Indian Press on Tanishq Ad, FATF, Taliban and Indian-Americans: New Age Islam's Selection, 15 October 2020
By New Age Islam Edit
Bureau
15 October
2020
• Tanishq Ad: Time to Wake Up and Smell the
Bigotry
By Sidharth Bhatia
• In Pakistan, a New Battle Takes Shape
By Vivek Katju
• In His 89th Year, Abdul Kalam’s Legend Lives
On
By Praveen Siddharth
• Will Pakistan Call Off Taliban Wolf At The
Door?
By Neena Gopal
• Extremist Thinking and the Spectre Of
Sedition
By Vappala Balachandran
• Challenges in Afghanistan
By G Parthasarathy
• Indian-Americans Are With Democrats
By Sumitra Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur and Milan
Vaishnav
• Pakistan Is Hoodwinking The World On Terror
Funding. FATF Grey List Needs To Go Darker
By Pradeep Singh Gautam
-----
Tanishq Ad: Time to Wake Up and Smell the
Bigotry
By Sidharth Bhatia
15 October
2020
Bollywood,
which has always been pilloried for being cowardly and standing up for
anything, has banded together to file a suit against two television channels.
The corporate sector, which functions on two default modes – complete silence
or generous praise of the government and its leader – is putting its money
where its mouth is and refusing to advertise on toxic channels. Clearly, they
are sending a message to the hate-mongering media they have had it and won’t
tolerate it anymore.
Is this the
beginning of a new movement to stand up to crass bigotry and fake news? Will
others follow? Most important, will television channels get so shaken up that
they will change their ways overnight? The joint action by stars and production
companies means they will not appear in the many awards ceremonies the large
media groups frequently hold—it will hit the Times Group the most, because
stars attend and perform at Filmfare awards nites etc. Besides, they may not
give interviews.
As for the
decision by the Bajaj group and Parle G not to advertise, it will almost
certainly hit the wallets of the channels, because the companies are big
advertisers. And advertising industry associations in India and abroad have
supported the ad, finding nothing particularly objectionable, though they have
focussed on the freedom of expression angle.
Yet, while
cheering these actions, caution is called for. The filing of the petition is
not likely to create a wave among stars or tycoons to boycott the channels. I
doubt if the Khans, Akshay Kumar or Ajay Devgn are going to hold a joint press
conference soon, or even make any statement on the case or any major public
issue.
At the same
time as these welcome steps were taken, a wonderfully heartwarming ad of
Tanishq jewellery, showing a pregnant Hindu girl being escorted by her (Muslim)
mother-in-law to a baby shower, was withdrawn by the company after a nasty and
sustained campaign online that it promoted ‘love jihad’. It is a well-made ad
with a much-need message in these times. But that obviously didn’t matter to
the trolls – they may have seen it as downright dangerous.
It is
obvious what has angered these Hindutva warriors – a Muslim man married to a
Hindu woman, to their warped mind, obviously suggests that she has somehow been
defiled. Perhaps the other way – a Hindu man with a Muslim wife – would have
been fine, because it would have implied that a Muslim had been ‘conquered’ by
a virile Hindu male? Somehow I doubt that – deep down, the idea of peace and
harmony with Muslims is such anathema to hate-driven Hindus that they will
simply not accept any representation of it.
Ratan Tata has
been roundly criticised (somewhat unfairly, I think) by those appalled at the
decision to pull the ad down. At the same time, the trolls going after Tanishq
too went after him, calling him ‘anti-national.’ But Tata personally does not
run Tanishq, nor the Tata empire – he may have been consulted by the group’s
honchos, but Tanishq itself may have felt the ad could be a public relations
disaster. There may be threats, perhaps of violence too. It may lead to a
boycott of their products and could affect sales and profits. We don’t know.
Tata’s own
credibility when it comes to consorting with the ruling party is so low, that
he became the obvious target when the ad was pulled. It was he who praised
Narendra Modi repeatedly in Gujarat and after that, when he became the prime
minister. He made major investments in the state; he went to meet the RSS
bosses in Nagpur and finally, Tata Trusts has made handsome donations to the PM
CARES fund. His continued supping with the Hindutva bosses and sucking up to
them makes it natural to assume that he had a major role to play in the pulling
of the ad, even if he was not directly behind it.
This kind
of coordinated hostility will have a chilling effect. After Aamir Khan bore the
brunt of unbridled hate after his mild suggestion that his wife had brought up
the topic of leaving India because it was unsafe, his fellow stars got the
message. He lost the Snapdeal endorsement contract – which the late Manohar
Parrikar boasted about – and after that everyone went into a shell.
Only a few
days ago, Karan Johar – whose company is among the petitioners in the latest
suit – announced that the industry will tell stories of “Indian valour and
values”, an initiative inspired by Modi. Safe to say therefore that he and
several of his colleagues are not suddenly going to become vociferous advocates
of secular ideals. The irony here is that most of them are not personally of
the Hindutva ilk and the industry over the years has generally promoted the
idea of harmony. But now, they want to play it safe.
No
industrialists are likely to put their hand up and support Bajaj or Parle and
announce they will not advertise. Some may do it under the radar; others may
congratulate Bajaj; but they will choose the ‘silence is golden’ rule. And when
the next opportunity rolls around, they will hail the big chief for his vision
and his wisdom.
But both,
the Mumbai film industry and the corporate sector are making a big mistake if
they think that keeping their heads down will save them. For this ruling
establishment, it is not enough that someone not oppose them – they want
full-throated support and that too, constantly. The dissenters will soon find
out that it doesn’t pay to step out of line, but the ones remaining quiet will
not necessarily get a pat on the back or even rewards – that is how the
right-wing works. Many supporters of this prime minister found swiftly that
they were not going to be the chosen ones or get any rewards and nor are they
insured against the vilest attacks from the Hindutva trolls, as Ratan Tata has.
There is news of a Tanishq store being attacked in Gujarat. No infraction is
tolerated, no slight forgotten.
Should
Tanishq have stood its ground and simply refused to take the ad down? The
answer is obviously yes, but companies don’t work this way. Managements
invariably take the safest route; their rationale is that it is to ‘protect’
the brand from any ‘negative’ connotations. But here, the connotations were
positive, so their reaction was clearly one of cowardice, not discretion. In a corporate
structure, no one wants to be seen sticking their neck out. The company’s face
will now be rubbed into it.
It thus
boils down to a moral choice which each individual, each institution has to
take. And while making this choice, they must consider the long term
implications—what if, for example, there is a demand from someone powerful or
even a large number of (paid) trolls to not hire Muslims? Will the company
comply? If a well-known person wants to marry a Muslim, will they be forced to
reconsider? This has ripple effects, because it could become difficult to get
an apartment or, in the case of a company, the public could stop buying its
products. These are not far-fetched fantasies – they have happened in the past.
Each time someone gives in, it only encourages the Hindutva brigade to up the
ante. This brigade has now tasted blood and will become even more feral.
In the past
few years, many people have stood up to the onslaught of the Hindutva
machinery, of which toxic channels are a big part, and some have paid a heavy
price for it. The students of JNU and Jamia, the protesters at Shaheen Bagh,
activists like Sudha Bharadwaj, Varavara Rao and Stan Swamy, or intellectuals
like Anand Teltumbde, all of whom were put in jail. But that didn’t stop
others, who still speak out. That an ad like the one for Tanishq got made is by
itself a sign that the Indian spirit of tolerance and secularism is alive and
well. This is the time to make more ads and films like this one which promote
the ‘real values’ of India and show all bigots that their propaganda of hatred
will not work, instead of just withdrawing into a shell and keeping a low
profile, because that will not save you.
https://thewire.in/rights/bigotry-hindutva-trolling-tanishq-parle-bajaj-tv-channels
-----
In Pakistan, A New Battle Takes Shape
By Vivek Katju
Oct 14,
2020
The Pakistan army and the country’s principal opposition parties are on a collision course. Despite the army’s warning not to drag it into politics, these parties have publicly complained about its political role. The Pakistani political class has traditionally accepted the army’s political role as a given and politicians have wanted to secure its support to promote their individual interests. Now, these Opposition parties are asking the generals not to interfere in the country’s politics.
The real
target of the People’s Democratic Movement (PDM), which is scheduled to hold
its first rally on October 16, is not Prime Minister (PM) Imran Khan, though
his resignation and fresh elections have been sought, but the men in khaki.
This also seems to borne out by former PM and the Pakistan Muslim League(N),
PML(N), leader Nawaz Sharif’s blistering attack on the army in his address to a
multi-party meeting called by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) on September 20.
Sharif said
that Pakistan was controlled by a “state above the state” which did not let any
elected Pakistani PM function properly or complete his term. He criticised the
manipulation of the 2018 national assembly election to foist a “selected” PM —
Khan — on the country. The meeting, which decided to launch the PDM, also
expressed great concern at the “establishment” (a euphemism for the army)
increasing its “role” in the country’s domestic affairs and, by doing so,
threatening the country’s stability and institutions. PPP chairman Bilawal
Bhutto Zardari also called for a “non-political establishment”.
The Pakistan
army is a professional fighting force and, at the same time, despite its
denials, a political institution. It is the final decision-maker of the
country’s security and foreign policies but has always, also, reserved the
right to intervene in any other area of governance during civilian rule in the
country.
Both the
army and Khan are taking PDM seriously. This is borne out by Khan alleging that
opposition leaders have joined hands to save themselves from corruption
charges. He has quickened the pace of investigations against PML(N) and PPP
leaders. Nawaz Sharif’s brother, Shahbaz Sharif, the former chief minister of
Punjab, has been jailed and former president Asif Ali Zardari has been charged
for corruption.
More
significantly, Khan, while mounting a stout defence of the army and maintaining
that the Inter-Services Intelligence is the finest service in the world, has
fired the brahmastra against Nawaz Sharif; he has accused the former PM of playing India’s game in maligning the army. There
is no more potent charge that can be levelled in Pakistan than colluding with
the permanent enemy, India. Nawaz Sharif is in London since last November. He
was then in jail but was allowed to go abroad for his medical condition was
said to be critical.
On its
part, the army is letting Khan take the lead in battling PDM but is expectedly
refuting charges of interference in governance. While addressing the cadets of
the Pakistan Military Academy on October 10, army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa said:
“I count it a great honour that we stand before the nation as a trusted and
accountable institution”. He also emphasised “Our actions are guided by
constitution and the national interest of Pakistan”.
This is not
the first time in Pakistan’s history that sections of its political class are
seeking to take on the army. What is different now is that they are openly
calling for it to be an apolitical force, as is traditional in true
democracies. This goes against the grain of the army’s entrenched belief that
it is the only institution that can uphold the country’s national interest,
that all others are ineffective, and the political class is venal and corrupt.
This thinking is reinforced by its view that India is a perpetual enemy. The army
has ensured that this view of India becomes deeply entrenched among the
Pakistani people. Now, even the few Pakistanis who stood for the normalisation
of India-Pakistan ties have turned against India because they feel that this
country has changed course after the 2019 elections.
Will the
PDM succeed in consolidating the substantial disillusionment against the Khan
government as well as creating a sentiment for the army to confine itself only
to its professional duties?
The
government has failed on different fronts since it assumed office. The economy
continues to be in a mess and the macroeconomic targets set by IMF remain
unmet. Consequently, the Fund is demanding an end to tax loopholes, increase in
electricity rates and greater autonomy for regulators. These are politically
almost impossible to accomplish. Pakistan’s foreign policy is under strain too.
Its Kashmir policy has not yielded results and the strains with the Arab
peninsular states, especially Saudi Arabia, are enormous; Turkey cannot replace
the Saudi connection. There is thus material to fan discontent against the Khan
government.
The same
will be difficult to do against the army, despite its support for Khan. Even if
there is some discontent because of Bajwa’s extension, the army will close
ranks to protect its role in the polity.
The India
factor will be used to remind the people that it is needed to protect them,
especially at this time. The army’s capacity to break Opposition unity should
also never be underestimated.
The October
16 rally may, therefore, give an indication of both the capability of the
opposition and the army’s strategy.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/in-pakistan-a-new-battle-takes-shape-analysis/story-vPNU2xAA5QoR6966Km1tAL.html
----
In His 89th Year, Abdul Kalam’s Legend Lives On
By Praveen Siddharth
Oct 15,
2020
Presidents
come and go. But the institution persists. However, certain presidents earn an
image larger than the institution.
If there
was a checklist of attributes for what it takes to be a president, APJ Abdul
Kalam would not have ticked all the boxes. He was certainly not a traditional
president. With his long hair and easy manner, he seemed to feel that he was a
one of the masses. He was a man of science, in a country steeped in
superstition.
In 2012, almost
five years after he ceased being President, Reliance along with Outlook,
CNN-IBN and The History Channel, conducted a poll to identify the greatest
Indian after Gandhi. Kalam ranked first in the market survey result and second
in the online polls. Why was he so popular?
Was it
because he rose to the highest office of the country by sheer dint of hard
work? Joining a government department as senior scientific adviser on a monthly
salary of Rs 250, he changed the shape of the country’s missile and space
programme by the end of a 43-year long career. In his book, Who is Kalam?, R
Ramanathan, who worked with him in Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO), recounts how Kalam would take late-night meetings and work
till the early hours of the morning. He recollects an incident when a
major-general sought an appointment and Kalam asked him to come at 10:30 am.
When the major general said it would be difficult to reach so early, Kalam said
he meant 10:30 pm.
Or was it
because of his extraordinary vision? From the beginning, Kalam could look over
the horizon. He came up with a Vision 2020 development plan in 1998. Even at
Rashtrapati Bhavan, he had no time for small talk. When then president of Pakistan,
Pervez Musharraf, visited in 2005, instead of raising Kashimir, Kalam engaged
him with a presentation on urban facilities in rural areas. Similarly, when
George Bush visited Rashtrapati Bhavan in 2006, Kalam asked for an LCD screen
and made a presentation on his vision for global energy self-sufficiency.
Then again,
perhaps the secret of Kalam’s popularity lies in his humaneness. The one label
that stuck to him was the “people’s president”. He was a nightmare for his
security team, constantly breaking protocol and reaching out to interact with
people. It is a tradition for the president to host an Iftar party and Kalam
was expected to continue this tradition. However, as his then secretary P M
Nair reveals in his book, The Kalam effect, when Kalam came to know that the
Iftar would cost Rs 2.5 lakh to host, he cancelled the party and instead
contributed the amount saved to 28 different orphanages adding Rs 1 lakh from
himself.
Or was
Kalam popular because of his simplicity? Customarily, when a president visits a
state for the first time, he is honoured with a banquet. On such a visit to
Kerala, Kalam invited a cobbler who used to mend his shoes and the owner of a
hotel where he would eat regularly in his earlier days to a state banquet. His
incredible connection with children may also be one reason for his popularity.
As he often said, he considered children to be the first scientists since they
keep asking the question “why?” with a curious mind. Even as president, he
answered their questions with patience hoping to inspire and ignite their young
minds.
The reason
for Kalam’s popularity may also be because of his unique syncretism. A devout
Muslim, and follower of Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti, he often quoted verses from
the Bhagavad Gita. His favourite character was Vidura from the Mahabharata whom
he liked for his simplicity and steadfastness to principles. At the same time,
he lived by the ideal of Caliph Omar that all men are equal before the eyes of
God. He was comfortable reciting the Koran as well as playing the Rudra veena.
In his 89th
year, Abdul Kalam’s legend lives on. New stories about him continue to emerge
and fresh anecdotes are revealed. At times, the lines between reality and lore;
man, and myth begin to blur. The secret to this enduring popularity, I believe
lies somewhere else.
It is a
practise for every president to have an official photograph taken. This is hung
in all government offices. Look closely at the official photo of Kalam and you
see that he has his coat unbuttoned at his neck and in his pocket, he has a
pilot pen. Here was a man who did not care for the appearances and niceties of
the world. He was unashamed of his roots and had the courage to live his life
uncomplicated by fears of how people would perceive him. He remains popular
even now as we see a reflection of who we want to be in him. A man who even
after becoming president, still remained the boy who delivered newspapers and
dreamed of a better world for everyone.
----
Praveen Siddharth is Private Secretary to the
President of India at Rashtrapati Bhavan
The views expressed are personal
https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/in-his-89th-year-abdul-kalam-s-legend-lives-on/story-BPefMgVNVJizudEnfODHHL.html
-----
Will Pakistan Call Off Taliban Wolf At The
Door?
By Neena Gopal
15th
October 2020
As Afghan
leader Dr Abdullah Abdullah headed home after a five-day visit to New Delhi
against the backdrop of US President Donald Trump’s rash announcement of a
stepped-up withdrawal of troops from that nation as early as Christmas, India
must factor in the instability that will follow this drastic decision and the
implications of Pakistan’s proxy, the Taliban, stepping in to fill that power
vacuum.
The
deliberate stalling of intra-Afghan talks in Doha by the newly empowered
Taliban has already seen US Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, who dropped a
19-year ban on talking to the group, heading to Pakistan capital Islamabad for
some urgent damage control. With reports now emerging of a secret meeting in
Islamabad between Taliban leader Mullah Ghani Barader and Khalilzad, and the
latter reportedly also reaching out to Pakistan’s army chief Gen Qamar
Bajwa—whom he has publicly described as “helpful”—it is an indicator that the
US envoy knows that he’s running out of time ... and bargaining chips.
He’s not
only acquiesced to the release of some 5,000 Taliban prisoners and a
whittled-down US presence that could remove the last robust security cover for
Afghan forces, he’s now offering Pakistan a ‘separate’ deal with Afghanistan,
the resurrection of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) energy
pipeline in return for a commitment in public by Pakistan—and Afghanistan—to
stop “their territory being used against the other by extremist groups”.
Will that
see Islamabad, so adept at playing both sides, call off the Taliban wolf at the
door? As a telling tweet by a former director of Afghanistan’s National
Directorate of Security, Rahmatullah Nabil, played out over “the intra-Afghan
dialogue being just a show”, the sidelining of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani
underscores the changing power equations in Kabul where the India-friendly
Ghani administration is losing traction. As the much-touted intra-Afghan talks
between the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Emirate, aka the Taliban, run
aground and the initial euphoria over talks that began on September 12
dissipates, the Taliban leadership is pushing for legitimacy by getting the
February agreement with the US imposed as the framework for talks and the
‘Hanafi Figh’ school of Islamic thought—that affects women and minorities—as
binding.
On an
equally precarious track is Ghani’s arch-rival and head of the High Council for
National Reconciliation, Dr Abdullah Abdullah. Tasked to head peace
negotiations, he arrived in Delhi after a path-breaking visit to Pakistan after
a gap of 12 years. The Tajik leader, who has few reservations over Pakistan’s
role in destabilising his country, walked a fine line as he sought the help of
Gen Bajwa as well as Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan to reduce
Taliban-sponsored violence, subtly red-flagging Islamabad’s continued backing
of the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network, which has relocated and reinvented
itself in the new geography of the Gulf.
In meetings
with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, however, Abdullah is putting together a
counter-manoeuvre. He must preempt Islamabad’s bid to take control of a
post-Ghani interim government that Khalilzad would like to see in place,
possibly six weeks from now. The Taliban want an interim government to take the
form of a 12-member ‘Guardian Council’, like the nominated body of officials
and clerics that wields considerable influence in Iran.
Abdullah’s
ask is for India to back Kabul’s recommendations over that of the Talibs, which
is seeking to pack the council with hardline clerics, albeit re-packaged and
presented to the world as younger and more forward-looking than their
ultra-conservative fathers. Abdullah’s nudge to New Delhi is to get back in the
game and act as a buffer against Pakistan’s designs. He will seek similar
support from Tehran, Moscow and Uzbekistan.
The rapid
US drawdown has already left Afghan security forces with little protection in
the face of the upsurge in violence from various terror groups; not just from
the Taliban, but from Islamic State-Khorasan, Daesh, al Qaeda fighters, etc.
The Taliban, who control close to 70% of the country and ring-fence Kabul, have
no intention of backing off. Khalilzad’s
recent reassurances that peace is at hand,“not in years but in months”, run
contrary to the US military’s warnings that violence gives the Taliban the
tools and the leverage to ensure its commanders take control from the ground up
in village after village.
Similarly,
Nabil’s fresh tweet that ‘the Quetta shura doesn’t have control of the Taliban,
it’s Pakistan that does’, points to the fact that Afghanistan could be looking
at a return to 1989, when the Soviet Union’s equally hasty withdrawal saw a
power vacuum and led to a protracted 10-year-long civil war. As Pakistan deftly
played host to the Taliban-Khalilzad talks and tried to put the onus of
violence in Afghanistan on India with its tired old trope that New Delhi was
pushing in Tehreek-i-Taliban and Jamaat ul Ahrar militants into Pakistan,
Nabil’s fresh warnings that “a proxy peace will lead to a proxy war” was shared
by Pakistani politician from Waziristan, Mohsin Dawar, of the Pashtun Tahafuz
Movement, who warned that the ‘secret deal’ between the US and Pakistan army is
aimed at breaking the Pashtun connect across the contested Durand Line and
bringing the largely Pashtun Taliban in through the back door.
India,
distrustful of the Taliban’s promise not to attack Indian interests in
Afghanistan and stoke militancy in Kashmir, has long held that Pakistan gains
little from a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. Keeping the pot boiling
ensures that Kabul cannot push for a greater Pashtunistan while its proxy, the
Taliban, calls the shots. This deeply flawed Afghan endgame cannot be
Khalilzad’s legacy. The hopes of a new generation of Afghans rest with the US
peace envoy, whatever the results of the US elections come November.
----
Neena Gopal is South Asia analyst and author
https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2020/oct/15/will-pakistan-call-off-taliban-wolf-at-the-door-2210440.html
----
Extremist Thinking And The Spectre Of Sedition
By Vappala
Balachandran
Oct 15,
2020
While the
Justice JN Patel-led Bhima Koregaon Commission is yet to finalise its report,
the National Investigation Agency (NIA) filed a 10,000-page charge-sheet on
October 9. The NIA felt that it was a ‘plot to damage the state’. Several civil
rights activists and academics were charged for the gravest offences against
the state, including arms training. Among them is 83-year-old Jesuit priest,
Stan Swamy. A stunned Jharkhand Chief Minister Hemant Soren asked: “Why this
insistence on crushing every voice of dissent?”
I feel
totally outdated in my understanding of our present criminal jurisprudence.
Earlier, we had learnt to treat every individual as innocent unless the state
is able to conclusively prove otherwise. I am also asking myself whether we are
still in a liberal democracy guided by the Directive Principles enshrined in
our secular Constitution. Or have we somehow slid into a stage of the Joseph
McCarthy era in America (1947-57), which is where US Attorney General William
Barr is taking his country by filing sedition charges against ‘radical
socialists’?
In 1947,
when Senator McCarthy started his ‘witch-hunt’, he was backed by the 1940
‘Smith Act’, which during the war time had made it criminal to ‘advocate
violent overthrow’ of the government or be a member of any such group. McCarthy
and his lawyer Roy Cohn started their inquisition against hundreds of
government servants, writers, stage and cine artistes and journalists. It also
resulted in the preparing of unofficial ‘black lists’ of people who should not
be hired. Among those ‘blacklisted’ were Hollywood personalities like Charlie
Chaplin, Orson Welles and Paul Robeson.
It was in
1957 that the US Supreme Court put an end to this scourge through Yates vs
United States, stating that the First Amendment protected radical and
reactionary speech unless “it posed a clear and present danger.” The same was
quoted by Judge William Webster in his 2009 Fort Hood shooting inquiry report:
“Radicalism is not a crime. Radicalisation alone, without incitement to
violence, may not constitute a threat.” The Fort Hood killing had shaken the
American military when Major Nidal Hasan had shot dead 13 colleagues.
Academic
interest in extremist thinking had started in the 19th century Europe due to
provocative calls by ‘anarchists’ like Karl Heinzen, Johann Mist and Mikhail
Bakunin. But they were mere ‘philosophical revolutionaries’ with no
infrastructure to back them. In 1961, eminent French philosopher Jean-Paul
Sartre wrote the preface to Frantz Fanon’s book The Wretched of the Earth,
which supported violence by the colonised people in Algeria against the French
colonisers. In 1971, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir openly defied the ban on
Maoist La Cause du Peuple, a publication of the banned party and courted arrest.
Neither of them was charged.
In a
similar manner, our Naxalite problem, later known as the Maoist movement, has
always elicited interest by the foreign media, security experts and academics.
One of my first interviews on that problem was published on October 29, 2003 by
the Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Times. On April 26, 2005, an
Indian daily published my review of my friend Prakash Singh’s French book
Histoire du Naxalisme which had earned the ‘Selection of the Month’ honour by
Boutique Librairie Quilombo, Paris, in 2004.
In June,
2006, I was requested by the Mumbai Nehru Centre to chair a full-day seminar on
the Maoist problem, for which I had prepared the theme paper. This was,
perhaps, the first ever joint meeting of serving and retired police officers
with human rights activists and media. Among those present was senior editor,
the late BG Verghese, who had just returned from Chhattisgarh after studying
the atrocities of the state-sponsored ragtag army Salwa Judum. Also present was
Prof G Hargopal, who had established the Centre for Human Rights at the
Hyderabad University.
In 2007, I
visited Hyderabad for two days to study the subject in depth by meeting people
who had dealt with the problem at the grassroots level. My first call was on the
late SR Sankaran, the legendary IAS officer. He and his seven colleagues were
dragged into the vortex of the Peoples’ War Group (PWG) violence as they were
kidnapped in East Godavari district on December 27, 1987. They were released in
exchange for some arrested PWG cadre by the NT Rama Rao government.
Sankaran
utilised his captivity to study the social issues behind this movement. He came
to the conclusion that it was due to the traditional exploitation by village
officials and neglect by successive governments. He also shocked me by saying
that an ordinary Adivasi found the Maoist parallel government more beneficial
to him than by the state. He was firm that a mere ‘law and order’ approach
would never solve it.
The second
person I met was a retired police officer who had spent his entire life
investigating and prosecuting PWG/Maoist cadres. It was he who told me that the
basic reason why an ordinary Adivasi joined the rebel movement was his feeling
of ‘empowerment’ against local officials, contractors and money lenders. They
felt that this was the only way they could resist this daily harassment.
More
recently, we were told that Dalit singer Bant Singh from Punjab had joined the
Mazdoor Mukti Morcha affiliated to the CPI(ML) to ‘empower’ himself against his
formidable opponents. In 2002, upper-caste men allegedly raped his 19-year-old
daughter. In 2006, he lost both hands and one leg in an attack by the accused
after they were prosecuted.
I do not
want to comment on the evidence against the Bhima Koregaon accused as it
appeared in the media, except one instance. I was intrigued by a report that
Gautam Navlakha was approached by the ISI during his foreign trip to help them
raise agents. This would lead us to the conclusion that the ISI was so
ham-handed in its approach as to leave such open trails. My long experience in
foreign intelligence does not allow me to reach that conclusion.
-----
Vappala Balachandran is a Former Special
Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/extremist-thinking-and-the-spectre-of-sedition-155910
-----
Challenges in Afghanistan
By G Parthasarathy
Oct 15,
2020
Global
attention on developments in Afghanistan is now focused on the uncertainties
and confusion surrounding the ongoing American withdrawal. But the suffering
inflicted on the people of Afghanistan by the ambitions of its neighbours, like
Pakistan, and by the rivalries between external powers, notably the Soviet
Union and the US, should not be forgotten. About 4.3 million Afghan refugees
fled to Pakistan and Iran during the Soviet intervention. Soviet casualties
included 13,310 killed. The Soviets departed from Afghanistan in 1992. What
followed was a brutal civil war, pitting the Soviet-backed Najibullah government
against the ISI trained, radicalised Afghan mujahideen, who were joined by
28,000-30,000 radicalised Pakistani Pashtuns. These were the developments which
led to the emergence of the Taliban. The present American intervention in
Afghanistan has lasted 19 years.
Pakistan
appears to have forgotten that its Taliban proteges are almost exclusively
Pashtuns, who constitute 42% of Afghanistan’s population. The majority 58% of
Afghanistan’s population are made up of Tajiks (37%), together with relatively
smaller numbers of Uzbeks, Hazaras (Shia), Baloch, Turkmen, and others. The
united resistance was initially against the Soviet Union and thereafter against
Pakistan and its Taliban proteges, who wanted exclusive control. It was
Afghanistan’s legendary Tajik hero, Ahmed Shah Masood, who forged a military
grouping called the Northern Alliance to resist advances by Pakistan and the
ISI-backed Taliban. The alliance, in turn, was given political, military and
diplomatic support by India, Iran and Russia.
Emerging
from bases in Pakistan, the Taliban moved northwards, only to meet resistance
from the alliance. The Americans started their post 9/11 military intervention
two days after Masood was assassinated. In these circumstances, the exclusively
Pashtun, Afghan Taliban, cannot come to power. They are not only unacceptable
to the non-Pashtuns, who constitute 58% of the population, but also to a
substantial number of Pashtuns who loathe their extremism. But, with the
Americans set to leave, the Taliban and its ISI backers are continuing military
operations to acquire more territory under their control before formal
discussions with the government on a ceasefire. Pakistan’s aim is to have a
Taliban-dominated government which would be beholden to it.
Recent
changes in the Afghan Taliban’s leadership, both in Pakistan and in its
negotiating team in Quetta, indicates the emergence of an uncompromising,
hardline new leadership. Pakistan is, however, announcing cosmetic moves to
avoid global sanctions, like placing the Taliban chief negotiator in Doha,
Mullah Baradar, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the head of the ISI’s favourite Afghan
Taliban group, the Haqqani Network, under sanctions. This is laughable, as no
one has any doubt that Haqqani, which operates from North Waziristan in Pakistan,
remains Pakistan’s most important Afghan asset for operations within
Afghanistan. There is also little doubt that in the minds of the Taliban
leadership, their greatest achievement has been to force the sceptical
President Trump to pack up and leave Afghanistan. While the Americans have
welcomed the agreement of the Taliban to talk directly to the Afghan
government, the Afghans have surely noted the recent appointment of Mullah
Mohammed Yakub, as a member of the Taliban delegation for talks with the government.
Yakub is the 30-year-old son of the Taliban founder, the late Mullah Omar, and
a hardliner.
Even as
American forces prepare to leave Afghanistan, the Taliban are not prepared to
lay down their arms. The conflict between the Taliban and the Afghan government
is set to continue, including in the non-Pashtun northern provinces. The ethnic
Hazaras, Shia descendants of Genghis Khan, have close ties with Iran, which
will inevitably play a more active role in Afghanistan. It is evident that even
as the Pentagon prepares to end active combat operations, there will be
pressures on the US to continue equipping the Afghan armed forces. There will
also be moves to persuade the Americans to provide air support by retaining
warplanes and helicopter gunships in places like the Bagram Base near Kabul,
and in Kandahar, while also using carrier-based airpower. The US and its
western allies would also be well advised to provide the Afghan government
adequate financial assistance to have the resources to meet the Taliban
challenge. New Delhi should also have serious discussions with the Taliban to
ensure that the security of our diplomats in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and
Mazar-e-Sharif, and for Indian personnel involved in aid projects, is
guaranteed.
The recent
visit of Dr Abdullah Abdullah, the chairman of the High Council for National
Reconciliation in Afghanistan to India, has been timely and useful. Dr Abdullah
is one of the few individuals who transcends ethnic, cultural and religious
barriers in Afghanistan. His father was Pashtun and his mother a Tajik. More
importantly, he joined Masood in the struggle against the Soviets and the
Taliban, while becoming a trusted associate of the Tajik leader. The Afghan
government thus has a highly experienced and respected political leader to head
the government delegation in talks with the Taliban.
The Taliban
have been in close touch with China, from well before the US intervention
commenced in Afghanistan. China was then not seen internationally as being
anti-Islamic. The persecution of Uighur Muslims by China is surely known to the
Taliban. Are they going to speak up for their fellow Muslims, or will they
remain silent like their Pakistani mentors? Finally, nowhere have women been
treated so badly and brutally in the modern world as in Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan. On October 5, Fawzia Koofi, the first woman Deputy Speaker of
Afghanistan, was declared a nominee for the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize.
Refusing to accept Taliban bigotry, she courageously proclaimed, despite threats
from the Taliban: ‘Peace means the ability to live with dignity, justice and
freedom. There is no alternative to democracy.’
----
G Parthasarathy is Chancellor, Jammu Central
University & former High Commissioner to Pakistan
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/challenges-in-afghanistan-155896
----
Indian-Americans are with Democrats
By Sumitra
Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur and Milan Vaishnav
Oct 15,
2020
A
surprising development in an already unprecedented American election season is
the amount of attention being devoted to the Indian-American electorate, which
collectively accounts for less than 1% of all registered voters.
Yet, thanks
to the growing importance of Indian-Americans in closely contested swing
states, their emerging status as key campaign contributors, and Democratic
candidate Joe Biden’s selection of Kamala Harris as his running mate, both
major parties are furiously courting their votes.
But
significant attention is also being paid to Indian-Americans because a popular
narrative is emerging that the supposed camaraderie between United States
President Donald Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi — compounded by
concerns over how a Biden administration might manage US-India ties — is
pushing Indian-Americans to flee the Democratic Party. The Trump campaign,
smelling blood, has issued targeted ads featuring Trump and Modi on the stage
at last year’s “Howdy, Modi!” rally in Houston.
A cursory
scan of recent headlines demonstrates how widely this narrative has taken root.
“Democrats Have a Loyal Base in Indian Americans, but Trump Is Fast Pulling
Them to His Side,” asserts a piece in The Print. “Kamala, Kashmir and Modi’s
Friend All on Ballot in US Election,” reads a BBC headline. An analysis in
Quartz boldly proclaims: “The Modi-Trump Friendship Could Change the Way
Indian-Americans Vote in November 2020.”
While this
narrative is seductive, it has one central flaw. There is little empirical
evidence to support it. A new study based on a nationally representative survey
of nearly 1,000 Indian-American citizens — the Indian American Attitudes Survey
(IAAS) — finds that 72% of registered Indian-American voters intend to support
Biden in the 2020 presidential election, while just 22% plan to back Trump.
This positions Indian-Americans between African-Americans and Hispanics in
terms of the intensity of their support for the Democrats.
Furthermore,
it appears that the speculation about the role US-India ties might play in
shaping the Indian-American vote is overblown. Indian-Americans view US-India
relations as a low-priority election issue compared to nationally salient
“kitchen table” issues such as the economy and health care. While many
Indian-Americans report that US-India relations are important to them, foreign
policy ultimately gets crowded out by pressing daily concerns — especially in
an election year marked by a pandemic, economic crisis, and a national uproar
over race and social justice.
On issues
ranging from immigration to press freedom, the policy preferences of
Indian-Americans line up remarkably well with those of the political Left.
Indeed, the leading reason Democrats and independents cite for their aversion
to the Republican Party is the latter’s intolerance of minorities (followed by
their apprehensions regarding the pervasive influence of Christian
evangelicalism on the party).
The
conjecture that the addition of Harris to the Democratic ticket could turn off
more Indian-American voters than it attracts — presumably based on her past
statements on India’s domestic policies or the perceived prioritising of her
Black identity over her Indian heritage — finds little support. Forty-five per
cent of respondents indicated that the Harris pick made them more likely to
vote in November, compared to 10% who said it made them less likely (40% said
her nomination made no difference).
This
enthusiasm has largely worked in favour of the Democratic ticket: 49% of
respondents stated that Harris makes them more excited about Biden’s candidacy,
compared to 15% who felt less enthusiastic. Why so? A plurality of respondents
enthused by her historic nomination cite the fact of her Indian heritage.
Many in
India seem convinced that an inexorable migration of Indian-Americans toward
the Republican Party is taking place. The reality is starkly different. Not
only is this migration not transpiring but, given the growing number of
second-generation Indian-Americans who are even more pro-Democratic Party than
their parents (see figure), the median Indian-American voter will likely become
even more aligned with the Democrats. Ironically, if Trump gets re-elected and
issues additional curbs on legal immigration, this trend will only intensify
since US-born Indian-Americans tend to be more liberal than their naturalised
counterparts.
Consequently,
it would be perilous for the Indian political establishment to ignore the
reality of the Indian diaspora’s political orientation toward the Democratic
Party. While Indian-American voters believe that a Biden presidency would be
good for US-India relations, the degree to which a Biden administration will
revisit US policies on India will depend on the extent to which progressive
groups manage to secure a seat in his administration.
In the past
year, Indian officials and members of the ruling party have routinely rejected
the concerns myriad Democratic leaders have expressed over India’s current
trajectory, especially with regard to democratic freedoms and civil liberties.
Notwithstanding the powerful forces operating in favour of a deepening
partnership — driven substantially by the spectre of an aggressive,
expansionist China — with India facing intensifying health, economic, and
security challenges, New Delhi would be tempting fate if it were to be
dismissive of these concerns.
----
Sumitra Badrinathan is a PhD candidate in
political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Devesh Kapur is Starr
Foundation Professor of South Asian Studies and director of Asia Programs at
the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Milan Vaishnav is a
senior fellow and director of the South Asia program at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/indian-americans-are-with-democrats/story-l9KWSRPRud2gu7t7znFvOP.html
----
Pakistan Is Hoodwinking The World On Terror
Funding. FATF Grey List Needs To Go Darker
By Pradeep Singh
Gautam
14 October
2020
After being
deferred twice due to Covid-19, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) plenary
meeting is now scheduled for 21-23 October 2020. Leading up to this plenary
meet one of its constituent bodies, the Asia Pacific Group, met to review the
pending cases, like that of Pakistan, pertaining to its jurisdiction. As if on
cue, there was news of Pakistan’s vigorous efforts at passing new laws in
compliance of its Anti-Money Laundering/ Countering Financing of Terror
(AML/CFT) obligations. Parallelly, there is increased speculation about whether
Pakistan would be “black listed” or if it would remain on the “grey list” or
manage to revert to the so-called “white list”.
This
sequence of events has been continuing for nearly two years now, since Pakistan
regressed to its “grey list” position in June 2018. As Pakistan continues to
fail to meet the successive deadlines set by the FATF, the threats from the
organisation are becoming shriller and, in response, so are protestations from
Islamabad.
Is there a
political cost?
The case of
Pakistan offers a great vantage point in appreciating the challenges faced by
the FATF regime. Pakistan has been in and out of the grey list more than once.
Having faced such close scrutiny, it has avoided effective implementation of
the recommendations of the FATF on the one hand and also not being put on black
list on the other.
Countries
falling in “grey list” technically indicate that these jurisdictions have
strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regime and they are considered for more
regular monitoring. It also indicates that they have committed to remove such
deficiencies in a time-bound manner. In contrast, countries in the “black list”
are those that have been reported for enhanced due diligence. Generally, the
black list comprises non-cooperative jurisdictions, which do not commit to
improve upon the strategic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regime.
Pakistan
has undergone full mutual evaluation twice: the first was in 2009 and latest in
2019. Many of the AML/CFT risks flagged in both these Mutual Evaluation Reports
(MER) are identical but MER-2019 is even more damning with Pakistan being
non-complaint on 27 out of 40 Recommendations. The question that arises is: how
did it get out of the grey list in 2015 and why did it re-enter in 2018? Did it
substantially comply with FATF Recommendations from 2015-18? If yes, then why
did it re-enter the grey list in 2018? If not, how did it come out in 2015?
Apart from
many other international terrorists historically living in or functioning from
Pakistan, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and his associates were put on UNSCR 1267
sanctions list as on 10 December 2008, vide UNSCR 1822 (2008). But as reported
in Dawn on 25 January 2015, just a month before Pakistan was taken off the grey
list, Saeed had publicly “clarified” that these sanctions had been going on for
the last six years and there was nothing serious about them, and that he would
continue his activities.
Thus,
Pakistan got out of the grey list by adopting some legal measures in form but
saving its “strategic assets” in content, which were sanctioned under UNSCR
1267. This failure on the part of FATF becomes even more glaring as, by this
time, it had already adopted its new methodology of risk assessment in 2012-13,
which took the effectiveness of the AML/CFT regime into account.
Apparently,
the only good reason on the FATF’s part in taking Pakistan out of the grey list
in 2015 may be its decision-making style: once political commitment is made at
the highest level, the FATF generally accepts the promise and/or only
undertakes periodic reviews. So, the FATF relied upon assurances and took
Pakistan out of the grey list in 2015 without considering the actual
performance. This experience poses another question to the FATF: what does it
mean to accept “political commitment from highest level” from a hybrid regime
where de facto and de jure authority may not be co-located? And if the FATF
accepts at face value promises which are not meant to be kept, what effect does
this have on its credibility?
Pakistan is
called a hybrid regime in the sense that writ of the elected government is
limited in certain areas like security or foreign policy. The tussle between
the elected government and the Pakistan Army regarding the policy to be adopted
for Pakistan-based terrorist organisations is well documented (see the “Dawn
Leaks” of 2017 or ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s speech dated 21 September
2020).
Indirectly
acknowledging its lapse at prematurely taking Pakistan out of grey list in
2015, the FATF put it back on the list in June 2018. This time round the FATF
has taken Pakistan for more regular periodic monitoring and it is trying to fix
stricter deadlines, but the fact remains that even after the lapse of several
such deadlines and warnings, the FATF is not able to extract genuine policy
action.
Despite
being grey listed time and again, why is Pakistan not effectively complying
with FATF Recommendations? The answer may lie in its experience in manipulating
and hoodwinking the FATF grey/black listing system in particular, and
international community in general.
Starting
from General Pervez Musharraf’s explicit pledge on 6 January 2004 to not allow
Pakistan’s soil to be used to hosting international terrorist organisations
till now, there have been many promises. These only proved to be a tactical
short-term ploy to get out of a tight spot. It is not that the world is unaware
of this. Most experts take Hafiz Saeed’s conviction in 2020 with a lump of salt
and think that he has been convicted on very weak evidence so that he may be
provided relief in appellate stages. According to Ayesha Siddiqa: “The complete
court order that I was able to access and read indicates Islamabad’s
willingness to take risks based on its understanding of the FATF. It is not
seen entirely as a technical mechanism but as an instrument of power politics.
This means there is an expectation that playing a favourable role in the
US-Taliban peace agreement will bring dividends, such as the removal from the
FATF’s grey list.”
In the
meantime, expecting impending trouble, Pakistan has washed its hands off its
long-time strategic asset, Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) chief Maulana Masood Azhar.
The Maulana and JeM are also proscribed under UNSCR 1267. This organisation
claimed responsibility for the Pulwama attack of 2019 and was blamed for the
2016 Pathankot attack. In 2016, an FIR was also registered in Pakistan and
Masood Azhar was taken into protective custody. Pakistan has avoided that
inconvenience this time round and claimed that the Maulana along with his
family remains untraceable.
In
Pakistan, many FATF Recommendations, which it has implemented and touts as
achievements, are meant to fulfil a domestic political agenda. For example,
money laundering, tax evasion and the issue of corruption has been used by the
present regime against political rivals like Nawaz Sharif and Asif Ali Zardari.
Issues of tax evasion and corruption form part of Prime Minister Imran Khan’s
larger political agenda. Experts claim that laws passed hurriedly in September
2020, claiming to be in compliance of the pending FATF review, also entail a
lot of arbitrary and excessive powers that are likely to be used for political
persecution of opponents.
It is
noteworthy that the basic issue, which has been continuously flagged by the
FATF against Pakistan, relates to terror financing and action against
proscribed persons and entities. This is where it has been failing and this is
where it has to deliver. Under a risk-based approach, critical failing in even
one criterion can lead to black listing. Taking a parallel example, in 2005,
Switzerland was flagged for monitoring regarding its opaque rules of beneficial
ownership of legal persons and cash couriers. Based on such risks, Switzerland
was made to comply and it did not matter that it had majorly complied with most
other technical recommendations.
Is there an
economic cost?
Post grey
listing, Pakistan’s credit ratings were downgraded. This credit rating
downgrade has a negative impact on rate of interest which, in turn, has adverse
impact on economic growth. But apart from the credit ratings downgrade, which
may have been caused by factors other than grey listing, what do other economic
parameters say? To analyse this, we consider trends in some key macroeconomic
parameters when Pakistan was on the grey list.
Figure 1
below shows that Pakistan has a long-term trend of current account deficit
leading to constant pressure on balance of payments. But contrary to
expectation, during the period 2012-15, its current account position was only a
shade better as compared to its historical average and showed some degree of
stability.
Figure 1:
Current account trend of Pakistan
Source:
World Bank, compiled by author.
Figure 2
below shows that the debt maturity period had no particular trend from 2012-15
but started decreasing after 2015. It shows that Pakistan’s quality of debt
deteriorated and became more short term post 2015, which is counter-intuitive.
Similarly, the interest rate has been rising after 2015 after moving up and
down from 2012-15. The grant component of foreign loans also decreased since
2015. This indicates that Pakistan is relying more on short-term high-interest
loans, which are riskier.
Figure 2:
Debt maturity in year, average interest rate on debt, element of grant
Source:
International Debt Statistics 2020, World Bank, compiled by author.
Similarly,
as per Figure 3 below, Pakistan’s debt service to exports position and reserves
to external debt stock position improved between 2013-15 as it had decreasing
debt servicing obligations to exports and increasing forex reserves cover for
that debt. After 2015, this started deteriorating. The percentage of concessional
debt, which is generally preferred as it has low interest rates, has been going
down since 2013.
Figure 3:
Quality of debt servicing indicators
Source:
International Debt Statistics 2020, World Bank, compiled by author.
As Figure 4
below shows, Pakistan’s interest payment to exports ratio and interest payment
to Gross National Income (GNI) ratio improved till 2014 and has been
deteriorating since then. For part of the period when Pakistan was grey listed,
its debt sustainability as measured by interest outgo was actually improving;
since 2014 this has been going down.
Figure 4:
Sustainability of interest payments
Source:
International Debt Statistics 2020, World Bank, compiled by author.
The above
figures show that for the large part of 2012-15, Pakistan’s macroeconomic
parameters interest rate, quality of debt and its sustainability, governing its
external sector were largely stable or had a secular trend. They also reveal
that these parameters had started deteriorating much before June 2018. This
shows that grey listing had a minimal impact on economic performance and it is
largely ineffective in imposing economic costs on the target jurisdiction. This
finding further corroborates the analysis as to why grey listing by the FATF
remains largely ineffective in bringing any real change in Pakistan’s
behaviour.
A related
question which needs answering is: if grey listing is really ineffective, then
why is Pakistan making any effort after all at passing laws or making
perfunctory changes? And what accounts for the media buzz inside Pakistan
regarding grey listing this time?
The answer
may lie in the fact that the country’s economic parameters have been
deteriorating for some time and its economy is currently very vulnerable. On a
more ominous note, Figure 5 shows that starting from mid-2019, Pakistan is
required to service huge amount of external debt in dollars. These include
maturing of old-time debts now as well as short term debts incurred lately.
This makes Pakistan’s economy particularly vulnerable over the next few years
and any likelihood of progression to black listing will be particularly
problematic. This timeline also underlines the fact it is not the grey listing
per se but Pakistan’s persisting economic weakness coupled with the threat of possible
black listing, which is worrying its government.
Figure 5:
Future debt servicing liabilities of Pakistan
Source:
World Bank Debtor Reporting System, compiled by author.
This is not
to say that grey listing may not have any impact on Pakistan’s economy. The
idea of “naming and shaming” by FATF may have a cost. As FATF works with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as well, the IMF has also
been putting conditionalities linked to FATF-related compliances before giving
bail-out packages. However, grey listing doesn’t seem to be the main cause of
Pakistan’s economic woes though it may be exacerbating an already present
malady.
Another
related question is: what are the costs of black listing by the FATF? Some
literature indicates the not-so-serious monetary effect of black listing and
also calls for even tougher a FATF regime for non-cooperative jurisdictions. By
and large, however, there is a larger consensus that black listing leads to
severe consequences for the target economy. Currently, only Iran and North
Korea are placed on the FATF black list, which may indicate its seriousness.
Weakness in
FATF regime: A case for different shades of grey
It appears
that as far as severity of consequences is concerned, the black list is a
quantum jump over the grey list. It is a serious escalation with very high
costs. For an already weak economy like Pakistan, it could even lead to large
scale turmoil and default. Akin to the nuclear option, this leads to a very
high threshold for black listing.
This
structural weakness in the FATF is also reflected in the somewhat brittle or
simplistic categorisation structure of different jurisdictions into so-called
white, grey and black. This straightjacketed view may not permit a flexible and
graduated response. The reason is a very substantial jump in international
commitment when putting some country on to the black list. Madeleine Albright,
former US Secretary of State, once called Pakistan an “international migraine”.
To put it bluntly, the international community may be trying to avoid turning a
migraine into a brain tumour by black listing. But Pakistan is also aware of
this dilemma, that the only option available to the FATF after the grey list is
one it may not be willing to take. So in place of gaining leverage the FATF is
actually losing it through this structure. This high threshold provides
considerable space for manipulation and manoeuvre to a country like Pakistan.
Another deficiency already considered is the natural difficulty faced by most
organisations in dealing with hybrid regimes like Pakistan, the FATF being no
exception.
Analysing
the problem faced by the FATF and risk associated with all the available
options, some scholars have tried to take the middle ground and suggest keeping
Pakistan in the grey list only. Their basic argument is that Pakistan has
definitely not done enough to move from the grey to the white list. Black
listing may lead to it being a pariah and this may have severe consequences.
The
drawback with this approach is that, first, it does not solve the problem and,
second, it undermines the effectiveness of FATF as an institution. As timelines
are being missed, news of geopolitical considerations playing an increasing
role in FATF meetings keep coming out. News of voting based on geopolitical
consideration undermines the consensus-based technical nature of the FATF
deliberations. Thus, status quo may not be the solution.
A possible
option worth exploring may be to generate policy options for graduated but firm
response while moving between the grey and black lists, that is, there may be a
scope for darker shades of grey. Though the FATF has adopted a risk-based
approach, the grey list shows countries as diverse as Mauritius, Pakistan,
Syria, Jamaica, Iceland and Barbados being clubbed together. They all may have
some strategic deficiencies vis-à-vis the FATF standard, but, qualitatively, do
they pose the same degree of risk? For example, the FATF targets weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, corruption, money laundering and terror
finance. There is, however, a difference in risk between political corruption
leading to money laundering and nuclear weapon proliferation or financing
terror. The present system lumps all such jurisdictions with different
qualitative risks in one grey list basket. Differentiating may help the FATF
better assess the risk posed by Iceland or Jamaica as opposed to, say,
Pakistan.
There may
be those jurisdictions in the grey list that have the will to implement the
FATF Recommendations but may lack the necessary technical or administrative
capacity. At the other extreme, jurisdictions may have the capacity but would
be unwilling in intent. A necessary categorisation that captures this crucial
aspect may be made in the grey list. Countries willing to act but lacking
capacity should be given technical support. But countries like Pakistan, which
largely lack the will to implement, may be put in the darker shade of grey and
sanctioned more severely. This should help in better targeting.
After
categorising the severity of the source of risk followed by whether the country
has the necessary capacity/will, or not, a graduated response may be designed
in consultation with different constituents like credit rating agencies, banks,
IMF and World Bank, etc. This approach may provide more flexibility in tackling
jurisdictions that may be undermining the FATF by repeatedly giving assurances
but not acting on them in any substantial way.
The time
may be right for such a discussion because the FATF is already in the process
of undertaking a strategic review of its methodology of assessment by 2021. It
is committed to making the FATF more effective by strengthening risk-based
elements of the assessment process.
Going by
its record of policy innovation and flexibility, it is safe to assume that the
FATF will again rise up to the challenge.
-----
Pradeep Singh Gautam is an officer of the
Indian Revenue Service (IT) of the 2008 batch. He is currently serving as
Research Fellow at MP-IDSA on deputation. Views are personal.
This is an edited excerpt of the author’s
article first published by the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses (MP-IDSA).
https://theprint.in/opinion/pakistan-is-hoodwinking-the-world-on-terror-funding-fatf-grey-list-needs-to-go-darker/522490/
----
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