Syrians longing for normalcy. With time, the reconstruction of infrastructure, the revival of the economy, and the healing of societal divisions can hopefully pave the way for a brighter future.
The rebuilding of Syria’s infrastructure will be a monumental task, but it is essential for enabling refugees to return and rebuild their lives. Roads, bridges, and public services must be restored to connect communities and facilitate economic activity. Schools and hospitals must be reconstructed to provide education and healthcare, laying the foundation for a healthier and more prosperous society. Investments in renewable energy and modern technology could help Syria leapfrog some development challenges, creating opportunities for innovation and growth.
As stability takes hold, the Syrian economy has the potential to recover and even thrive. Agriculture can be revitalized through investment in irrigation and sustainable practices. Industries such as manufacturing and construction can provide jobs and drive economic growth. Tourism, once a major contributor to Syria’s economy, could gradually rebound as historical sites are restored and security improves. The entrepreneurial spirit of the Syrian people, evident in the diaspora, can play a crucial role in rebuilding the nation.
Social healing will be equally important. Programs aimed at reconciliation and community building can help bridge divides and foster a sense of unity. Education will be key to equipping the next generation with the skills and knowledge needed to rebuild their country. Cultural and artistic initiatives can celebrate Syria’s rich heritage and inspire a sense of shared identity.
While the road ahead is long and fraught with challenges, the resilience of the Syrian people offers hope. For those who have endured unimaginable hardship, the dream of returning to a safe and thriving homeland is a powerful motivator. With patience and perseverance, many Syrians hope that their country can rise from the ashes of war, offering its citizens the security, stability, and opportunities they deserve. The international community will undoubtedly watch as the Syrian people work toward their hope of a brighter future, determined to rebuild their lives and their nation.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2584413
----
New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism