By New Age Islam Edit
Desk
1 December
2020
• Turkey Opens Secret Channel To Fix Ties With
Israel
By Amberin Zaman
• Trump Is Leaving Biden A Landmine Field In
The Middle East
By Joe Macaron
• A Political Flirt: The Diaries Of Barack
Hussein Obama
By Marwan Bishara
• Netanyahu Prepares His Iran Cards Before
Biden Takes Office
By Ben Caspit
------
Turkey Opens Secret Channel To Fix Ties With
Israel
By Amberin Zaman
Nov 30,
2020
The chief
of Turkey’s national intelligence service has been holding secret talks with
Israeli officials, part of a Turkish-initiated effort to normalize relations,
well-placed sources have told Al-Monitor. Speaking to Al-Monitor on condition
that they not be identified by name, three sources confirmed that meetings had
taken place in recent weeks with Hakan Fidan representing Turkey in at least
one of them, but they declined to say where. Governments typically decline to
formally comment on intelligence-related issues.
One of the
sources said, “The traffic [between Turkey and Israel] is continuing,” but he
did not elaborate. There has been no ambassador in either country since May
2018, when Turkey showed Israel’s ambassador the door over its bloody attacks
on Gaza and Washington’s decision to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem.
Fidan is
believed to have held several such meetings in the past, to discuss joint
security concerns in Syria and Libya among other things, as first reported by
Al-Monitor, but the sources said the latest round was specifically aimed at
upgrading ties back to ambassador level.
There is
mounting worry in Ankara that the incoming Joe Biden administration will be
less indulgent of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s bellicosity, which
has seen Turkey mount three separate incursions against the Syrian Kurds since
2016, send troops and Syrian mercenaries to Libya and Azerbaijan, and lock
horns with Greece in Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean waters. The biggest
concern is that, unlike President Donald Trump, Biden will not shield Turkey
from sanctions over its purchase of Russian S-400 missiles and for Turkish
state lender Halkbank’s paramount role in facilitating Iran’s
multibillion-dollar illicit oil for gold trade.
“The
calculation is that making nice with Israel will win them favor with the Biden
team,” said a Western official speaking not for attribution. “It’s like Lucy
and the football; it works each time,” he said, referring to a recurring theme
in the world-famous cartoon strip “Peanuts.”
Gallia
Lindenstrauss, a senior research fellow at the Israeli Institute for National
Security Studies, agrees that there’s a window of opportunity for turning the
page. “I would think it would be in the interest of both states not to
overstate the meaning of the step of bringing the ambassadors back. As
relations were not downgraded in 2018, it is from the diplomatic protocol point
of view a simple step.”
“Both
states can present it as a goodwill step for the coming Biden administration
that is likely to be more interested in relaxing tensions between Israel and
Turkey than the Trump administration, which didn't push this agenda at all,”
Lindenstrauss added in emailed comments to Al-Monitor.
Commercial
ties between the two countries — vaunted as the only pro-secular democracies in
the Middle East until Erdogan took a sharply authoritarian turn — have remained
intact.
But one of
the sources aired skepticism at the prospects of a real reset “for as long as
Turkey continues to be the global headquarters for Hamas."
Israel
alleges that hundreds of Hamas operatives, among them US-designated terrorists
who have plotted attacks against the Jewish state, have been offered sanctuary
and in some cases Turkish nationality by Ankara. In August, the State
Department blasted Ankara for hosting two Hamas leaders, including Ismail
Haniyeh, head of the Hamas political bureau. “President Erdogan’s continued
outreach to this terrorist organization only serves to isolate Turkey from the
international community, harms the interests of the Palestinian people, and
undercuts global efforts to prevent terrorist attacks launched from Gaza,” it
said in a statement.
Egypt,
which has also had rocky relations with Turkey since the ouster of Mohammed
Morsi, similarly accuses Turkey of harboring its Muslim Brotherhood opponents.
The
prevailing consensus is that the United States’ waning diplomatic and military
engagement in the region has eased what many view as Turkish irredentism in its
former Ottoman dominions. However, despite its success in curbing Kurdish
ambitions in Syria, salvaging Libya’s Government of National Accord from the
jaws of a rival warlord, and helping Azerbaijan defeat Armenia, Turkey has
found itself increasingly isolated. Israel, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus have
united against Ankara’s ongoing gas drilling operations in contested waters in
the Eastern Mediterranean through a mix of economic and military cooperation
accords.
More
broadly, Saudi Arabia, France and the United Arab Emirates in particular have
been pushing back against Erdogan’s efforts to expand Turkey’s military
hegemony across the Levant, the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa.
The UAE and
Bahrain’s decision to establish diplomatic ties with Israel — scoring brownie
points in Washington is part of their calculus too — has left Turkey looking
even more friendless. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be in no
rush to make up with Ankara just as he is courting Turkey’s Gulf foes.
Turkey’s
growing economic difficulties are seen at the root of Erdogan’s efforts to
shift course. These are poised to grow sharply worse despite continued Qatari
benevolence should US or EU sanctions come into play. Tellingly, Turkey
withdrew its seismic exploration vessel, the Oruc Reis, from the disputed
Mediterranean waters Nov. 30 ahead of an EU summit that is due to be held Dec.
10-11 and where sanctions against Ankara are to be weighed.
In a
further climb down, Ankara has now reached out to Saudi Arabia. Erdogan spoke
to Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud Nov. 21 ahead of a G20 summit
chaired by Saudi Arabia. Turkish officials quoted by Middle East Eye said
Erdogan sought his help to end an unofficial boycott of Turkish goods that is
beginning to take a toll. Turkey’s exports to the kingdom fell 15% in September
compared with the same period last year, the third straight month of decline,
Bloomberg reported.
Relations
between the two countries took a nosedive following the gruesome Oct. 2018
murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in
Istanbul. Turkey led a noisy campaign to expose Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman’s alleged role in the affair. Last week a Turkish court added six new
defendants — including two close aides of the prince — to the 20 Saudis who are
being tried in absentia for their alleged participation in killing and then
dismembering Khashoggi.
Erdogan had
spurned Salman's entreaties to bury the story in the days following Khashoggi’s
death. Salman’s global image has been sullied beyond repair, with the United
Nations and the CIA pointing to his complicity. Yet he remains stronger than
ever with many Saudis rallying behind their prince in the face of what they see
as a global conspiracy.
Turkey’s
goal was to prevent the prince’s accession to the throne, reckons Ali Shihabi,
a New York-based expert on the Middle East and the co-author of “The Saudi
Kingdom: Between the Jihadi Hammer and the Iranian Anvil.”
“What the
Khashoggi affair exposed beyond all was Erdogan’s lack of understanding of how
the Saudi succession works,” Shihabi told Al-Monitor in a telephone interview.
Moreover, the notion that any wedge could be driven between the king and his
son was never realistic.
While the
Saudis are open to bringing relations to a “level of cordiality,” Shihabi
contended, the steady drip of incriminating evidence against the crown prince
through the international media “left a very bad taste.”
"I
don’t see that mistrust of Erdogan disappearing any time soon. Not before
Erdogan moderates his regional fantasies,” Shihabi predicted.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/11/turkey-ties-israel-biden-trump-s400-saudi-arabia-erdogan.html
-----
Trump Is Leaving Biden A Landmine Field In The
Middle East
By Joe Macaron
30 Nov 2020
US
President Donald Trump has caused much damage by questioning the legitimacy of
the US elections and the victory of his opponent, Joe Biden. His refusal to
accept the results of the vote has not only caused much trouble at home but it
has also undermined the image of the United States abroad and its moral
authority to preach smooth power transition and commitment to democratic ideals
to foreign leaders.
This, along
with the policies he is leaving behind after four years in the White House, is
setting up a turbulent transition for Biden at home and most probably a rough
start for the new administration abroad, especially in the Middle East.
In recent
weeks, Trump’s administration has been giving unprecedented attention to the
region. At least four US officials have visited Israel and close Gulf allies in
recent weeks: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Special Representative for Iran
and Venezuela Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs R Clarke Cooper from the State Department and the White House adviser,
Jared Kushner.
Meanwhile,
Trump has ramped up sanctions on Iran and is suspected of giving a green light
for Israel to kill Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. A US aircraft
carrier group led by the nuclear-powered USS Nimitz has also moved back into
the Gulf region. This offensive posture seems linked to US domestic politics
rather than to a clear policy objective.
Allies of
the outgoing administration in the Middle East may have congratulated Biden,
but they are also giving the impression that they will join hands with Trump
and the political opposition to the Democratic White House he will soon lead.
Still,
they, along with the rest of the Middle East, are gearing up for the Biden
presidency. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman now seems inclined to
resolve the dispute with Qatar (even though it is not clear yet if he will give
this foreign policy win to Trump or Biden) and ease relations with Turkey; he
is also more cautious about normalisation with Israel. MBS is aiming to defuse
tensions so he can start on the right foot with the Biden administration.
Egypt’s
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seems to be making conciliatory moves. The
Egyptian government has been releasing political prisoners in recent weeks. In
Turkey, Erdogan has felt less constrained to let go of his son-in-law Berat
Albayrak as finance minister whose primary added value until recently was being
the indispensable contact person for Kushner and Trump’s White House. Iran is
also trying to avoid escalation in the region, hoping to potentially restore
nuclear talks with Biden and get US sanctions relief.
It seems
Middle Eastern leaders are expecting Biden’s presidency to be the exact
opposite of Trump’s and to bring back aspects of Barack Obama’s. But this may
not be the case, as his recent appointments of national security officials have
shown. However, the new administration will certainly change the way US foreign
policy is conducted in at least three ways.
First,
institutional decision making will be restored in Washington. US foreign policy
under Trump was dangerously personalised by a leader with narcissistic and
authoritarian inclinations, which helped foreign leaders gain more influence in
the White House. Officials who challenged his authority were fired from his
administration or pushed to resign and those who stayed were loyalists or
opportunists. Traditional foreign policymaking was sidelined and so was
inter-agency cooperation. Trump did not trust key institutions like the
Pentagon and the State Department, which were defunded or marginalised under
his administration.
Once Biden
and the Democrats are officially in power, Middle East leaders will no longer
be able to get their way by exchanging late-night WhatsApp messages with
Trump’s son-in-law or pretend the US State Department is a trivial agency. They
will have to turn to traditional diplomacy, dealing with the embassies and
official emissaries. The re-establishment of this institutional process also means
a return to rivalries between US agencies over foreign policy issues, most
notably in the Middle East. This will likely slow down the decision-making
process in Washington.
Second, the
Biden administration will bring back the predictability of US foreign policy.
The domestic turmoil of Trump’s presidency – the high-level investigations, the
impeachment, the racial tensions, the Twitter rants, the constant change of
appointed officials, etc – affected not only US politics but also political
dynamics abroad.
The
outgoing president’s penchant for unconventional foreign policy moves – using
tariffs as a political tool, bashing allies, casually issuing threats to use
force, and engaging traditional foes like North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and
Afghanistan’s Taliban – also brought uncertainty on the international scene.
Biden will likely bring back positive engagement with traditional allies,
especially in Europe, and return to foreign policy rhetoric that can be more
easily anticipated.
Third,
there will likely be a major shift in the US priorities in the Middle East. The
Biden administration will most likely align with the thinking of the Washington
establishment, seeking to pull US resources out of the Middle East to focus on
deterring Russia and China, a move that Trump is now making more difficult by
antagonising Iran.
The Biden
administration will seek to mitigate conflicts across the Middle East and will
most probably face resistance from concerned actors looking to maximise their
strategic positions. This expected shift of priorities in Washington to deter
Russia and China on a global scale will be most probably be viewed by Middle
East leaders once again as a sign of weakness and as an affirmation of the
limits of US power.
Trump has
overly invested in the Middle East with emphasis on a transactional approach,
and Middle East leaders should prepare to not to be overindulged by Washington
in the next four years. His core approach was the advancement of an
Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran at the expense of traditional Arab partners
like Jordan, and the support of disparate allies ranging from Turkey’s Recep
Tayyip Erdogan to Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman.
Unlike
Trump, the Biden presidency will most probably be reactive instead of proactive
in the Middle East. This means minimal engagement with Iran, complex relations
with Turkey and the appeasement of Israel. Biden will be somewhere between
Trump and Obama and will have to reckon with Trump’s legacy in the Middle East,
which includes new preconditions to strike a deal with Iran and a timid
Arab-Israeli normalisation process.
Some Middle
Eastern leaders are wary of the coming change in Washington. If the Biden
administration sets a new tone in exposing their authoritarianism or goes too
far in engaging the Iranian regime, these staunch Trump allies might be
inclined to ignore Biden’s demands on human rights issues and exploit their new
alliance with Israel to stand their ground. They can directly cooperate with
Israel or use its clout in Washington to pressure the Biden administration.
The legacy
of the outgoing Trump presidency may offer some opportunities for the new
administration moving forward, but the regional challenges will persist. The
Trump team has already planted a field of foreign policy landmines in the
Middle East and clearing it over the next four years will be a fraught
endeavour. Middle East leaders will test Biden early on and the new US
president will have to show some spine if he is to be taken seriously over the
next four years.
-----
Joe Macaron is a fellow at the Arab Center
Washington DC.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/30/trump-is-leaving-biden-a-landmine-field-in-the-middle-east/
------
A Political Flirt: The Diaries Of Barack
Hussein Obama
By Marwan Bishara
30 Nov 2020
When in
June 2009, Barack Hussein Obama, who had just become the president of the
world’s foremost superpower and leader of the “free world”, started his
landmark speech to the Muslim world with, “al-salamu alaykum” or “peace be upon
you”, Arabs and Muslims must have felt like Dorothy in the film Jerry Maguire
when she tells Jerry, “You had me at hello.”
Obama had
us at al-salamu alaykum.
It was
great to see the US president speaking at Cairo University, humanising and
engaging the Muslim world, but it also felt like he was hedging on almost every
issue, probably realising, correctly, that his detractors back home were
listening to every word. Indeed, they called his trip an “apology tour”.
At that
time, my critique of certain aspects of the president’s speech on Al Jazeera
did not go down well with some of my prickly colleagues, who were (rightly)
taken by the magic of the moment. But in his own recollection of that day in
his memoir, A Promised Land, Obama is a sweet-talking pragmatist, a realist at
heart.
Obama can
talk the talk. He just loves to flirt with ideas and with the public, loves to
orate, preach, and sermonise. But he should have known better than to flirt
with the Muslim world without having the intention to commit.
Alas, he
did not walk the walk. He did not come through on many of his promises, or
perhaps more accurately, the promise of his presidency, for which he feels only
partly responsible. In his book, he repeatedly laments people pinning too much
hope on him and stretching or misinterpreting his words.
When he
acted proactively, as when he reached a landmark nuclear disarmament treaty
with Russia or when he crashed a China-led climate change meeting to force a
compromise between China and Europe in Copenhagen, progress was in fact
possible.
But it got
harder and more complicated when it came to fulfilling his promise to end
America’s endless war in the Middle East and do away with the mindset behind
it.
He says he
was misunderstood. He says that he opposed the Iraq war, as other American realists
did, but not the Afghan war. He says that he is no pacifist who believes
everything can be resolved with diplomacy. His extensive use of drones, which
he mentions only in passing in the book, showed him capable and willing to
champion new means of warfare.
On the
other hand – and there is always “on another hand” with this guy – he seems to
think, as he did in his earlier years, that politicians are “actors in a rigged
game”. It is one thing to want to end a war, but it is another thing to
actually get it done, when the military and foreign policy establishments are
stacked against it, set in their ways, defending indefensible mantras about
credibility and prestige.
If he
wanted to decrease troop deployment in Afghanistan and the Pentagon wanted it increased,
he felt obliged to accept a compromise with the formidable generals in the form
of a surge.
His vice
president, Joe Biden, urged him not to get rolled over by the Pentagon but
rolled over he got, at least until he “grew more comfortable and efficient” in
his role as commander-in-chief.
And he
rolled over when Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected his demand
that Israel freezes the illegal settlement-building as long as the negotiations
with the Palestinians were under way. Obama compliments Netanyahu, he calls him
“smart, canny, tough and a gifted communicator” in his book, even though he
clearly dislikes him, and accuses him of orchestrating a campaign against his
administration.
Obama shows
sympathy for the Palestinian suffering, but instead of condemning its
perpetrator, Israel, he defends the “unbreakable” US commitment to its
security. He also blames the Palestinians for refusing to endorse the rigged
diplomatic charade and for demanding Israel choose between “Jewish settlements”
and a “peace settlement”. He even found it in himself to blame Al Jazeera for
Arab anger at Netanyahu’s intransigence.
Much of
this is already known, but what is less known is just how much Obama is annoyed
or intimidated by the influence of the Israel lobby, which may partially
explain his sheepishness towards Israel.
He contends
in his book that, unlike relations with other allies, disagreement with Israel
comes with a “domestic political cost”. Those who criticised Israel’s policy
“risked being tagged as ‘anti-Israel’ (and possibly anti-Semitic) and
confronted with a well-funded opponent in the next election”.
Predictably,
some have already labelled Obama’s claim as “anti-Semitic”.
Obama
writes how he was moved by Arab protesters during the early days of the Arab
Spring, by their “Yes, we can” spirit, and decided to pressure Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak to step down, despite opposition from his senior
cabinet members and from Saudi and Emirati leaders, who warned him that America
would no longer be trusted.
He was also
moved by reports of potential bloody civil war in Libya and decided to act
against the advice of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Alas, his failure, as
he puts it, was not to follow through.
His earlier
drive soon came to a halt, as counter-revolutionary forces stepped in and chaos
spread throughout the region. He stopped following through on his previous
plans or pronouncements, choosing instead to disengage or temper expectation.
After five
years of disappointments, Obama arrived at his “don’t do stupid sh**” foreign
policy moment in 2014. He became as disillusioned with our region as many were
disappointed in him.
Obama is
wrong on many issues, but he is not wrong in asking the Muslim world to
“closely examine the roots of [its] unhappiness”.
If his
detractors only looked in the mirror, they would see that Obama’s shortcomings
pale in comparison to our own; just think of how divided, hateful, and
malicious we are towards each another in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
It is also paradoxical,
not to say hypocritical, of us to condemn the US as an imperial hegemon and
plead with it to intervene on our side, be it against an enemy or a neighbour.
It is a
cop-out to blame Obama for many of our own failures. Why should an American
president give a hoot if we do not give a damn?
He is a
flirt, not a fool.
-----
Bishara was previously a professor of
International Relations at the American University of Paris. An author who
writes extensively on global politics, he is widely regarded as a leading
authority on the Middle East and international affairs.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/30/a-political-flirt-the-diaries-of-barack-hussein/
-----
Netanyahu Prepares His Iran Cards Before Biden
Takes Office
By Ben Caspit
Nov 30,
2020
“One of
their eyes and possibly both were directed at Washington and not at Iran,” Maj.
Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, the former head of military intelligence and current
director of the Institute for National Security Studies, told the Army Radio
Station Nov. 29. He was responding to the interviewer’s question about the
motives behind the Nov. 26 assassination of Iran’s nuclear program mastermind,
Mohsen Fakharizadeh. While the entire Middle East is caught up in the
unprecedented tensions between Tehran and Jerusalem and growing concerns in
other regional capitals, the more interesting axis is actually the one between
Washington and Tel Aviv (where Israel’s security agencies are located).
The
Iranians, Americans and the rest of the world have already estimated that the
particularly impressive and daring operation in the heart of Iran was most
likely the work of Israel’s Mossad. While Israel did not assume formal
responsibility for the attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not
resist a barely veiled admission in a video clip he posted shortly after the
news broke.
“Israel’s
activities in recent months in general, and this time in particular, remind me
of a hurried shopping spree by the mistress of a dying lover,” a Western
diplomat serving in the region told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity. “She
knows that once he closes his eyes for good, the party is over, so she is doing
as much as she can right now.”
According
to this interpretation, Netanyahu’s desk and that of Mossad Chief Yossi Cohen
are piled high with “to do” lists, and they are trying to tick off as many
boxes as possible before Washington cuts off their credit line. Their goal is
to undermine Iran’s nuclear program, destabilize the Iranian regime and create
as much chaos as possible to hamper renewed negotiations by the future Joe
Biden administration with Tehran and a return to the Barack Obama
administration’s Iran policy so reviled by Netanyahu.
When
Netanyahu approves Cohen’s proposed Mossad operations behind enemy lines, he
also maintains eye contact with two separate Washington entities: the White
House and the State Department. If Israel was behind this operation, this could
explain the encouraging wink from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, alongside
President Donald Trump’s retweet of Israeli journalist Yossi Melman’s report of
the Tehran assassination. From the transition headquarters of President-elect
Biden on the other side of the capital, Netanyahu gets a glowering stare.
Former Obama administration officials, meanwhile, take turns condemning the
killing.
Israel has
the upper tactical and operational hand in its secret war with Iran. Israel’s
edge is decisive; the blows inflicted on Iran in recent years are abundant and
painful. Nonetheless, the Iranian regime is planning for the long term. Current
events, as far as they are concerned, are simply inconsequential background
noise. Israel, on the other hand, is high on self-confidence and adrenalin,
seeming intent to set the region on fire.
The
operation attributed to Israel is a response to one of the most sensitive
issues of the current era, and it suggests that Netanyahu has no intention of
adopting a pragmatic view on the subject with the Biden administration. On the
contrary, he plans on being oppositional and leading a hawkish line and an
aggressive Israeli-Sunni coalition in order to prevent Biden from repeating the
mistakes of his Democratic predecessor. Netanyahu will not bow his head at his
first White House meeting with the new president. He will come spoiling for a
fight.
Iran is
confused, embarrassed, aching and hesitant. The official versions of
Fakharizadeh’s assassination emanating from Iran range from an alleged robotic
operation (supposedly a machinegun activated by remote control from the top of
a Nissan vehicle, which then self-destructed) to a hit squad of 62 agents that
the Mossad allegedly ran inside Iran. Israeli officials believe Iran faces a
wrenching dilemma regarding reprisal for the assassination because it suspects
Israel of trying to spark a conflagration in the region to force Trump to
launch a military intervention in his final days in the White House. That is
the last thing Tehran wants.
These
latest developments take us back to three consecutive summers between 2010 and
2013, during which Israel considered a strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure
during the days of the Obama administration. Prime Minister Netanyahu and
then-Defense Minister and former Premier Ehud Barak supported such a move,
while other Cabinet ministers and the heads of the nation’s security agencies
demanded US approval of the operation or active involvement in it. One of the
more interesting considerations discussed by Netanyahu and Barak — which they
then raised with head of the Israel Defense Forces Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi,
then-Mossad Chief Yossi Dagan, Military Intelligence Director Yadlin and other
top officials — was whether an Israeli strike could draw the Americans into the
conflict against their will. At a certain point, someone deluded Netanyahu into
believing that such a scenario was possible. The late Mossad Chief Dagan got on
a plane to Washington, met with his counterparts and returned with a huge
container of cold water that he dumped on this hypothesis.
This same
issue is now under discussion yet again. Trump is no Obama. The American
president is likely the most unpredictable leader on earth, certainly from now
until Jan. 20. A US B-52 bomber that overflew Israel on its way east, an
additional US aircraft carrier making its way eastward, and frequent meetings
in the region by Pompeo and other senior Trump administration figures (the
president’s top adviser, Jared Kushner, is en route to Saudi Arabia) have
generated slews of violent conspiracy theories that are firing up imaginations
and further straining tensions between the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and back.
Netanyahu’s
gamble is a complex one. He could decide to go for broke right now and raise
the ante even if it means getting off on the wrong foot with President-elect
Biden and a possible confrontation with the incoming US administration even
before it takes office. The old Netanyahu whom the world knew was cautious,
hesitant, reluctant to engage in adventures, and knew his place in the
hierarchy and balance of forces with world powers. Netanyahu of 2020, whose
defence team petitioned the court this week to dismiss the three indictments
against him on charges of bribery, fraud and breach of trust (a move that does
not stand much of a chance), is a different leader. He is confrontational,
supremely self-confident, spoiling for a fight and ready to take risks. Iran,
at least, is in a much calmer place right now, as it waits to figure out
President-elect Biden’s intentions.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/11/israel-iran-us-benjamin-netanyahu-joe-biden-ehud-barak.html
-----
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