By New Age Islam Edit
Desk
24 November
2020
• Israeli Arabs Enjoy Fruits Of Normalization
With The Emirates
By Afif Abu Much
• The Future Of Iran’s Ties With Al-Qaeda Under
New US President
By Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami
• International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Definition
Will Not Help Fight Anti-Semitism
By Mark Muhannad Ayyash
• How Abiy Ahmed Can Bring Back Peace To Ethiopia
By Ashok Swain
• Antony Blinken, Biden’s New Secretary Of
State Ready To Take On The Middle East
By Elizabeth Hagedorn
-----
Israeli Arabs Enjoy Fruits Of Normalization
With The Emirates
By Afif Abu Much
Nov 23,
2020
Egyptian
actor and singer Mohamed Ramadan found himself at the center of a storm on
social media following his photos in Dubai with Israeli singer Omer Adam and
Israeli-Arab soccer player Dia Saba. Both Adam and Saba arrived to Dubai
following the normalization agreement between Israel and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). Still, this controversy does not seem to stop the momentum
created by the agreement, including one within the Israeli-Arab public.
In fact,
several Israeli Arabs have decided to ride the momentum of the agreement. They
have started flying to the Emirates, a destination that up to now had been
closed to those with an Israeli passport. Some of them fly for business, others
for pleasure.
It started
with the Bank Hapoalim initiative that sent Sept. 8 a delegation of 14
businesspeople, among them businessman Ahmad Dabbah from Dir al-Assad, for an
official visit to the UAE, which included meetings with the commerce department
and representatives from the financial and banking sectors. On Sept. 14, the
chairman of the Board of Bank Leumi, Samer Haj Yehia, headed a delegation of
businessmen including Ahmad Afifi of Nazareth. At the end of their visit they
announced the signing of an agreement with banks from Dubai and Abu Dhabi.
So far this
month, an increasing number of Israeli-Arab citizens have flown to Dubai to enjoy
this beautiful city, which is home to the tallest tower in the world, Burj
Khalifa, the largest shopping mall in the world and an indoor ski slope.
Hadeel
Tellawi of Taibe, who is currently visiting Dubai, told Al-Monitor, “I’m
visiting Dubai for the first time and I’m amazed at the beauty of this city. In
my view Dubai is a source for Arab pride, a city we can be proud of all over
the world. What is striking and surprising to me is the sheer cleanliness of
the city, where they clean and wash the streets and entertainment venues every
day. When I went up Burj Khalifa I was thrilled that an Arab country managed to
build the tallest building in the world. [Dubai is] a gorgeous, unique,
interesting and charming city.” When asked how the UAE is dealing with the
coronavirus pandemic, she said, “They enforce the restrictions and wearing of
masks and don’t let anyone take off the mask even for a second, so you feel
very safe.”
In the
past, a number of Israeli Arabs have visited the UAE for business and pleasure.
Most did so with a Palestinian passport they obtained from the Palestinian
Authority (PA) after much bureaucracy, which enabled them to fly to a variety
of destinations in the Arab world through the airport in Amman, since an
Israeli passport prevented them from doing so.
Examples of
such visits were those of Israeli-Arab singers Haitham Halaila and Manal Mousa,
who participated in the "Arab Idol" competition, the most popular TV
show in the Arab world, in 2014 in Lebanon. This gave them the opportunity to
perform in many Arab countries, including in the UAE.
The
normalization agreement has not only made travel between Israel and the UAE
possible, it is also, according to many, an opportunity to build bridges and
connect with the Arab world. The first to reap the fruits of the agreement was
Israeli national soccer team player Saba from Majd al-Krum, who made history
and joined Al-Nasr Dubai in a deal that is considered historic on many levels,
becoming the first Israeli soccer player to play for the Emirati team.
Amir Assi
from Kafr Bara is another example of someone who has taken advantage of the
normalization agreement. Assi heads Al-Amir Group that specializes in building
business and tourist connections with the Arab world and the PA, including
arranging flights to Saudi Arabia for hajj and umrah, the nonmandatory
pilgrimage that can be undertaken throughout the year. He has recently signed
an agreement with Flydubai to arrange direct flights from Ben-Gurion Airport to
the UAE.
In a
conversation with Al-Monitor, Assi said that he was on his way to meet with one
of the most well-known businessmen in Dubai. “We have recently opened an office
for Al-Amir Group in Dubai and our representative in the office is Manal Mousa,
who became famous for her participation in 'Arab Idol.'”
Assi noted
that his company is the first from Israel to sign an agreement for direct
flights to Dubai, whether for business or pleasure. “Up to now five of our
flights have flown to Dubai — the passengers were half Arab and half Jewish.
The decision to open an office in Dubai came in response to a wave of requests
we received to advance business connections in the UAE. We are now working to
set up a delegation that will include 70 to 80 leading businessmen in Israel,
to hold business meetings with the owners of Dubai Mall and Burj Khalifa at the
beginning of January.”
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/11/israel-united-arab-emirates-manal-mousa-haitham-halaila.html
-----
The Future Of Iran’s Ties With Al-Qaeda Under
New US President
By Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami
November
23, 2020
Al-Qaeda
------
The
announcement of the killing of Al-Qaeda’s deputy commander in Tehran has again
raised questions about the Iranian regime’s relationship with the terrorist
organization and has provided a fresh reminder of the need to analyze the
regime’s strategy based on using the organization as an asset and providing
safe havens for its leaders.
On Nov. 14,
2020, American media outlets cited reports from US officials confirming that a
covert joint operation by US and Israeli intelligence services had resulted in
the assassination of Al-Qaeda commander Abu Mohammed Al-Masri in the heart of
Tehran on Aug. 7, 2020. Al-Masri was involved in the attacks on the US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. The Iranian Foreign Ministry
predictably dismissed the reports of Al-Masri’s killing on Iranian soil,
describing them as “fake news.”
In the face
of significant evidence from various sources repeatedly confirming the
longstanding relationship between Iran and Al-Qaeda, the regime in Tehran
insists on sticking unyieldingly to its policy of denial. It cites sectarian
differences and conflicting ideological views as supposedly compelling evidence
of the lack of any connection between Tehran and Al-Qaeda, and it reiterates
the animosity between the two sides. However, a closer look at both the
trajectory of relations between the two sides and their ideological
similarities will quickly reveal the deep-rooted ties between them and show the
Iranian regime’s success in forging an alliance with Al-Qaeda and employing its
operatives to meet Iranian objectives.
In theory,
there are two different schools of thought within Al-Qaeda in relation to
dealing with Shiites in general and with Iran in particular. The first school
of thought, spearheaded by Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abu Mohammed Al-Maqdisi,
believes that targeting Iranians and Shiites in general is not a priority for
the organization because they are excused for their ignorance of the “true”
understanding of Islam, which Al-Qaeda claims to monopolize. Also, this school
is somewhat more lenient and flexible in its attitude toward Shiites when
compared to the second school of thought, which will be discussed in the
following lines. According to this first school of thought, precedence should
be given to confronting the more evident enemy: The West, the US and those
aligned with them.
The second
school of thought within Al-Qaeda was spearheaded by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, a
student of Al-Maqdisi and the assassinated leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who
believed in the necessity of expanding the organization’s terrorist operations
against Shiites with the aim of sparking a Sunni-Shiite civil war in Iraq.
On the
ground, meanwhile, Iran’s regime has provided a safe haven for Al-Qaeda
operatives who had been trapped in Afghanistan following the US invasion of
Kabul in 2001. Many members of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups found they
had no choice but to escape to Iran, particularly in light of the Iranian
regime sharing the organization’s animosity toward the US and feeling they had
no hope of fleeing to Pakistan given the strong CIA presence there.
By having
these Al-Qaeda members and affiliates on its soil, Iran found additional assets
for extending its terrorist capabilities in the region and beyond. These assets
had the potential to carry out whatever terrorist operations the Iranian regime
wished to mount or potentially serve as a useful bargaining chip with the US,
to be swapped — if necessary — to achieve its interests against the US.
Meanwhile,
Al-Zarqawi directed his extremist vision toward the Shiites in Iraq in order to
cause the greatest possible disruption for the remaining US troops in Iraq in
order to drive them out of the country, enabling Iran to take control of Iraq.
It is worth noting that Al-Zarqawi had first fled to Iran following the 2001 US
invasion of Afghanistan before moving to Iraq.
Although 20
years have passed since the confrontation between the US and Al-Qaeda reached
its peak, Iran still maintains the organization as an asset and bargaining
chip, harboring senior Al-Qaeda commanders such as Saif Al-Adel, a high-level
member of the organization’s shoura council, on its soil. Experts believe that
Al-Adel has tremendous field experience, with most observers agreeing that he
is still in Iran according to a UN report released in 2018. Other prominent
Al-Qaeda associates still in Iran include the family of the terrorist
organization’s deceased founder, Osama bin Laden.
With the
“alliance and employment” relationship between Al-Qaeda and Iran’s regime
proven and well-documented, it seems probable that the future of the
Washington-Tehran relationship under the incoming US President Joe Biden will
put the Iranian regime under significant US pressure no less than the extreme
pressure imposed on the regime by President Donald Trump.
Despite the
expected gradual settlement of the crisis surrounding the nuclear deal during
Biden’s time in office, the problems resulting from all the other Iranian
excesses will emerge more than ever before. These excesses include Iran’s
expansionism across the Middle East, the regime’s support for armed militias
and terrorist groups, its human rights abuses and the issue of detainees with
dual Iranian-European citizenship in Iranian prisons. Each of these excesses
and aggressions by Iran’s regime is sufficient to provoke sanctions against
Tehran and they should be as severe as those imposed on it due to its nuclear
activities. The foregoing is based on the assumption that US sanctions will be
lifted all in one go after Biden comes to power, which we believe to be rather
unrealistic.
For its
part, Iran, for the first time, announced the upcoming release of several
detainees from its prisons shortly after the announcement of Biden’s victory in
the US presidential election. After Trump filed lawsuits challenging the
validity of the voting process in a few states, Iran slowed down in taking the
remaining steps to release the detainees. This was in addition to the growing
debate within the Iranian ruling elite about the possible future scenarios in
relation to the US position on the nuclear deal under Biden and the best way to
deal with them.
While
dragging its heels on releasing some detainees, Iran was expected to release
some of the imprisoned dual nationals. A significant number of dual nationals
have been arrested while visiting their relatives in Iran. The regime levels
various implausible allegations at detained dual nationals, such as accusing
them of carrying out espionage missions for Western countries, and effectively
uses them as bargaining chips during its negotiations with the West. One of the
best known among these cases is that of Iranian-British dual citizen Nazanin
Zaghari-Ratcliffe, detained in Tehran since April 2016.
Based on
all the mentioned points, even if the assassination of Al-Qaeda leaders in Iran
carried out by the US and Israel results in the close relationship between
Tehran and Al-Qaeda coming to the fore again, this will serve Iran indirectly,
relieving the regime of the burden of harboring Al-Qaeda commanders, and
significantly reducing the likelihood of future escalation between Iran and the
Biden administration. This is especially so when we put the killing of Al-Masri
in Iran on Nov. 14, 2020, side by side with the success of French forces in
killing Bah Ag Moussa, an Al-Qaeda military leader in the organization’s North
African wing on Nov. 13, 2020, and with Afghanistan’s announcement of the
killing of one of Al-Qaeda’s senior commanders on its soil, Mohammad Hanif Rezai,
on Nov. 12, 2020.
This means
there are a number of files related to Al-Qaeda and its collaboration with
certain governments, first and foremost Iran, that are about to be closed,
meaning the policy of “alliance and employment” that Iran has pursued with
Al-Qaeda may come to an end. In the meantime, the current US administration is
hastening its withdrawal of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, making them
conducive arenas for the spread of terror activities of Iranian militias
operating on the ground in both countries.
-----
Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is head of the
International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah).
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1767291
-------
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Definition
Will Not Help Fight Anti-Semitism
By Mark Muhannad
Ayyash
23 Nov 2020
Following
in the footsteps of various European and North American local and national
governments, the Legislative Assembly of Canada’s Ontario province was set to
become the latest political body to adopt a controversial definition and list
of illustrative examples of anti-Semitism.
First put
forward in December 2019, the Combating Antisemitism Act, or Bill 168, sought
to revise the province’s definition in accordance with what the International
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) has outlined constitutes anti-Semitism.
But on
October 26, the day before public hearings were set to begin, Premier Doug Ford
instead issued Order in Council 1450/2020, which declared that the Ontario
government would recognise the IHRA. Unlike Bill 168, however, the Order in
Council did not reference the illustrative examples or amend existing statutes.
It remains unclear whether Bill 168 will be shelved and whether decision-makers
will still be encouraged to interpret the Order in Council as including the
illustrative examples.
According
to the IHRA’s working definition of anti-Semitism:
“Antisemitism
is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews.
Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward
Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community
institutions and religious facilities.”
Many
advocates for justice in Palestine find nothing wrong with this definition, and
they indeed support the necessary fight against anti-Semitism. The problem,
however, as they point out is the conflation of this definition with critiques
of Israel. Even though the IHRA insists that it does not wish to censor
criticism of Israel, the effect of adopting this definition and its examples is
certainly to police and censor the Palestinian critique of Israel.
Despite the
IHRA’s claim that the definition is non-legally binding, the definition and its
adoption, according to American scholar Rebecca Ruth Gould, “comes to function
as … a quasi-law, in which capacity it exercises the de facto authority of the
law, without having acquired legal legitimacy”.
In short,
the IHRA definition seeks to make rather banal and soft criticisms of Israel
acceptable (eg, policy X failed because of certain unintended consequences, a
misreading of the political conditions, etc.) while censoring more serious and
necessary critiques (ie, the Palestinian critique of the colonial foundations
of the Israeli state and the need to transform them).
Of the
examples presented in the IHRA definition, three in particular stand out. The
first casts as anti-Semitic any argument in which we may find the following
feature: “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, eg, by
claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.”
The list of
academic articles and books that would become anti-Semitic if we accepted this
example is indeed astounding. It would include the writings of Hannah Arendt,
Edward Said, Gilles Deleuze, Judith Butler, Joseph Massad, Achille Mbembe,
Robert Wolfe, Angela Davis, Hamid Dabashi, Audra Simpson and many others. In
fact, an entire academic journal, Settler Colonial Studies, would have to be
removed from all of our libraries.
What is
really alarming about this example is that it posits the nation-state as a
natural and irrefutable fact of social and political life, and one that is
beyond reproach, critique and deep analysis. The historical reality is that the
nation-state is a relatively new mode of social and political organisation.
The
overwhelming majority of nation-states that exist today, including Israel, only
came into being as modern nation-states during the 20th century. Academic
theorisations and analyses of the nation-state are replete with critiques of
these states as founded in violence, and as based in racial and sexual
contracts that foundationally discriminate and attack certain racialised and
gendered bodies.
Israel is
not singled out when its statehood is called a racist endeavour. It is, in
fact, treated with the same level of critique that is often directed against
all nation-states, including Canada. The equivalent of this example if applied
to Canada is to render the following statement as hate speech and potentially
criminal: “Canada’s foundational structure is racist.”
If this is
the path the IHRA is promoting, then let us stop all pretention and censor
Indigenous studies and critical race theory, as well as all textbooks that
mention these theoretical traditions and schools of thought. I realise that the
Ford government and other conservative governments would welcome such a
censorship, but the majority of the world’s scholars and thinkers would not.
Moreover,
this example paradoxically violates another example put forth in the IHRA
definition. As they state, “Applying double standards by requiring of [Israel]
a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.” By stating
in the first example that no one shall point out the racist endeavour that
underpins the Israeli state, it actually applies a different standard to the
Israeli state. The first example dissolves the very equality of standards that
this second example is alleging to promote.
But there
is also another serious problem with this example. What sort of behaviour
qualifies as “not expected” of any other democratic nation? Supporters of
Israel often argue that criticism of Israel’s violent actions in Gaza and other
Palestinian territories, or maintaining the right of Palestinian refugees to
return to their land, or questioning Israel’s alleged democratic character
constitutes anti-Semitism.
But is
ending a siege on a native population “not expected” of a democratic nation? In
Israel’s case, that would be Gaza, and in a country like Canada, that would be
the political siege on Indigenous communities which allows the government to
get away with not providing basic services to them, such as clean drinking
water.
Is the
demand not to kill civilians in military operations never asked of Canada or
the United States when they commit war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq? Is the
demand to allow Palestinians sovereign rights to their land and resources not
also demanded of Canada when we are debating and critiquing the building of
pipelines and their infringement on Indigenous sovereignty?
More
generally, are we, as activists, scholars and citizens not allowed to ask
questions about what constitutes a “democratic nation”, what demands and behaviours
we ought to expect from our governments and other governments? As a
Palestinian-Canadian scholar myself, am I not allowed to interrogate the nature
of government in Israel? Do we expect Kashmiri-Canadians to not interrogate the
Indian state and make demands of it? Or Irish-Canadians to not do the same in
regard to the United Kingdom?
If that is
the case, then more bodies of work need to be removed from our libraries:
democratic theory, critical political and social theory, all Marxist analysis
of democracy, postcolonial theory and feminist theory.
While we
are at it, we had better remove Aristotle from our libraries as well. He does
at one point suggest that democracy is not a favourable form of government
because it does not serve us well in achieving the “common good”, and that
might encourage students to question what makes a democracy a “democracy”, how
its current structure may fail to achieve the common good, and this might lead
them to challenge the accepted and conventional norms of what we ought to
expect from a democracy.
And this in
turn might lead Palestinian-Canadian scholars and others to question what we
might demand of Israel and the nature of the Israeli state.
Finally,
there is the third, more complex example: “Drawing comparisons of contemporary
Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.” Personally, I do not engage in this kind
of comparison. I am mindful of the pain that this comparison can inflict on
members of the Jewish community. But more to the point, I do not find it
historically accurate or illuminating. For me, it is much more insightful to
compare Israeli policy and violence with colonial (British) and
settler-colonial states (the US, Canada, and Australia).
Nonetheless,
one needs to ask here a very uncomfortable question but one that the example
itself brings to bear: are the Holocaust survivors who themselves have made
this comparison in the past, are they anti-Semitic? Does this mean that we
ought to censor those particular accounts from Holocaust survivors, or books by
Israeli and Palestinian academics who attempt to think the Holocaust and the
Nakba (the 1948 catastrophe) side by side?
I realise
that some will see my line of argument as an effort to extend these examples to
absurd conclusions that do not really concern the proposed IHRA definition.
This response in fact affirms my main point in this piece. Proponents of the
IHRA will surely argue that they are not interested in censoring Indigenous
theory, critical race theory, postcolonial theory, democratic theory, accounts
of Holocaust survivors or Aristotle. And my retort to that assertion is why
not?
All of
these schools and ideas conjure a kind of critique that can deeply challenge
the nation-state as a racist and ethnonational endeavour that ought to be
transformed. Why is it that only when these critiques are applied to Israel
that we ought to censor them?
The answer
is that this definition and these examples are only interested in how
Palestinian scholars and supporters of justice for Palestinians have taken up
these critiques and directed them against Israel. That is their only target,
and as such, this is a purely political manoeuvre, not a substantive one. These
examples are, on a fundamental level, anti-Palestinian.
The
absurdity here is not the logical conclusion I am drawing out of these
examples. Rather, absurdity is embedded within these examples and guides them.
These examples reveal that the effect of the IHRA definition is not the
necessary, timely and important work of combatting anti-Semitism, but rather
the censorship and erasure of Palestinian opposition to the violence that
continues to dispossess them.
The
strategic context in which all of this is taking place is critical to
underscore. Palestinians are weaker than the Israelis militarily and
politically. The only advantage that Palestinians hold is the justness of their
cause and struggle. The moral basis of their struggle is what still connects
many people across the world to the Palestinian cause, for example through the
BDS campaign.
By painting
Palestinian resistance, which comes in the form of a radical and deep critique
of the Israeli state, as anti-Semitic, the IHRA definition effectively seeks to
gain the upper hand for Israel and for supporters of Israel in the moral domain
as well.
It should
be noted that member countries in the IHRA are all European or the products of
European settler colonialism – almost all of which are, to varying degrees,
allies and supporters of Israel as a result of that shared colonial foundation
and world view.
Regardless
of what transpires in Ontario, one thing is clear: the IHRA definition with its
illustrative examples will accomplish nothing in the fight against
anti-Semitism. But it will present a serious obstacle to the work of scholars,
groups and organisations that are struggling for Palestinian freedom and
liberation, and thus, it stands in the way of peace and justice in
Palestine/Israel.
-----
Ayyash is the author of A Hermeneutics of
Violence (UTP, 2019). He was born and raised in Silwan, Jerusalem, before
immigrating to Canada. He is currently writing a book on settler colonial
sovereignty.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/11/23/the-ihra-and-the-palestinian-struggle-for/
-----
How Abiy Ahmed
Can Bring Back Peace To Ethiopia
By Ashok Swain
November
23, 2020
Ethiopian
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed addresses members of parliament at the Parliament
building
---
Abiy Ahmed
became the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in April 2018. After only 18 months in
office, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2019. He was given this honour
for achieving peace and resolving the border conflict with neighbouring
Eritrea.
Prime
Minister Abiy’s effort to bring a swift end to more than two decades of bitter bilateral
conflict was then appreciated by the world. However, the way the internal
security dynamic in Ethiopia has evolved since then and the civil war is raging
in its northern province Tigray, doubts have started arising about a peaceful
Ethiopia.
After
coming to power in 2018, Prime Minister Abiy pursued a reform agenda, freed
political prisoners, allowed political exiles to return home. He also took some
praiseworthy steps to promote democracy in the country and started to promise
to build legal and institutional frameworks for the protection of human rights.
The Nobel
Prize
Besides his
landmark deal with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, all these promises of
reforms convinced the Noble Committee to give him the Nobel Prize.
I was in
Ethiopia in December 2019 when Abiy received his prize in Oslo. People were
everywhere listening to his acceptance speech and there were mass celebrations.
Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic nation, and the major ethnic groups are the Oromo,
the Amhara, and the Tigrayans. Amhara elites had been traditionally dominating
Ethiopia, though the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated
Ethiopian politics from 1991 to 2018, through the Ethiopian People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Front.
Abiy came
to power in 2018 with the support of the largest ethnic group, Oromo, and the
traditionally powerful ethnic group, Amhara. However, in the summer of this
year, the killing of famous Oromo singer Hachalu Hundessa and the violent riots
afterward brought a question mark over the largest ethnic group’s support for
the Abiy.
The rise of
Abiy due to an alliance of Oromo and Amhara political pushed the TPLF to its
home state Tigray under the leadership of Debretsion Gebremichael to remobilize
itself. Abiy has pursued a policy of centralisation of power to strengthen his
Prosperity Party.
There is a
conflict going on in the Ethiopian northern region which has forced thousands
of poor people from Tigray to take refuge in neighbouring Sudan. The UN
estimates that if the fighting continues for some more time, the refugee number
might go up to 200,000. Abiy has the support of Eritrean President Isaias but
to tame the battle-hardened TPLF, he needs Sudan on his side.
Sudan,
going through a transition period, is in very bad shape economically. A large
number of refugee influx from Tigray has already become its concern.
GERD
negotiations
Sudan has
already strengthened its position in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
negotiation as it has told on 19 November that it will not participate in the future
deliberations unless its demand for a mediation body with the greater role of
the African Union is accepted.
For the
first time, Sudan has taken this strong stance in this negotiation. In this
long-drawn negotiation process over the filling and operation of the dam, the
negotiation was mostly between Egypt and Ethiopia, but Sudan now demands its
pound of flesh. TPLF’s censure has already limited Abiy’s hands in GERD
negotiation with Egypt, and now he has to deal with an assertive Sudan.
Prime
Minister Abiy has given a deadline for TPLF to surrender. He, however, needs to
end the military conflict in Tigray as it has resulted in a serious
humanitarian crisis. But, Ethiopia is yet to accept the mediation offer of the
African Union, and a UN report believes it is going to be a long war.
Abiy has to
go back to the promise and hope he had shown in the initial months of his
administration, and engage in negotiation with political adversaries, to commit
to power-sharing under a federal system. Ethiopia in particular and the region
in general badly needs peace and development, not war.
-----
Ashok Swain is a Professor of Peace and
Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden
https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/how-abiy-ahmed-can-bring-back-peace-to-ethiopia-1.75444261
-----
Antony Blinken, Biden’s new secretary of state
ready to take on the Middle East
By Elizabeth Hagedorn
Nov 23,
2020
Antony Blinken to serve as secretary of state
-----
President-elect
Joe Biden named foreign policy veteran Antony Blinken as his pick for Secretary
of State on Monday, tasking a trusted aide with fulfilling his campaign pledge
to reassert America’s standing on the world stage.
Blinken,
58, has worked alongside the incoming president for nearly two decades, dating
back to Biden’s chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Blinken
also served as a senior director at the national security council and foreign
policy speechwriter in the Clinton White House, and later rose through the
ranks of the Obama administration to serve as deputy secretary of state from
2015-2017. Blinken was Biden’s chief foreign policy adviser during the 2020
presidential campaign.
If
confirmed by the Senate as expected, Blinken will take the helm at the State
Department at a time when deadly civil wars rage in Libya, Yemen and Syria, the
Islamic State poses a simmering threat and the rift among the Gulf states
remains unresolved.
Blinken
would oversee a drastically different foreign policy than that of current
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, whose embrace of Trump’s “America First”
foreign policy the Biden team has vowed to reverse.
“We’d
actually show up again, day in, day out. But to engage the world, not as it was
in 2009 or even in 2017 when we left it, but as it is and as we anticipate it
will become,” Blinken told CBS’s Intelligence Matters podcast in September.
One of the
Biden administration’s early foreign policy priorities will be salvaging the
landmark Iran nuclear deal, from which Trump unilaterally withdrew in 2018.
Biden has called for rejoining the accord if Iran resumes compliance.
Doing so,
Blinken has said, would put the United States "in a position to use our
renewed commitment to diplomacy … but also we'd be in a much better position to
effectively push back against Iran's other destabilizing activities.”
The
incoming administration will face a long list of challenges in Syria, where a
brutal civil war has killed hundreds of thousands and spawned a massive refugee
crisis.
Blinken,
who played a key role in crafting President Barack Obama’s troop drawdown in
Iraq, has criticized Trump’s move last year to pull troops from northeast Syria
as one that “gutted American credibility.”
During a
May interview with CBS, Blinken advocated for keeping US boots on the ground in
Syria and expressed regret over the Obama administration’s actions — or lack
thereof — in the nearly decade-long conflict that saw the former president draw
a “red line” on chemical weapons use that he never enforced.
“We failed
to prevent a horrific loss of life. We failed to prevent massive displacement …
something I will take with me for the rest of my days,” he said.
In
war-wracked Yemen, another country where civilians are bearing the brunt of a
protracted civil war, the president-elect has pledged to end US support for the
Saudi-led military campaign.
In 2018,
Blinken and several other former Obama administration officials signed an open
letter calling on the Donald Trump administration to withdraw support for
Riyadh’s military campaign, which rights groups have accused of war crimes.
The US
relationship with Saudi leaders and other Middle East autocrats would “look
very different” under Biden, his chief foreign policy adviser said in July.
"We
would review the US relationship with the government of Saudi Arabia, to which
President Trump has basically given a blank check to pursue a disastrous set of
policies, including the war in Yemen, but also the murder of Jamal Khashoggi
[and] the crackdown on dissent at home," said Blinken.
Blinken has
also signaled tougher US policy on Egypt. He accused Trump of undermining
"our moral standing globally and our ability to lead" through his
relationship President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the military strongman who Trump
reportedly referred to as his “favorite dictator.”
Blinken,
who is the stepson of a Holocaust survivor, has touted Biden’s “unshakeable
commitment” to Israel’s security and recently questioned whether the Trump
administration’s planned sale of F-35 stealth fighters to the United Arab
Emirates would undermine Israel’s qualitative military edge.
“[Biden]
believes strongly that a secure Jewish homeland in Israel is the single best
guarantee to ensure that never again will the Jewish people be threatened with
destruction," Blinken told the Times of Israel.
Blinken has
also said his boss would ensure disagreements with Israel are kept private.
“Joe Biden
believes strongly in keeping your differences as far as possible between
friends behind doors, maintaining as little distance in public as possible,”
Blinken told a pro-Israel Democratic group in May.
Biden has
rounded out his foreign policy and national security team with a number of
other Obama-era officials, including career diplomat Linda Thomas-Greenfield as
his pick for US ambassador to the United Nations. Thomas-Greenfield, who served
as the top diplomat for African affairs from 2013 to 2017, has called for the
new administration to bring back career diplomatic staff forced out under
Trump.
“The United
States needs a top-to-bottom diplomatic surge,” she and Biden adviser Nicholas
Burns wrote in Foreign Affairs. “The Trump administration’s unilateral
diplomatic disarmament is a reminder that it is much easier to break than to
build. The country doesn’t have the luxury of waiting for a generational
replenishment.”
Biden also
named Avril Haines as the first woman to serve as director of national
intelligence and Jake Sullivan, a former official in the Clinton State
Department, as national security adviser.
Former
Secretary of State John Kerry will serve as Biden’s special presidential envoy
for Climate, suggesting the new president will make climate policy a major
focus of his administration. Biden has already pledged to rejoin the Paris
climate agreement on day one of his presidency.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/11/antony-blinken-secretary-of-state-biden-transition-foreign.html
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