Middle East Press on: Hamas, Trump, Israel, Palestinian, Knesset, Gaza: New Age Islam's Selection, 6 January 2025
By New Age Islam Edit Desk
6 January 2025
Hamas Hostage Video Sparks Urgent Calls To Secure A Deal And Save Lives
Will Trump Seize The Opportunity For An Israel-Palestinian Breakthrough?
Netanyahu's Hospital Visit Highlights Knesset Drama Amid Coalition Instability
We Need To Adjust Our Approach To Israel Advocacy
Turkey's Position Boosted By HTS' Coup In Syria
Israel Needs Trump On Board To Defeat Hamas In Gaza
How Assad’s Failures Fueled Syria’s Collapse
What Next For The Palestinian Authority?
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Hamas Hostage Video Sparks Urgent Calls To Secure A Deal And Save Lives
By JPOST EDITORIAL
JANUARY 6, 2025
The video of hostage Liri Albag, which Hamas publicized on her 456th day of captivity, provided glimpses into a reality that remains incomprehensible and nightmarish. It highlighted the otherworldly nature of captivity and sharpened the need to secure a deal and the risk of not doing it – severing the delicate bond in the social contract between government and citizens.
The Albag family did not permit the contents of the video to be publicized but did allow for two photos; Liri’s exasperation, exhaustion, trauma, and fear are palpable. Her parents put out a video message later, one full of desperation and love for their daughter.
“The video tore our hearts apart. This is not the daughter and sister that we know. She is not in a good place; her deteriorated psychological state is palpable,” Eli and Shira Albag said. “We saw our brave Liri fighting for her life. She is only a few kilometers away from us, and for 456 days, we have failed to bring her home,” they added.
They turned to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the other decision-makers: “The time has come for you to treat these decisions as though it’s your children that are held there! Liri is alive, and she must return alive! This is up to you! You cannot miss this opportunity to bring everyone back.”
The Prime Minister’s Office said Netanyahu spoke with the Albags and that he promised to “work relentlessly to bring all the hostages home, all while fighting on all the fronts.” President Isaac Herzog and Defense Minister Israel Katz spoke with them as well.
A working delegation flew to Qatar on Friday, and the White House said a deal is imminent and possible.
Keren Neubach, a radio show host at KAN, said in an interview with the broadcast network on Saturday that the one thing she can’t let go of is that the seven observer soldiers who Hamas terrorists cuffed that morning were held hostage at the base at around 8 a.m. “They were there until around 10, [after which they were taken captive to the Gaza Strip]. What went through their minds? That someone would come to save them. Any minute now. And no one came.”
It may sound repetitive and has sadly become politicized in a dialogue of “price” – that some prices are too high for the hostages.
While the security concern is valid, what those who take this stance fail to understand is that the social price for waiting longer, perhaps signing the death sentences of some of the hostages should the deal be partial, is that the social fabric that makes Israeli society strong will be severed.
“This is such a betrayal of who we are, of the state that we should strive to be. It is such a massive chasm, such a betrayal of trust,” Neubach added.
Trauma still felt
Over 50 soldiers were killed that day, 16 of them observers. Seven female observer soldiers were taken captive. The IDF rescued Ori Megidish in late October 2023, and Noa Marciano was killed in Shifa Hospital by Hamas terrorists. Albag, Naama Levy, Agam Berger, Karina Ariev, and Daniella Gilboa remain in Hamas captivity.
Former hostage Yagil Yaakov, who was returned in the November 2023 ceasefire deal and whose father, Yair, was killed on October 7 with his body being held in Gaza, said on Saturday that the video “gave me flashbacks of myself from over a year ago.”
He said he stood in front of a gun pointed at his face, “terrified and begging to go home. A [Hamas] terrorist stood over me and told me what to say. I was alone and only hoped that my mother would see it and know that all I wanted was to come home.”
Framing the hostage negotiations as a matter of “price” has not only politicized the issue but also neglected the devastating societal toll of inaction, which could irreparably weaken Israel’s social unity if hostages are left behind or deals are delayed.
The focus on the “cost” of rescuing hostages often overshadows the actual risk: prolonging their captivity or losing some altogether, a delay that could fracture the social strength that defines Israeli society as we know it.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-836197
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Will Trump Seize The Opportunity For An Israel-Palestinian Breakthrough?
By Alon Ben-Meir
JANUARY 6, 2025
Hamas’s horrific October 7 attack and Israel’s massive retaliatory war have fundamentally changed the dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. New political, psychological, and factual regional conditions have been created since October 7 that cannot be ignored, as they directly impacted not only Israeli-Palestinian relations for a generation but also regional stability.
President-elect Donald Trump will have to choose between paving the way toward the establishment of a Palestinian state or setting the stage for the next catastrophic conflagration that will dwarf the current war.
Trump should carefully consider the following five crucial changes in regional dynamics if he wants to revive “the deal of the century,” however remote it may seem at this particular juncture.
The massacre’s psychological implications
It is hard to overestimate the psychological ramifications of Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israelis as it brought to life images from the Holocaust. In many ways, it reaffirmed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s tragically misleading two-decades-long public narrative and reinforced the pervasive public mindset that the Palestinians posed a perpetual existential threat to Israel.
Thus, any effort that could lead to a two-state solution will face vehement Israeli resistance, which can be mitigated once Israelis come to terms with the fact that their ultimate national security rests on the establishment of a Palestinian state. This must be firmly tied to comprehensive security arrangements to allay the Israelis’ psychologically ingrained national security concerns.
Neither can destroy the other
After 15 months of brutal war, both sides have failed to achieve their stated objective. Even if Israel captures or kills every Hamas combatant, it cannot liquidate it as a national movement and as an idea. Hamas will survive any losses and terrorize Israel for as long as it takes, albeit knowing that Israel is a formidable military power, far beyond their capacity to destroy.
This mutual realization has changed the dynamic. Though nearly decimated, Hamas largely achieved its goal. It has fundamentally shaken the status quo, making it unequivocally clear that the Palestinian cause will no longer be ignored.
Saudi Arabia’s role
Before October 7, the US had been negotiating Israeli-Saudi normalization. At the time, the Saudis were willing to settle for a vague commitment by Israel “to make major progress toward a solution to the Palestinian conflict.” But as the horror of the war in Gaza unfolded, the Saudis changed their position, mainly due to public outcry about what the Palestinians have tragically endured.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) publicly stated, “The Kingdom will not cease its tireless efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and we affirm that the kingdom will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without one.”
It should be noted that this statement is not political posturing. Saudi Arabia will no longer settle for a vague reference to the Palestinians’ right to statehood, but MBS can pressure the Palestinians to moderate their position.
Jordan’s growing trepidation
Jordan faces significant challenges in maintaining internal stability amid rising public anger toward Israel. It must balance its historical commitments to the Palestinian cause and its peace treaty with Israel, while managing complex regional dynamics.
There are also fears of a spillover of Palestinian refugees into Jordan, which can destabilize it, especially if Israel annexes further Palestinian territories in the West Bank. Recently, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich declared that “2025 is the year of sovereignty in Judea and Samaria,” which terrifies the kingdom.
The ongoing conflicts could also increase militant activity and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, particularly among Jordanian youth. Moreover, other regional dynamics further complicate Jordan’s position, compelling it to navigate threats from Iranian proxies while managing its relationships with Israel, Western allies, and neighboring Arab states.
The creation of a Palestinian state will prevent instability in Jordan, which is critical to Israel’s national security.
International recognition of a Palestinian state
Already, 146 countries have recognized the Palestinian state, which is a significant step because it legitimizes the Palestinians’ right to statehood and places Palestine on equal footing with other states. Three Western European countries – Ireland, Norway, and Spain – have recognized Palestine this year, which may encourage others to follow suit.
Unquestionably, the Palestinians have made significant international inroads in support of a Palestinian state.
Trump may well be in the best position to start a genuine peace process that will eventually lead to Palestinian statehood. Given his commitment to Israel’s security, he must not allow Israel to annex any more territory in the West Bank or resettle in Gaza, as this will only set the stage for the next horrific conflagration and throw the entire region into unprecedented turmoil.
Due to the affinity that most Israelis hold toward Trump, he is in a much stronger position than many of his predecessors, not only to call for a two-state solution but to act on it.
Working toward Palestinian statehood would dramatically allay Jordan’s deep anxiety about the country’s stability, meet the Saudis’ demand to establish a Palestinian state as a prerequisite to normalizing relations with Israel, give hope to the Palestinians that the day of their salvation is near, and temper extremism and anti-Israeli sentiments.
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the dramatic weakening of Iran and Hezbollah will deprive them of exploiting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to advance their regional agendas.
The biggest obstacle Trump will face is the current Israeli government, which has sworn to block the creation of a Palestinian state. This government has learned nothing from decades of occupation. It wants now to annex much of the West Bank, resettle Gaza, and plunge Israel into interminable violence and destruction.
There is nothing more ominous for Israel if, indeed, the government implements such a plan. It will shatter the Palestinians’ final glimmer of hope as it will lead to horrific consequences unless Trump prevents it from happening.
For Trump to revive the “deal of the century,” he will have to go over Netanyahu’s head and address the Israeli public directly, pointing out the stark reality that the Israelis continue to be oblivious to. He should emphasize that:
After 57 years of occupation, it has become abundantly clear that the occupation is not sustainable, evidenced by the fact that Israeli-Palestinian relations are worse today than ever before. The situation is bound to explode time and again with ever-increasing death and destruction.
Nearly seven million Palestinians are living in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper, equal to the number of Jews living in the same area. By what means and for how much longer, he must ask, can Israel oppress the Palestinians of an equivalent population with no endgame in sight?
Ninety percent of all Palestinians were born under occupation; they will deprive Israel of peace until they free themselves from the shackles of the occupation that has dehumanized them and robbed them of their dignity.
Coexistence is not one of many options; it is the only option. The Israelis must choose to live in peace or maintain a state of constant hostilities while poisoning one generation after another against the Palestinians.
Conclusion
Trump faces a historic opportunity. He can lay the foundation for a Palestinian state or set the stage for the next catastrophic war.
His appointment of an extraordinarily supportive team of Israel gives him the latitude and credibility to persuade the Israelis that only a two-state solution offers them peace and security, and his “Deal of the Century” provides the framework to that end.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-836210
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Netanyahu's Hospital Visit Highlights Knesset Drama Amid Coalition Instability
By Susan Hattis Rolef
JANUARY 6, 2025
One would have to be heartless not to grasp the tragic reality that unveiled itself last Tuesday, December 31, 2024, in the Knesset plenum, when votes were held on second and third readings on a bill to tax undistributed profits, thereby increasing the government’s income through taxation.
In order for the government not to lose in the votes, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had to leave his sickbed at Hadassah-University Medical Center following prostate removal surgery, and MK Boaz Bismuth (Likud) had to leave the shiva mourning period for his late mother, and participate in the voting.
The situation resulted from the fact that five out of Otzma Yehudit’s six MKs announced they would vote against the bill as part of National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s protest against the government on the issue of policemen’s salaries.
Another three MKs from Agudat Yisrael stayed away from the voting in connection to the so-called “enlistment law,” as did former defense minister Yoav Gallant (Likud), a few days before resigning from Knesset against the background of being fired from his post as defense minister.
The opposition could have been generous and prevented the grotesque situation by simply agreeing to pair off with Netanyahu and Bismuth. However, after the previous opposition in the 24th Knesset, led by Netanyahu, had refused to enable any of the opposition members to pair off with MK Emilie Moatti (Labor) in a vote important to the Government of Change, which had led to Moatti being brought to the vote on a stretcher – nobody expected the current opposition to Netanyahu’s government to demonstrate magnanimity.
The sight in the plenum was truly painful. Netanyahu looked pale and disheveled and was clearly suffering. The fact that his wife, Sara (“the support of my life,” as he recently referred to her), has been away in Miami for over a month, visiting their son Yair, and avoided rejoining her husband at his sickbed with an unconvincing excuse, increased the empathy one felt for Netanyahu, at least momentarily.
Bismuth, who on normal days is a cocky and not pleasant person, looked distraught and deserving of compassion.
Ben-Gvir as an obstacle
BEN-GVIR’S CONDUCT was predictable, though he decided on Friday night to apologize to Netanyahu and Bismuth for having refused to pair them off in the voting, after realizing that his move had not been viewed favorably by his political base.
Since the government was formed on December 29, 2022, he has regularly provided Netanyahu with reasons to fire him and has earned a reputation as a troublemaker. The main reason Netanyahu has refrained from firing Ben-Gvir is that doing so is liable to lead to the collapse of his coalition.
Even though the decision of MK Gideon Sa’ar (New Hope-United Right) to join the government with his party’s four Knesset seats, becoming foreign minister, and Gallant’s decision to resign from the Knesset and thus enable Netanyahu to replace him with a more reliable MK, provide greater stability to the coalition, Netanyahu is still wary of having to depend on a narrow majority.
However, on several occasions since Israel’s 37th government was formed, Yair Lapid expressed willingness to join the government with his Yesh Atid party’s 24 MKs, on condition that the government’s two most extreme members – Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich – be removed. Netanyahu wouldn’t even consider such an option.
In general, Netanyahu is wary of losing any members of his all-Right coalition. For the same reason, he is unwilling to opt for the implementation of the enlistment to the IDF (or alternative service) of the haredim (ultra-Orthodox) as the existing Security Service Law prescribes, even though that is what the current security situation necessitates.
THE SECOND bundle of uncertainties and instabilities concerns the Gaza Strip.
The current reality in the Gaza Strip is that the physical destruction is vast. Certain locations, such as the Jabalya refugee camp, have been more or less razed to the ground, the humanitarian situation is catastrophic, and in many cases, international humanitarian aid is not reaching the civilian population because it is being robbed by Hamas to serve its own interests.
Is all this the result of a decree from heaven?
While Israel’s goal of destroying Hamas as a governing and military force is perfectly justifiable in light of the events of October 7, 2023, the fact is that since that date, there is no official Israeli policy regarding an interim administration to run the affairs of the Gaza Strip, until such time as some alternative non-Hamas Palestinian, Arab, or international regime is established.
De facto, Israel is involved in massive military construction, which suggests it might be considering staying in the Gaza Strip for a lengthy period; in operations designed to empty the northern Gaza Strip of most or all of its Palestinian population; and in not preventing abusive treatment of Gazan civilians by the military forces.
A recent example involves cases of military personnel forbidding civilians moving southward from taking clothing and other basic possessions with them, even though the IDF denies such a policy exists.
Though Netanyahu has stated that Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip is not in the cards, various settlement organizations (such as Nahala, headed by Daniella Weiss) are not being prevented from actively promoting such settlement.
Does the Israeli public know who officially decides the moves in the Gaza Strip these days, besides Netanyahu, on the basis of fleeting whims and American pressure? Does the public know what exactly the policy is? In fact, when some time ago Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara criticized the government’s decision-making process, she was inter alia referring also to this.
Does the public know where the issue of returning the hostages fits into the general policy (whatever it is), in terms of priorities? Is anyone accountable for the results of initiatives taken by local commanders acting on the basis of their own personal agendas, without the backing of their superiors, and occasionally even contrary to standing orders?
Since early elections are not in sight, is it too much to request that efforts be made to improve how our government system works?
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-836205
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We Need To Adjust Our Approach To Israel Advocacy
By Todd L. Pittinsky
JANUARY 6, 2025
As we begin 2025, many reflect on the challenges and successes of the past year, both as individuals and communities. The year 2024 was marked by profound unease for the American Jewish community. A surge of anti-Israel sentiment, often intertwined with antisemitism, became disturbingly commonplace. Outbursts were frequent and occurred in a wide array of settings.
Unfortunately, the new year will likely bring similar challenges as these efforts continue gaining momentum and legitimacy. Jewish institutions responded to the relentless efforts to undermine Israel socially, culturally, and politically and will undoubtedly plan to do so again. However, doing this effectively requires a sober assessment of what worked and what didn’t in the responses of the past year, enabling a more effective approach to Israel support and advocacy in the year ahead.
The past year was not merely marked by a series of unfortunate events. It was a bigger story, one in which traditional tools of pro-Israel advocacy proved less effective than the moment demanded. The challenge, at its core, was the nature of the war launched against Israel. It used a range of guerilla warfare tactics.
Online, anti-Israel activists orchestrated rapid, targeted, hateful social media campaigns. They overwhelmed platforms before moderation systems could respond, quickly replacing removed content to maintain a constant barrage. They use incendiary viral hashtags. They migrated to platforms other than social media to embed their narratives into product descriptions, user reviews, and online articles.
In physical spaces, anti-Israel activists launched surprise protests without permits. They chanted slogans calling for violence in public. They displayed symbols of recognized terrorist groups. They blockaded and successfully prevented a range of activities that included an Israeli official, artists, or academics.
They infiltrated public schools by, for example, producing and distributing maps to public school teachers that omit the Jewish state. They vandalized Jewish institutions – temples, day schools, yeshivas, Jewish community centers, and even Jewish-owned businesses. They harassed and attacked individual Jews and supporters of Israel.
The core of our communal challenge lies in the stark asymmetry in the strategies of the anti-Israel forces and the response from the Jewish establishment. The anti-Israel movement is agile and aggressive in nature, thriving on disruption and chaos.
They break the law. They lie. In contrast, established Jewish organizations tend to be structured, hierarchical, and conservative. Jewish leaders deliberate. They plan. They issue press releases. They file lawsuits. They organize meetings and conferences. They commission research studies.
These tools are all tools of a thoughtful, organized, and orderly response. They are also woefully inadequate against guerilla warfare. They are too slow, reactive, and timid by their nature. They played offensively – we played too defensively.
A professor's perspective
AS A professor, the setting I know best is universities. On campuses, Hillel International is the most prominent Jewish organization, with a mission that includes supporting Israel. Yet, last year, Hillel failed to mount a sufficient response on my campus or those of my close colleagues. This should not be surprising.
Hillel’s partnership model with universities prioritizes avoiding conflicts with administrators in order not to alienate them, leading to carefully worded statements and restrained actions. Its broad mission, spanning religious, social, and cultural programming, limits focus on necessary, more systematic campus reform, and its core constituency – Jewish students – further narrows its impact on broader campus culture.
While Hamas’s invasion on October 7, 2023, was unexpected (for most), the surge of hate on US campuses on October 8 should not have been.
For years, Hillel itself has documented growing hostility toward Jewish students on campus after campus – but it hasn’t demanded systemic reform. Despite doing much good work, Hillel – by nature and choice – has not, and will not, effectively address more systemic anti-Israelism and antisemitism on campuses.
Hillel’s posture reflects a broader trend among Jewish institutions, which, by their nature and norms, struggle to counter agile and disruptive anti-Israel activism. Their over-reliance on established, bureaucratic channels – products of decades spent prioritizing structured, management-driven ideas and approaches to Jewish philanthropy over more adaptive, grassroots strategies – leads them to prioritize orderliness over agility and real-time innovation.
Moreover, they have become overly universalistic, assuming a general tide of social betterment on a range of social issues will ensure the betterment of the condition of US Jews. We see it does not. They are too willing to join coalitions that, as we have sadly seen, fail to prioritize antisemitism.
To riff on Hillel the Elder’s wise words – we have embraced the second half of his counsel: “If we are only for ourselves, what are we?” We have paid too little attention to the first part: “If we are not for ourselves, who will be for us?”
The ADL, for example, in its work with K-12 schools for the past decade, has not particularly prioritized antisemitism. That may sound strange, but in the flagship program I reviewed, when the ADL visits schools, it brings a universalist approach – presenting antisemitism as one of a smorgasbord of “isms.”
Educational programs are not centered on particularities of antisemitism per se but rather on a basket of universal niceties and messages that focus more on the social psychology of prejudice than the historical, political, social, and lived reality of antisemitism, let alone Zionism and prejudice against the historical homeland of the Jewish people, Israel.
TO MORE effectively counter the guerrilla tactics employed by anti-Israel and antisemitic activists, we must approach the coming year differently in two key ways. First, we must decentralize our responses. This means shifting from top-down strategies to empowering grassroots efforts, giving students and individuals in communities nationwide resources to act quickly and authentically. Direct funding for student-led initiatives should bypass bureaucratic hurdles.
Instead of waiting for Hillel board meetings, students should have the resources to respond immediately to hate. With just a few texts outlining an idea, a college student or staff member with a good idea should be able to access a micro-grant for a pro-Israel or pro-Jewish activity or event. Will there be some wasted funds along the way? Yes – but large, centralized bureaucracies, such as Hillel and the ADL, experience waste, too.
For decades, Jewish organizations have modeled themselves on large, established business processes, emphasizing process, procedure, impact assessment, etc. This approach works well in stable conditions, but is ill-suited for the demands of guerrilla warfare.
SECOND, THE community needs to go on the offensive. Donors should not pull their investments out of campuses, they should increase them – funding faculty positions, research centers, student support programs, speaker events, and initiatives promoting pro-Israel and pro-Jewish perspectives or simply objectively addressing Israel and Jewish issues. Endowed faculty chairs are expensive, but post-doctoral positions are far more affordable and allow donors to support specific areas of scholarship.
Over time, this will help improve our campuses in more fundamental and enduring ways. Organizations aiming to support Jewish students must act more boldly. They need to go all in. Bold initiatives, like proud, grand Israeli cultural festivals and programs targeting entire student bodies – such as comedy festivals featuring edgy Israeli and Jewish American comedians (known for tackling challenging topics with humor) – can shift narratives for non-Jewish students.
Instead of waiting to respond to campus boycotts, they should launch and advertise large-scale “buycott” campaigns on campuses, proudly promoting Israeli products and culture, transforming support for Israel into a positive act of cultural appreciation and economic solidarity.
Our traditional organizations must adapt and become – well, less traditional. While responding to adverse events is always important, it is reactive, not proactive. It is not enough. The challenges facing the Jewish community demand dynamic, bold, grassroots responses that are proactive and ambitious, enabling us to go on the offense rather than remaining reactive.
We must craft a strategy that fights guerrilla warfare without compromising our principles and integrity. When they lie, we boldly trumpet the truth. When they intimidate, we respond with even greater confidence. When they call for intifada, we call louder for the next round of the Abraham Accords.
When they break the law, we double down to show our appreciation for the police and public safety workers who keep Jewish communities – and all communities – safer. Last year, Jewish institutions were on the defensive; this year, let’s go on the offensive.
Many today are lamenting that the golden age of Jewry in America is ending. Let us now begin working toward the platinum age of Jewry in America – an era in which the Jewish community is even more vibrant, righteous, creative, and successful; and makes even more outstanding contributions to US culture, society, politics, and economy – symbolized by a metal rarer and more durable than gold.
By responding smartly and boldly, we can do it.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-836209
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Turkey's Position Boosted By HTS' Coup In Syria
By Neville Teller
JANUARY 6, 2025
After the Syrian people, it is Turkey that has emerged as the biggest winner from the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December. As soon as Assad fled to Moscow, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan knew that fate had played into his hands.
As far back as March 2012, Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Assad. But within a few days of the regime’s overthrow it had reestablished its diplomatic representation in Syria, and Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, and the head of Turkish intelligence, Ibrahim Kalin, were in Damascus visiting Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the victorious rebel movement.
Turkey was able to share the joy and elation of the Syrian people because it had long supported HTS, as well as other Syrian opposition forces that aimed to replace Assad’s regime. With the ascent of HTS and its leader Julani, Erdogan knew that he was well placed to play a pivotal role in shaping Syria’s future governance and policies, and – he doubtless hoped – align them with Turkish strategic objectives.
Commercial benefits were also in Turkey’s sights. On December 27, Reuters quoted Turkey’s Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar as saying that Ankara aims to provide electricity to Syria. Bayraktar added that Turkey may also work with Syria’s new leadership on oil and natural gas, developing its energy infrastructure, including potential oil pipelines connecting the two countries.
Reporters from NPR said on December 27 that Turkish construction companies are poised to go into Syria, and that Turkish businesses are talking about moving factories across the border.
This would certainly create much needed jobs for Syrians, but they pointed out that before initiatives like this could occur, an effective infrastructure would be needed, such as consistent water and electricity supplies and efficient Internet services, and that these basics are not widely available at present.
In the new situation, Turkey would appear to have the upper hand over the fraught issue of the large Kurdish occupied region known as Rojava in the northeast of Syria, adjacent to the Turkish-Syrian border. It occupies nearly 30% of the original sovereign Syria.
Exploring Erdogan's goals
Erdogan views the Kurdish occupied region as a security threat, because of its links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), widely regarded as a terrorist organization, and believes it could inspire Kurdish separatists inside Turkey.
Ever since 2015, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have collaborated with the US-led coalition, leading ground operations that demolished the ISIS caliphate. This military achievement boosted the Kurdish standing in the US and revived their aspirations to achieve autonomy in the area they occupy, on the lines of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that enjoys a quasi-state status in Iraq.
Where Erdogan may miscalculate the extent of his increased influence within Syria is in relation to Julani’s intentions. Erdogan may be perceiving the HTS achievement as a traditional military coup aimed at projecting its leader to a position of autocratic power.
But ever since Assad’s fall, Julani has presented a moderate face to the world, consistently declaring that he intends to be as inclusive as possible in establishing Syria’s new governance. He has said several times that Kurds are “part of the Syrian homeland” while assuring the nation that “there will be no injustice”.
HOW WILL his sweet words play out against Turkey’s pivotal influence and resistance to Kurdish autonomy in Rojava? On December 17, The Wall Street Journal reported that US officials are growing increasingly worried that Turkey might soon launch a “full-scale incursion” into territory held by Syrian Kurds. They may have been reacting to Erdogan’s wide-ranging speech that day in which he declared: “As a nation, we cannot limit our horizons.”
He may be riding high at the moment, but he would do well to take note of the old saying: “Pride comes before a fall.” For the Kurds will not forget that something akin to the semi-autonomous situation of their compatriots in Iraq was actually offered to them by the Assad regime. In March 2015, the then-Syrian information minister announced that the government was considering recognizing Kurdish autonomy “within the law and constitution.”
Later, in September 2017, Syria’s then-foreign minister stated that Damascus would consider granting Kurds greater autonomy once ISIS was defeated. Events overtook these aspirations, and nothing of the sort materialized. But they might provide Julani with a template for a future accommodation with the Kurds within the constitution of a unified and restored Syrian state.
The pragmatic nature of politics means that Turkey’s augmented political and diplomatic standing has been immediately recognized by world leaders. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have reached out to Erdogan since the military coup.
On December 16, the EU instructed a senior diplomat to engage directly with the provisional government set up by HTS, while von der Leyen traveled to Ankara for a meeting with Erdogan. He came away from the discussion with €1 billion of EU cash to support the 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, and to assist in their repatriation.
The fall of the Syrian regime has been a major blow to Russian interests. President Vladimir Putin’s vital naval and air bases in Syria, assured under the Assad regime, have become vulnerable. He had big plans, both economic and political, for the Middle East, and the military bases in Syria were crucial to their achievement. He may need Erdogan’s support to retain them but there is always the chance that the Kremlin can conclude a deal with Syria’s new government.
According to Reuters, Russia has moved its naval vessels out to sea from the Tartus naval base, and drawn down equipment from its Khmeimim air base, but intends to keep both. With no indication that Putin is using Erdogan as a go-between, he is reported to have contacted Julani, requesting a renewal of the deals made with Assad.
An arrangement in 2015 gave Russia full control of the Khmeimim air base, while under the 2017 Tartus Naval Agreement, Russia was granted 49-year access to the Tartus naval base, with an automatic 25-year extension option.
According to an unnamed Syrian rebel official quoted by Reuters, the new Syrian government has not made a final decision on Russia’s request. This issue, like so much else about the future of Syria and the Syrian people, has yet to be resolved.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-836207
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Israel Needs Trump On Board To Defeat Hamas In Gaza
By Eric R. Mandel
JANUARY 6, 2025
A few months into the Israel-Hamas War, it became apparent that Israel had vastly underestimated the complexity and length of Hamas’s underground tunnel terror network. Some estimates claimed there were 1,130 km. of tunnels, many at different depth levels, which were designed to force the Israeli enemy to fight within them on unfavorable terms.
I wrote then that I thought the most logical strategy to destroy Hamas and its terror tunnel dens was to temporarily evacuate Gazan civilians from designated areas, so that the IDF could go in and destroy Hamas’s infrastructure in the evacuated areas.
Unfortunately for Gazan civilians, that might have entailed demolishing many above-ground buildings, because the terror infrastructure was constructed like an infiltrating cancer, above and below ground, with tunnel shafts running through homes, mosques, hospitals, and schools.
When I was asked where the civilians should go, I said the best choice would be to transfer them to secured tent cities in the Egyptian Sinai and Israel’s Negev, in addition to the humanitarian areas along the Gaza coast.
I was told this was impossible because the Egyptians would refuse, and Israelis would be in no mood so close to October 7 to have hundreds of thousands of Gazans brought into the Jewish state, knowing how many participated in the massacres. You can also understand the Egyptian unwillingness, considering that Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood, the arch-enemy of the Sisi military regime.
I responded that was this is where American leadership was needed, but unfortunately, President Joe Biden had transitioned into his deescalation and blaming Israel mode, slowing shipments of vital weapons to Israel.
This, in effect, prolonged the war and put Israel on the diplomatic and military defensive, being forced to stop their advance south to the Philadelphi Corridor and Rafah, Hamas’s supply line. At the time, I maintained that the Biden administration should leverage American financial aid with additional carrots to the impoverished Egyptian economy to accept this temporary situation, and as a quid pro quo, Israel would also have to accept Gazans in exchange for ending the slowdown of military supplies from the US.
Israel's quagmire
ISRAEL’S LACK of a specific day-after plan for Gaza has left the Jewish state and its military in a quagmire. It has become clear that Israel has chosen not to make the destruction of the underground terror network its primary mission.
Every time Israel clears a Hamas stronghold and withdraws, the terrorists reemerge from the remaining tunnel system to force Israel to return and play whack-a-mole again and again and again.
Without a comprehensive military plan to destroy the tunnel system, the IDF will remain in Gaza for many years as the terrorists of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas come out of their terror mazes to fight a long war of attrition and wear out the Israeli nation’s morale. This is akin to the 18-year Israeli-Lebanese occupation (1982-2000) that eventually, under public opinion, forced Israel to leave as losers, emboldening Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, who all play the long game.
Israel, as a citizen army, is not prepared for long wars of attrition. If this becomes similar to Ithe 18-year war of attrition in Lebanon, it will require the sacrifice of soldiers being disabled and killed in Gaza for years.
There has been a relatively effective war of attrition in the West Bank since 2003 after the Second Intifada, which is why Judea and Samaria haven’t exploded sooner. It has brought 20 years of relative control. Yet today, the West Bank is more under Iranian influence than ever before, another growing proxy threat on Israel’s doorstep, 9 km. from Tel Aviv. That will happen in Gaza, too, if this option is chosen.
Suppose Israel’s choice is to control Gaza for the next generation, as it does the West Bank, going in every night extracting terrorist networks to keep the flames of terror and missile attacks low.
In that case, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should tell the Israeli people this is the chosen plan. It is not unreasonable, considering the choices include a return of the Palestinian Authority (PA), which the current Israeli government and most Israelis, as well as non-Hamas Palestinians, do not trust, with good reason.
The PA security forces are incapable at this time of fighting Hamas due to a combination of lack of training, lack of will to confront a much more motivated and better trained Hamas army, and because many non-Hamas Palestinians also desire the annihilation of the Jewish state.
Think of a PA security force in Gaza like the Syrian army at the end of 2024, which collapsed immediately, with the Sunni jihadist rebels of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) taking over the nation in just a few days.
For a modern democracy, war requires a civilian-directed policy with defined military goals, and it is up to the army to fulfill the mission. Until this point, the army has done an excellent job in Gaza, even without a concrete political plan to destroy Hamas definitively.
There is one plan circulating to destroy Hamas in northern Gaza called the “General’s Plan,” designed by the respected former head of the National Security Council, Gen. Giora Eiland. It would evacuate all Palestinian civilians from northern Gaza, creating a military zone with only the terrorists remaining to fight a battle between combatants. But it would not be on Hamas’s terms using the Palestinian civilians as human shields.
According to the diplomatic and political analyst at Israel Hayom, “Members of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee… argue that the ground operation that began on October 27, 2023 fails to achieve the war’s objectives as defined by the political echelon – dismantling Hamas’s governmental and military capabilities.” It should be noted that Netanyahu rejected the General’s Plan on October 1.
Over time, Israel can transition to an Arab and international governing and security force, with the return of the Gazan civilians to a restored infrastructure without a terror tunnel network.
The incoming Trump administration wants Israel’s wars wrapped up quickly. The further supply of weapons for Israel to fight a war of attrition with Hamas should not be counted on indefinitely, especially with many in the new administration looking to cut foreign aid.
So, Bibi, it’s time to rise to the occasion and define a plan for destroying Hamas so that the nation and Trump can get behind it. Do it quickly and implement it expeditiously to keep president-elect Trump on board, as he likes winners. Do it before the victories over Hezbollah and Iran fade in the American mind, and Israel looks like it is adrift without a strategy in a war of attrition in Gaza.
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-836199
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How Assad’s Failures Fuelled Syria’s Collapse
Abdulrahman Al-Rashed
January 05, 2025
When Bashar Assad lost control of the oil-rich areas in eastern Syria, most of which came under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces, he turned to Iran for oil and its derivatives to enable his forces to continue fighting and to maintain services in the areas under his rule.
His weak economy was collapsing and the government was in a state of bankruptcy as it waged war without any revenues. He relied on drugs and terrorism, which became the regime’s most significant exports.
Some might think this is an exaggeration or propaganda against a fallen regime incapable of defending itself. However, the regime itself did not hide this reality and even used it as leverage in negotiating its regional and international relations.
No Saudi ambassador arrived in Damascus despite the agreement reached in May 2023. Diplomatic representation was limited to operating out of the Four Seasons Hotel and Saudi Arabia did not send its ambassador to the Syrian capital for the first time until the entry of the new leadership and its forces.
Relations slowed as the regime failed to fulfill its promises, including halting the smuggling of Captagon. Assad, as usual, delayed delivering on the promised reconciliation and expected billions of dollars in compensation to stop the smuggling operations. Riyadh was not pleased with this, especially since rewarding drug traffickers for halting their activities would encourage further extortion. Assad acted like Colombia’s infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar, earning, according to Western estimates, more than $5 billion annually from Captagon sales — more than his oil revenues before the war.
I met the ousted president at least five times in direct sessions, where we talked for hours. Even so, I cannot claim to truly know him. I published most of the discussions from those meetings in Asharq Al-Awsat at the time but stopped after the assassination operations in Lebanon, as his threats began targeting journalists. I was also blacklisted from entering Lebanon. I met him again shortly before the revolution against him, in a group session, where he appeared confident and assured of his safety.
In any case, despite the horrifying revelations about him after his downfall, which added to what we already knew about his terrifying regime, he always seemed polite in person, ready to listen and respond. Rarely did he lose his composure. This was his demeanor with all his guests.
This left many puzzled about his true nature. Was there a sinister group behind the atrocities in Syria and Lebanon? Was it his brother Maher, his officer Ali Mamlouk, his wife Asma or the Iranian Qassem Soleimani?
The truth is that he was behind it all, orchestrating and managing it — not the image he projected. He compensated for his failure to govern the state by wielding brute force. The impoverished country became even poorer, contrary to his claims of being targeted by hostile nations.
The truth is, Assad received widespread regional and international support after assuming power. There was hope he would move Syria beyond Hafez Assad’s legacy toward openness and modernization. Instead, he increased the number of prisons, surpassed his father in terms of assassinations and bombings, and hosted terrorist organizations.
Thus, the Syrian revolution against Bashar was no surprise, even though it erupted three months after Tunisia’s uprising. Having failed economically, Assad resorted to drug trafficking and hosting armed groups during the Iraq war in coordination with Iran, repeating the same approach during his decade-long war. I cannot recall him ever discussing economic development, modernization or improving citizens’ livelihoods before the revolution.
Today, Syria and its new leaders need to reflect on the history of the Assad regime. It is no surprise that a regime collapses when a soldier guarding it or a university professor, who represents the societal elite, earns about $20 a month. The profound lesson is that the risks of economic failure are greater than those of security failure.
Economic failure preceded the war by years, as well as America’s Caesar Act sanctions, the freezing of state assets abroad and the collapse of the currency. It was the result of Assad’s mismanagement, rampant corruption, weak governance and the regime’s reliance on a shadow economy fueled by drugs and foreign wars.
Despite their severe hardships in the countries in which they sought refuge, Syrians have achieved success in every field. Today, a great opportunity lies ahead. The government of Ahmad Al-Sharaa must first bring together all Syrians in their diversity to become part of the state and open up to the world to attract investment.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2585334
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What Next For The Palestinian Authority?
Dr. Ramzy Baroud
January 05, 2025
The latest news from the Palestinian Authority’s “Protecting the Homeland” operation in the Jenin refugee camp paints a grim picture. Nine Palestinian lives have been claimed in this ongoing crackdown, which began on Dec. 5, including a young journalist, Shaza Al-Sabbagh.
The assault, as reported by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, has expectedly received a stamp of approval from the Israeli occupation army. Meanwhile, Israel’s Channel 14 confirmed that Tel Aviv had issued a clear deadline to the PA to finish the task — effectively eradicating what remains of the resistance in Jenin in the name of ending lawlessness and apprehending outlaws.
It is an irony that has become all too familiar: the Palestinian entity that was supposed to represent the will of the people and lead them toward freedom has become complicit in crushing resistance in one of the most marginalized and impoverished areas of the West Bank. This is the heart of the Palestinian paradox in the West Bank.
For years, the PA has demanded unflinching obedience from the Palestinian people in the name of preparing Palestine for sovereignty and statehood. Yet, as the years have passed, this pledge has slipped further and further away. In its place, the PA seems to have become complicit in the expansion of Israel’s territorial control and the erosion of Palestinian rights. This might be a difficult conclusion to digest, but the killing of innocent Palestinians in Jenin at the hands of Palestinian security forces, while Israel and its settlers are cracking down on Palestinians elsewhere in the West Bank, should be all the proof needed to support this claim.
Moreover, the PA’s strategy of appeasing Israel through “security coordination” has done little to hinder its systematic land grab and the continued construction of illegal settlements.
The operation in Jenin is a clear manifestation of how Israel uses the PA to carry out its dirty work. The Jenin refugee camp, which covers an area of less than 0.5 sq. km, has always been a symbol of Palestinian resistance. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, Israel has raided Jenin 80 times in the last year alone, killing more than 220 Palestinians and wounding hundreds more. But Jenin remains unbowed.
What complicates this crisis even further is the silence of many Palestinian intellectuals, both in the West Bank and the diaspora, who have failed to confront the PA with the same vigor with which they criticize the Israeli occupation. But why have so many prominent voices, intellectuals and political analysts remained mute on this issue?
The answer lies in a complex mixture of fear, political pragmatism and historical inertia. For decades, the PA has maintained a stranglehold on the political landscape of Palestinian life. It controls the levers of power. Palestinian intellectuals, particularly those in the West Bank, are all too aware of this reality.
Additionally, there is a deep sense of paralysis within the Palestinian intellectual community in the West Bank, in part due to their leadership’s failure to confront Israel over the ongoing genocide in Gaza. But there is more to this ongoing paralysis.
For years, the PA has framed itself as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Palestinian people. Many intellectuals who would normally criticize Israel’s occupation are unwilling to take on the PA for fear of further fragmenting the Palestinians. There is a deep-seated belief among some that a public confrontation with the PA would lead to greater disunity, which could play into Israel’s hands.
But can the PA be saved? The answer may not even matter. What matters is whether the Palestinian people can, through their collective will and resistance, liberate themselves from Israel’s settler colonialism. The events of the coming weeks and months will be decisive.
https://www.arabnews.com/node/2585333
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URL: https://www.newageislam.com/middle-east-press/hamas-trump-israel-palestinian-knesset-gaza/d/134251
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