Middle East Press on: Lebanese, Gaza, Iran, Hamas, Zionist: New Age Islam's Selection, 16 January 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
16 January 2025
Has The Lebanese System Passed The Test?
What Comes After A Gaza Ceasefire Deal
Iran’s Deterrence Doctrine: From Horizontal Resilience To Vertical Strength
Factbox - War-Ravaged Gaza Faces Multi-Billion Dollar Reconstruction Challenge
Who Lost The Gaza War, Hamas Or Netanyahu?
Israel Faces The Risk Of A War With Turkey
How To Pave Iran's Path To Freedom
How We Should Navigate Media Narratives And Israel’s Zionist Ethos
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How We Should Navigate Media Narratives And Israel’s Zionist Ethos
By Yisrael Medad
January 16, 2025
A year ago, during a Channel 12 News broadcast of its Friday evening summary-of-the-week diary Ulpan Shishi (Friday Studio), Foreign News Editor Arad Nir called for Israel to halt the fighting in Gaza. That was on the 100th day of the war. In a post on X/Twitter, he noted that since then he has not appeared, based on the decision of his editor.
In the video of that broadcast, he said: “Hamas’s condition for progress [regarding a hostage deal] is to halt the fighting. So let’s halt the fighting. Because, 100 days later, we can no longer endure the plight of the 136 hostages.” He added that “if 136 coffins were to return, the State of Israel would never recover. The Zionist ethos would never recover.”
With every new reporting on developments regarding possible hostage release agreements these past few months and of supposed progress, the emotional and psychological pressure is continuously being ramped up by the families of the hostages, politically interested anti-government groups and the media.
No one, of course, can deny the parents and relatives of the hostages their right to express their pain and concern for their loved ones. This is true even if they utter the most outlandish accusations against the prime minister and his fellow ministers.
On the other hand, there are other family members of hostages who champion a different approach than the one that has dominated public discourse. They, too, need to be allowed their right of free expression. Pundits and commentators supporting their positions need to also be allowed time on our television screens and in radio studios.
But that has not been the case, as air-time dominance has been awarded to those seeking to alter the Zionist ethos to become as they see it and want it to be. In essence, parallel to the pressure building that the government should agree to a hostage deal – any hostage deal – there is an ideological and political struggle taking place below the surface.
Will Israel “never recover” as Nir asserted above, if 136 coffins (God forbid) return instead of live hostages? Of course it would. Nir and others voicing similar opinions are simply propagandizing. In 1948, Israel’s losses numbered 1% of the country’s population.
But that has not been the case, as air-time dominance has been awarded to those seeking to alter the Zionist ethos to become as they see it and want it to be. In essence, parallel to the pressure building that the government should agree to a hostage deal – any hostage deal – there is an ideological and political struggle taking place below the surface.
Will Israel “never recover” as Nir asserted above, if 136 coffins (God forbid) return instead of live hostages? Of course it would. Nir and others voicing similar opinions are simply propagandizing. In 1948, Israel’s losses numbered 1% of the country’s population.
Little if any talk has been devoted to what were the actual developments stemming from previous releases of terrorists from Israeli prisons.
After all, former Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar himself was a prime example of what can happen if a terrorist is released. Instead of Nir’s fabricated “ethos,” should we not be talking about the value of lives of future possible victims of Hamas and Fatah terror? Or debating a possible breakdown in social solidarity?
Has any official or pro-hostage deal activist been asked why has Hamas refused even to inform Israel about who among the hostages they hold are still alive? Should that not be an indicator that Hamas knows full well it is stringing Israel along? Can Hamas be trusted?
As this is being composed, we are still waiting for something to actually happen. What we do know, however, is that Israel’s public is being ill treated, not for the first time, about conducting an open and fact-based debate over a critical issue that involves our personal security and collective Jewish-Zionist ethos as a people.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-837715
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How To Pave Iran's Path To Freedom
By Nazanin Afshin-Jam Mackay
January 16, 2025
Transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracies offer valuable lessons in balancing external support with internal leadership. Countries like Germany and Japan rebuilt their political systems after devastating wars through substantial external aid, but their success stemmed from aligning reforms with their cultural contexts and ensuring active citizen participation.
Conversely, recent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the dangers of imposing external solutions that overlook local dynamics. These experiences emphasize the need for grassroots-driven efforts to establish lasting democratic stability.
For 45 years, the Islamic Republic of Iran has stifled its citizens’ rights under a theocratic regime born from the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Yet, Iranians have persistently sought to dismantle this system and establish a secular, democratic alternative.
A key example of this struggle occurred in September 2022, following the tragic death of Jina Mahsa Amini at the hands of the regime’s morality police. Her death ignited the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, sparking a nationwide uprising with millions on the street calling for not just reforms but full change of regime.
Widespread discontent, fueled by corruption, mismanagement, and economic hardships, coupled with the suppression of fundamental rights, has intensified internal pressure on the regime, leading to protests and calls for regime change.
Additionally, external factors – such as the weakening of the regime’s regional proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and Assad’s government – have left the Islamic Republic more vulnerable than ever.
This raises critical questions: Will the regime survive, evolve, collapse, or be overthrown? How can a relatively peaceful and democratic transition be achieved, with safeguards in place to prevent violence, chaos, or the rise of another authoritarian regime?
The Iranian opposition forces have long envisioned creating a government-in-exile or an interim transitional council, often bringing together political parties, high-profile advocates, and celebrity figures from the diaspora. Yet, despite these efforts, success has remained elusive. Over the past 45 years, efforts to unite diverse political groups have repeatedly faltered.
Disparate visions for Iran’s future, ranging from a secular republic to a monarchy, have created deep ideological divisions and a persistent stalemate in coalition building. Competition and power struggles among opposition figures and their followers have further hindered meaningful collaboration, while the regime’s cyber army actively exacerbates these divides and mistrust.
Compounding these challenges is a widespread wariness of foreign assistance, rooted in a history of outside interventions. Brutal crackdowns not only have limited activists’ ability to organize internally but have also instilled fear, discouraging many from getting involved. Additionally, the diaspora often struggles with legitimacy to reflect the truest most up-to-date sentiments of those on the ground.
The Woman, Life, Freedom movement revealed the readiness, courage, and resilience of Iranian protesters but also exposed the costs of division. In just a couple of years of the movement, over 700 people, including 68 children, were killed, with thousands more imprisoned, blinded, or tortured. While the movement brought international attention, it underscored the urgent need for a cohesive strategy.
The key reason for stagnation in progress is that the Iranian opposition has repeatedly relied on the same traditional models and strategies to foster political coalition and unity, hoping for different outcomes.
It is time for the Iranian opposition to think beyond conventional approaches. What it requires is a new and fresh framework prioritizing shared objectives over individual agendas – a shift from the tried and tested coalition-building among groups to a model where expertise and management take precedence over identity politics.
Unity is not an impossible goal. A new paradigm must be developed that draws lessons from other successful movements while developing a unique, tailored strategy that resonates with the Iranian people and their specific struggle and immediate needs.
Forming a democracy commission
TO ADDRESS these challenges and avoid past failures, the formation of an Iran Transition to Democracy Commission (ITDC) is essential. This interim body would comprise Iranian technocrats and experts dedicated to steering the country toward a democratic future.
The ITDC would serve as a non-partisan platform, prioritizing practical governance and inclusivity. While its selection process primarily focuses on skills, expertise, and capabilities, it ideally would reflect Iran’s rich diversity.
Initiatives such as rotating leadership roles would promote shared responsibility and balanced representation, fostering trust and collaboration within the group. By establishing a sister network that pairs advocates with partners within Iran, the ITDC can harmonize internal and external efforts, bridging any gaps and staying aligned with the realities on the ground.
The ITDC will act as a neutral platform, utilizing a structured, task-focused approach, managed like a project with clearly defined timelines. It will be divided into two key phases: pre-transition and post-transition, each ideally spanning 365 days or less.
The ITDC would focus on establishing credibility and organization by assembling committed, impartial, skilled technocrats, drafting a road map for transition, and creating a transparent, third-party-monitored “Freedom Fund” for financial accountability.
It would build domestic support by engaging civil society, unions, activists, entrepreneurs, and professionals. The ITDC would cultivate cohesion through non-political means but still seek support and endorsements from political leaders and other factions and emphasize non-partisan inclusivity.
International outreach would involve seeking recognition and support from governments, international organizations, NGOs, and the Iranian diaspora. Additionally, capacity building would include preparing for transitional governance by forming teams to manage key sectors like security, humanitarian relief, and economic stabilization.
After successfully completing the pre-transition phase and implementing an interim governance framework with well-defined, actionable plans that have garnered significant support from the Iranian community, coordinated calls will be issued for nationwide demonstrations, general strikes, and other collective actions designed to dismantle the existing regime.
The ITDC would ensure safety and order by maintaining public order and continuity of services. Stabilizing the economy would be a priority to prevent financial collapse and support economic recovery. The commission would facilitate the drafting of a new constitution through an elected assembly and prepare for elections by establishing commissions to ensure internationally monitored free and fair processes.
Democratic institutions, such as independent judicial, media, and administrative systems, would be developed. Additionally, the ITDC would strengthen international relations, cultivating trust and diplomatic, political, and economic partnerships to promote peace and diplomacy and attract aid and investment.
The ITDC pioneers an innovative blueprint for Iran’s transition, ensuring a peaceful, inclusive, and effective path to democracy. By fostering internal and international trust and adopting a project-based, non-partisan approach, the ITDC can provide a stable foundation for Iran’s future.
With careful planning and execution, it has the potential to inspire confidence and contribute to a more democratic and prosperous Iran, benefiting the broader Middle East region and the world.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-837706
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Israel Faces The Risk Of A War With Turkey
By Ariel Harkham
January 16, 202
Israel must prepare for potential war with Turkey, the Nagel Committee has warned in its recent report, emphasizing the gravity of a rising threat that could reshape the region’s strategic landscape.
This warning underscores the urgency of addressing an evolving challenge that demands immediate attention. The catastrophic failure of October 7 has forced Israel to grapple with existential challenges. Chief among them is Iran’s acceleration toward nuclear deterrence.
Yet, as Israel navigates this perilous moment, it faces another formidable adversary – a rising neo-Ottoman Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. With its growing economic and military strength, Turkey represents a strategic challenge that surpasses Iran in scale and complexity. This evolving threat demands a comprehensive strategy that begins with reforming Israel’s national security apparatus.
Erdogan’s ambitions are no longer confined to rhetoric. They are manifesting in actions that encroach closer to Israel’s borders. Through military involvement in Syria, the expansion of its navy, and an assertive presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s posture signals a desire to dominate the region.
Complicating matters is Turkey’s NATO membership and its military tradition rooted in the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – founder of the Republic of Turkey – which amplify its strategic weight. Israel cannot afford complacency; it must act decisively to prepare for this emerging challenge.
Since October 7, 2023, Israel has made strides in addressing its security needs, learning through the adversity of a seven-front war. Since that black Saturday, it has focused on building a robust force structure capable of countering state adversaries, bolstering defense industrial independence, and recognizing the foundational threat posed by jihadist ideologies.
These measures are critical, but they fall short of addressing the Turkish threat. Turkey’s advanced military capabilities, economic resilience, and influential standing on the global stage require a long-term strategy that not only manages emergencies but also deters conflict over time.
To meet the Turkish challenge, Israel must compete in three critical arenas. Its economic development must match Turkey’s larger GDP to sustain long-term competition. Israel needs to enhance its ability to project power across sea, air, and land to counter Turkey’s expansive ambitions.
Additionally, Israel must communicate effectively to the region, the West, and the global community why Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman agenda undermines collective stability and progress.
Abraham Lincoln’s adage, “If I had to cut a tree down in seven hours, I would spend the first three sharpening the axe,” is particularly apt for Israel today. Sharpening the axe means prioritizing effective leadership and decision-making. Currently, Israel’s national security processes are fragmented, lacking transparency, accountability, and strategic coherence. Addressing these deficiencies is an urgent first step.
Israeli national security decision-making remains disproportionately dominated by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Over time, the military has hollowed out what should be a political process, reducing elected leaders to secondary roles. Instead of serving as advisors, the IDF has become the de facto driver of national security policy. This imbalance undermines the civilian leadership’s ability to set and execute long-term strategies.
The creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in the mid-1990s under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was intended to counterbalance the IDF’s dominance. However, the NSC has achieved limited success. It often serves as a policy task force for the prime minister rather than a robust strategic body.
The root of the issue lies in information control: The IDF and intelligence agencies tightly manage the flow of information, limiting the NSC’s capacity to challenge or complement their assessments and insure decision implementation by the political leadership to the national-security apparatus.
The infamous Feldstein leaks – the passing of classified intelligence information to the foreign press – exemplify how this dynamic hampers accountability and transparency in a politicized IDF sensitive to its failures on October 7.
To build a functional and accountable national security apparatus, Israel must undertake targeted reforms. The NSC’s mandate must be clearly defined to avoid overlaps with the Defense Ministry and intelligence agencies. Legislation should formalize the NSC’s authority over interagency coordination and strategic planning, ensuring its recommendations carry significant weight.
A permanent unit within the NSC should be established to focus exclusively on long-term planning for emerging challenges such as hybrid warfare, regional instability, and economic disruptions. Additionally, regular scenario planning exercises should be conducted to prepare for contingencies, including military conflicts, economic crises, and technological threats.
The clock is ticking.
Recent developments underscore the urgency of these reforms. Turkey’s construction of advanced naval assets, including submarines, destroyers, and an aircraft carrier, demonstrates its ambitions.
Meanwhile, Israel’s Defense Ministry has announced investments in domestic industries to produce air-to-ground missiles and tank shells. The disparity is stark: Turkey builds aircraft carriers while Israel focuses on equipping its tanks. Without strategic foresight, Israel risks falling behind and relying on external support in times of crisis.
Israel’s democratic vibrancy, characterized by its spirited Knesset debates, frequent elections, and active protest movements, is a source of strength. Yet, in many ways, the representative system hastily established in 1948 remains fragile and dysfunctional. While most Israelis acknowledge the need for reform, progress requires decisive and energetic leadership.
The road ahead is steep, but the first step in addressing the Turkish challenge lies in empowering Israel’s leadership with adequate forums for strategic decision-making. Reforming the NSC is not just a bureaucratic necessity but a strategic imperative. Leadership is fundamentally about solving problems and without this foundational change, broader reforms to Israel’s democratic and economic systems will be stymied, delayed, and more often than not, falter.
The Knesset must act swiftly to equip Israel’s leaders with the tools to set policy to meet the challenges posed by a resurgent Turkey and other emerging threats endemic to the ever-shifting sands of the Middle East. The time to sharpen the axe is now.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-837709
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Who Lost The Gaza War, Hamas Or Netanyahu?
By Motasem A Dalloul
January 15, 2025
At last, after 15 months of brutal attacks and committing unprecedented crimes, Israeli Occupation state agreed on a ceasefire without achieving any of its goals declared at the beginning of the genocide —destroying Hamas, liberating Israeli prisoners in Gaza and securing safe return for Zionist settlers to the settlements in the Gaza periphery.
Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his fanatic entourage exerted their utmost efforts to destroy Gaza and kill its inhabitants in front of the whole world, using the most developed lethal weapons and threatening to even force them out of Gaza or exterminate them.
The United States and many other countries, including Western, Arab and Muslim countries such as Germany, France, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia clearly backed the Israeli genocide in Gaza. Many of them took direct part in the war crimes.
After all of this, Netanyahu’s immoral army could not free except few number of Israeli prisoners. After 54 days of the genocide, he freed tens of them only through a deal with the Palestinian Resistance. Had Hamas insisted not to offer a goodwill gesture, they would not have been released.
This night, after 467 days of committing“livestream genocide”, Netanyahu got down on his knees and agreed to strike a deal with Hamas that guarantees the release of Israeli prisoners.
Referring to the text of the deal, it is clear that it met almost completely all the demands put by Hamas during the war, and it is very clear that even a single demand from Netanyahu’s has not been met. In addition to this, the Israeli Occupation plunged into swamps it did not expect at all. At the same time, a prediction by late Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Al Sinwar, was realised.
Netanyahu agreed to strike the ceasefire deal with Hamas. This point explodes Netanyahu’s goals as he had pledged to destroy Hamas but, in the end he found himself striking a deal with it. Even he, during the last 24 hours before Hamas’ announcement, his office along with the Americans were reported saying they were waiting for Hamas’ response.
All the Israeli politics along with Israel’s genocide sponsor were waiting for Hamas to decide. All their power and influence could not oblige Hamas to surrender and retreat.
The release of Israeli prisoners also is not the result of Netanyahu’s pogroms, but the result of Hamas’ agreement, and based on its own demands —the release of Palestinian prisoners, including those who have been in prison for decades and are convicted for life terms. The Israeli Occupation wanted these prisoners to die in prison, but they will be free, thanks to Hamas resilience.
Regarding Netanyahu’s third goal, it would not have been also realised without Hamas’ consent.
In addition to Netanyahu’s failure to achieve the goals of his genocide, he made of Israel a pariah state as its name has become synonymous with criminal and immoral people. Despite the unprecedented crackdown on hundreds of thousands of anti-Israel demonstrators in the largest Western and American cities, people continued their demonstrations.
Under popular pressure of financial and academic institutions have cut or promised to cut their relations with Israel. Netanyahu’s genocide in Gaza has opened the eyes of the American and Western people who recognised how much Zionists are deeply rooted in their political systems.
In an old recorded speech for Al Sinwar, he predicted that Israel is to become an isolated state. It seems that Netanyahu’s war crimes in Gaza fulfilled Al Sinwar’s prediction. Its PM and FM are wanted by the ICC, and Israeli soldiers are legally chased everywhere, mainly in the West. Many have, so far, fled secretly from different countries after they became wanted for detention.
Regardless of the number of deaths, wounded and the large scale destruction, what more is needed to prove that Hamas won the war? The indications of victory are not measured by the scale of sacrifices, but measured by which side accepts the conditions of the other. I see Israel’s Netanyahu has accepted Hamas conditions.
Some say that both Hamas and Netanyahu came under the pressure of the US President-elect, Donald Trump. I say: no, because Trump is Netanyahu’s friend and Netanyahu used Trump as leverage to his defeat when he told his partners, who had been against the deal, that they are going to get much strategic gains through Trump.
What pushed Netanyahu to accept the ceasefire deal is the miraculous Palestinian Resistance. Israeli soldiers on the ground said several times that they were fighting ghosts in Gaza.
Will Netanyahu respect the terms of the deal? I don’t know, but the Zionists, in general, are used to breaching every deal and the Americans are not a trusted party to be a guarantor of the deal, but if they returned to the war, the Palestinian Resistance is ready to be there.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250115-who-lost-the-gaza-war-hamas-or-netanyahu/
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Factbox - War-Ravaged Gaza Faces Multi-Billion Dollar Reconstruction Challenge
January 15, 2025
Billions of dollars will be needed to rebuild Gaza after the war between Israel and the Palestinian group, Hamas, according to assessments from the United Nations.
Israel and Hamas agreed to a deal to halt fighting in the enclave and swap Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners, an official briefed on the agreement said on Wednesday.
Here is a breakdown of the destruction in Gaza from the conflict prompted by the 7 October, 2023 attack on Israel by Hamas, which at the time ruled the Palestinian enclave.
How many casualties are there?
The Hamas attack on Israel killed 1,200 people, according to Israeli tallies.
However, since then, it has been revealed by Haaretz that helicopters and tanks of the Israeli army had, in fact, killed many of the 1,139 soldiers and civilians claimed by Israel to have been killed by the Palestinian Resistance.
Israel’s retaliation has killed more than 46,000 people, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry. However, a recent in-depth study by researchers at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine states that the figure is at least 41 per cent higher.
How long will it take to clear the rubble?
The United Nations warned in October that removing 42 million tonnes of rubble left in the aftermath of Israel’s bombardment could take years and cost $1.2 billion.
A UN estimate from April 2024 suggested it would take 14 years to clear the rubble.
The debris is believed to be contaminated with asbestos, with some refugee camps struck during the war known to have been built with the material. The rubble also likely holds human remains. The Palestinian Ministry of Health estimated in May that 10,000 bodies were missing under the debris.
How many buildings have been destroyed?
Rebuilding Gaza’s shattered homes will take at least until 2040, but could drag on for many decades, according to a UN report released last year.
Two-thirds of Gaza’s pre-war structures – over 170,000 buildings – have been damaged or flattened, according to UN satellite data (UNOSAT) in December. That amounts to around 69 per cent of the total structures of the Gaza Strip.
Within the count are a total of 245,123 housing units, according to an estimate from UNOSAT. Currently, over 1.8 million people are in need of emergency shelter in Gaza, the UN humanitarian office said.
What is the infrastructure damage?
The estimated damage to infrastructure totalled $18.5 billion as of end-January 2024, affecting residential buildings, commerce, industry and essential services such as education, health and energy, a UN-World Bank report said.
An update by the UN humanitarian office this month showed that less than a quarter of the pre-war water supplies were available, while at least 68 per cent of the road network has been damaged.
How will Gaza feed itself?
More than half of Gaza’s agricultural land, crucial for feeding the war-ravaged territory’s hungry population, has been degraded by conflict, satellite images analysed by the United Nations show.
The data reveals a rise in the destruction of orchards, field crops and vegetables in the Palestinian enclave, where hunger is widespread after 15 months of Israeli bombardment.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation said last year that 15,000 cattle, or over 95 per cent, of the total had been slaughtered or died since the conflict began and nearly half the sheep.
What about schools, universities, religious buildings?
Palestinian data shows that the conflict has led to the destruction of over 200 government facilities, 136 schools and universities, 823 mosques and three churches. Many hospitals have been damaged during the conflict, with only 17 out of 36 units partially functional as of January, the UN humanitarian office’s report showed.
Amnesty International’s Crisis Evidence Lab has highlighted the extent of destruction along Gaza’s eastern boundary. As of May 2024, over 90 per cent of the buildings in this area, including more than 3,500 structures, were either destroyed or severely damaged.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250115-factbox-war-ravaged-gaza-faces-multi-billion-dollar-reconstruction-challenge/
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Iran’s Deterrence Doctrine: From Horizontal Resilience To Vertical Strength
By Dr Umud Shokri
January 15, 2025
Iran is moving from a horizontal to a vertical stance in its deterrent strategy, which is a major change. The decrease in its regional influence and the waning effectiveness of its proxy networks have forced a strategic recalibration, which is reflected in this change. Iran has historically projected strength outside of its boundaries using a horizontal deterrent strategy known as “forward defence” or “mosaic defence”, which included the employment of proxies, ballistic missiles, naval guerrilla tactics and cyber technologies. It aimed to neutralise threats before they reached its territory by keeping its defensive depth. Recent events, however, have highlighted this policy’s shortcomings, leading to a shift toward a more centralised and technologically driven deterrence posture.
The weakening of horizontal deterrence
Iran’s horizontal deterrence policy has encountered increasing difficulties in recent years. The efficiency of its proxy networks has been undermined by the severe attrition they have experienced because of ongoing battles, especially in Gaza and Lebanon. The insufficiency of Iran’s conventional deterrent weapons against technologically superior foes was exposed by its missile strikes on Israel in April 2024. Iran’s traditional strategy has been further stressed by changing regional dynamics, such as an increasingly forceful Israeli posture and increased US military involvement. Iran’s forward defence strategy is therefore widely seen as unable to counter modern threats.
A combination of long-term security imperatives, foreign challenges and internal dynamics is driving Iran’s strategic pivot to vertical deterrence. Tehran has been compelled to reevaluate its reliance on its proxy networks for forward defence due to their declining effectiveness because of regional instability and the crises in Gaza and Lebanon.
Furthermore, the necessity for technological modernisation has been highlighted by Israeli military operations that have revealed serious weaknesses in Iran’s solid-fuel missile production capabilities and air defence systems. Despite budgetary restraints and a heavily sanctioned economy, Iran has dramatically raised its military budget for the year 1404 (March 2025–March 2026) by 200 per cent, prioritising the development of modern defence technologies, including drones, air defences and missile systems. This investment demonstrates a dedication to improving its strategic posture and resolving technology shortcomings. Even if Iran’s leadership continues to formally reject any plans to weaponise the country, continuous internal discussions about nuclear deterrence raise the possibility of a change in strategy. All these elements work together to highlight Iran’s resolute shift toward a vertically integrated defence policy meant to protect its interests as a nation in the face of growing regional and international threats.
Implications of the strategic shift
Iran’s move from horizontal to vertical deterrence has significant ramifications for regional and international security, and it may have a cascade of destabilising consequences. Iran’s developments in drones, missiles and nuclear weapons might create a security conundrum in the region, forcing nearby nations to step up their own defence initiatives and escalating the Middle East’s arms race. Conflict risks would increase because of this spread of military technologies since nations like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others would try to offset Iran’s increasing military might. Iran’s already troubled economy could be made worse by its pursuit of superior military weapons, especially its nuclear hedging approach. Increasing defence spending might increase Tehran’s diplomatic isolation, invite further international sanctions and take funds away from urgent domestic needs.
The ambiguity surrounding Iran’s nuclear intentions also undermines global nonproliferation efforts, as the international community remains uncertain about Tehran’s true nuclear ambitions. By maintaining its nuclear programme on the edge of weaponisation, Iran raises concerns of a potential regional nuclear arms race and challenges the global nonproliferation framework, making it harder for diplomatic solutions to prevail. This evolving situation demands careful attention from both regional actors and the international community to mitigate the risks of escalation and prevent the further destabilisation of the region.
The role of Shia ideology
Iran’s Shia religious beliefs, which combine strategic goals with theological explanations, have a significant impact on its deterrent policy. Iran is able to give regime survival and national security first priority because of the ideology of Velayat-e-faqih, which gives the governing jurist flexibility in coordinating strategic decisions with Islamic precepts. Its use of asymmetric warfare techniques, such as ballistic missiles, drones and proxies, reflects this flexibility and is consistent with Shia beliefs about defending Shia people around the region and against oppression. The state’s dedication to defending allies like Hezbollah and Iraqi militias is demonstrated by its regional dominance, which is embodied in the “Shia Axis”.
Iran’s changing strategic calculation is made considerably more complex by Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in 2025, which could hasten Iran’s transition to vertical deterrence. Tehran is under increased pressure due to the expected return of “maximum pressure” measures, including harsher economic sanctions and steadfast support for Israeli military operations. Iran may accelerate its vertical deterrence measures in response to these outside pressures and the alleged danger of Israeli or American strikes on vital facilities.
Pursuing a nuclear “threshold state” status, in which Iran retains sophisticated nuclear capabilities without completely weaponising, is one possible reaction. This would maintain strategic ambiguity while preventing overt international reprisal. Hardline groups within Iran, however, might push for going over the threshold to build a nuclear weapon, claiming that it is the only reliable deterrence against the United States and Israel’s increasing hostilities. At the same time, Tehran may use its sophisticated nuclear programme as leverage in diplomatic negotiations, requesting concessions or security assurances that lessen outside pressure. Iran’s will to protect its national security and navigate a more hostile geopolitical landscape during Trump’s second term is reflected in this multifaceted strategy.
Domestically, Iran faces the challenge of balancing its military investments with the economic strain caused by sanctions and internal dissatisfaction. Increased defence spending on missile and nuclear technologies may further stretch the country’s resources, aggravating domestic economic hardships and potentially spark unrest. Iran’s decisions in the coming months will have lasting implications for the Middle East’s geopolitical dynamics, and the international community must act decisively to address the underlying causes of Iran’s strategic shift while promoting regional and global stability.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250115-irans-deterrence-doctrine-from-horizontal-resilience-to-vertical-strength/
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What Comes After A Gaza Ceasefire Deal
Osama Al-Sharif
January 15, 2025
A long-awaited ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas appears imminent, according to US, Israeli, Qatari and Palestinian sources. After months of fruitless negotiations, the two sides are now closer than ever to sealing a multi-phased agreement that would bring an end to the bloodletting, allow for the release of Israeli captives and Palestinian prisoners, and ensure a gradual Israeli withdrawal from war-ravaged Gaza.
Details are sketchy, but what is clear is that US President-elect Donald Trump has stepped in and put pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to embrace a deal before his inauguration on Jan. 20. President Joe Biden also spoke of an agreement to be sealed soon, while Secretary of State Antony Blinken unveiled his vision for a postwar Gaza on Tuesday.
Speaking about his own foreign policy achievements, Biden mentioned the plight of the people of Gaza, “who have been through hell,” and spoke of the right of Palestinians to self-determination. Trump, on his part, said on Monday: “We are very close to getting it done. There has been a handshake, and they are getting it finished. If it won’t happen, there will be a lot of trouble.”
It is ironic and sad that Trump has been able to push all parties to accept a deal when Biden could have done the same months ago, thus sparing many innocent lives on both sides. The fact that Biden and Blinken have allowed Netanyahu and his far-right coalition to carry out the worst genocide in modern times, all while supplying Israel with tens of billions of dollars-worth of arms, is an indelible stain that has made the US complicit in the Gaza carnage.
Trump will take credit for stopping the massacre and ending what had become the most horrific war against civilians in the 21st century. Netanyahu, who wasted no opportunity to derail an agreement that could have been reached many months ago, finds himself in a corner. He has not delivered a “total victory,” nor has his army been able to free all hostages. Under the proposed agreement, the Israeli military will withdraw from key positions in Gaza, culminating in total withdrawal in the final phase of the ceasefire agreement.
The end of the war — a final cessation of hostilities that is yet to be agreed upon — will trigger a political crisis in Israel. Netanyahu’s far-right partners have threatened to quit the coalition. Pressure will rise in Israel for an independent inquiry into the events of Oct. 7, 2023. Netanyahu’s trial on corruption charges will resume. His margin of maneuverability will become much smaller. It is unlikely that he will be able to survive politically as captives begin to return home and the world has a first glance at the level of mass destruction Israel has inflicted on Gaza.
Regarding the “day-after” scenario, Blinken’s vision of a reformed Palestinian Authority role, with Arab participation, will depend on how the Trump team sees things. While Hamas has sustained significant losses in its leadership structure and military prowess in Gaza, it has survived as a political force. What role it will have in Gaza in the future depends on the Trump White House, Israel and, to some extent, the PA.
Much also depends on what the people of Gaza want. They have paid the ultimate price for the events of Oct. 7, 2023, and it is up to them to determine their own future. They should be allowed to do so. The biggest challenges once a ceasefire deal is adopted are to facilitate the passage of humanitarian assistance and the documentation of war crimes in Gaza.
That last challenge will not be mentioned in the ceasefire deal. But even if the war ends, the world should not ignore the fact that Israel has committed serious breaches of international law. Independent investigators and foreign journalists must be allowed into the stricken Strip. They have to report to the world the horrific war crimes that Israel has committed over the past 15 months. Accountability must be a cornerstone of any lasting agreement involving Gaza.
Meanwhile, one has to be wary of Israel’s commitment to the ceasefire deal. In Lebanon, Israel has allegedly violated the agreement with Hezbollah hundreds of times. The same will happen in Gaza. Israel will find excuses to derail the deal and resume its aggression in Gaza. The guarantors — the US, Qatar and Egypt — must make sure that an end to the war is lasting and that Israel will have no reason to resume its attacks.
Two complex issues are: who will end up ruling Gaza and when can reconstruction begin. Trump has yet to unveil his Middle East policy, especially regarding the future of the West Bank and the PA. He is reportedly eager to complete what he started with the Abraham Accords. He is to make clear his stand on Palestinian statehood and the right to self-determination. These are issues that will shape the region and the future of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. More than 15 months of the Israeli war on Gaza have failed to liquidate the Palestinian issue. Despite the destruction, the targeting of women and children, journalists, doctors, medics, academics and aid workers, the world today is more aware of the just cause of the Palestinians than ever before.
And then there is the issue of inter-Palestinian reconciliation. The Palestinian leadership must conclude that reconciliation and unity are the bulwark of a just cause that the world must address and rectify. After more than 46,000 fatalities — although that figure could double once the war ends — the Palestinians must overcome their differences and find common ground if they are to plead their case to the world.
And, as much as there must be Israeli accountability, there will also have to be a Palestinian revision of the consequences of the events of Oct. 7, 2023, and the geopolitical changes that have occurred as a result. Palestinians have the right to resist the occupiers but they must agree on how to conduct their resistance. Israel has used the Hamas attacks to launch a genocidal war that has claimed tens of thousands of innocent lives and wreaked inconceivable destruction on Gaza, home to more than 2.3 million Palestinians. There will have to be lessons learned. No outside actors can tag what has happened as a victory or a loss. It is for the people of Gaza to decide. After all, it is they who have paid the ultimate price.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2586540
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Has The Lebanese System Passed The Test?
Nadim Shehadi
January 15, 2025
Miracles happen, sometimes with a lot of suspense and a unique alignment of the stars. In the midst of major regional and international developments, and after 24 months of a political vacuum and complete paralysis, the Lebanese parliament has produced a new president and a new prime minister. Does this mean that the political system works? This question about the uniquely Lebanese power-sharing formula has troubled generations.
Lebanon’s system is sometimes seen as an example of coexistence to be followed by others and at other times there are calls for partition or some form of separation like federalism because coexistence is impossible.
The answer is not obvious. In October 2019, people took to the streets in a blanket condemnation of the political class, political parties, the economic system and the power-sharing formula. The revolutionary slogan was “all means all” — nothing was right and everyone was guilty. Bankers, politicians and corrupt government officials were all responsible for what seemed like a total collapse of the country. Lebanon was also abandoned by the world because it was considered a hopeless case. For many, this meant the end: there was no future and no hope with the current system. Until the last few days, nothing had happened to prove them wrong.
Now, suddenly, there is euphoria and optimism that the country could be on the right path once again, even though the actors are probably going to be more or less the same. Lebanese politicians somehow pulled it off and managed to get out of the paralysis, but the questions about the system and reforming it to avoid further paralysis in the future remain and the answers are not straightforward. The system failed and succeeded at the same time.
The election of Joseph Aoun as president was a triumph of diplomacy and deal-making. He is perceived to be a man of integrity with an impeccable track record who had won the confidence of the international community. But it was also a malfunction of the political process that necessitated external intervention, albeit a friendly one. The choice was also from outside the political class, which could not bring in one of its own. Aoun is the fourth consecutive current or former military chief to be parachuted into the presidency for lack of a viable alternative through the system.
Aoun’s election resembles a military coup but with a Lebanese twist: when politicians fail, the military steps in and takes over. The difference is that, in Lebanon, it is done by consensus and through parliament. Politicians admitted their inability and handed over power by electing the general who switches to a business suit and tie. Exceptionally, the constitution was amended for “one time and one time only” — for the third time. But let’s not kid ourselves, this should be the last exception, otherwise it becomes the rule.
However, the appointment of Nawaf Salam as prime minister was a shining example of civil society and the political establishment reaching what was seen as the best possible result at the last minute. An academic and a diplomat, Salam previously headed the UN Security Council and presided over the International Court of Justice during the high-profile Gaza genocide case.
Just the day before, it seemed like a choice between two other candidates. All things considered, for such a small country, it could be viewed as a better choice than American voters had a couple of months earlier. We went to bed thinking that caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati was not only leading but was also the inevitable international choice. He represented stability and continuity and had made successful transitions before.
But who wants continuity? There were protests and an intensive social media campaign. We were flooded with emails, WhatsApp messages and social media posts calling for the nomination of Salam as an alternative. The next day, unpredictably, a crescendo of declarations from MPs started naming Salam, one block after the other and from the most unexpected parties. It was too much excitement for one day and, considering what had just happened in Syria, it was enough excitement for a generation.
In 1952, Georges Naccache, the owner of the newspaper L’Orient and a sharp political commentator, diagnosed the problem. People had gone on to the streets to protest what was perceived as a corrupt establishment. They managed to force a president to resign and bring about the election of a popular outsider.
Naccache wrote that it is all very well for the Lebanese to congratulate themselves when the country comes out of a crisis, but he warned that if the solution did not come from within the system, this was also a failure. It is all too easy to blame one man and to think that, by deposing him, the system has rid itself of all its ills. He drew attention to the fact that the events in Lebanon were accompanied by disturbances in Egypt, Iran and Syria, with repercussions that had to be taken into account when answering questions about Lebanon’s existence, character and the chances of its survival and its role in the world.
For Naccache, the significance of the 1952 uprising, regardless of how successful or unsuccessful it was, is that it was the first attempt since independence to mobilize the country for a single cause. The danger there was that this was done outside parliament and outside the normal democratic process. He warned that, if Lebanese institutions were not reformed to contain future events of that sort, they would be done away with on the next occasion. Today, reforming the system to prevent another breakdown is the main task that lies ahead for the new president and prime minister.
While it is true that the system has broken down many times in the country’s history, it did so under the weight of regional factors such as Nasserism, the Palestine Liberation Organization or Syrian and Iranian control, which affected the whole area. Now that these have eased, we will see how it quickly bounces back, even if it needs a little help.
The country is technically still at war with Israel, there are hundreds of thousands of people displaced, entire villages destroyed and forming a government looks impossible. Lebanon is not only recovering from a war, but also from 54 years of the Assad regime as its neighbor.
But with all the challenges ahead, after these last few days in Lebanon, everything feels possible. A friend texted me while I was writing this piece: “My God, we look like a real country.”
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2586533
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URL: https://www.newageislam.com/middle-east-press/lebanese-gaza-iran-hamas-zionist/d/134344
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