Middle East Press On Royal Civil War in Saudi Arabia, Child Recruitment and Iran-Backed Militias: New Age Islam's Selection, 8 December 2020
By
New Age Islam Edit Desk
8 December
2020
• How Israel Is Triggering a Royal Civil War in Saudi
Arabia
By Elie Podeh
• Fear and the freedom to care: France’s delicate
balance
By Tala Jarjour
• Child recruitment casts shadow over Syrian Kurds'
push for global legitimacy
By Amberin Zaman and Dan Wilkofsky
• Shiite factions close to Sistani move to separate
from Iran-backed militias
By Mustafa Saadoun
• Is the solution to the Gulf crisis not approaching?
By Tariq Al-Homayed
------
How
Israel Is Triggering a Royal Civil War in Saudi Arabia
By
Elie Podeh
8 December
2020
Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman arrives at the Future Investment Initiative FII conference
in the Saudi capital Riyadh. October 24, 2018.Credit: GIUSEPPE CACACE - AFP
-----
Two weeks
after Netanyahu’s surprising meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin
Salman, Turki al-Faisal, a prominent Saudi prince close to the ruling royals,
lambasted Israel as a "Western colonizing" power, accusing it of
incarcerating Palestinians "in concentration camps under the flimsiest of
security accusations" and "assassinat[ing] whomever they want."
Turki’s
declarations, made at the Manama Security Dialogue in Bahrain, came as a blow
to Israeli foreign minister Gabi Ashkenazi, who spoke immediately afterwards,
and tried to sweep away the discomfort by expressing "regret" that
Turki had expressed sentiments out of sync with "the spirit and the
changes taking place in the Middle East."
But Turki’s
statements are important. He served as the kingdom’s intelligence chief for 20
years, was ambassador both in London and Washington, and met, unofficially,
many Israelis over the years.
His
comments stand in sharp contrast to recent statements made by another former
high-ranking Saudi official, Bandar bin Sultan, who vehemently attacked the
Palestinian leadership for their "reprehensible" opposition to
Israel-Gulf normalization.
So what is
going in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
Turki and
Bandar express two contrasting schools of thought with regard to the
normalization issue with Israel.
Turki
belongs to the school of King Salman, adhering to the traditional Saudi view,
as expressed in the Arab Peace Initiative which Riyadh initiated, that normalization with Israel must be part of a
reciprocal process. In this view, Saudi recognition of Israel rests on the
establishment of a Palestinian state within 1967 borders, East Jerusalem as its
capital, and an agreed upon solution of the Palestinian refugee problem.
Why
Israel’s anti-Bibi left is so lost – and chasing yet another general as its
Messiah. LISTEN
As the
custodian of Islam’s holy sites, Mecca and Medina, that in non-COVID years draw
some two million Muslim pilgrims annually, King Salman has no interest in a
diplomatic move that could weaken Saudi Arabia’s pre-eminent leadership status
by alienating substantial numbers of Muslims worldwide – and would also result
in dramatic economic repercussions.
In
contrast, his son, Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman is willing to move more
quickly on the normalization issue, and seems far less tied to the Arab Peace
Initiative criteria. It is still unclear what price he is demanding for
recognition, though he certainly wants to wipe away the stain of the assassination
of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi and to be offered a substantial U.S. arms
deal, eclipsing the F-35s and drones deal that the UAE clinched.
The
internal Saudi conflict on the Palestinian issue should not obscure the fact
that Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Israel is a consummation of a long
process, and it was not solely triggered by the emergence of Iran as a
hegemonic power in the Gulf.
https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium-how-israel-is-triggering-a-royal-civil-war-in-saudi-arabia-1.9353905?utm
-----
Fear And
The Freedom To Care: France’s Delicate Balance
By
Tala Jarjour
December
07, 2020
My regional
flight had landed in Istanbul just a few hours earlier, and what I thought
would be an uneventful early January night at an airport hotel in 2015 turned
out to be a nonstop news stream from Paris. Footage showing some car in a
narrow street in the French capital was replayed ad nauseam. News bulletins
were scrambling to report what was happening around the offices of a satirical
magazine I had not heard of. Tension was high; fear and shock were palpable.
Never had French news reporting seemed so incoherent. A terrorist attack was
ongoing. Charlie Hebdo quickly became a loaded term in Europe, embodying an
unmitigated clash of values. But that was just the beginning.
Fast
forward to autumn 2020 and a new level of terrifying news emerged from Paris:
The beheading of a schoolteacher on his way out of work. I tuned in to the
France Culture channel for some local reporting. “Detruire notre liberte”
(destroying our liberty) said the live stream. This was a predictable
combination of words and receiving them at the outset was little surprise.
Returning to the abundance of arguments on individual freedoms, which got
heated in the wake of the numerous attacks around Paris in January 2015, and
the invocation of the Bataclan alongside Charlie Hebdo are hardly edifying
anymore. But, on this occasion, there was more at stake. In France, education
is a red line.
The teacher
in question was reportedly targeted because he had shown the controversial
cartoons. The class in question was civics and the topic was the limits of free
speech. The teacher, praised by colleagues and pupils for his competence and
care, had a teaching plan and had communicated it to students. According to
other teachers, addressing controversial materials such as satirical cartoons
is common practice in French classroom discussions on the freedom of speech. In
a different world, namely a university classroom in the US, I encouraged
students in sessions on music and censorship to find songs from their own world
that were subjected to restriction. While initially some were outraged by the
thought of censorship in a country where many individual freedoms are
constitutionally protected, the students had no shortage of examples. The
exercise was eye-opening, to say the least. It demonstrated how society
practices censorship in myriad ways. In another example from the US, a
colleague who taught a class on civic law told me it was a very stressful
experience, and it took a toll on the professor’s popularity among students.
Stirring up
emotions when discussing the exercise of freedoms, especially the freedom of
expression, is not unusual. The slain French teacher was all too aware of this
peril; it was widely reported that he warned students about the cartoons,
telling them they could leave the classroom if the images might offend. But
little did he know. What in his mind was an act of sensitivity to contradicting
views would fail to spare his life.
In the
debates that followed the 2015 attack on Charlie Hebdo staff, I found one
notion particularly perplexing: The freedom to offend, which, I must say, was
new to me. For someone who spent their formative years in a diverse part of the
Middle East, the right to offend contains an inherent contradiction. If
behaving sensitively to values that others hold dear is a moral value in its
own right, then offending is definitely not a socially constructive choice. In
other words, in diverse societies, people take care of each other; avoiding
intentional offending is a no-brainer — but that, too, is a choice.
Thinkers
have been debating the meaning of free will for ages, and in great nuance.
Philosophers, religious scholars and scientists are still trying to work out
how free we really are as individual human beings. Recent research suggests
that, alongside our upbringing, our genetic makeup also influences our belief
systems.
While the
existence of mass-disseminated publications that offend may be the result of
believing in the freedom to do so, teaching about them is not. If anything,
dissecting the complexities of freedom and choice within educational debate
helps students appreciate the power of their freedom to choose, which equips
them for making socially responsible decisions. This awareness is especially
important when disagreements cut wide and deep.
Back in
2015, I packed up and headed to Ataturk Airport in the small hours of Jan. 8.
As I lugged my large suitcase to the check-in desk, the TV was still on. My
transatlantic flight included a stopover in Paris and I needed to know whether
airports were still open, especially to flights and travelers from the Middle
East. There were no major disruptions, save for tighter security checks — something
I had got used to when boarding US-bound flights in Paris since the early
2000s. But this time I had no complaints. The country was visibly in shock,
even in the transit zone of its largest international airport.
Perhaps I
should buy something in print with today’s date on it, I thought. A particular
option came to mind. “Charlie Hebdo no longer is,” said the newspaper seller,
looking me in the eye but staring into the void. Fear had hit home, and deep,
his eyes seemed to say. “Ca n’existe plus,” were his exact words, which my mind
heard as: “On what planet are you living, insensitive visitor?” I subsequently
learned that the magazine prints flew off the shelves while I was glued to a
news screen.
The
magazine eventually returned to circulation and, with it, seemingly unending
controversies. But the memory of that moment in Paris-Charles De Gaulle leaves
me wondering today: What other things have ceased to exist in the souls of
teachers and parents from all religious creeds and cultural backgrounds in France?
How will Muslim parents and children — also teachers — deal with the
repercussions of such troubling events as they try to lead normal lives in
Europe? As this piece goes to print, France is fully embroiled in debating new
laws that will, at best, restrict civil freedoms and, at worst, further isolate
specific slices of its population. Reading the news and following the media, I
wish that I, and many people, could have a chance to look into each other’s
eyes more often.
-----
Tala
Jarjour is author of “Sense and Sadness: Syriac Chant in Aleppo.” She is
Visiting Research Fellow at King’s College London, and Associate Fellow of Yale
College.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1773866
-----
Child
Recruitment Casts Shadow Over Syrian Kurds' Push For Global Legitimacy
By
Amberin Zaman and Dan Wilkofsky
Dec 7, 2020
Rawan
Aleku, a 16-year-old Syrian Kurdish high school student, has been missing from
her hometown of Dirbasiya since Oct 8. In multiple interviews with the local
press, her father, Umran, claimed that she was kidnapped by an armed group who
then handed the girl to “another group.” He has appealed to Mazlum Kobane, the
commander-in-chief of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the
“highest authority” in northeast Syria, “to undertake his humanitarian duty.”
“Return my
daughter Rawan Aleku to me, if you are honest. The pain of her disappearance is
killing me. I’m fighting to get her back whatever it costs me, even my life,”
Umran wrote in a Facebook post Nov. 10.
Rawan is
among dozens of minors who have been either willingly or forcibly recruited by
Kurdish rebels to fight in battles spanning Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, all
home to large Kurdish minorities. Kurds have long accepted that some of their
sons and daughters would have to be given up to the “cause” — to wrest their
rights from brutal regimes that have denied their existence and bloodily
silenced those who dared to call themselves Kurds. Lovingly framed photographs
of “martyred” children in their uniforms are proudly displayed in many a home.
Families of the fallen are accorded a privileged status. But in northeast
Syria, the mood is shifting as a growing number of Kurds aspire to a more
stable life away from war. And a handful of parents like Umran are beginning to
air their resentment publicly.
Between God
and a hard place
“I have
tried every avenue within the autonomous administration’s institutions to get
my daughter back,” Umran wrote in the local online Arknews. “But it appears
that Rojava isn’t ruled by anyone, but rather a higher power, God,” he wrote,
using the Kurdish name for the Kurdish-majority regions of Syria, “Because
everyone keeps directing me ‘higher,’ saying that decisions are coming ‘from
above,’ and ‘we don’t know anything.’ Who’s above except God? I want to call
specifically on Gen. Mazlum (Kobane) to get personally involved and end my
suffering. You are the last remaining national hope for us,” the anguished
father implored.
Kobane, who
successfully oversaw the coalition-led campaign against the Islamic State (IS)
in Syria, is — without question — the most popular and powerful man in the
Kurdish-run enclave that is also known as Rojava, or Western Kurdistan. But can
he deliver? The question goes to the heart of the power struggles pitting a
bewildering array of Kurdish factions against each other and Washington’s
efforts to help the autonomous administration establish political legitimacy in
the face of fierce pushback from Turkey.
The armed
group Umran alluded to is the "Ciwanen Soresger," or Revolutionary
Youth. They are believed to take their cues from the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK), the rebel group that has been fighting Turkey since 1984, initially for
Kurdish independence and now for political autonomy.
The “other
group” to which Umran says Rawan was handed could be either the PKK or its
all-female Syrian offshoot, the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ).
The YPJ and
its male counterpart the People's Protection Units (YPG) form the backbone of
Kobane’s SDF. Rights groups and the UN have called out all three over the
recruitment of minors for combat in violation of international law.
On June 29,
2019, Kobane signed an action plan with Special Representative of the UN
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Virginia Gamba in Geneva “to
end and prevent the recruitment and use of children, to identify and separate
boys and girls currently within its ranks, and to put in place preventative
protection and disciplinary measures related to child recruitment and use.”
A month
later, the autonomous administration opened the Child Protection Office to
combat child recruitment, among other things.
More than a
year on, and in an apparent challenge to Kobane’s authority, there are
persistent reports of boys and girls under the age of 18 being recruited by the
Revolutionary Youth. They are said to report to senior PKK commanders inside
Rojava.
Fuad,
another member of the Aleku family, told Al-Monitor that his nephew Lewend was
only 13 when he was spirited off by the PKK in 2015 and taken to their
headquarters in the Qandil Mountains bridging Iraq and Iran. “They trained him
for two years and sent him as a soldier back to Syria. He was martyred in Deir
ez-Zor in 2019,” Fuad said.
There are
no formal estimates for the number of children who have been forcibly recruited
in northeast Syria. The UN said that between January and July of this year, 51
girls between the ages of 13 and 17 had been removed from the ranks of the YPJ
and housed in a rehabilitation center, while 18 boys were in the process of
being released at the time of reporting.
The Child
Protection Office said it had received 50 complaints since opening its doors
and had returned as many as 15 children to their families. Kobane said in a
July interview that he regarded the practice as unacceptable and that perpetrators
would be punished. But there have been no prosecutions so far.
Parents who
speak up against the Revolutionary Youth face threats and intimidation,
according to several Syrian Kurds interviewed by Al-Monitor. None was willing
to be identified by name for fear of retribution. “These child protection
offices release one child, and the young men in the background go and take 10
or 15 children and send them to training centers,” said one, adding, however,
that he believed the Child Protection Office was sincere in its efforts but
could only do so much.
“Revolutionary
Youth monitor children through putting on events — sports, recreation, music.
They try to exploit children that way, and no one can say anything. No one can
raise his voice or complain,” one father told Al-Monitor. “Let’s say there is a
soccer match. The Revolutionary Youth will be present at these types of events.
They’ll take note of people. Those boys, what are their hobbies? What do they
like to do? If any child there is open to the idea of joining, they’ll entice
them. ‘What do you guys want?’ they’ll ask. 'We’ll give it to you. Soccer, ping
pong, whatever you want.'”
Hosheng
Ossi, a Syrian Kurd and former PKK sympathizer who now lives in exile in
Europe, says that the Revolutionary Youth is similar to PKK-linked armed youth
militias operating in Turkey that keep popping up under different names. “All
report directly to the PKK’s military wing, the Kurdistan Popular Resistance
Forces,” he asserted in a telephone interview with Al-Monitor.
The Patriotic
Revolutionary Youth movement, for example, led the urban insurrection in 2015
across towns and cities in Turkey’s heavily Kurdish southeast region. Entire
neighborhoods were pulverized and hundreds of civilians were killed when the
Turkish army responded with savagely indiscriminate force. The UN said Turkey’s
abuses amounted to “war crimes.” Yet the PKK was also sharply criticized by
many of its supporters for putting civilians at risk by shifting its battle to
population centers. Over half a million people were forcibly displaced, and Sur
— the historic heart of the Kurds’ unofficial capital Diyarbakir and home to a
magnificent Armenian church and an Ottoman-era mosque — was destroyed.
A Syrian
Kurdish media activist in Rojava said the Revolutionary Youth threatened him
because of his critical reporting. “Mazlum is against child recruitment, but he
can’t stop it. Why not? Because military cadres in the PKK are directing child
recruitment via the Revolutionary Youth,” the media activist told Al-Monitor.
Kobane, he noted, “has power over the SDF as an organization. But the PKK
military figures, mostly Turks and Iranians, they don’t abide by his
decisions."
A PKK
spokesman contacted via WhatsApp in Qandil declined to comment on PKK links
with the Revolutionary Youth or the presence of senior ranking PKK commanders
inside Rojava.
Nasser
Afrin, a member of the general coordinating committee for the Revolutionary
Youth Movement, also dodged Al-Monitor’s questions about whether it took its
orders from the PKK. But he rebuffed suggestions that the group partook in
child recruitment. “We are not a military organization that enables us to
recruit children. We totally deny it,” he said.
While some
Revolutionary Youth members serve on some of the autonomous administration's
youth committees, “We are an independent youth group; we are not part of the
autonomous administration, there's a difference” Afrin asserted. “Our goal is
to be able to organize youth across all areas of northeast Syria, educated
youth, youth interested in sports, culture, employed, unemployed. Meaning all
youth everywhere..”
Afrin
acknowledged that part of the effort to “develop the thought, the talents, the
psychology of youth” in communes across the Kurdish zone included “military
exercises.” He claimed this was to enable the youth to “protect themselves” and
to “develop young people’s potential.”
Queried
about Rawan, Afrin responded, “I have no idea about that.”
Kobane’s
office did not respond to Al-Monitor’s request for comment as to Rawan’s
whereabouts.
The PKK is
classified as a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union.
Many of the autonomous administration’s leaders, including Kobane, were drawn
from the PKK's ranks. This has served as justification for Turkey’s continued
assaults against the Syrian Kurdish entity and pushes US-Turkish ties into the
abyss. As Ankara sees things, its NATO ally is partnered with terrorists who
pose an existential threat to Turkey.
Washington
has sought to allay Turkish concerns, claiming initially that its partnership
with the SDF was “tactical, temporary and transactional,” and limited to the
fight against IS. But the continued presence of US troops since the fall of
Baghouz, the jihadis’ last remaining patch of territory last spring, has
deepened Turkish paranoia about Washington’s plans. The abiding worry in the
Turkish security establishment is that the United States and its European
allies are bent on establishing an independent Kurdish state that will nibble
away at Turkey.
The
outgoing US administration’s efforts to appease Turkey took a Machiavellian
turn in October 2019 when President Donald Trump allowed Turkish troops to
invade a large swath of Kurdish-run territory including the border towns of Ras
al-Ain and Tell Abyad and ordered US troops to withdraw to clear the way.
Russian and regime troops moved into the border areas vacated by the Americans
who moved deeper south, upending balances in the Kurdish-run zone.
Yankee stay
on!
Getting US
troops to remain in Rojava is Kobane’s priority. However modest — and
precarious — their presence, unlike that of the Russians, insulates the Kurds
against attacks from the regime and IS, but not against Turkey. So what could
be done to get Turkey to back off? Kobane came up with an idea: reach out to
the rival Kurdish National Council (KNC), a group of Syrian Kurdish parties
with close ties to the Turkish-supported Syrian opposition and Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) wing of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq.
Peace with
the KNC serves several important purposes. It would broaden the autonomous
administration’s public support, lubricate relations with the KRG and serve as
a backdoor for improving relations with Turkey. This would in turn make it
easier for US troops to remain in the northeast, melt Turkish resistance to the
Democratic Union Party's (PYD) participation in UN-facilitated talks to
determine Syria’s future, and expand Kobane’s room for maneuver until these
talks come to fruition. And that won’t be anytime soon.
Kobane
succeeded in convincing Washington to broker talks for a power-sharing
agreement with the KNC that kicked off in April. In a recent interview with
Al-Monitor, he acknowledged that he desired detente with Turkey and was ready
to talk with Ankara “without any preconditions.”
On paper,
there is quite a bit of progress toward finalizing the text of what will be
called the Qamishli Declaration. The document builds on an earlier set of
principles agreed upon between the sides in 2014 when Massoud Barzani, the KDP
leader, sponsored a second — and unsuccessful — round of talks between the KNC
and the PYD.
One of the
stickiest issues for example, deciding the KNC and the PYD’s respective share
of members on a proposed Kurdish Shura Council, has been agreed upon with
plenty of prodding from US diplomats on the ground. Many credit Kobane for
continuously accommodating the KNC’s demands when it's clearly the lesser
power. A well-placed source told Al-Monitor, “The KNC is asking for 50% of what
the PYD has but is not willing to give anything that they have in return.”
“For the
PYD and for Mazlum, this is an effort worth pursuing anyway because they are
interested in reforming the self-administration, they are interested in
international legitimacy and they hope it would lead to a role for them in the
[UN-mentored] political process — but there is no guarantee for them that it
would,” the source added.
However,
the one point on which the talks keep getting stuck is the PKK. Kobane
confirmed to Al-Monitor that the KNC insists that the Qamishli Declaration
contain wording that specifically refers to the PKK and states that the
autonomous administration and its affiliates disavow all connections to the
group. He has refused, saying the autonomous administration will not declare
support or hostility to any group as part of the agreement.
Washington
has also long pressed Kobane to “distance” himself from the PKK, not least
because their presence in Rojava serves as justification for Turkey’s repeated
attacks and poisons US relations.
The catch
is that Mazlum and many senior figures in the autonomous administration rose
through the PKK’s ranks when its now-imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, ran
the insurgency out of Syria. Washington is perfectly aware of this yet feigns
ignorance. In 1998, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s late father, Hafez,
expelled the PKK leader when the Turkish army threatened to invade. Ocalan was
captured soon after — with the CIA’s help — and has been kept in a prison
island off the coast of Istanbul ever since.
Coming full
circle
During his
19 years in Syria, Ocalan built what is now regarded as one of the most
resilient and sophisticated guerrilla outfits in recent history, one that has
withstood NATO’s second-largest army for 36 years. His message of mobilizing
and empowering women has spawned fawning coverage in the Western media.
Assad
Senior gave the PKK sanctuary for two reasons. One was to redirect the ire of
Syria’s own restive Kurds to their other big oppressor, Turkey, from whence
many had fled in the early 20th century. The other was to use the PKK as a
lever to pressure Turkey into releasing Syria’s fair share of water from the
Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which irrigate the country’s breadbasket, the
Jazirah region.
The Assad
regime’s Kurdish chickens have now come home to roost. Kobane is a globally
acclaimed figure who has spoken to Trump over the telephone, while Ilham Ahmed,
who heads the SDF’s civilian arm, has been received by France’s President
Emmanuel Macron and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The Jazirah region
and the country’s main dams and oil fields are now under Kurdish control and
protected by US forces. Turkey occupies large swaths of northern Syria with its
Sunni rebel allies. Unfazed and ever recalcitrant, Assad Junior has spurned the
Kurds’ demands for a fair deal.
Yet one of
Ankara’s worst fears is that they could yet strike one and team up, with Russia
and Iran’s backing, against Turkey once again. It follows that Turkey might
view a power-sharing arrangement between the PYD and the KNC that would
eventually encompass Arabs in the northeast, all under US protection, as a
lesser evil.
But there
are few signs that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is interested, even
though Kobane has signaled privately that PKK cadres within the civilian
administration need to be gently eased out. Already by assuming a
co-sponsorship role along with the United States in the Kurdish unity talks,
Kobane has effectively cast himself as independent of the PKK and the PYD. Not
only that, he announced for the first time via Al-Monitor that should this be
of benefit to Rojava and his people and, provided that the Turks were sincere,
he would be willing to mediate between Ankara and the PKK.
It wouldn’t
be a first. Amed Dicle, a veteran Kurdish reporter, revealed in a
groundbreaking book about the Turkish state’s secret talks with the PKK that a
Turkish colonel had met with the PKK’s top man in Europe on the German-Dutch
border in the late 1990s to test the possibility of a cease-fire. The PKK’s man
was Kobane. When Turkey’s latest stab at peace with the PKK in the early days
of the Syrian conflict was still in play, Kobane was very much in the loop.
Either way,
the fiction that the PKK and the YPG are not connected is becoming increasingly
hard to maintain.
“The
secrecy that was surrounding the presence of these cadres is no longer viable.
It’s not possible to keep this clandestine streak in Arab areas like Deir
ez-Zor where the way they conduct themselves appears foreign to the area.
Today, people know who they are and talk openly about it,” said Dareen Khalifa,
a senior Syria analyst for the International Crisis Group who just returned
from a field trip to Rojava where she interviewed Kobane. “To the autonomous
administration’s credit, it’s something that’s being discussed more openly
within the realm of the intra-Kurdish talks and the internal reform process
that they’ve been undergoing, through town hall, meetings, general conferences,”
Khalifa explained in an interview with Al-Monitor. “So, the way they are
working on this now,” she continued, “is putting it within the framework of a
Syrianization of institutions, reforming local governance based on domestic
pressure.”
Khalifa added, “So when [Kobane] said they’d
already committed to phasing out the cadres and that the process has already
started, he put it within the framework of intra-Kurdish talks and of the local
dialogues they have been having in the predominantly Arab areas [under Kurdish
control].”
“Despite
the significance of Kobane’s pledge to pull out non-Syrian cadres from Syria,
it remains unclear whether such a move would be sufficient to de-escalate
tensions with Ankara since for Turkey the main issue is party affiliation (and
operational ties to Qandil) rather than citizenship. Ankara is also skeptical
whether Kobane is actually willing and capable of implementing such a move,”
she said.
Zagros
Hiwa, the PKK spokesman, declined to comment on US efforts to drive out the PKK
from Syria. "The main source of the problems in north Syria, and Syria in
general, is the Turkish state’s occupation of Syria, either directly or through
radical jihadist groups. If the US really wants to solve the Syrian crisis,
they will have to address this core issue," Hiwa said via Whatsapp.
Kurds
across the ideological spectrum support Kobane and his efforts to secure
Rojava’s future through a mix of pragmatism and diplomacy. His dream for the
northeast to eventually become the template for a democratic and prosperous
Syria that is anchored in the West and has cordial ties with all of its
neighbors is catching on.
The
Revolutionary Youth’s actions and Kobane’s apparent inability to rein them in,
however, flies in the face of such efforts and provides Ankara with further
ammunition.
KNC
officials blame the group for vandalizing its offices in Qamishli in August.
The SDF condemned the attack, saying the perpetrators would be held
accountable. “Recently, every time the KNC-PYD negotiations have progressed,
under American supervision and [with Kobane] present, this group’s activity has
increased more and more,” said Ibrahim Birro, a senior KNC figure.
“It’s a
clear sign from Qandil, from the PKK, that they don’t want these negotiations
to succeed,” he told Al-Monitor in an interview. But is it?
The same
night that the KNC affiliate’s office was targeted, Revolutionary Youth members
returned to the scene and restored the awning along with a defaced drawing of
the party’s flag.
Child
recruitment is commonplace among Kurdish groups throughout the region. By
resisting Kobane’s efforts to end the practice, the PKK is likely signaling
displeasure that the unity talks appear to be coming at their expense.
US
hypocrisy in this regard is “utterly disgusting,” said a Western civil society
worker who has dealt with Kurdish factions for more than three decades. “All of
those US generals who were planning the battles against the Islamic State, who
were they planning it with, who was doing the heavy lifting on the ground? The
PKK,” he said. “And now they are just supposed to disappear?”
“It’s
thanks in large part to PKK cadre that the Islamic State was defeated,”
concurred Aliza Marcus, the author of “Blood and Belief,” the most
authoritative English-language history of the PKK. “The question is: What is
the point of the demand?” she said in emailed comments to Al-Monitor. “Is this in hopes of satisfying Turkey or is
there an actual deal underway? If it’s the former — in other words, a hope this
will satisfy Ankara — then the US needs to recognize that removing Turkish
cadres will not be sufficient, not least of all because there are Syrian
Kurdish cadres active as well,” she observed.
Meanwhile,
Turkey’s unremitting attacks against the group across Iraqi Kurdistan
contradict its calls for PKK militants to leave Rojava. The weaker they grow in
Iraq, the deeper they will likely dig into Syria.
Kobane, in
his November interview with Al-Monitor, praised the PKK for its role in
defeating IS. “It’s important to note that the PKK made big sacrifices in the
war against terror in Rojava. Nobody can dispute this. The PKK will always
defend the interests of the people of Rojava. It will not create problems for
them. On the contrary, it will always look to ease their path. That is what we
believe,” he said. What better proof than to return Rawan to her family.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/12/syria-kurds-pkk-missing-youth-sdf-kobane-us-turkey-erdogan.html
-----
Shiite
Factions Close To Sistani Move To Separate From Iran-Backed Militias
By
Mustafa Saadoun
Dec 6, 2020
Four
brigades close to top Shiite cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani held a Dec.
2-4 conference on supporting the state against opposition movements from some
militias close to Iran.
The final
statement of the conference carried a harsh tone against corruption and
militias’ exploitation of the war against the Islamic State for personal and
factional interests.
The four
factions are Liwa Ansar al-Marjaiya, Liwa Ali al-Akbar, Firqat al-Abbas
al-Qitaliyah and Firqat al-Imam Ali al-Qitaliyah. They had previously asked to
get detached from the Popular Mobilization Units and instead be affiliated with
the Iraqi Defense Ministry, as a part of integration into the state forces.
The four
factions declared themselves under full control of the state, demanding to be
separated from the PMU and instead be directly connected with Iraq's prime
minister, the country's commander in chief.
The final
statement was released three days after the “shrine units’ conference” in the Imam
Ali Shrine in Najaf, where Sistani lives. The conference was a surprise for the
remaining armed Shiite factions, be they under the wing of the PMU or outside
of it.
An official
in the shrine units told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity that they were
working to separate organizations that supported the Iraq government from
factions and political parties that follow the interests of another state. This
was a reference to Iran, which is accused of controlling the PMU.
He told
Al-Monitor, “Some of the armed factions inside the PMU took advantage of
Sistani’s fatwa to adopt entities parallel to the state entity and forces
parallel to its regular troops. They also exploited the capacities of the PMU
and its power in political affairs and were implicated in crimes of corruption
and murder.”
The fatwa
the official was referring to was Sistani's call upon volunteers to join Iraqi
official security forces after the Islamic State seized Mosul and other parts
of Iraq in 2014.
The
official added, “The separation project was on the table, even before the
killing of deputy head of the PMU, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis [in January 2020], but
it was delayed when he was killed." The official said other PMU militias
have been ignoring the shrine factions' demands to have the PMU under state
control and have not been giving the shrine militias a chance to participate in
the PMU decision-making process. He said an exacerbating factor was the
designation of the Kataib Hezbollah leader known as Abu Fadak as the PMU chief
of staff.
“The recent
conference was a reaction to the ongoing chaos, including the illegal measure
that PMU chairman Faleh al-Fayadh, who is not favored by Najaf, took by
installing Abu Muntadher al-Husseini … as secretary of the PMU,” the official
said.
The shrine
factions' official also spoke about “the imminent withdrawal of their forces
from the PMU for good, unless the government and political forces pay attention
to the signs of the shrine units united with Sistani.”
Yazan
al-Jabouri, who leads a Sunni PMU brigade, told Al-Monitor, “This is a
Shiite-Shiite dispute between the shrine units and the loyalist [pro-Iranian]
units. We are the state’s units, and we are not part of the dispute. We did not
fight for a religious fatwa, but we fought to liberate our areas, and we found
in the PMU a legal umbrella for our military presence.”
He
mentioned “problems within the PMU,” adding, “These problems threaten the
future of the PMU because the risks are internal rather than external.”
Officials
in the shrine units accused factions that are loyal to Iran and that follow
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of pursuing riches and their own
interests.
The shrine
factions' move to associate themselves with the government had been expected,
particularly since the four militias had closely cooperated with the chief of
staff of the Iraqi armed forces during the battle against the Islamic State,
and were also known for not committing human rights abuses.
Mahmoud
al-Rabihi, a spokesman for Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which is accused of loyalty to
Iran, told Al-Monitor, “Talking about more than one PMU is unacceptable and
violates Iraqi law. Sistani did not make any reference to such a divisive
description. Sistani refuses to be affiliated with one party because he is
there for all the units, all Iraqis and every believer in all countries of the
world.”
Rabihi
added, “Stirring this issue does not please Sistani, who has been known to be
the father of all. Some want to be affiliated with the general leader or the
Defense Ministry, and they have their reasons and motives, which we think will
not divide the … PMU.”
Adel
Badawi, a professor of political science at the University of Baghdad, told
Al-Monitor that the separation of the shine units from the PMU could reduce the
legitimacy of the factions loyal to Iran.
It seems
highly likely that the shrine factions' push toward separation from the PMU
occurred with the knowledge or even instruction of Sistani. Such a conference
likely could not be held in the Imam Ali Shrine without the approval of
Sistani, who directly oversees it; it also is just steps away from his
residence.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/12/iraq-iran-pmu-sistani.html
------
Is The
Solution To The Gulf Crisis Not Approaching?
By
Tariq Al-Homayed
December 7, 2020
Kuwaiti
Foreign Minister Sheikh Ahmed Nasser Al-Sabah said that progress has been made
towards ending the Arab Gulf dispute with Qatar.
In a
televised statement, he said, “all parties involved in recent talks affirmed
their keenness on Gulf and Arab solidarity and stability and expressed their
desire to find a final and lasting solution to the GCC crisis for the benefit
of their people.”
As a
result, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal Bin Farhan said: “We have made great
progress in recent days, thanks to the continuous efforts of Kuwait and to the
strong support of US President Donald Trump.
“We hope
that this progress will result in a final agreement that appears within reach,
and I can say that I am optimistic that we are close to concluding an agreement
between all the countries that are in disagreement.”
It is
clear, as of now while writing this article, that we are seeing optimistic
statements all of which justify the necessity of achieving this peace now
between the Gulf countries — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and
Bahrain, besides Egypt, with Qatar for the sake of the unity and cohesion of
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
The truth
is that the GCC has gone through many challenges over the past four decades,
the consequences of which have surpassed the current crisis or those that
preceded it with Qatar, and yet the Council, led by Saudi Arabia, passed
through them to safety, and that is with the cooperation of its sister States.
The fear
for the GCC is justified, and therefore there were several statements about the
need for the Gulf security coordination, and for Gulf-Gulf relations to be
good, hoping to cut off the road to Iran, and of course Turkey too.
This was
evident in the Vision of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman in 2015
that aimed at achieving the desired integration of the GCC in the security,
political, military and economic sectors, and hence no one wants to divide the
Council and its States.
Likewise,
no one wants to shake the relationship of the GCC with Egypt, which is the
cornerstone of security and stability in the region. This makes it imperative
to strengthen this relationship, as it is very important to protect Arab
national security and achieve higher common interests.
Therefore,
what is required now, and in the event of reconciliation, is to ensure that
there is a mechanism for resolving differences and disputes that occur in the
Council, and that would be practical, in order to ensure that the main issues
do not recur, especially since the differences are real, and that affect our
security and our existence.
It also
affects the security and the entity of the GCC as a whole. There must be a
mechanism to ensure that we learn from experiences and not repeat those things
that undermine our security.
The differences
are fundamental and existential, and that do not end only with a handshake, but
with real change. This should be coupled with proper awareness about the
importance of the council’s entity, and before that the security and stability
of countries.
And I say
it again that no one is upset with reconciliation, if it happens, especially if
it is based on pragmatic foundations and real guarantees. What is important,
and most important, is that we not test the examiner.
https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/601104/Opinion/Voices/Is-the-solution-to-the-Gulf-crisis-not-approaching
------
URL: https://newageislam.com/middle-east-press/middle-east-press-royal-civil/d/123689
New Age Islam, Islam Online, Islamic Website, African Muslim News, Arab World News, South Asia News, Indian Muslim News, World Muslim News, Women in Islam, Islamic Feminism, Arab Women, Women In Arab, Islamophobia in America, Muslim Women in West, Islam Women and Feminism