By
Shruti Rajagopalan
21 Dec 2020
The ‘love
jihad’ ordinance looks like the latest weapon of the Uttar Pradesh government
in its battle to further Hindu nationalism. A few other states led by the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are considering the UP model. Naturally, this
morally and constitutionally abhorrent law has been criticized by many Indians.
While I agree with the criticism, the diagnosis offered of
anti-interfaith-marriage and anti-conversion sentiments has left me unconvinced.
Most believe that the underlying cause is religious bigotry and hatred. But
this bigotry was always prevalent in Indian society. In my view, the current
angst is driven by social and economic change, and long-present bigotry
manifests itself through such laws.
Historically,
‘love jihad’ was never a movement, because the possibility of interfaith
marriage, in particular Hindu-Muslim marriage, was so limited. India is
infamous for marital endogamy, especially caste endogamy, which maintains
social control in an otherwise pluralistic society. Even during Nehruvian
secularism, interfaith marriages, though allowed by the law, were not
commonplace. Much of this had to do with society and parental emphasis on
marrying not just within the same religion, but the same caste (jaati). The law
of that generation also reflects this social control over marriage. The Special
Marriage Act, 1955, allows individuals of different faiths to marry, but only
after a month’s notice period. The couple’s personal details, address, intentions,
etc., are widely publicized. It is almost as if the law was written by parents
who needed some time to intervene and discipline their errant children. These
procedural hurdles sometimes drove interfaith couples to convert their religion
and elope.
Secularism
to most Indians only meant living together peacefully in the aftermath of a
bloody Partition, but it didn’t translate to intermarriage. Think of Amar Akbar
Anthony (1977), that beacon of secularism nicely wrapped in Bollywood masala.
Three sons, each raised in a different faith, can mainline blood to their
mother. But each “hero" has the good sense to fall in love with a girl
(Lakshmi, Salma, Jenny) of his own faith. This was the Indian pluralism model
for decades: Bloodlines and mother’s love can transcend religion, but marriage
is a step too far.
India
always had religious hatred and bigotry without movements like ‘love jihad’,
because religious endogamy was rarely threatened. Interfaith couples were few
and far between and the state was not involved beyond the oppressive Special
Marriage Act. But the fact that ‘love jihad’ is now a movement that’s changing
laws means India has come a long way from the Amar Akbar Anthony model.
I don’t
intend to look for a silver lining in this abhorrent law and practice, but that
Hindu-Muslim marriages are a political issue is proof that India has made
progress in weakening religious endogamy. A world where groups feel threatened
enough to stop interfaith marriage is, perversely, progress for India, because
it is also a world where interfaith marriages are increasing and socially
accepted. Reactions to the UP ordinance—interfaith couples are sharing their
wonderful love stories—confirm this trend.
India is
stepping away from the world of Amar Akbar Anthony, and into the world of Mani
Ratnam’s Bombay, where a young Muslim girl befriends a Hindu girl in school,
elopes with her friend’s brother, and moves to a big city to raise secular
children. The movie, released in 1995, was a sign of a liberalizing and urbanizing
India.
Indian
girls now are more likely to go to school and college than their grandmothers.
More women migrate to cities for education and work. Their grandmothers
scarcely had an opportunity to meet a man of a different religion or caste, let
alone interact enough to fall in love; but this generation of young women can
and do. Relative to their grandparents’ generation, fewer Indian parents
exercise control over their children’s choice of partner. These are small
steps, but it represents progress.
And this
newly-gained exposure, education and choice (however limited) for women also
means men must compete in the marriage market. India’s current mobs are not
just against interfaith marriage, but more specifically against Muslim men
marrying Hindu women. The reverse, Hindu men marrying Muslim women, is frowned
upon but not as unacceptable.
The UP
ordinance is not only about social control, but also a method of reducing
competition for Hindu men in the marriage market. Unlike their grandfathers,
who were born with a certain caste and land status and were assured a bride
selected for them, this generation of Hindu men find themselves without jobs,
and with the burden of status and aspirations that do not match their lived
reality. Add to this the skewed sex ratio and “missing women" of India,
and competition from Muslim men becomes the last straw.
It is
telling that Bajirao Mastani (2015), where a Hindu man is in an interfaith
relationship, was received very differently from Padmavat (2018), where even a
hint of interaction or attraction between a Muslim warrior and a Hindu princess
was considered intolerable. Both movies were based on historical figures, had
the same lead pair of actors, and also the same director, but the aftermath was
quite different.
Indians must
fight the UP ordinance of social control. But it is also important to pause and
understand that the turmoil is part of a larger social and economic change
that’s positive. It’s not simply about hate.
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Shruti
Rajagopalan is a senior research fellow with the Mercatus Center at George
Mason University, US
Original
Headline: Love jihad laws are a backlash to India’s own progress
Source: The Live Mint
URL: https://newageislam.com/islam-politics/love-jihad-laws-sign-increasing/d/123872
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