Intra-Muslim Conflict and the Menace of Takfir
By
Maulana Waris Mazhari
(Translated
from Urdu by Yoginder Sikand)
Both
the Quran and the Hadith expressly condemn extremism and aggression in the name
of religion. They also exhort Muslims to be one, and to relate to each other
with love and goodwill. Despite these Islamic teachings, intra-Muslim conflict,
particularly on sectarian lines, remains rife and shows no sign of diminishing.
In some places, such conflict has assumed the form of a major menace. It has
now become common place for ulema of different sects to hurl fatwas against
fellow Muslims of other sects, branding them as kafirs.
Condemning
others as kafirs is known in the terminology of the shariah as takfir. Misuse
of takfir is both an indication as well as a major cause for internal strife
and intolerance within Muslim communities. In some places, it has led to much
bloodshed, in which thousands of innocent people—all Muslims—have lost their
precious lives.
The
phenomenon of takfir is, really, a form of religious sadism. It has become a
deadly weapon for supposedly religious people to wield against their alleged
opponents, even simply to take revenge for real or alleged personal slights.
Takfir
was unknown in the earliest Islamic period, the time of the companions of the
Prophet, which Muslims consider the model era.
was
despite the fact that the companions often differed from each other in their
understanding of various religious issues. Sometimes, these differences would
be extreme. Thus, for instance, Abuzar Ghiffari believed, in contrast to many
other companions, that one must not save or hoard any money at all, and that
whatever money one had in excess of what was needed for a single day should be
given to the poor.
Likewise, Abdullah Ibn Masud differed from the
other companions in that he did not regard the last two chapters found in the
Quran as having actually been part of the Quranic text. Another companion,
Qudama Ibn Mazlun, drank alcohol and argued, against the insistence of the
other companions that this was not forbidden by the Quran. The Caliph Umar
punished him for drinking but, yet, did not declare him a kafir. Nor were the
other companions mentioned above declared as kafirs by their fellow Muslims.
Likewise, Muwaiya and Imam Ali were at complete loggerheads on political
matters, but yet this did not lead to them engaging in takfir against each
other.
The
Kharijites declared Ali, Usman, and the majority of the Prophet’s companions as
kafirs and even as worthy of being slain. Yet, Imam Ali never responded by
engaging in takfir against them.
Given
the horrific misuse of the lethal weapon of takfir today, it is crucial to be
clear about this concept and the terms and conditions of its legitimate
practice. These have been discussed at length by the classical Islamic
scholars.
Unfortunately,
the generation that came soon after that of the Prophet’s companions was
afflicted by enormous strife and conflict. This began during the later period
of Usman’s Caliphate. A group of rebels engaged in takfir against Usman and
then slew him. The Kharijites, who emerged at this time, considered all Muslims
other than themselves as kafirs, who deserved to be killed. They branded a
massive number of companions of the Prophet and their companions as infidels.
They regarded it their duty to wage war against other Muslims, and considered
their lives, properties and women as objects that could be seized in war as
booty (mal-e ghanimah).
They
were ready to provide refuge to polytheists so that they could hear the Quran
from them, but had absolutely no tolerance for fellow Muslims, whom they
considered apostates. Following the dialogue that Abdullah Ibn Abbas entered
into them at the urging of Imam Ali, a few of them appeared to water down their
radicalism somewhat. However, the vast majority of the Kharijites refused to
give up their extremist approach to takfir and the killing of their fellow
Muslim opponents whom they branded as kafirs.
After
the Kharijites, the phenomenon of takfir witnessed a fresh impetus at the time
of the emergence of various theological schools among Muslims. Groups that
developed at this time, such as the Mutazilites, the Jahmites, the Qadrites and
so on, developed novel interpretations of faith and kufr (infidelity), and, on
the basis of these, engaged in takfir against rival schools. The Asharites
developed in response to the Mutazilites, and the two groups indulged in takfir
against each other.
In
contrast to this, the Muslim jurists or fuqaha practiced considerable restraint
on the issue of takfir. They considered sectarian hairsplitting to be a cause
of grave strife. They sought to apply shariah rules on individuals according to
their external conditions and acts, considering their internal or batini state
as God’s domain to judge. Accordingly, they regarded as Muslims all those who
believed in the basic principles of Islam and who considered themselves to be
Muslims. This is why they did not engage in takfir against groups like the
Mutazilites, Jahmites, and Qadrites, despite the fact that the deviation of
these groups was apparent.
However,
things began to change later, when the doctrine of taqlid or rigid adherence to
one or the other school of jurisprudence was propounded and acquired general
acceptance. This phase of Muslim history marked the beginning of a marked
stagnation in Muslim thought. At this time, a section of the fuqaha became
closely allied to the rulers, attracted by the worldly benefits of such an
alliance. They were appointed to high posts with hefty salaries, a development
that the noted Islamic scholar Imam Ghazali, among others, vociferously
denounced. This development rapidly led to the emergence of groupism among the
fuqaha and to fierce contestations and confusion between the different schools
of fiqh. In this climate of conflict takfir began being wielded by rival groups
to silence their opponents.
In the
modern period, the phenomenon of takfir emerged in new forms. Fringe radical
groups emerged in some countries, like the Jama‘at al -Takfir wa al-Hijrah in
Egypt, that considered themselves alone as true Muslims and branded all other
Muslims as apostates. In their fierce exclusivism and their free use of takfir
they bore a striking resemblance to the Kharijites. Numerous other groups
similar in their approach emerged in Pakistan.
They
engaged in armed conflict with their Muslim opponents and with all those who
were part of the Pakistani state machinery, considering them to be apostates
fit to be killed. This has now developed into a very worrisome menace, causing
the deaths of literally thousands of people. The bomb of takfir continues to
take a massive toll in that country.
Numerous
factors were responsible for the re-emergence of takfiri tendencies among
certain self-styled Islamic groups in recent times. These include a rapid
escalation of conflicts based on sectarian and party politics among the ulema,
and a growing lack of confidence on the part of Muslim publics with regard to
their governments, leading to widespread disaffection.
It is
true that there have always been differences between various groups of ulema.
This is but to be expected, and is not unusual. However, these differences took
on a monstrous form in the twentieth century. This was a result of new social
and political developments and ideologies and the rapid changes that these
wrought in Muslim societies. Traditional Muslim communities, rooted in cultures
characterized by decline and stagnation, simply did not possess the tolerance
required to accept or creatively respond to these changes. This led to chaos
and conflict in many such communities, which gave birth to new ideological
tendencies championed by various new groups and movements.
In the
late colonial period, the common struggle against Western colonial rulers
managed to hold these groups together or at least to force them to tolerate
each other. However, as the grip of Western colonialism on Muslim countries
began to loosen, this illusory sense of unity began to weaken. With the end of
formal colonial rule and the departure of their common enemy, these groups
began fighting among themselves. In this internecine conflict, takfir was
wielded as a deadly weapon by rival groups to silence their ideological and
political opponents, declaring them as apostates who deserved to die.
The
class of Muslims who, as rulers, administrators and intellectuals, stepped into
the shoes of the Western imperialists who had departed from Muslim lands with
the formal end of colonialism were, by and large, thoroughly Westernised in
their thought and manners. They were more loyal to the West than to Islam and
the Muslims. That is why they failed to generate the support of the general
Muslim public. This led to an enormous and ever-widening gulf between the
ruling class and the Muslim masses in almost all Muslim countries.
It was
in this context that ideologues, activists and movements emerged, fired by
romanticized images and emotionally-driven slogans calling for the revival of
the lost ‘Golden Age’ of the Muslims. Several of these ideologues and movements
wielded the sword of takfir against the rulers of Muslim countries. It is
striking to note that most of the leaders and activists of these groups were
not traditional ulema but, rather, people who had been educated in ‘modern’
institutions, and who had been heavily influenced by anti-colonial Islamic
movements.
The
rise of extremist, including takfiri, tendencies in many Muslim countries was
also a response to the powerful hold of ultra-secularist elements who were not
just irreligious, but who also strongly believed that mocking religion and
aiming to destroy it was indispensable to prove their proclaimed credentials as
‘enlightened’ and ‘modern’. They might have considered themselves simply
‘cultural Muslims’ or Muslims by birth, but they simply refused to follow or
respect any tenet of Islam. One extreme thus gave birth to another. Responding
to popular resentment against such elements, the ulema and other Islamic forces
began to speak out against them, and, gradually, some of them turned to takfir
in order to ostracise them and render them ineffective.
Yet
another factor for the rise of takfiri tendencies in recent years is the fact
that experts in religious knowledge (rasikhin fi‘l ‘ilm) rapidly declined in
most Muslim societies with the marginalization of religious madrasas, which
were now replaced by ‘modern’ schools. This decline was, in fact, predicted in
hadith reports attributed to the Prophet. Their place was soon occupied by
public preachers (khutaba), many of who began to stoke the fires of conflict,
and even to engage in takfir, in the misplaced belief that they were thereby
serving the cause of Islam.
In
this way, then, the gross misuse of takfir has emerged as a major menace in
many Muslim societies today, leading to extremist thinking and taking a heavy
toll of human lives. It is time level-headed Islamic scholars and activists put
their heads together to combat this hydra-headed monster.
Maulana
Waris Mazhari is the editor of the New Delhi-based monthly Tarjuman Dar
ul-Uloom, the official organ of the Graduates’ Association of the Deoband
madrasa. He can be contacted on w.mazhari@gmail.com
Yoginder
Sikand works with the Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion at the National
Law School, Bangalore.
URL: