European
Foundation for South Asian Studies
04 August
2020
The death
sentence delivered in late December to Pakistani professor and scholar, Junaid
Hafeez, on unsound allegations of blasphemy, sent shockwaves of indignation
throughout the international community, eliciting the United Nations’ prompt
response, which condemned the verdict as a “travesty of justice”. Contrary to
some unduly auspicious expectations that the preceding release of Asia Bibi, a
Christian woman, who was on death row for blasphemy charges, yet eventually
acquitted, has been a watershed moment in the history of blasphemy laws in
Pakistan, the current reality remains grim.
Asia Bibi, a Christian woman
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Governor Salman Taseer
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Pakistan Christian Minister Shahbaz Bhatti
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For the
purposes of further analysing the abovementioned dismal situation, this paper
will explore the legal background and genesis of the blasphemy laws of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, examine them through the socio-economic and
political spectrums of the time and illuminate their grievous consequences,
which more than often result in grave miscarriages of justice, the erroneous
detention and conviction of innocent people, and vigilantism and mob violence.
The Pakistani Justitia seems not to wear the blindfold when measuring
accusations of blasphemy on her scales; on the contrary, her judgments appear
to be clouded by personal vendetta, prejudice against minorities,
self-interest, envy and power, turning the courtroom in an arena of hostility,
instead of fairness and impartiality, perpetuating a subsequent cycle of
labelling and demonization, which translates into lifelong emotional trauma and
persecution, even for those found innocent.
This paper
will rely upon certain landmark cases, which vividly highlight the atmosphere
of injustice, fear and maltreatment, in which those laws operate, alongside the
political opportunism which tends to go hand in hand with public support. In
conclusion, the paper will press for the urgent reform of the blasphemy laws
under the Pakistani Penal Code, arguing that their design is not simply open to
misuse, but is inherently created to abuse, being drafted in a fashion that
curtails basic freedoms of speech, expression and religion, while promoting
religious intolerance, ethnic marginalization and discrimination, ultimately
eroding the social fabric of the Pakistani State. The draconian blasphemy laws
of Pakistan once again prove how the democratic set-up of the country remains
an elaborate façade for the ongoing persecution of vulnerable individuals and
the reign of violent extremist ideas; as Mashaal Gauhar, Pakistani journalist
for the Daily Times asserts, “…too many precious lives have been lost as a result
of this law — the time for reform has been long overdue”.
Historical
& Legal Background
The
Pakistani blasphemy laws under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) derive from the
Indian Penal Code, which was originally designed by the British Raj in 1860
under the guidance of Lord Macaulay. The spirit of the then Chapter XV, which
described criminal offences related to religion, manifested in primarily
fostering acceptance of all religious beliefs, by punishing acts intended to
insult the religion of any members of society regardless of class differences,
with a maximum prison sentence of 3 years or/and a fine. After Pakistani
independence in 1947, the country adopted the said provisions without change,
until the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haque came to power.
Zia-ul-Haque’s
reign, which lasted between 1977 and 1988, as described by Jamal Shah, Lecturer
in Political Science at Government College Takht Bhai, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, was
“…a combination of the mullah and military alliance where he used Islam to legitimize
his dictatorial rule”. According to Shah, the internal dimensions of Zia’s
Islamization fell into three distinct categories: political, social and
economic. The political motivation was essentially popularizing his regime,
which was not favoured at the time, and henceforth prevent civilian revolt, by
strengthening his authoritarian rule. The social objective was to accommodate
the right-wing religious political parties in order to remain in power by
complying with their demands for an Islamic State, while the economic rationale
was to adopt Islamic interest-free banking practices. Meantime, the external
dimensions of Zia’s Islamization were associated with the Pakistani Army’s
apprehensions vis-à-vis the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, which ultimately
translated into arousing religious sentiments and jihadist beliefs in guerrilla
groups called Mujahideen, which were mobilized to fight the Soviets. As a
result, fundamentalist militant groups not only managed to establish foothold
in the country by working together with the Pakistani Army and the country’s
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Agency, but also as seen from the present-day
reality, their Kalashnikov culture managed to outlive the relevance of its
times.
What
simultaneously ensued was the Islamization process of Pakistan’s legal system,
through the incorporation of Shariah law in the form of Hudood Ordinances,
under which the blasphemy laws also underwent certain amendments, which
exacerbated their punitive nature. In 1984, the Evidence Act of 1872 was
replaced by the ‘Qanun-e-Shahadat’ (Law of Evidence), according to which its
provisions must be read in conformity with the Quran and Sunnah, while the
integrity of witness testimony should be constructed through the observation of
Islamic injunctions. As a result, the Pakistani blasphemy laws, which between
1980 and 1986 were subject to severe transformation, currently appear as
following:
As outlined
in the graph, the majority of offences appear to be ‘cognizable’, which means
that the police could issue an arrest without a warrant. In addition, those
that are classified as ‘non-bailable’, further indicate that in the
abovementioned situations a bail cannot be claimed as a matter of right and
could be only given at the discretion of the court.
Startlingly,
in comparison with the other provisions, clauses 295-C and 298-A do not require
any proof of intent, or in legal words, men’s rea, thus leaving the nature of
the offences widely to the interpretation of the accuser and the subsequent
discretion of the court. They further make no mention of the perpetrator’s
potential psychological state or mental health, which often results in the
erroneous detention of people with psychiatric problems, regardless of the fact
that the PPC includes the defence of legal insanity. Meantime, provisions 298-B
and 298-C, which were introduced during Zia’s regime, were specifically crafted
to restrict the freedom of religion and expression of Ahmadi Muslims, arguing
that individuals belonging to the Ahmadiyya Community cannot call themselves
Muslims or act as such. In addition to that, sections 295-A and 298-A have been
included in the list of scheduled offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997.
The
following section will further examine the legal loopholes related to these
blasphemy laws, notably section 295-C, and will demonstrate through the
synopsis of numerous prominent cases how the inherently un-Islamic design of
those provisions incites violence against innocent people and denial of fair trial
and justice. It will further reiterate the fact that blasphemy laws are
man-made and not the divine creation of God, thus prone to human err and abuse.
Legal
Shortfalls
As far as
Zia’s formulation of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws is concerned, the covert and
ulterior purpose of these provisions is to protect only one religion, - Sunni
Islam. That being said, it automatically casts any other religious belief as
inferior and unwelcome, placing religious minorities in particular at the risk
of maltreatment.
According
to the graph above, although the majority of those accused were Muslims, as Dr.
Qaiser Julius, Director of Open Theological Seminary, Lahore, Pakistan
highlights, the biggest proportion of Muslims charged with blasphemy offences
still belong to the Shia community, which is considered one of the most
persecuted minorities in Pakistan. According to him, in 2013, 70% of Muslims,
which were accused of religious offences (excluding the Ahmadiyya community),
were Shias. Considering that recognized religious minorities in Pakistan
constitute only 4% of the entire population and the Shia community further
accounts for 10-15%, what becomes evident is, that the country’s blasphemy laws
have been disproportionately targeting minority groups, often used as a tool
for promoting discrimination and bigotry.
Important
to note, after the 1986 amendment of the PPC, the accusations of blasphemy
offences have increased exponentially. According to the Pakistani advocacy
group Centre for Social Justice, between 1987 and 2017, an estimated number of
1,549 people have been charged under the draconian blasphemy laws; for
comparison, before 1986, only 14 cases have been reported. Julius further
pinpoints that the year 1991 was a particular landmark in that regard, with the
PPC amendment of provision 295-C, which made the death sentence for blasphemy
offences mandatory in the Federal Shari’at Court, alongside the alteration of
the length of imprisonment from 2 to 10 years for section 295-A.
Numerous
researchers pose the question, how could one justify the paradoxical phenomenon
that cases of blasphemy suddenly increased with the introduction of more
draconian measures? What becomes a rather credible argument is that the
noticeable increase in such offences does not stem from change in human
behavior, instead it is a consequence from the promulgation of these stringent
laws. Further proof for that is reflected in the fact that the majority of
cases brought up by lower courts to the superior courts in Pakistan have been automatically
overturned on the grounds that the evidences have been fabricated and motivated
by self-interest.
More
importantly, the reality that the majority of convictions have been made below
the baseline of “beyond reasonable doubt” is particularly visible from the fact
that the evidence, which is more than often an oral testimony, and on which the
accusations have been made, is rarely presented in court from fears from both
witnesses and defence lawyers of reproducing the blasphemous content themselves.
Such fears of repeating the words used by the accused not only create an absurd
spiral of condemnation and censorship of any fair process, but further fail to
provide scope for acquittal and exoneration of those wrongfully indicted.
Unfortunately,
such atmosphere of lawlessness additionally creates justification for vigilante
justice. More than 70 cases of extrajudicial killings undergone by vigilantes
against accused of blasphemy have taken place since the 1980s till present day.
In contrast, between 1947 and 1980, not a single individual subject to
accusation has been killed extra-judicially. Such observation makes one
conclude that the reinforcement of punitive actions has not only given legal
dimensions to the delivery of punitive justice, but further instigated and
emboldened ordinary citizens to take matters into their own hands by condoning
mob violence. This is further portrayed in the way media outlets and prominent
State figures respond to the phenomenon. As Abida Eijaz, Assistant Professor of
Mass Communication at the Institute of Communication Studies at the University
of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan explains, often in their “competition for point
scoring”, news channels not only fail to fulfil the role they are expected to
perform as impartial news reporters, but further twist facts and truths in
order to create spectacle.
In regards
to blasphemy laws, she gives an example how the remarks of the late former
Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, who was defending the case of Asia Bibi and
was subsequently assassinated for doing so, have been framed as non-supportive
of the laws by TV channels, which ultimately triggered public resentment and
hatred against him, leading to his killing. Former LHC Justice Mian Nazir
Akhtar, who used to be the defence lawyer of Mumtaz Qadri, the bodyguard who
killed Salman Taseer and became a national hero of blasphemy supporters, has
not only justified the heinous act but further argued that “no one had
authority to pardon blasphemy and anyone accused of blasphemy should be killed
on the spot as a religious obligation”. In return, Mumtaz Qadri also argued
that he was inspired by a sermon delivered by Mufti Muhammad Hanif Qureshi in
Rawalpindi, who encouraged the public to take up vigilante justice stating that
people such as Salman Taseer were worthy of being killed (“Wajibul Qatal”).
Such harmful statements, particularly coming from individuals in a position of
power and authority, not only show the extent to which the criminal justice
system of Pakistan is bigoted and prejudiced, but also give a carte blanche to
religious fanatics and vigilantes, thus defending and safeguarding offenders
and murderers.
Case
Studies
Looking
closer at other prominent case studies, the abovementioned abuse of the law
becomes visible through numerous miscarriages of justice. For example in
Salamat Masih v. the State, a 13-year old Christian boy was sentenced to death
under section 295-C in 1995 for writing offensive words on the walls of a
mosque. As described and analyzed by Osama Siddique, Associate Professor and
Head of Department of Law & Policy, Lahore University of Management
Sciences, Pakistan, charges against the accused and two older relatives of his
– Rehmat Masih and Mazoor Masih, the latter of whom was later shot dead by
unidentified assailants outside the court, were brought up in 1993 by the Imam
of a local mosque, who argued that "objectionable words about the Holy
Prophet" were found scribbled in the toilet of the mosque. He further
suggested that pieces of paper containing "derogatory words about the Holy
Prophet" were also thrown in various places around the mosque. The
complainant and the Lambardar (Lambardar is a title in India and Pakistan which
applies to powerful families of zamindars of the village or town, a State-privileged
status which is hereditary and has wide ranging governmental powers: the
policing authority of the village, and many other governmental and
administrative perks) of the village allegedly saw the three accused and tried
to apprehend them, yet the latter were said to have managed to flee, whereupon
the complainant and other witnesses immediately wiped off what was written. The
complainant reproduced the pieces of paper, which contained the derogatory
remarks, claiming to the police that he has kept them in his possession for a
year. Throughout the process, the testimonies of the various witnesses greatly
contradicted each other in terms of the exact places, timings and tools used
regarding the committed offences. None of the witnesses were able to repeat before
the court the allegedly defamatory words written on the wall from apprehensions
of reproducing the same blasphemous content. At one stage of the trial, the
complainant stated that he will no longer pursue the case, however the
prosecution decided to keep using the testimony and evidence he provided. Asma
Jahangir, one of Pakistan's foremost human rights lawyers and counsel for the
appellants, asserted that the prosecution’s case and the court’s proceedings
were subject to multiple grave flaws. Among those, she highlighted that with
the withdrawal of the main complainant from the process, his testimony lost any
evidentiary value; the reluctance of the witnesses to reproduce the derogatory
remarks amounted to making a conviction on the sole basis of feelings and
perceptions; the fact that the pieces of paper were recovered a year after the
beginning of the trial undermined their credibility; there were implications of
personal vendetta which motivated the charges pinpointing several cases of
unsettled disputes, including one over a stolen tree. Meantime violent
demonstrations barricaded the streets around the LHC, with angry mobs
threatening the accused, the defence lawyers and judges. Religious
organisations such as "Jamaat Alh-e-Sunnat" and "Muttahida Ulema
Council" went so far to offer a reward of a million rupees and 300, 000
rupees, respectively, for the killing of the defendants. Despite their
subsequent acquittal in 1995, the Masihs were no longer safe in Pakistan and
had to flee to Germany, which provided them with political asylum.
Nevertheless, even upon their escape, the ordeal of the trial was not over with
the defence lawyer’s and her family’s lives being threatened on numerous
occasions and the Justice of the case, Arif Iqbal Bhatti, soon after killed.
In another
case, in 1996, Ayub Masih, a Christian man, was accused of blasphemy by his
Muslim neighbour, Muhammad Akram, who argued that Masih told him to read Salman
Rushdie’s “The Satanic Verses” and said that Christianity was “right”. Masih
instantly denied the accusations as fabricated, yet he was immediately
arrested, charged under article 295-C and sentenced to death. Akram acquired
his land and property, and the entire Christian population of his village was
displaced. In defence of Masih, Bishop John Joseph of Faisalbad pointed out
that the former could not read English and thus would know little about
Rushdie's book. During the trial, Akram shot and injured Masih, but the former
was never tried for the crime. Throughout the whole judicial process, the
courtroom was surrounded by violent extremists, who were threatening Masih and
his lawyers with reprisal in case he was acquitted. In May 1998, the Bishop
committed suicide in front of the Court in protest against Masih's conviction.
In September 2001, Masih’s family contacted the United Nations Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention (WGAD), as a result of which in November 2001, the WGAD
found “the deprivation of liberty of Ayub Masih is arbitrary, being in
contravention of Articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights”. In response to the international pressure imposed, in August 2002, the
Supreme Court of Pakistan welcomed the appeal, acquitted Masih of his charges,
and ordered his release. Shortly afterwards he was granted political asylum in
the United States and transitioned safely.
Despite the
relatively swift resolution of the abovementioned cases, the fate of the
majority of individuals charged with blasphemy offences is considerably less
bright and the anguish of not knowing when their suffering will be over,
continues for decades. The story of Wajeeh-ul-Hassan, who spent almost 20 years
on death row, features the reality of those hundreds erroneously charged and
imprisoned in solitary confinement, who see no hope in experiencing freedom
anymore. As narrated by Asad Hashim, correspondent for Al Jazeera based in
Islamabad, Hassan was working for Hala Enterprises, a Lahore-based textile
company, owned by Mian Tahir Jehangir, the husband of Asma Jehangir, which
earlier in 1994 was attacked, following the Masihs case. In 1998, Hassan moved
to work for two brothers - Muhammad Wasim and Muhammad Naveed, who were running
a steel foundry. At some point they started coercing Hassan to disclose
information about his work at the Jehangirs in their bid of pressurizing her
family to give up a valuable piece of property. When he refused to implicate
her, the brothers tortured him and forced him to write "blasphemous"
letters in which he insults the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the Islamic faith
while stating that their author has converted to Christianity. The letters were
later send to Ismail Qureshi – prominent lawyer and proponent of the blasphemy
laws who had represented the prosecution in the case against Salamat, Manzoor
and Rehmat Masih. Over the following year, the brothers were trying to use
those letters as a clout over Hassan to make him “confess” that they were
either written by Asma Jehengir or that she had compelled him to write them. In
case he did not, they threatened him that the letters will be sent to Qureshi
and implicate him as being the writer, while also endanger the lives of his
family. Hassan did not want to implicate the Jehangirs, also because his father
was still working for them, and he tried to escape from the situation by
joining the Tableeghi Jamaat, an Islamic missionary organisation, in order to
repent his sins and find salvation in prayer. Four months later, when he
returned back to Lahore, Wasim and Naveed took hold of him, abducted him and
heinously tortured him, this time coercing him to write a blasphemous letter
signed by him. After sending it to Qureshi, Hassan was handed over to the
police, which further beat him mercilessly throughout the interrogation.
Fearing the lives of his family, Hassan did not testify in his defence in front
of the court.
"I
have even said this in court, to the stenographer, to the judge, I have told
them that my family members are in danger, that is why I cannot testify [in my
defence]", he argued.
"[The
judge] just said he was in more danger than I am".
As a
result, Wajeeh-ul-Hassan was sentenced to death. Not only was he subjected to
inhumane conditions, but he was further tortured and sexually abused during his
sentence.
“In
Pakistani prisons, those convicted of blasphemy exist at the bottom of the
hierarchy”, he explained.
However,
after spending almost 20 years on death row, the recent landmark ruling of
Judge Asif Saeed Khosa in the Asia Bibi case, gave Hassan hope and he wrote to
the Judge a letter with full testimony in his defence, and he was miraculously
released some months afterwards. Yet, despite his acquittal, Hassan continues
to live in fear for himself and his family in Pakistan, since even those found
innocent remain permanently blemished by the scarlet letter of blasphemy.
Blasphemy
Offences and Mental Illness
Although
the aforementioned cases are just a minute snapshot of the vast chronicles of
innocent lives thrown at the gates of torment and agony due to false
accusations, personal vendetta, duress, prejudice and a string of failures of
the judicial system to attain the ends of justice, these excerpts manage to
portray the extent to which people from all walks of life could become
faultless victims of groundless allegations. Not only that, but the individuals
involved in their defence and trial – lawyers, judges, public figures and human
rights activists, also automatically become branded as guilty.
Therefore,
such traumatic sequence of events, stemming from these miscarriages of justice,
could have long-lasting implications on the mental health of individuals, such
as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), panic attacks, paranoia, substance
abuse, depression, anxiety and others.
In addition
to that, this section will also explore one of the groups that is widely misrepresented
in the public discourse in terms of wrongful convictions, yet in reality is
over-represented in the group of accused and disproportionately targeted under
the blasphemy laws – namely individuals who are mentally ill.
As
explained by Muzaffar Husain, Forensic Psychiatrist at the Kent Forensic
Psychiatric Service, Dartford and Consultant for blasphemy defendants with
mental illness held in custody in Pakistan, individuals with psychotic
disorders such as schizophrenia and mania could manifest grandiose behavior,
suffer delusions and lack disinhibition, which place them particularly in
danger of wrongful accusation and prosecution. People with intellectual
disabilities further fall under the diagnostic group of victims, due to their
inability to follow social norms and comprehend what the community might hold
as sacrosanct. In addition to that, neurotic disorders such as
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), could have an overbearing urge on
individuals to conduct repeated compulsive actions, which might be seen by
others as blasphemous. Not only this, but people with mental illnesses are in
significant danger of physical and psychological abuse. As further illuminated
by Husain, cases of sexual abuse have been often masked by the abusers as
accusations of blasphemy upon the victim in order to instil fear in them so
that they do not report the assault.
For
example, in 2012, an unidentified man, widely described by the police as
mentally unstable was accused of blasphemy for burning pages of the Quran and
subsequently arrested. Media channels and testimony of officers argued that the
man was acting confused, “laughing and chanting in custody”, having no idea of
what was happening. A large crowd gathered outside the police station,
forcefully took him out of custody, doused him in petrol and set him on fire.
According
to Dr. Adnan Ahmed and Dr. Chinmoy Gulrajani, Private Psychiatrist and Adjunct
Associate Professor, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences,
University of Minnesota, respectively, the fact that the Pakistani laws do not
afford protection to individuals with mental health problems is further visible
from the case of Muhammed Asghar, a British man diagnosed with schizophrenia
who travelled to Pakistan and was accused of blasphemy in 2014 for claiming to
be the Prophet (PBUH). The Judge initially refused to welcome any evidence
regarding Mr. Asghar’s medical history, yet when the latter attempted suicide
in custody, a medical panel was allowed to make a report on his situation.
However, the panel was later threatened by an angry mob of vigilantes and could
not support the defence. While in prison Asghar was shot by a police officer,
he survived the attack, but still remains on death row till present day.
The
abovementioned case further suggests the pressure under which medical and
psychiatric professionals find themselves, often making them reluctant to
provide expert opinion and medical evidence due to external intimidation and
fears for their own safety.
In another
case, earlier in 2012, a 14-year old Christian girl, Rimsha Masih, with an
intellectual disability, arguably Down syndrome, was arrested and jailed on
allegations of committing blasphemy by burning pages of the Quran. Violent
demonstrations by Muslims in her predominantly Christian neighbourhood forced
her family and community to flee. Throughout the trial it became evident that
her accuser, the Imam of a nearby mosque called Hafiz Mohammed Khalid Chishti,
had fabricated and planted the evidence as part of a conspiracy to remove the
Christian population from the area. Her case, however, unfolded in a rather
divergent manner. Not only was Chishti found to have tampered with the
evidence, but he was further charged with a blasphemy offence. By the end of
2012, Rimsha was cleared of all charges and shortly after moved with her family
to Canada to avoid vigilante violence. Regrettably, in August 2013 the Imam was
released, under ruling that the prosecution had not brought forward sufficient
evidence to convict him.
Although
this case was widely considered a precedent in the justice system of Pakistan
and many hoped it would signal a turning point in the way blasphemy laws are
being addressed, as analyzed by Matt Hoffman, Researcher at Washington
University School of Law, those rather extraordinary developments occurred more
as a result of the unique circumstances of the case, instead of as a reflection
of a wider public desire for reform. First, Rimsha was a minor girl with mental
deficiency; second, the evidence that she was framed was very quickly tracked
down, and thirdly, due to those preceding factors, the case received an
enormous amount of coverage by the media, which put large pressure on the
prosecution and Pakistani officials. The last aspect is also visible from the
fact that initially the accuser's lawyer and the prosecutor argued that her
mental health report was fake, by being made to “favour” her, in addition to
not even being the age of a minor. Hoffman further argues that all the ensuing
events, such as Chishti’s acquittal, the lack of discourse on amendment of the
laws, the unceremonious condoning of vigilantism and the continuation of
handling allegations of blasphemy on the basis of fallacious evidence,
individual prejudices and self-interests, substitute the argument that nothing
had changed with Rimsha’s case.
Popular
Support and Political Opportunism
As Hoffman argues,
the Pakistani blasphemy laws enjoy high level of social support and political
backing, with the former strongly influencing the latter. Many State officials
either openly promote the laws or avoid discourse on reform from fears of
losing political power, while a sizeable segment of the population expresses
eagerness to establish “justice” on their own terms both against blasphemers
and advocates of such. Courts and law firms often find themselves obstructed or
even prevented from fulfilling their purpose, while the police resort to
unnecessary and extrajudicial arrests to appease violent crowds.
In 2011,
Shahbaz Bhatti, the then Minister of Minorities of Pakistan and the only
Christian in the Cabinet, was assassinated by an unidentified gunman, who was a
member of the Islamic terrorist group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which
was responsible for the 2014 Peshawar School Massacre in which 132 children
were killed. Bhatti was a prominent critic of the blasphemy laws and had been a
vocal defender of Asia Bibi and other erroneously prosecuted members of
minorities in the country. Despite the outright international condemnation of
the attack, including from parties such as the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, the European Union, USA, UK, Canada, Germany and the Vatican,
the domestic response ranged from silence to openly in favour of the
unfortunate development. Unsurprisingly, neither the assailant has been
arrested, nor has there been any development in the investigation.
Such cases
not only suggest how the delicate matter of blasphemy laws is used for
accumulation of dividends by Pakistani political-, religious- and media bodies,
but is further hijacked by violent extremist outfits for the purposes of
accomplishing their agendas. As argued by Nilay Saiya, Assistant Professor of
Political Science and Director of International Studies at the State University
of New York, Brockport, “…instead of promoting respect for religion ... laws
against religious defamation weaken reform-minded moderate Muslims, silence
members of minority faiths and political dissidents, and promote violence and
terrorism”.
According
to Saiya, considering that the prescription of a punishment for blasphemy is
non-existent, neither in the Quran, nor in the Hadith, the modern utilization
of laws designed against religious desecration stem from the desire of leaders
of Muslim-majority countries to make use of such laws in order to harness
political power, censor unwelcome criticism and political opposition, instigate
religious sentiments and legitimize religious discrimination, foster nationwide
“patriotism” and consolidate a sense of Muslim union, as a result of which
those political figures often find themselves backed up by radical Islamists,
who enjoy legal cover for their acts of violence and terrorism.
He
continues on saying that, “Violent non-State actors thus feel empowered to
commit acts of terrorism with little or no fear of governmental reprisal
because blasphemy laws, in effect, lend the authority of the State to religious
figures and reinforce extreme views. Rather than control the forces of
extremism, blasphemy laws appease and encourage them. The result, expectedly,
is that States that attempt to curry favor with radicals embolden them to take
matters into their own hands; eventually such countries fall prey to violence
carried out by those same radicals”.
As a
result, the government often finds itself in a self-induced gridlock of
extremist rule, which they are unable to control. That is particularly visible
from the case of the far-right Islamist political party, Tehreek-e-Labbaik
Pakistan (TLP), headed by the preacher Khadim Hussain Rizvi. The TLP has been
widely known for their long-lasting country-wide mass protests regarding any
changes or opposition to Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. The party was established
and subsequently gained prominence, after the hanging of the killer of Salman
Taseer, Mumtaz Qadri, which according to the group was unjust.
Following
the acquittal of Asia Bibi in October 2018, the TLP held days of violent
protests, blocking roads and major intersections across the country. In an
attempt to end the demonstrations and appease the masses, Prime Minister Imran
Khan signed a deal with the TLP leadership to put Asia Bibi on the Exit Control
List (ECL) in order to prevent her from fleeing abroad, alongside with
releasing arrested TLP members. Numerous prominent figures considered such
moves as Pakistan’s capitulation to extremists, including Jemima Goldsmith,
Imran Khan’s former wife.
However, Rizvi
took a step too far by verbally attacking the Pakistani military for which he
was heavily reprimanded, by getting subsequently indicted on charges of
inciting violence and terrorism vis-à-vis the protests. Although, he was later
on released on bail, that particular episode further signified the
opportunistic political appliance of the blasphemy laws – the moment, their
utilisation might be in discrepancy with the actual powerhouse, the State
starts acting in a “responsible” manner.
Conclusion
Since nowhere
in the Quran a punishment is stipulated in this world for blasphemy, regardless
of whether it is against the Holly Prophet (PBUH) or the Islamic religion per
se, the current blasphemy laws of Pakistan stand on very flimsy ground in
respect to their authenticity according to Islamic jurisprudence. Numerous
Muslim scholars and jurists have conveyed their objections regarding the
criminalized nature of blasphemy, yet their narrative rarely dominates the
public and political discourse.
As
explained by Raza Ahmad Rumi, Visiting Lecturer at Cornell Institute for Public
Affairs, USA, prominent Pakistani policy analyst, journalist and editor of
Pakistan’s Daily Times, “…whenever States incorporate religion into their
agenda, increased religious persecution is one of the natural outcomes”. He
continues on arguing that in the case of Pakistan the problem is even two-fold
since the country must not only recognize the long-term futility of blasphemy
laws, instead of their short-term utility, but further address the matter of
blasphemy not from a religious, but a secular perspective: “that is, not as an
insult to God, but as an insult to the people who believe in a God, that is,
from the point of view of regulating hate speech”.
As another
prominent Pakistani journalist, Kunwar Khuldune Shahid, correspondent for The
Diplomat and Asia Times, argues, the issue further stems from the fact that the
majority of Muslims consider their religious identity above their national,
ethnic or residential identity, thus taking any act of criticism on Islam as a
manifestation of aggression against all Muslims, and not simply an ideological
critique. Hence, as he continues on saying, “…the only way a tolerant and
moderate Islam can emerge is when the majority of the Muslim world unites as a
community that shares a lot more than just religious scriptures. When Islam
will only form a part of a Muslim’s identity and not its entirety, offensive
cartoons will only be considered distasteful and not incitement for terrorism”.
Therefore,
this paper vigorously presses for the urgent reform of the blasphemy laws, by
repealing the existent provisions and drafting new legislation, which is fully
compliant with the international legal obligations in respect to the rights to
life; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief; freedom of
opinion and expression; equality before the law; and the prohibition of
discrimination, as described in Amnesty International’s Report of 2016 on the
matter. As such, the Pakistani officials should design and install
comprehensive and efficient procedural and institutional safeguarding
mechanisms at the investigative, prosecutorial and judicial stages in order to
preclude any form of abuse and ensure the fair trial of those accused.
Moreover, the State should take urgent steps in repealing the death penalty and
commute all death sentences that have already been imposed. Criminal justice
professionals should receive extensive training on identifying individuals with
mental health issues and refer them to special assessment and treatment,
recognising their needs and diverting them away from the criminal justice
system.
By all
odds, that will be a long and arduous process, yet, more importantly, such
debate and resolution must start from within, with the Pakistani society, which
is highly polarized between the suppressed secular minority and dominant
religiously inclined majority, recognizing that a differentiation between a
devoted and lay Muslim should not be made on the basis of acting upon religious
slanders. Instead, both should contemplate the fact that the Islamic religion
is not punitive, but forgiving in nature; that it is human to err, and even
more human to bear no malice.
Whereas,
regarding those who in mala fides engage in treacherous acts and deceitful language
in order to erroneously frame an innocent being, the society should ask itself
the question, is it not a blasphemy to lie, mischief, accuse and kill, and
justify that in the name of religion or the Holy Prophet (PBUH)? In Islamic
theology, the ends do not justify the means. Thus, not only procedural measures
should be taken by the criminal justice system against such individuals, but
the community as a whole must realise the harm and damage they inflict upon the
cohesiveness of the Pakistani social fabric.
The
emergence of the blasphemy laws of Pakistan in the form they are implemented
currently, took place during the era of Zia’s Islamisation, where the focal
point was not Islam in itself, but a desire for consolidating State power and
popularising the existing government. As summarised by Shah, “from this
perspective Islamic reforms were a witty device to mobilize popular support
especially among the mullahs and bigots and to divert attention from issues of
representation versus authoritarian rule. Religion was also used as a shield of
survival for elites”. As a result, what becomes visible is that in their
essence, the Pakistani blasphemy laws were designed simply as an instrument for
public control utilised not only by politicians, but in general by those who
perceive themselves to be in a position of power in order to command and
repress those considered inferior, virtually placing them outside the realm of
the rule of law.
Therefore,
it is a high time, this gravely perilous and divisive tenet is brought to an
end. Not only for the purposes of preventing injustice and discrimination, but
also to take away the license of invincibility and omnipotence from the hands
of the State and the elite.
Original
Headline: Guilty until proven innocent: The sacrilegious nature of blasphemy
laws in Pakistan
Source: European Foundation for South Asian
Studies
URL: https://newageislam.com/islamic-society/blasphemy-offences-mental-illness-pakistan/d/122542