Middle East Press On Iran Sentencing Kameel Ahmady, Iran-Turkey Conflict and Intifada: New Age Islam's Selection, 15 December 2020
By
New Age Islam Edit Desk
15 December
2020
• Iran Sentences Kameel Ahmady, British-Iranian
Anthropologist, To Prison
By Al-Monitor Staff
• How A Poem Could Spark A New Iran-Turkey Conflict
By Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg
• How The Intifada Changed The Palestinian Political
Discourse
By Ramzy Baroud
• Biden Should Not Repeat Trump And Obama’s Mistakes
In Iraq
By Zeidon Alkinani
------
Iran
Sentences Kameel Ahmady, British-Iranian Anthropologist, To Prison
By
Al-Monitor Staff
Dec 14,
2020
Kameel Ahmady in an undated photo with his wife. Photo by TWITTER.
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A
British-Iranian social anthropologist who conducted research on child marriage,
female genital mutilation and other sensitive subjects has been sentenced to
prison in Iran, his lawyer and state media reported.
On Sunday,
Branch 15 of the Revolutionary Court in Tehran sentenced Kameel Ahmady to nine
years in prison and ordered him to pay a $727,000 fine, the semi-official
Tasnim news agency reported. Ahmady’s lawyer, Amir Raesian, tweeted that his
client was handed an eight-year sentence for “collaborating with a hostile
government.”
"We
will present an appeal request against this ruling and we are still
hopeful," Raesian said.
According
to a translation of the Tasnim report from the Associated Press, Ahmady was charged
over “cooperation with European embassies in support of promoting
homosexuality, visiting Israel as a reporter for the BBC, cooperation and
communication with foreign and hostile media, infiltration aimed at changing
the law, and sending false reports about the country to the UN’s special
rapporteur on human rights in Iran."
Iranian
security forces raided Ahmady’s Tehran home in August 2019, arresting him and
seizing his birth certificate and other documents, his wife said at the time.
Ahmady was released on bail in November 2019 after reportedly being held for
prolonged periods in solitary confinement.
Ahmady, who
is ethnically Kurdish, has authored books and articles on ethnic minorities,
child marriage, LGBT issues and other controversial subjects in the Middle
East. He’s also written extensively on the prevalence of female genital
mutilation in Iran.
In a
separate development on Saturday, Iran hanged dissident journalist Ruhollah
Zam, who was sentenced to death in June after a court found him guilty of
“corruption on earth.” Zam, who ran an opposition news site while living in
exile in Paris, was reportedly captured by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Iraq
in 2019 and taken to Iran.
The
European Union condemned his execution in a statement, adding that it is
“imperative for the Iranian authorities to uphold the due process rights of
accused individuals and to cease the practice of using televised confessions to
establish and promote their guilt.”
United
Nations human rights chief Michelle Bachelet said she was “appalled” by Zam’s
execution and called on Iran to “immediately halt their alarming and increasing
use of the death penalty and vague national security charges to suppress
independent voices and dissent.”
Iran is
holding a number of dual citizens and foreigners on spying and other political
charges, including Iranian-Americans Morad Tahbaz, Siamak and Baquer Namazi,
and British-Iranian charity worker Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe. Kylie
Moore-Gilbert, a British-Australian academic convicted of espionage, was
released in a reported prisoner swap last month.
On Monday,
the Trump administration sanctioned two Iranian intelligence officials over
their alleged role in the abduction, detention and probable death of Robert
Levinson, a retired FBI agent who disappeared while on an unauthorized CIA
mission in Iran in 2007.
https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/12/kameel-ahmady-iran-sentence-prison-british-anthropologist.html
------
How A
Poem Could Spark A New Iran-Turkey Conflict
By
Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg
December
14, 2020
History
appears to be repeating itself in the Caucasus. The recent fight between
Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia has revived the historical rivalry between
Iran and Turkey and could threaten to evolve into a wider conflict if not kept
in check by cooler heads. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stoked Iran’s fears
last week, when he recited a poem about Azeri nationalism — something Iran
fears and tries very hard to suppress.
For
hundreds of years, the Persian-Turkish rivalry has been among the most notable
features of West Asia, with major spillover effects in the Middle East too.
They fought at least 10 ruthless wars from the 16th to the 19th centuries. At
the time, both were emerging empires seeking to enlarge their domains.
Historians
believe that Iran’s conversion to Shiite Islam was partly a result of that
rivalry. Until the 16th century, Iran was a majority Sunni country and a major
center for Sunni learning, attracting scholars from near and far, including
Turkey. But Shah Ismail I, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, converted his
empire to the Shiite sect and launched a cruel campaign of forced conversion in
the areas under his control, with unspeakable atrocities committed against
those who refused. At the time, the Ottomans were expanding their influence in
the region, and having the mantle of “the Muslim Caliphate” was an important
factor in their success. As a caliph, the Ottoman sultan garnered loyalty from
Sunni Muslims everywhere, including Iran. By converting Iran to the Shiite
sect, the shah sought to sever that tie. The speed and force with which he
imposed this conversion underlined the urgency he felt to create a solid
internal front against the Ottomans.
The
Ottomans and Safavids fought each other for control of the Caucasus. While the
Ottomans were victors in most of these wars, the Persians were able to extend
their dominion over most of historical Azerbaijan, in the northwestern part of
today’s Iran. The Azeris are ethnically Turkish and speak a Turkic language,
which meant they had a natural affinity with Turkey. The shah, therefore,
imposed the Shiite sect in Azerbaijan to weaken that affinity.
In today’s
world, religious wars are no longer in fashion, but Iran is still hoping that
it can play the sectarian card to its advantage in the areas of historical
Azerbaijan it still controls, where Shiite Islam is the dominant faith. On the
other hand, modern Turkey is all about Turkish nationalism and is now
reasserting its ethnic ties with the Azeris.
According to
some accounts, Azeris constitute about 25 percent of Iran’s population, making
them the largest minority in the country. At about 20 million, the Iranian
Azeri population is double that of the country of Azerbaijan. Both populations
speak the same Turkic language (written in two different scripts) and both are
majority Shiite.
This
combustible mix of ethnic and religious factors is now threatening to ignite.
In the recent conflict in the Caucasus, Turkey sided with Azerbaijan while Iran
sided with Armenia. And, while addressing a parade in Baku, Erdogan last week
read parts of an Azeri poem lamenting the presence of an artificial border
“tearing apart ancient Azeri lands by force.” Coming on the heels of an Azeri
victory, Tehran took this move as an expression of support for calls for the
secession of the ethnic Azeri parts of Iran. It summoned the Turkish ambassador
to Tehran and launched a disparaging blitz against Erdogan in official and
semi-official media outlets. One publication dedicated a full-page under the
headline, “Delusions of Ottoman caliph,” with a large drawing of Erdogan riding
a wooden horse and resembling Don Quixote. Other publications elaborated on the
theme of the sultan’s “delusions.”
Iranian
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif lambasted Erdogan and reasserted Iran’s
sovereignty over its Azeri regions. There then erupted a media war pitting
Iranian and Turkish social media against each other. It is not clear how much
of this media war was officially directed, but it exposed several underlying issues.
First,
despite the Iranian-Turkish detente over Syria, for example, the two countries
still harbor deep-seated suspicions that can boil over at the slightest
provocation, such as reciting an old poem.
Second, the
war over Nagorno-Karabakh whetted Turkey’s appetite for more conquests in that
region, as Ankara perceives that it “won” that war.
Third, the
speed with which Iran erupted in protest at the perceived reference to disputed
Azeri lands revealed how worried it is about its hold over ethnic minorities,
including the Azeris. There have been numerous attempts by Azeris in Iran to
assert their cultural independence and political autonomy, in addition to calls
to unify the two parts of historical Azerbaijan, which Erdogan was reviving by
reciting that poem in Baku last week.
The
conflict could spiral out of control. Poor economic conditions in both Turkey
and Iran have provoked popular protests, which have challenged the sanctity of
each country’s leadership and legitimate hold on power. Foreign adventures have
served as useful diversions and cover for repression at home. The war in
Nagorno-Karabakh may have encouraged Turkey to push forth, while stoking Iran’s
fears about the future.
The UN
should take note to contain this potentially dangerous conflict. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has previously mediated in
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and could also help the UN’s efforts.
----
Dr. Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg is the GCC Assistant Secretary-General for
Political Affairs & Negotiation, and a columnist for Arab News. The views
expressed in this piece are personal and do not necessarily represent GCC
views.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1777321
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How the
Intifada Changed the Palestinian Political Discourse
By
Ramzy Baroud
December
14, 2020
Dec. 8 came
and went last week as if it was an ordinary day. For Palestinian political
groups, however, it was another anniversary to be commemorated. It was on that
date 33 years ago that the First Intifada (uprising) broke out, and there was
nothing ordinary about this historic event.
Today, the
uprising is merely seen from a historical point of view; another opportunity to
reflect and perhaps learn from a seemingly distant past. Whatever political
context the intifada had, it has seemingly evaporated over time.
The simple
explanation of the intifada goes as follows: Ordinary Palestinians were at that
time fed up with the status quo. They wished to shake off Israel’s military
occupation and make their voices heard.
Expectedly,
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) quickly moved in to harvest the
fruit of the people’s sacrifices and translate them into tangible political
gains, as if the traditional Palestinian leadership truly and democratically
represented the will of the people. The outcome was a disaster, as the intifada
was merely used to resurrect the careers of some “leaders,” who claimed to be
mandated by the Palestinians to speak on their behalf, resulting in the Madrid
Conference of 1991, the Oslo Accords, and all the other “compromises” ever
since.
But there
is more to the story. Thousands of Palestinians, mostly youths, were killed by
the Israeli army during the seven years of the intifada, as Israel treated
non-violent protesters and rock-throwing children, who were demanding their
freedom, as enemy combatants. It was during these horrific years that terms
such as “shoot to kill,” “broken bones policies” and many more military
stratagems were introduced to an already violent discourse.
In truth,
however, the intifada was not a mandate for Yasser Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas or any
other Palestinian official or faction to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian
people. And it was certainly not a people’s call on their leadership to offer
unreciprocated political compromises.
To understand
the meaning of the intifada and its current relevance, it has to be viewed as
an active political event, constantly generating new meanings, as opposed to a
historical event of little relevance to today’s realities.
Historically,
the Palestinian people have struggled with the issue of political
representation. As early as the mid-20th century, various regimes claimed to
speak on behalf of the Palestinian people — thus using Palestine as an item on
their own domestic and foreign policy agendas.
The use and
misuse of Palestine as an item in some imagined collective Arab agenda came to
a relative end after the humiliating defeat of several Arab armies in the 1967
war, known in Arabic as the “Naksa” (letdown). The crisis of legitimacy was
meant to be quickly resolved as the largest Palestinian political party, Fatah,
took over the leadership of the PLO. The latter was then recognized as the
“sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” during the Arab
League summit in Rabat in 1974.
The above
statement alone was meant to be the formula that resolved the crisis of
representation, therefore drowning out all other claims made by Arab
governments. That strategy did work, but not for long. Despite Arafat and
Fatah’s hegemony over the PLO, it did enjoy a degree of legitimacy among
Palestinians. At that time, Palestine was part of a global national liberation
movement and Arab governments, despite the deep wounds of war, were forced to
accommodate the aspirations of the Arab people, keeping Palestine as the focal
issue among the masses.
However, in
the 1980s, things began changing rapidly. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982
resulted in the forced exile of tens of thousands of Palestinian fighters,
along with the leaderships of all Palestinian groups, leading to several
massacres of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
The years
that followed accentuated two grave realities. First, the Palestinian
leadership shifted its focus from armed struggle to merely remaining relevant
as a political actor. After relocating to Tunis, Arafat, Abbas and others were
issuing many statements, sending all kinds of signals that they were ready to
“compromise” — as per the American definition of this term. Second, the Arab
governments moved on, as the growing marginalization of the Palestinian
leadership lessened the pressure of the Arab masses for a united front against
Israeli military occupation and colonialism in Palestine.
It was at
this precise moment in history that the Palestinians rose up. It was a
spontaneous movement that, in the beginning, involved none of the traditional
Palestinian leadership, Arab regimes or any of the familiar slogans. I was a
teenager in a Gaza refugee camp when all of this took place — a true popular
revolution being fashioned in its most organic and pure form. The intifada saw
the use of slingshots to counter Israeli military helicopters; the use of
blankets to disable the chains of Israeli army tanks; the use of raw onions to
assuage the pain of inhaling tear gas; and, most importantly, the creation of
language to respond to every violent strategy employed by the Israeli army and
to articulate the resistance of Palestinians on the ground in simple yet
profound slogans, written on the decaying walls of every Palestinian refugee
camp, town or city.
While the
intifada did not attack the traditional leadership openly, it was clear that
Palestinians were seeking alternative leadership. Grassroots local leadership
swiftly sprang out of every neighborhood, university and even prison, and no
amount of Israeli violence was able to thwart the natural formation of this
leadership.
Alas, years
of relentless Israeli violence, coupled with the lack of a political strategy,
sheer exhaustion, growing factionalism and extreme poverty brought the intifada
to an end. Since then, even the achievements of the intifada have been
tarnished, as the exiled Palestinian leadership used them to revive itself
politically and financially, eventually reaching the point of arguing that the
dismal Oslo Accords and the futile peace process were direct “achievements” of
the intifada.
But the
true accomplishment of the intifada was the fact that it allowed the
Palestinian people to demonstrate their own capacity to challenge Israel
without having their own military, to counteract the Palestinian leadership by
organically generating their own leaders, and to confront the Arabs and, in
fact, the whole world regarding their moral and legal responsibilities toward
Palestine and the Palestinian people.
-----
Ramzy
Baroud is a journalist and the Editor of The Palestine Chronicle. He is the
author of five books. His latest is “These Chains Will Be Broken: Palestinian
Stories of Struggle and Defiance in Israeli Prisons” (Clarity Press, Atlanta).
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1777301
----
Biden Should
Not Repeat Trump and Obama’s Mistakes in Iraq
By
Zeidon Alkinani
14 Dec 2020
For more
than 17 years since its invasion of Iraq, the United States has failed to
present itself as a partner interested in supporting Iraqi efforts for
democratic and economic development. It has continued to pursue its military
and geopolitical interests at the expense of the Iraqi people, their security
and wellbeing.
This became
clear once again at the beginning of this year when, amid a popular uprising
against rampant corruption, sectarian politics, political violence,
unemployment, and Iranian interference in Iraq, the Trump administration
decided to assassinate in Baghdad top Iranian General Qassem Soleimani. Instead
of backing the Iraqi people’s democratic aspirations, Washington once again
propped up the dysfunctional political status quo by escalating its
confrontation with Iran and in this way, undermining the movement for reform
and political change.
In this
context, the fact that US President Donald Trump is pursuing his own narrow
political interests in Iraq in the last months of his presidency is hardly
surprising to Iraqis. His decision to withdraw more US troops from the country
is another attempt to present himself as fulfilling his election promises while
setting yet another foreign policy trap for the incoming administration of Joe
Biden.
In his
pursuit of disastrous policies in Iraq, however, Trump is no different from his
predecessors. And many Iraqis fear that his successor may bring more of the
same.
US-Iran
confrontation
Since
President George W Bush’s “mission accomplished” speech in May 2003, he and his
successors have repeatedly talked about the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq,
but have never fully or permanently carried it out.
This has
been the case with Trump as well. In fact, despite his domestic rhetoric about
ending the “forever wars” started by past administrations, the US president
rejected the Iraqi parliament’s resolution calling for full US military
withdrawal from the country.
The latest
announcement of a “withdrawal” concerns just 500 of the 3,000 US troops
currently deployed in Iraq. Like his predecessors, Trump is held back by
certain considerations, particularly that the US needs a military presence in
Iraq in order to defend its own economic and geopolitical interests. This is
especially the case amid the escalating confrontation with Iran.
It is for
the same reason that Trump had to backtrack on his decision in 2019 to pull out
of Syria and leave 200 troops to “secure the oil”. Today, US military personnel
in Syria are close to 1,000 by some estimates and serve as a foothold to
counter Russian and Iranian influence in the area.
Thus, Trump
has continued the policies of his predecessors of sending mixed messages on US
military presence in Iraq, which has caused much uncertainty among Iraqi
officials and the general public. But he has also made the situation worse by
escalating tensions with Iran without having a clear-cut plan for containing
it.
Trump’s
withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Tehran and his “maximum pressure” policy
of expanding sanctions and stifling Iranian oil and trade revenues have
provoked an aggressive response. Iran has sought to hit back against regional
US allies as well as US positions in its immediate neighbourhood – i.e. Iraq.
Over the
past two years, Tehran has mobilised its full Iraqi capabilities – from its
loyal militias to its infiltrators in the Iraqi intelligence, security and
governance structures – to confront the US. This has greatly destabilised Iraq,
worsening security and undermining efforts for political reforms.
The
response of the Trump administration has been completely incoherent. It has
blamed Iraqis for Iranian attacks on US military and diplomatic assets and has
threatened the Iraqi government with sanctions. It has effectively transformed
Iraq into a battleground, with devastating consequences for the Iraqi
population and its political movement for change.
The Trump
administration’s behaviour has made it clear that it was after short-term
strategic gains for domestic consumption rather than an actual long-term
strategy to contain Iranian influence in Iraq, disempower its militias, and
help Iraqi military and civilian institutions regain sovereign decision-making.
In this
regard, again, Trump has only followed in the footsteps of his predecessors.
This apparent American indifference towards the fate of the country has left
many Iraqis feeling equally hostile to both Tehran and Washington.
Biden’s
policies in Iraq
Having gone
through the same failed policies of three consecutive US presidents since 2003,
many Iraqis are cautious about expecting much from the upcoming Biden
administration.
The Iraqi
Kurds are probably the most optimistic about his presidency. They hope he could
be “America’s most pro-Kurdish president”, given his past statements on Kurdish
statehood and ties with Erbil’s leadership.
Iraq’s
Sunni Arabs, who once denounced the US occupation because of their
marginalisation on the political scene, are now in favour of a US military
presence against the enormous Iranian influence. Biden’s willingness to expand
the deployment of US troops will probably be welcomed by Sunni Arab political
circles.
The Shia
Arabs are ambivalent at best. The elites
– the majority of whom adopt a pro-Iran discourse – will probably evaluate
Biden’s administration based on its approach to de-escalation with Iran. But
there are also many among the ordinary Shia population who are frustrated by
both Tehran and Washington. They would like to see the Iranian grip on Iraq
relax and a strong Iraqi national state emerge, but their bitter experience
with Trump during the protests of 2019-2020 has dampened their hopes that the
US can be an effective anti-Iran influence.
Biden
himself has a mixed record on Iraq as a senator and vice president. In June
2006, he proposed a soft partition of Iraq to allow for federal autonomy for
the Shia Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish communities, which was welcomed by the
Kurds, but rejected by many Arabs.
He
continued to promote his plan even amid the war against ISIL (ISIS), calling in
a 2014 Washington Post article for “functioning federalism… which would ensure
equitable revenue-sharing for all provinces and establish locally rooted
security structures”.
Biden would
do well to drop this proposal from his foreign policy objectives in Iraq.
Solidifying political divisions between the different communities would
encourage more political fragmentation and provide even more ground for the
expansion of Iranian influence. A semi-autonomous Shia region would most likely
fall completely under the control of Tehran.
Biden has
also voiced his support for maintaining a US military presence in Iraq and
Syria, but it would be challenging for him to redeploy troops to Iraq, as
American public opinion is generally against it. If the security situation
remains the same, his administration will likely keep the same number of troops
in Iraq.
At the same
time, some observers believe that he will follow Obama’s policy on Iraq – i.e.
look for an opportunity for a full withdrawal and de-escalation with Iran. On
the campaign trail, Biden has made it clear that he wants to re-enter the
nuclear deal with Iran, but on what terms, it is still unclear.
Trump has
put on the table a new set of conditions for renegotiating the agreement,
including a halt on Iran’s ballistic missile programme. It remains to be seen
whether Biden will backtrack on those, but he is under pressure from US allies
not to ignore Iran’s destabilising activities in the Middle East as Obama did.
Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud recently stated that Saudi
should be a “partner” to any future agreement.
From an
Iraqi perspective, a new round of negotiations could be a perfect opportunity
for the US to strike a deal with Iran on Iraq. Tehran will always remain a
factor in Iraq politics by virtue of its neighbouring location, its sheer size,
and the close cultural, religious and economic ties between the two countries.
But that does not mean that Iranian interference cannot be curbed. A deal with
the West may be able to achieve that, at least to a certain extent, but enough
to give Iraqis the chance to pursue reform and meaningful political change.
After
decades of disastrous policies on Iraq, it is time for the US to learn from its
mistakes. The Biden administration must side with the Iraqi people and help
clear the rubble the US’s war and occupation have left behind. It must do its
part – take care of the pervasive Iranian interference it let into the country
with the 2003 invasion – and allow Iraqis to rebuild their country.
----
Zeidon
Alkinani specialises in geopolitics, identity politics, and democratisation. He
is a PhD candidate in politics and international relations at the University of
Aberdeen, UK.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/14/iraq-after-trump
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