The US military presence in any terror-hit region only prolongs and
exacerbates the conflict
1.
Recent
jailbreak in Syria by the ISIS inmates was the sign of growing influence of IS
in the region.
2.
Killing of
Laden or ousting of IS from Mosul did not mean elimination of terrorism.
3.
Even after
destroying large parts of Syria and Iraq, the US cannot claim to have
eliminated IS and Al Qaeda.
4.
Millions of
people were displaced and had to migrate to other countries despite five years
of war against ISIS.
New Age Islam Edit Desk
Praveen Swami’s analysis of the situation in Iraq and
Syria post withdrawal of US troops is true to the ground. Now gradually the US
game in Iraq and Syria is becoming clearer. Recently, the ISIS attack on a jail
in Syria and escape of hundreds of hardcore IS terrorists is an indication that
the IS is regrouping in the region while the US has its two thousand plus
troops still stationed there. It has also been observed that the presence of
the US army, one of the most powerful and sophisticated armies of the world
only gives rise to terrorism and the terrorist groups only get stronger in
place of losing strength. In 2014, the Iraqi army while advancing towards Mosul,
had intriguingly escaped leaving tanks and other weapons which were seized by
the IS. Soon, ISIS captured power in Mosul and a caliphate was
established. The Arab Spring was hijacked by ISIS with the covert help of
the US so that Bashar al Asad government could be toppled to hit Iran’s
political ambitions in the region and to harm Russia’s trade and economic ties
with Syria. Saudi Intelligence Minister Bandar Bin Sultan had admitted before
Putin that the terrorist groups fighting in Syria were patronized by Saudi
Arabia and it is known to all that the US was an ally of Saudi Arabia during
the civil war in Syria. A long civil war ensued causing millions of lives and
displacement of Syrians and Iraqis and mass migration to European
countries. The rise of the ISIS again after their exit from the region
raises many questions on the real intent of the US and its commitment towards
elimination of terrorism. It is only a recent example of the US encouraging
militant Islamic groups that it helped Taliban come to power in Afghanistan
after destroying Afghanistan in the name of fighting Taliban and terrorism.
6
February, 2022
An ISIS convoy (Representational image) | Twitter/@Intlatm
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Prisoner M060108 — dark-skinned, his
captors recorded, 218.5cm, 101kg — was driven past the wire soon after New
Year’s Day in 2008, into the dust-blown prison camp at Umm Qasr, Iraq. In
coming weeks, declassified interrogation records show, M060108 betrayed his comrades in al-Qaeda, one after one.
Exactly why, the documents do not record; otherprisoners were beaten with rifle-butts, sexually humiliated, pepper-sprayed, left
hog-tied under the blazing sun.
For a few seconds last week, United States Special Forces caught sight
of that prisoner again, before the self-described caliph of the Islamic State
blew himself up with his family.
Like the killing of Osama bin Laden in
2011, or that of the Islamic State’s (IS) first caliph, Ibrahim Awad al-Badri,
in 2019, the killing of Amir Muhammad Abdul-Rahman—also known as Abu Ibrahim
al-Hashmi—is being cast as a critical milestone in the fight against terrorism.
The truth is muddier.
Even as former US president Donald
Trump bragged of the “100 percent” defeat of the caliphate in 2019, the IS was regrouping
under Abdul-Rahman in Iraq and Syria, and expanding across Africa and Asia. In
recent weeks, the terrorist group has staged sophisticated attacks in its Iraq-Syria heartlands. IS-inspired movements have
flowered in two continents.
The destruction of Iraqi despot Saddam
Husain’s regime in 2003 was heralded as the beginning of a new age of democracy
and peace in the Middle East. Instead, a long, grinding insurgency ensued—the
consequence of the destruction of State institutions, religious and ethnic
conflicts, poverty and foreign occupation.
How American ultra-violence bred jihadism
Like so many other armies, the US and its key ally, the
UK, responded to barbarism with barbarism. Following a 2005 bombing in
the Iraqi town of Haditha, US and British troops were alleged to have
killed dozens in cold blood. Fallujah
was levelled, then levelled again, as American
and British soldiers fought to recapture it from insurgents. In 2009 alone, 33
separate allegations of torture and sexual abuse were brought against British
troops.
“It is well that war is so terrible,” General Robert Lee
had said in December 1867, as he surveyed the carnage on the battlefields of
Fredericksburg, “otherwise we would grow too fond of it”. President George
Bush, though, didn’t flinch.
Al-Qaeda—drawing legitimacy from nationalist rage against
atrocities, as well as Sunni fears of being marginalized by Iraq’s Shi’a
majority—grew larger than it had ever been before 9/11, powered by the
storm-winds of violence.
The most authoritative biography of Abdul-Rahman, written by journalist Feras Kilani, tells us that the to-be caliph was born
in 1976 to a cleric in Mosul, the youngest of his father’s seven children by
two wives. Abdul-Rahman finished eighteen months of mandatory military service
in Saddam Husain’s army, before completing a masters’ degree in Islamic
theology.
From 2003, as anarchy spread across
Iraq, Abdal-Rahman seems to have drifted towards the Ansar ul-Islam, which soon
after merged itself into al-Qaeda. Later, after the death of the key al-Qaeda
commander, Jordanian Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal, Abdal-Rahman followed the
rank-and-file into the IS.
In 2007, Abdal-Rahman’s interrogation
records show, he took charge of running religious-courts in Mosul, ruling among other things on kidnappings and ransoms.
Taken prisoner from his home in 2008
by Kurdish Peshmerga militia, Abdal-Rahman ended up in prison alongside other
key figures in the IS. Following Camp Bucca’s closure in 2009, its alumni would
go on to become the backbone of the IS.
Little about Abdul-Rahman’s life is
documented thereafter. For a while, he was given charge of establishing an
institute for training religious judges and clergy at the al-Imam al-Adham
College in Mosul. He is alleged, in some accounts, to have provided religious
legitimacy for the killing of Yazidis, and the capture of Yazidi women as
slaves, after Sinjar fell in 2014.
Extremism, it should have been clear,
flourished in conditions where government and social structures were destroyed
by violence. Washington, though, wasn’t listening.
From 2010, mass protests erupted
against authoritarian regimes across the Middle East, in what came to be known
as the Arab Spring. The United States threw its weight behind one key uprising,
in Syria, hoping to depose arch-enemy Bashar al-Asad’s regime, and to contain
Iranian influence in the region. Like the European revolutions of 1848, from
which the Arab Spring got its name, the uprisings had very different outcomes
in each country. In Syria, jihadists—the best organised force—won.
The seeds of this disaster were,
ironically, in part laid by Bashar al-Asad himself. Fighting youth anger
brought on by his liberal economic reforms—which created growth, but not
jobs—al-Asad moved to accommodate the Islamist political vanguard, the Muslim
Brotherhood, and allowed Iraqi jihadists safe havens.
For its part, the US enabled the rise
of the IS through benign neglect, seeing it as a tool to use against Iran’s
influence in Iraq, and an instrument to bring down the Syrian regime.
Even though some semblance of order
has been won back, large swathes of Syria and Iraq remain outside of meaningful
State control. The IS still has an estimated 10,000 fighters, and controls
significant territory. Its example has inspired jihadists across Asia and
Africa.
Last year, the United Nations recorded that Islamic State violence is up across Africa, spilling
from northern Mali into the country’s central region, as well as Niger and
Burkina Faso. In oil-rich Mozambique, jihadists successfully stormed the town
of Palma; the 14-year war against al-Shabaab terrorists in Somalia has made no
discernible progress towards stabilising the country.
Nigeria, similarly, has had little
success in fighting Boko Haram, a jihadist group which has claimed thousands of
lives in terrorist attacks since 2002. The insurgency has expanded into Niger
and northern Cameroon.
Tiring of these endless wars, western
governments are withdrawing from the chaos they sparked off after 9/11. Last
year, French President Emmanuel Macron announced his intention to wind down
Operation Barkhane, his country’s small-scale edition of the 9/11 war in
Afghanistan. No one knows for certain how long the 2,500 US troops deployed in Iraq, or 900 in Syria, will stay.
Like Afghanistan, those countries
might well implode—sending shock waves through a region critical to India’s
energy security. Few Indians—just 66, by one estimate—fought with the IS, but some among them are known to have
received advanced training, and conducted suicide attacks in Afghanistan. Should communal tensions in India engender
large-scale violence in the future, Islamic State’s conceivable recruitment
will rise, with grave consequences.
There’s no lesson in Abdul-Rahman’s
story barring the one mothers teach little children: Don’t play with matches.
The fires lit by America’s Iraq war will likely rage on for many years more.
The author tweets
@praveenswami. Views are personal.(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)
URL: https://www.newageislam.com/islamterrorism-jihad/role-u-s-war-terror-doubtful/d/126327
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