Middle East Press On: Jordan, Brotherhood, Cybersecurity, War, Gaza: New Age Islam's Selection, 26 April 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
26 April 2025
Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood Ban A Turning Point
Türkiye's Cybersecurity Approach: From Policy To Robust Action
Trump 2.0 And Israel's Ongoing War In Gaza
Ai's Potential Impact On Labour Market In Türkiye
Netanyahu's Sins: Peace Plan Rejection Leading Israel To Strategic Dead End In Gaza
Israel Suffers From A Leadership Of Deflection And Evasion
Jews Must Visibly And Vigorously Defend Fellow Jews From Harm
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Jews Must Visibly And Vigorously Defend Fellow Jews From Harm
By Moshe Hauer
April 25, 2025
A recent statement from a group of organizations claiming to represent a broad swath of mainstream American Jewry vigorously rejected the US government’s recent actions to combat antisemitism. This prompts the question: How should Jews – fiercely committed to democracy, the rule of law, and due process – react when other Jews are threatened? How should we respond both to those who threaten us and to those who seek to protect and support us?
Azariah Figo was born in Venice in the 16th century, during a period of Church-mandated burnings of the Talmud and other Jewish books. In his youth, he joined many of his Jewish contemporaries in embracing the intellectual and social opportunities of the Italian Renaissance but later turned to focus on his own people and faith, dedicating his life to serving the Jewish communities of Pisa and Venice and to the revival of the study of Torah.
Considering the challenge of preserving Jewish identity in the Diaspora, Rabbi Figo offered a stunningly novel, simple, and painfully relevant interpretation of Moses’ first encounter with the Jewish people in Egypt.
The Biblical story is well-known. Moses emerged from his adoptive home in Pharaoh’s palace to connect to his brethren and observed their persecution first-hand, witnessing an Egyptian beating a Jew. Turning this way and that and seeing no one, Moses took the law into his own hands and struck down the attacking Egyptian.
What was Moses looking for when he turned this way and that? While the conventional understanding is that he was scanning the horizon to ensure the coast was clear, Rabbi Figo suggested otherwise.
This attack on a Jew was happening in broad daylight in the presence of many other Jews, and Moses expected to see someone stand up for the victim. When he looked around and saw no one prepared to act, he took it upon himself to neutralize the attacker.
Moses initially wrote off the inaction of others as a symptom of the Jews’ persecution fatigue, but then, on the next day, he saw Jews energetically fighting each other and heard them stand up for the killed Egyptian.
Evidently, the Jewish people were not too tired to fight or to care, but – much more concerning – they had given up their reflexive instinct to defend and protect each other, questioning Moses’ actions against the Egyptian attacker more than they had shown concern for the Jewish victim.
Pharaoh had apparently succeeded at rending the fabric of Jewish peoplehood. He was not alone. The Italy of Rabbi Figo and our own America have had the same effect on too many Jews who have allowed other ideals to supersede their Jewish sense of kinship.
As Jews, we should make sure our fellow Jews are safe before worrying about those who have fomented or acted with violence against them. We should understand our history and place in the world too well to entrust our security to the Egyptian Pharaohs we have faithfully served, the Ivy League institutions we have attended and funded, or the many on the margins we have consistently defended.
We should encourage those committed to act decisively to protect us, understanding well that Jew-hatred grows out of deeply diseased systems and cannot just be trimmed at the edges. Like Moses, we must promote love and justice for all but act decisively against those who promote and celebrate hatred and violence.
As Jews, we are thankful for US support for Israel and are fiercely proud and protective of the world’s one Jewish state, its vigorous democracy, and its moral army. And if a Jewish brother or sister anywhere is threatened or hurt, we will be there, visibly and vigorously defending them.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-851446
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Israel Suffers From A Leadership Of Deflection And Evasion
By Yaakov Katz
April 25, 2025
As bad as Tuesday night’s security cabinet meeting was, there was one glimmer of relief: Itamar Ben-Gvir wasn’t there.
The far-right minister, never shy to turn national security into performance art, was instead gallivanting through Florida – attending an event in a side room at Mar-a-Lago, window shopping rifles at a local gun store, inspecting a prison, and wandering the palm-lined streets of Bal Harbour, talking with random pedestrians and police officers.
Had Ben-Gvir attended the cabinet meeting, his theatrics might have overshadowed what was already a disgraceful moment in the government’s ongoing shameful conduct. This was highlighted by the way Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich sparred with IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir and ignored Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) head Ronen Bar.
During the meeting, Smotrich clashed with Zamir over the distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza, demanding that IDF troops take on the task despite warnings that it would compromise the military’s operational preparedness.
“We’ve specified the goal. You execute it,” Smotrich reportedly said to Zamir. “If you’re incapable, we’ll find someone who is.”
This wasn’t a policy debate. It was a calculated humiliation of the IDF’s top commander. Later, when Bar began speaking, Smotrich stood up and left the room, telling colleagues he was going to the bathroom.
The way he treated Bar is not surprising due to the ongoing standoff between the Shin Bet chief and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But Smotrich’s treatment of Zamir, who assumed his post just over a month ago and received unanimous praise upon appointment, marked a new low. This was not about security policy. It was about power and submission.
But this is the reality today in Israel. Ministers like Smotrich don’t believe that they can be questioned or challenged. They don’t see the value in having a chief of staff who does not simply do what he is told. This is what happened with Bar and Netanyahu.
The prime minister – according to Bar’s affidavit to the High Court – wanted a Shin Bet director who would prioritize his personal loyalty to the prime minister over his allegiance to the state. When Bar refused to do that, he became the government’s public enemy number one.
Obviously, the government sets policy, and the security chiefs implement it. After all, it is the ministers who were elected by the people. And exactly because of this, it is striking how, more than 18 months after October 7, no one in the government has taken responsibility for what happened.
The chief of staff has gone home, the head of Military Intelligence hung up his uniform more than a year ago, and Bar is just a matter of days away from being out of a job as well.
Responsibility or accountability
But the ministers? They have no sense of responsibility or accountability.
Take Education Minister Yoav Kisch as an example. A recording released by Channel 12 this week provided a glimpse into how the man responsible for our children’s education views the hostages. Most of them, he is heard saying in a recording from a meeting he had with the family of a hostage still being held in Gaza, are IDF soldiers.
“No, there are 24,” a relative corrected him.
“But out of the 24, how many are soldiers?” Kisch asked again.
The answer is four: Matan Angrest, Tamir Nimrodi, Edan Alexander, and Nimrod Cohen.
That Kisch, the minister responsible for our education system, does not know the most basic facts about the hostages still in Gaza – 567 days after their abduction – is appalling. It is an insult to the hostages, their families, and to every Israeli who expects even a minimum of seriousness from those in power.
There is no excuse. All Kisch has to do is walk into almost any school in the country, where hostage posters still hang in hallways. He can watch the Hamas propaganda videos of Omri Miran and Elkana Bohbot – neither of whom are soldiers – which were put out in the last week. By the way, they are civilians – Israelis who were abandoned at the Nova music festival and in their homes by this government.
And yet, this isn’t just about Kisch. It is the policy of the entire government, and they learn it from the man on top. Netanyahu is the champion of avoiding responsibility and not knowing the details of the failures that happen on his watch. He has misstated the date of when the Hamas massacre happened, has forgotten the names of hostages, and more.
But this is the irony of this government. Netanyahu, Smotrich, and others want security chiefs to do what they say, but then, when something happens – an October 7 or anything else – they absolve themselves of any responsibility. The prime minister presided over a policy for 15 years that empowered Hamas, and when that policy exploded in Israel’s face, he claimed no responsibility.
It was, his loyalists say, the fault of the Shin Bet. It was because no one woke up the prime minister in the middle of the night.
No responsibility and no accountability. Only deflections and distractions.
The Israeli public deserves leaders who don’t hide behind excuses and scapegoats. With this style of leadership, it will be impossible for the country to heal.
This cannot continue. Israel needs a national reset. That will not happen while Yoav Kisch lectures hostage families, Bezalel Smotrich berates the IDF, and Benjamin Netanyahu clings to power through blame.
Healing will begin the day they step down.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-851435
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Netanyahu's Sins: Peace Plan Rejection Leading Israel To Strategic Dead End In Gaza
By Amotz Asa-El
April 25, 2025
It’s too late. Humility – the readiness to say “I am only that big, only that smart, and only that right’’ – will never penetrate Bibi Netanyahu’s mind.
The prime minister’s response to his chief spook’s accusations under oath – “lies” – means King Bibi will never in his life say what King David said after his own sins were laid bare: “I sinned.”
Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar’s charges, that Netanyahu asked him to surveil demonstrators, obstruct the PM’s trial, and oppose the High Court in case of a constitutional crisis – are part of a 12-year moral slide that began when this column warned against Netanyahu’s granting of a cabinet seat to a convicted bribe taker (“Strategic threat looming,” November 2, 2012).
Morally, that was Netanyahu’s original sin as prime minister, but his premiership was marred by two other original sins as well – one political, the other strategic.
The political sin, as argued here in the past (“Netanyahu’s last opportunity,” February 14, 2024) came in 2014, when Netanyahu divorced the political Center, ultimately pawning his future, and ours, with ultra-Orthodoxy and the far Right.
The third original sin concerns the Palestinian problem, the predicament Netanyahu has misread for more than half a century and now leads him, and us, into a strategic dead end.
At this writing, the IDF is reportedly preparing a grand attack on Gaza, an assault that will presumably involve scores of aircraft, hundreds of tanks, and thousands of troops. Just what that assault’s exact purpose will be is unclear, but some of its results can already be assumed.
First, the IDF will lose soldiers, possibly many. Second, our troops will return to patrol Gaza’s angry streets. And third, Hamas, though decimated, will survive. To these, one might add the low likelihood that a ground attack will liberate our hostages.
The kind of decisive victory the IDF achieved in Lebanon is not at stake in Gaza – not because of the military difference between the two arenas, daunting though it is, as Gaza is a densely built urban thicket, whereas south Lebanon is a disjointed and mostly rural countryside.
The difference is political. Hezbollah was part of a sovereign country with a complex society that could potentially confront the minority that had hijacked it. That, in fact, is what is happening there now, following Iran’s effective eviction, and its Shi’ite proxy’s consequent loss of clout.
Gaza, by contrast, is not heterogeneous and not a country. It’s a political no-man’s land populated by Sunni Muslims and fully conquered by jihadists. There is no equivalent there of Lebanon’s sectarian mosaic of Christian, Druze, Shi’ite, Sunni, Armenian, and other tribes and sects. That is why any change in Gaza will have to involve some kind of political reengineering.
Military action, no matter how imaginative and brave, will not deliver this change. For Gaza to change politically, its government must be redesigned not by Israelis, but by Arabs.
The good news is that a blueprint for such an Arab redesign has emerged. The bad news is that Netanyahu, in line with his time-honored Palestinian strategy, and despite his strategy’s manifest collapse, has already rejected that Arab plan.
Egypt's plan for Gaza reconstruction and management backed by Arab allies
The plan, introduced in Cairo on March 4 by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, was vague on details but clear on one thing: Hamas would cease to rule, and the Palestinian Authority would not take over immediately. Instead, a government of non-political experts would oversee reconstruction, which would be financed and managed by Arab governments.
Anyone familiar with Middle Eastern dynamics understood the subtext. The governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – all of which endorsed the plan – would join Egypt in overseeing Gaza’s reconstruction.
Is this a panacea? Of course not. Is this a wholesome plan? It isn’t. It is, however, the potential beginning of an Arab alternative to Hamas. Underpinning that thinking is the Egyptian, Saudi, Emirati, and Jordanian fear of the Islamist scourge. They care about it greatly, and want it defeated no less than Israel, maybe even more.
Israel could therefore have said about that plan, “We have our reservations, but this is a beginning, let’s talk.” Instead, Netanyahu ignored the plan. Netanyahu did not bother explaining his rejection, but its two parts – what he doesn’t want and what he does want – are clear.
What Netanyahu doesn’t want is any form of Palestinian statehood, an aim that Sisi’s plan indeed recommends. Netanyahu also doesn’t want any role for the Palestinian Authority, which the plan does offer, albeit in a delayed, conditional, and piecemeal way.
What, then, does Netanyahu want? Well, he wants to continue riding the Islamist tiger.
People don’t change at age 75, and Netanyahu is not prepared to admit that his big gamble – invest in Hamas, pit it against the PA, and rule the Palestinians – has failed. That is why he – alone among Israel’s relevant policymakers in recent years – resists the establishment of an independent commission of inquiry.
Such a panel would prove that Netanyahu consciously cultivated Hamas as the ruler of Gaza, hoping it would divide the Palestinians nationally and marginalize them internationally.
It should be said in Netanyahu’s favor that this quest, to sweep the Palestinian problem under the rug, did not begin with him. Rather, it is part of Revisionist Zionism’s attitude since well before he was born.
What began with Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s dismissal of the partition idea in 1937 was followed by Menachem Begin’s refusal to include a Palestinian deal in the Camp David Accords in 1979, and by Yitzhak Shamir’s rejection of Shimon Peres’s London Agreement with Jordan’s King Hussein in 1987.
At some point, the ostrich will have to take its head out of the sand. Yes, Hamas and any other Palestinian out to kill us deserve death. The rest, however, exactly like us, deserve a life. www.MiddleIsrael.net
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-851421
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Ai's Potential Impact On Labour Market In Türkiye
By Mahmut Özer
Apr 26, 2025
Unlike previous technological disruptions, artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly entering all areas of life and causing significant transformations wherever it is adopted. In particular, the development and accessibility of generative AI have led to this transformation taking on a radical dimension. As a result, countries have begun to focus on the economic opportunities that generative AI may offer and the potential impacts it could have on employment within labour markets.
In this context, the report titled "The Economic Potential of Artificial Intelligence in Türkiye," prepared by professor Altan Çakır with the support of Google and Implement Consulting and published in May 2024, provides highly significant projections regarding AI's possible contributions to the Turkish economy and its impacts on the labor market. The report’s central projection is that, if the opportunities presented by generative AI can be effectively leveraged, it could contribute an additional 5% – approximately $50 billion to $60 billion (TL 1.92 trillion to TL 2.31 trillion) – to Türkiye’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) within the next decade. This additional economic contribution is expected to result from increased worker productivity enabled by this technology, the expansion of unallocated time and the reallocation of that time to other value-added activities.
On the other hand, the report estimates that 41% of the current 31 million job positions in Türkiye (approximately 13 million jobs) will not be exposed to automation, while 55% (around 17 million jobs) will benefit from the contributions of generative AI. For the remaining 4% (roughly 1 million jobs), partial or complete job transformation is expected. Accordingly, it is projected that generative AI technologies will impact 59% of job positions. As noted above, this impact is expected to take place across three dimensions. In 55% of positions – 70% of which are in the service sector – worker productivity is expected to increase. The 4% involving partial or complete job transformation will emerge through newly created roles, resulting from the reallocation of time freed up in the 55% segment to other value-added activities. Thus, no net loss in employment is anticipated.
The report emphasizes three key regulatory measures necessary for the anticipated economic benefits and employment impacts of generative AI technologies to materialize as projected: reskilling and upskilling the workforce, increasing R&D activities by local innovative actors and accelerating commercial innovation efforts.
Key employment projections
The preparation of such a comprehensive report on the potential impacts of AI technologies on Türkiye's economy and labor markets is highly significant. However, there is a growing need for even more detailed and extensive reports in this area. This is because international discussions and findings concerning the economic and labor market effects of AI technologies are becoming increasingly pessimistic.
In previous major technological transformations, the jobs eliminated were, to some extent, balanced by the creation of new positions. Yet, recent studies warn that this may not be the case with AI technologies. Either the number of newly created jobs will not be sufficient to compensate for those lost, or the newly created jobs themselves will be rapidly taken over by exponentially advancing AI systems, or both outcomes may occur simultaneously. Therefore, more comprehensive and forward-looking preparations are urgently needed.
As highlighted in the report, the impact of generative AI technologies on worker productivity is significantly higher for low- and medium-skilled groups than for high-skilled groups. In other words, if adopted appropriately, this technology can rapidly enhance the productivity of low- and medium-skilled workers, thereby increasing overall efficiency and output. The phrase “if adopted” is emphasized here to indicate that this outcome depends on the choices made by employers. Unfortunately, the global trend does not appear to be moving in this direction. Employers often prefer to use this technology to reduce the number of employees, thereby increasing profits. In other words, the prevailing tendency favors automation, often at the expense of employment, rather than using AI to augment human labor and improve the productivity of low- and medium-skilled workers. Moreover, as employment declines, union activities related to labor rights are also increasingly undermined.
In short, if the process is left to unfold on its own, there is a risk that the automation pathway will become further entrenched. Therefore, in the projected 55% of job positions where productivity gains are expected due to automation, as stated in the report, this issue must be carefully considered. Another important point is the need to pay attention to potential wage reductions from partial or complete job transitions within the 4% of positions identified in the report. This is because, in cases of job transitions, workers are often forced to shift to lower-skilled – and thus lower-paid – positions.
4 fixes for labor market
The report notes that, between 2008 and 2021, an average of 5.2 million new jobs were created annually in Türkiye, while approximately 5 million jobs were closed each year. This indicates that, in terms of job positions, Türkiye maintains a relatively balanced labor market. However, the report also states that as of 2023, only 19% of large companies and just 5% of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) had implemented AI technologies. Therefore, the real impact of AI is expected to unfold in the coming period. In this regard, for the optimistic projections outlined in the report to materialize, it is essential to take meaningful steps to strengthen the skills of workers in the labor market.
The first step is to organize continuous training programs – particularly for low- and medium-skilled workers – to strengthen their resilience in the labor market by enhancing their skills related to AI technologies. In this context, the continuing education centers of higher education institutions and the in-service training units within businesses should be made significantly more active.
The recent introduction of higher education programs focused on artificial intelligence (AI) is a significant step. However, considering the massive wave of AI integration, this is insufficient. Therefore, as a second step, all higher education programs should include courses designed to enhance AI literacy, with content tailored to the specific needs of each field of study. Additionally, training programs aimed at improving the AI literacy of all academics in higher education and teachers should be implemented rapidly and repeated at regular intervals. As noted in the report, 55% of job positions expected to be affected by automation are predominantly white-collar occupations. If this step is not taken, the strengthening of the automation pathway will increase the risk of job loss among white-collar workers, and newly emerging positions are likely to shift toward lower-skilled (and thus lower-paid) roles.
Forty-four percent of job positions identified in the report as unlikely to be affected by AI likely correspond to areas within the scope of vocational education. Vocational education offers a more resilient career path against the impacts of AI. In this context, the steps taken in recent years to strengthen vocational education in Türkiye have provided a significant advantage. Enhancing this advantage presents a valuable opportunity to reduce youth unemployment in the labor market and to facilitate the school-to-work transition. Therefore, as the third step, efforts to strengthen vocational education should be continued, and the focus should be placed on equipping students in vocational education with artificial intelligence skills, as these programs allow time for acquiring new competencies.
Finally, despite all these steps, unforeseen contractions may still occur in the fields in which individuals have received their education. Therefore, "skills development and updating support platforms" should be established – offering short-term training programs that enable skill transfer and are recognized by the labor market. Through such platforms, graduates will be able to redirect themselves toward fields with employment opportunities by acquiring new skills in a short time, thereby gaining access to new opportunities in the face of unemployment. In light of the rapid changes that AI is bringing – and will continue to bring – to skill sets, lifelong learning is no longer a choice but a necessity.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/ais-potential-impact-on-labor-market-in-turkiye
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Trump 2.0 And Israel's Ongoing War In Gaza
By Fazzur Rahman Siddiqui
Apr 26, 2025
It was only amid the peak of the 2020 U.S. presidential election campaign in October of last year that the imam of Michigan, Belal al-Zuhairi, showered praise on Donald Trump in his presence and called him a man of peace. The imam did not stop there, but endorsed his candidacy and promised full support to him, believing his political rhetoric was gospel that Trump would end the war in Gaza. Trump had stated that he was only one capable of ending the war in Gaza and accused his predecessor and opponent, both former President Joe Biden and the Democratic candidate Kamala Harris, of all the plights in the region.
It was not only in Michigan, a major swing state, where Trump was welcomed, but in other states as well; he maintained his lead over his rival among the majority of Arab American voters. The day after the imam endorsed Trump, one of Trump’s closest friends, Rudy Giuliani, claimed that Hamas, along with Iran, wants to kill Americans and all Palestinians, since the age of 2, are taught to kill Americans. He also expressed his anger over why Palestinians are living in Israel today instead of Jordan and Egypt.
Hollow promises
Though forgetfulness or amnesia is a blessing to survive in today’s chaotic world, one still finds it difficult to overlook the prejudices that Trump continues to exhibit in favor of Israel. Though he was able to impose a cease-fire in Gaza before entering the White House, the massacre soon resumed, with all cease-fire violations occurring after a year-long marathon of efforts. Instead of adhering to the first phase of the cease-fire and resuming the talks for the second phase as stipulated in the plan, Israeli forces launched a fresh military operation from one corner of Gaza to another on March 19, with a call for fresh peace talks to secure the release of more Israeli prisoners. The second round of Israeli operations in Gaza is enjoying all support from Trump, as his Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, also talked of a fresh cease-fire plan, first aimed at securing the release of Israeli prisoners, ignoring the earlier cease-fire plan, which was more judicious.
Before the inauguration of the first phase of the three-phase cease-fire plan on Jan. 19, 2025, many, including Trump, had expressed apprehensions about the plan's successful implementation, which aimed to end the occupation of Gaza, establish some form of governance and ultimately, those apprehensions proved to be true.
The resumption of the genocidal war in Gaza, along with the prevention of all humanitarian aid despite global outcry, exposed the fleeting nature and emptiness of Trump’s promise to end the war.
The ongoing genocidal campaign seems to be a copy-paste of what had happened in the first round, which already turned the Gaza Strip into an inhospitable land of rubble and killed more than 50,000, victimizing numerous people. Many watchers of the violence in Gaza claim that the numbers could be much higher than what is being reported in pro-Israel and Western media, which are acting more like spokespersons of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government.
Disrespectful proposals
Amid the yes-no dilemma of the cease-fire entering into the second phase, Trump came up with a provocative proposal triggering an unprecedented crisis when he in a joint press conference with Netanyahu in White House on Feb. 4, 2025, said that the U.S. would take over the war-battered Gaza Strip as it has become a demolition site and approximately 1.8 million Palestinians should be moved to countries such as Egypt and Jordan where they can live in peace. He also promised to turn Gaza into a beautiful location, which he called the “Riviera of the Middle East."
Trump's statement not only rendered all talk of a two-state solution redundant, but the plan seems to have evaporated the aspiration of Palestinians for an independent state, paving the way for an unending regional cycle of violence. His Gaza proposal not only pushed the clock of Palestinian movement back but scared the Arab countries and prompted them, particularly Egypt which has all the pretense to dictate the strategic and diplomatic trajectory on Palestine, to call a meeting of the Arab League, a divided and tattered house since its inception, on March 4, 2024 to offer an alternative proposal for the reconstruction of Gaza. The plan provided a comprehensive blueprint for Gaza reconstruction, but was silent about the means of the huge economic resources worth $53 billion. As expected, Israel took no time to reject the plan, saying that the resolution passed at the Arab League Summit was more a reflection of the impotence of Arab politics. The U.S. also rejected the plan, citing that the outcome statement overlooks the realities on the ground.
It is not the Trump plan of takeover of Gaza or rejection of the Gaza reconstruction plan that shows the height of the U.S. proclivity for Israel, but Trump’s every move on the Israel-Gaza conflict shows his disrespect and insensitivity toward the victimized Palestinians. The choice of Pete Hegseth as U.S. secretary of defense by Trump reveals all the misfortunes lying ahead for the Palestinians. During his confirmation speech in the Senate, Hegseth justified the atrocities in Gaza and stated that he would extend all support to the killing of the last member of Hamas. We know well that the prerogative of distinguishing between Hamas and non-Hamas lies only with the Israel-U.S. duo. Similarly, the appointment of Mike Huckabee as the U.S. ambassador to Israel is revealing of Trump’s plan for the West Bank and Gaza. The newly appointed ambassador is someone who has always called for the total capture of the West Bank and sending the indigenous people to Jordan.
Tension everywhere
This one-sided plan of Trump for Gaza, the West Bank or the whole of the Middle East is facing all-out resistance across the world. Within months of his entering the White House, the entire region, ranging from Syria to Iran to Yemen, has become tense, and the verbal sparring between Iran and the U.S. has reached a point where the decade-old war-like situation seems on the verge of becoming a terrible reality at any moment.
Since Trump was inaugurated for his second term, U.S. streets have witnessed protests daily. The majority of the protests are aimed against the brutal war in Gaza and Trump’s defense of the genocidal acts of Netanyahu and his armed forces. The Turnberry Golf Club in Scotland, owned by Trump, was spray-painted red and areas of the lawn were dug up with the words "Gaza Not for Sale" written in bold letters. Another of Trump’s golf courses in Ireland was vandalized when pro-Palestinian activists planted a Palestinian flag there. A deal between Trump and the government of Indonesia to develop six resorts in Bali has failed to make any headway since the war in Gaza broke out. Similarly, the score of Holocaust survivors signed a memorandum condemning the harassment of another Holocaust survivor, Stephen Kapos, by London police for expressing solidarity with the people of Palestine.
The most recent protest occurred in the first week of April, when hundreds of thousands of Americans in different U.S. cities took to the streets against Trump’s clampdown on democratic voices and his politics of weaponizing trade policy. The rally drew support from around 300 organizations. Mahmoud Khalil, a green card holder and graduate of Columbia University, has already become a symbol of protest after he was detained for his pro-Palestine advocacy. In another case of opposition to Trump’s policy of a crackdown against academic institutions, Harvard University filed a lawsuit against his administration for withholding billions of dollars of funding for the university.
A recent poll conducted by Reuters/Ipsos shows a steady decline in Trump's popularity since he returned to the White House. Today it has reached its lowest. Some 83% of the 4,306 respondents said the U.S. president should comply with federal court rulings even if he doesn't want to.
Trump 2.0 is giving all indications that one should harbor no hope that Palestinians will receive a just solution under the Trump administration. No doubt, all negotiations on the prospect of the two-state solution will lie buried as long as he occupies the White House.
His first term in office (2016-2020) was equally unjust for the people of Palestine, as he was the one who shifted the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to the city of Jerusalem and declared the city the eternal capital of the state of Israel. Trump is not unpredictable, as assumed by many in his first term, and whatever he is doing today in the region is to ensure a secure, stable and prosperous future for the state of Israel. To achieve this objective, he can sacrifice centuries-old American values nurtured by the founding fathers of America, which was loftily called a shining city on a hill.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/trump-20-and-israels-ongoing-war-in-gaza
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Türkiye's Cybersecurity Approach: From Policy To Robust Action
By Cenay Babaoğlu
Apr 25, 2025
In the context of evolving global dynamics, the digital realm has become an increasingly critical arena of power competition, prompting states to adopt a range of strategies to address its growing implications. As we look ahead to 2025, it is heartening to see the notable institutional and legislative steps taken by Türkiye in the digital sphere, which signify a significant turning point for its cybersecurity architecture.
On Jan.8, 2025, the Cybersecurity Directorate was established under the authority of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye. This was followed by the enactment of the Cybersecurity Law on March 19, 2025. In recent weeks, the Digital Transformation Office of the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye (CBDDO) was dissolved, with a significant portion of its responsibilities transferred to the newly formed Cybersecurity Directorate. These developments may signal a new phase in Türkiye's cybersecurity policies. In this context, a historical overview may be a helpful way to understand how Türkiye's cybersecurity policies have evolved to date and where they might be headed in the future.
1990s: Genesis of policies
Türkiye’s journey in cybersecurity policy began in earnest in the 1990s, spurred by the civilian adoption of network technologies. Initially focused on military applications, the field rapidly gained strategic importance as internet usage expanded and cyber threats became more prevalent. A critical step came in 1991, when cybercrimes were incorporated into the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) – an early legislative attempt to address emerging digital risks. In 1996, the Security Working Group drafted a preliminary framework, although it could not be materialized into a formal legislative proposal.
In 1999, the Ministry of Transport released Türkiye’s National Information Infrastructure Master Plan (TUENA), the first official document aimed at strengthening IT infrastructure. Institutionally, organizations such as the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye (TÜBITAK), particularly its Informatics and Information Security Research Center (BILGEM), played formative roles in early cybersecurity research. Throughout the 1990s, cybersecurity was viewed as a secondary issue within the broader context of technological advancement. However, the rapid digital transformations of the 2000s led to a growing recognition of the need for more robust policy responses.
2000s: Emergence of cybersecurity
The 2000s marked the beginning of a more structured legal and institutional approach to cybersecurity in Türkiye. Although a draft law on the Nnational Information Security Organization and its duties was introduced in 2000, followed by another draft on national information security in 2002, neither was enacted. It is nevertheless encouraging to see that cybersecurity is beginning to feature in national planning documents. The 2002 e-Türkiye Initiative Action Plan included information security as a subcomponent. In a similar vein, the 2003 e-Transformation Türkiye Project and the 2003-2004 Short-Term Action Plan addressed the subject of information security, while Prime Ministry Circular No. 2003/10 outlined guiding principles for information systems security.
During this period, legal milestones such as the Electronic Signature Law (Law No. 5070) and the revised TCK (Law No. 5237), both enacted in 2004, which addressed legal dimensions of cyberspace. The National Information Systems Security Program was launched in 2006 and cybersecurity measures were also integrated into the 2006-2010 Information Society Strategy and Action Plan.
Further legal groundwork was established with Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed Using Such Publications (“The Internet Law”) (2007), followed by the Electronic Communications Law No. 5809 (2008). Meanwhile, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK) began to assume a regulatory role in cybersecurity, and Türkiye conducted its first national cybersecurity exercise. As the decade drew to a close, a Draft Law on e-government and the Information Society was prepared. In parallel with NATO’s prioritization of cybersecurity, Türkiye formulated its own National Cybersecurity Policy Document in this term.
2010-2018: National strategies
The period from 2010 to 2018 marked a significant turning point in Türkiye’s cybersecurity policies. For the first time, the Constitution was amended to include provisions on the protection of personal data, and cyber threats were explicitly acknowledged in the National Security Council Declaration. In addition, Türkiye signed the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime.
In 2012, the BTK was given the mandate to coordinate national cybersecurity efforts. TÜBITAK BILGEM’s Cybersecurity Institute emerged as a key actor in developing technologies and providing specialized training. During this period, crucial institutions were established, including the Cybersecurity Board, the Computer Emergency Response Team of the Republic of Türkiye (TR-CERT), the National Cybercrime Department of the Turkish National Police and the Turkish Armed Forces Cyber Defense Command.
The 2013-2014 National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan was followed by the AFAD’s 2014-2023 Road Map for the Protection of Critical Infrastructures. The 2015-2018 Information Society Strategy and Action Plan featured information security as a core theme. The National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan was updated in 2016. That same year, the Personal Data Protection Law (Law No. 6698) was passed. In 2017, the Personal Data Protection Authority was established. The 2010s saw a growing recognition of cybersecurity as a key element of national security, accompanied by a rapid institutionalization.
2018-2025: Integration in cybersecurity
With Türkiye’s transition to a presidential system in 2018, the establishment of the CBDDO marked a significant organizational shift. National cybersecurity coordination was entrusted to the CBDDO’s newly formed Cybersecurity Department, while the Cybersecurity Board was dissolved. During this phase, key documents were published, including the Decree on Information and Communication Security Measures, the Information and Communication Security Guide, the 2020-2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan and the National Cybersecurity Governance Analysis Report.
This period also saw significant educational advances: Türkiye’s first cybersecurity high school, vocational college and cybersecurity engineering program were launched, and the National Cybersecurity Workshop was held. The National Cybersecurity Strategy and Action Plan was updated again in 2024 for the 2024-2028 term. During this period, policy priorities centered on mitigating cyber threats, strengthening national capabilities, safeguarding critical infrastructure and promoting international cooperation. Additionally, efforts have been made to nurture the cybersecurity ecosystem through education, awareness-building, and technological development.
Post-2025: A new era
In recent years, Türkiye has experienced notable developments in its digitalization and cybersecurity landscape. The enactment of the Cybersecurity Law in early 2025, along with the establishment of the Cybersecurity Directorate and Cybersecurity Council, appears to signal a move toward a more centralized and comprehensive approach to countering cyber threats. The new law introduces harsh penalties for data breaches and cyberattacks and strengthens oversight of critical infrastructure.
The Cybersecurity Directorate is poised to take a central role in implementing the law. Its duties include fostering inter-agency coordination, maintaining data inventories, conducting risk assessments, and enforcing security protocols. On March 28, 2025, the CBDDO was officially dissolved, and its responsibilities were transferred to the new Cybersecurity Directorate. This body is not only tasked with defending against cyber threats, but also plays a broader role in guiding public sector digital transformation, enhancing e-government services and promoting the adoption of artificial intelligence.
This development underscores a paradigm shift: Cybersecurity is no longer viewed merely as a defense mechanism, but as a core pillar of the digital ecosystem. It could be seen as marking a new phase in Türkiye's cybersecurity trajectory – one that may require a proactive, inclusive and adaptable approach to address evolving threats. It is thought that a framework of this kind could potentially contribute to national security and enhance Türkiye's international competitiveness. As a presidential centralized entity, the Cybersecurity Directorate is strategically positioned to assume a critical role in coordinating cohesive and impactful cybersecurity policies. This new role reflects the dynamic evolution of the digital sphere, which is progressively more recognized not merely as a domain of security but also as an arena for fostering innovation, enhancing governance, and advancing public service delivery.
https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/turkiyes-cybersecurity-approach-from-policy-to-robust-action
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Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood Ban A Turning Point
Hani Hazaimeh
April 25, 2025
Jordan’s decision to formally ban all activities of the dissolved Muslim Brotherhood marks a watershed moment in the kingdom’s modern political history — a decision that could reverberate well beyond its borders.
Announced by Interior Minister Mazen Al-Faraya on Wednesday, the move came on the heels of a shocking revelation: a foiled plot involving the manufacture of rockets by individuals allegedly linked to the group. This development sent shock waves through Jordan’s security apparatus and fundamentally reshaped the national discourse on the role of political Islam within the state.
Since the establishment of the Jordanian state in 1946, the Muslim Brotherhood has played a paradoxical role — at once an integrated actor in Jordan’s political development and a perennial source of ideological friction. Its founding in Jordan was marked by a pragmatic collaboration with the Hashemite monarchy, built on mutual concerns about communism and Arab nationalism.
Over the decades, the Brotherhood crafted a unique position within the kingdom’s political architecture. Unlike its outlawed counterparts in neighboring states, Jordan’s Brotherhood operated with relative openness, participating in parliamentary elections, running charitable institutions and mobilizing support through grassroots networks.
Throughout the latter half of the 20th century and into the 2000s, the Brotherhood managed to straddle the line between loyalty to the monarchy and advocacy for a distinct sociopolitical agenda rooted in Islamic principles. It garnered support from a wide spectrum of society, particularly among those in the middle and lower classes, who felt marginalized by the economic liberalization policies of successive governments. Its role in advocating for the Palestinian cause — especially during crises such as the ongoing Gaza war — further amplified its resonance with the Jordanian public, culminating in a stronger-than-expected performance in the 2024 legislative elections.
However, what once served as a pressure valve for societal grievances has, in the eyes of the state, transformed into a potential vector for subversion. The recent discovery of a clandestine rocket-manufacturing operation, allegedly orchestrated by the son of a senior Brotherhood figure, has shattered long-held assumptions about the group’s strict adherence to nonviolence. Although the Brotherhood’s leadership was quick to disavow any connection to the plot and reiterated its commitment to peaceful activism, the incident has nonetheless cast a dark cloud over the movement’s credibility and internal coherence.
In response, the government launched a sweeping crackdown: banning all Brotherhood-related activities, shuttering affiliated offices, freezing financial assets and pursuing legal action against anyone promoting or collaborating with the outlawed group. The tone was unambiguous — Jordan would no longer tolerate political entities that, under the guise of ideological pluralism, harbor or inspire elements posing a threat to national cohesion.
Domestically, the ban has reignited fierce debates. Supporters of the move argue that Jordan’s stability must come above all else, particularly in a region plagued by insurgencies and ideological militancy. Critics, however, warn of the dangers of conflating dissent with subversion.
For many Jordanians, especially those disillusioned by stagnant political reforms and economic hardship, the Brotherhood once symbolized an alternative — albeit an imperfect one. Its community-driven initiatives, female-led platforms and focus on social justice filled a void left by traditional political parties. Yet, the exposure of violent plots has irreversibly undermined the group’s moral capital, casting doubt on whether it can still claim the mantle of peaceful opposition.
Regionally, Jordan’s decision represents more than a domestic policy shift — it is a calculated geopolitical signal. By outlawing the Brotherhood, Amman aligns itself more explicitly with a regional bloc that includes Egypt and the UAE, both of which have adopted aggressive stances against Islamist movements. Jordan’s pivot thus underscores its intent to stay firmly within the fold of Western-aligned, security-focused regimes that prioritize order over ideological pluralism.
The timing of this crackdown is especially significant. The Middle East remains in flux due to the devastating conflict in Gaza, which has intensified regional polarization and exposed the fragile fault lines running through many Arab societies. With Iran-backed militias expanding their influence in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and with extremist networks seeking new footholds amid growing public anger, Jordan’s leadership is understandably concerned about the risks of internal radicalization. The foiled rocket plot — believed to be targeting security installations — was not just an act of criminal defiance, it was a direct challenge to the state’s monopoly on force and legitimacy.
The path forward is fraught with uncertainty. The Brotherhood’s ideological imprint will not vanish overnight. While the organization may be structurally dismantled, its supporters are unlikely to simply abandon their beliefs. The risk of splinter groups radicalizing or operating underground is real. To mitigate this, Jordan must walk a careful line: safeguarding national security without extinguishing avenues for legitimate political expression.
This moment also presents an opportunity. The end of the Brotherhood’s formal political role could open space for new, reform-minded movements that advocate transparency, inclusivity and constructive engagement. But such developments will only materialize if the state demonstrates a genuine commitment to democratic renewal, economic equity and responsive governance. Simply replacing one set of actors with another will not address the deeper societal grievances that fueled the Brotherhood’s rise in the first place.
In essence, Jordan’s ban on the Muslim Brotherhood is not merely the closing of a political chapter — it is the culmination of a complex and often uneasy relationship between religion, ideology and statehood. It is also a bold recalibration of the kingdom’s political doctrine in response to an evolving regional order marked by ideological polarization and shifting alliances.
Whether this move ushers in a new era of stability or sows the seeds of future discord will depend largely on what the government does next — not just in terms of repression or security, but in its ability to offer a compelling, inclusive vision for the nation’s future.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2598462
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URL: https://www.newageislam.com/middle-east-press/jordan-brotherhood-cybersecurity-war-gaza/d/135320
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