The Kamra Fallout
By Taj M Khattak
28 August, 2012
During the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, Gen William Westmoreland, President Johnson’s top US commander, stood before TV cameras on the grounds of the US embassy in Saigon with gaping holes in compound wall, trying to remain as composed as possible as he grasped the enormity of what had happened. To his countrymen back home, he looked completely out of touch with reality as, only days earlier, he had declared the offensive a failure. That moment, however, was a defining one in the history of insurgency warfare, because it redefined some basics: ‘The psychological space in an adversary’s mind is more important. The transitory tactical advantage is of less significance and never the ultimate objective in an insurgent’s tactical actions.”
The above lessons were driven home again recently by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) as it breached the parameter wall of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at the PAF Base at Kamra and exposed our helplessness to stop them from attacking wherever and whenever they want to. On 9/11, Al-Qaeda was believed to constitute around 400 members. That number has shot up many times over, counting its sympathisers like the TTP, no one knows the exact number.
It has been nearly seven years since the TTP declared war on the state of Pakistan. After earlier attacks on the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi and the Pakistan Naval Aviation Base Mehran at Karachi, the TTP attacked Kamra base for the third time. The base figures prominently in the country’s nuclear deterrence paradigm, and the attack came on the most sacred night of the Islamic calendar during which the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is believed to have received divine revelation in a cave with which began the religion of Islam. When it was over, both sides declared their dead to be “martyrs.”
It sent ripples across powerful capitals of the world already hostile to Pakistan. No one was surprised when the usual concerns about weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands were voiced, which had to be rebutted strongly by the foreign ministry. The base personnel acquitted themselves well in containing the damage, but the fuller psychological impact and any affects on the PAF’s capability have yet to emerge.
An immediate effect of the Kamra attack was the closure of cell phone services during and prior to Eid-ul-Fitr by the ministry of interior, though some other unsavoury reasons are also being attributed to this action. While some order and rationalisation in regulating pre- and post-paid mobile phone is warranted, it should be known that, in neighbouring Afghanistan, the Taliban routinely employ this very strategy with mobile phones towers going off the air in nearly half the country every day for up to twelve hours. This conveys a message to all as to who is in charge, besides denying their adversary nearly half the period in a month to track their movements. One hopes the interior ministry will handle this with extreme care and not slide the country where the TTP wants it to.
In an important speech only days before the attack, Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani described “absolutism” as being the genesis of organised anti-state violence. Clearly, undercurrents of undiluted religious convictions, and their imposition through the sword, go right back to the beginning of Islamic history.
It doesn’t therefore worry the suicide attackers in the least that taking one’s own life is forbidden in their faith. It is clearly stated in the Quran, “O ye who believe... (do not) kill yourselves, for truly Allah has been to you Most Merciful. If any do that in rancour and injustice, soon shall we cast him into the Fire. (4:29: 30). The taking of a life is allowed only by way of justice (i.e. the death penalty for murder) but, even then, forgiveness is better. “Nor take life – which Allah has made sacred-except for just cause...” (17:33). The above noble message of the faith needs to be propagated from every pulpit of mosques across the country during every Friday prayers, but isn’t.
A large majority in Pakistan is convinced that suicide attacks are a result of separation from society of vulnerable individuals by the religiously bigoted, a view which might be subjective as it is not based on any research. Robert Pape, an American professor of political science, presents a different view after studying nearly 315 suicide attacks spanning over a quarter of a century and suggests that suicide attackers’ actions stem from logical military strategy, not so much their religion—specially Islam. This view merits a closer examination in order to strategise countermeasures and need not be ignored out of hand.
After the Kamra attack, highly placed government officials spared no efforts to explain that there was no security lapse, a line which ironically had also been parroted during Mehran incident. As reported in the press, at least four out of nine terrorists striking Kamra received logistic assistance from the adjacent village. In its simplest meaning, there is a security lapse the moment an unauthorised person leaps over the compound wall of a restricted area with mala-fide intent. So, what else was it if it was not a security lapse? These officials are not naive, but whenever they see prospects of heads rolling, they go into denial to keep their own on the shoulders. They get away with such shenanigans as there is no Morsi in Islamabad to let heads roll.
Much has been made of prior threat warnings issued by the ministry of interior but those familiar with such reports might agree that these are just about as generalised as the weekly horoscope and serve little purpose other than the spooks clearing their yardarm. That said, obtaining precise intelligence information and efficient follow up are never easy even for the most well resourced intelligence outfits, as recently revealed by a former FBI agent Ali Soufan in an interview. Almost a year before 9/11, the CIA had a tag on two terrorists who continued to live in San Diego without any action taken against them and later crashed one of hijacked aircraft into the Pentagon. He called lack of communications between the FBI and the CIA as “China Wall.” Evidently, getting wiser after the event is not a phenomenon restricted only to this part of the world. The “China Wall” between our Intelligence Bureau (IB) and ISI is well known and needs to be brought down.
In the interview, Ali Soufan reveals that the alleged planner of 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, was subjected to water-boarding 183 times, yet he lied about Al-Kuwaiti, the man whose cell call eventually helped track Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. Most suspects crack after the second or third water-boarding session. What surprised him most, however, was that whenever he showed a humane gesture, even the most hardened suspects were at a loss to respond. That is a thought.
In cricket, if a side scores the first century after hours but races for the double century in just a few minutes, it is obvious that the bowlers have been whacked all over the field and a change of strategy is called for. In Afghanistan, the US lost its first 1,000 soldiers in nearly nine years and crossed the 2,000 mark early this month in just 27 months. Gen John R Allen, commander of the ISAF forces, apparently misses its significance and has resolved to plough on regardless. A similar resolve has been expressed by Pakistan’s prominent civil and military leaders in the face of repeated failures, helplessness and the increasingly bold attacks by the TTP. Expressing resolve from high and secure offices is easier. chalking out an effective strategy to fight this menace is the difficult part.
The writer is a retired vice-admiral and former vice-chief of the naval staff.
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