By
New Age Islam Edit Desk
20 March
2021
• PIL
to Remove 26 Quranic Verses Is a Cynical Strategy and Political Manoeuvre
By
Ali Khan Mahmudabad
•
Muslim Parties Contesting a Large Chunk Of Seats As Part Of A Larger Secular
Alliance
By
Asim Ali
•
Pakistan’s Changing Idea Of National Security
By
Tara Kartha
•
Bajwa’s Change Of Heart on IndiaIsn’t Enough. All of Pakistani Military Must Be
On Board
By
Husain Haqqani
•
Celebrate the Spring Equinox as Navroz
By
Sheriar Nooreyezdan
•
Unpleasant Truth: Britain's Deep-Seated Racism
By
Amit Roy
--------
PIL to
Remove 26 Quranic Verses Is a Cynical Strategy and Political Manoeuvre
By Ali
Khan Mahmudabad
March 20,
2021
Recently, a
PIL was filed in the Supreme Court by the former chairman of the Shia Waqf
Board, Waseem Rizvi, calling for the removal of 26 verses from the Quran. The
petition tries to argue that these verses were interpolated into the Quran by
the first three Caliphs of Islam and encourage violence and terror. The reality
is that since the compilation of the Quran by the third Caliph Usman ibn Affan,
Muslims of all sects have unanimously agreed that the Usmanic codex is the
correct version of the Quran. Importantly, neither the first Imam of the Shia,
Ali ibn Abi Talib, nor his 11 descendants questioned the veracity of the Quran.
Ali was a contemporary of Usman’s and after him became the fourth rightly-guided
Caliph, according to the Sunnis. The attempt to blame the Caliphs for the
so-called “violent” verses and, thus, linking this to the genesis of modern-day
terrorism is a brazen attempt at provoking sectarianism.
Muslims
believe that the Quran is God’s unalterable word. For centuries, Muslim
scholars have used various hermeneutical and exegetical methods to explain
verses that are not immediately easy to understand. Like the Bible, Gita,
Talmud and other sacred texts, the Quran too deals with questions of just war,
violence and ideas of the “other”. All of these can only be understood once
someone has a grip on the language, the history of revelation, context and even
grammar of the concerned language. Of course, much before we come to these
tools of understanding, the question of intention arises. Our intention, when
we approach a text, particularly a holy or sacred text, will determine to a
large part what we find in it. These books are not manuals. Instead, they use
metaphor, allegory, stories and other devices to convey messages about ethics
and morality. These cannot always be viewed through a black and white prism and
nor are they always fixed in stone, apart from certain foundational principles.
What is forbidden in a certain situation can become morally obligatory in
another. For instance, some substances are absolutely forbidden but if, and
only if, using such products is the only way of saving someone’s life then the
Shari’ah insists that primacy must be given to the sacrality and preservation of
life.
In the case
of this petition, there is no need to get into a debate about the transcendence
and inalterability of the Quran. We must begin with intentions. Rizvi has
previously issued comments about madrassas being factories of terror, Muslims
reproducing like animals and has made derogatory and provocative films about
Sunni beliefs and practices.
The reasons
for doubting his intentions are twofold. Firstly, the Shia Waqf Board is being
investigated by the CBI and apart from wanting a clean chit, Rizvi may want to
be renominated by the government as its chairman. There is no better way than
trying to provoke sectarian discontent amongst Shias and Sunnis. For the past
few years, the BJP has time and again sought to project an image of who or what
they think is a “good” or “acceptable” Muslim. Some Sufi and certain Shia
leaders have been cultivated for this image and exacerbate intra-faith
divisions within the Muslim community. As I have argued elsewhere, this search
for “the acceptable Muslim” must be seen in the wider context of the global war
on terror. For some years, international conferences and conventions, such as
the World Sufi Forum, have been held and regular outreach is conducted with
Shia and Sufi Sunni leaders which is then projected in the media and on social
media. This is done by the BJP as well as by the unofficial Muslim outreach arm
of the RSS — the Muslim Rashtriya Manch.
The brazen
sectarianism of this petition sits at odds with the position of the greatest
Shia scholars who have time and again spoken of the need to desist from
speaking ill of figures, especially some of the wives and companions of the
Prophet, that are venerated by the Sunnis. Ayatollah Sistani, who was recently
visited by the Pope in Najaf (Iraq), has consistently and constantly spoken of
the need for unity amongst Shias and Sunnis. In a public statement, he spoke of
the need for all Muslims to be united by the belief in God, the Prophet, the
Hereafter and the Quran as God’s unalterable word, as well as the importance of
prayer, fasting, pilgrimage and charity which bind all the sects together. Once
someone from the Popular Mobilisation Forces of Iraq, while speaking to
Sistani, referred to the Sunnis as ikhwanuna al-sunna — our brothers the
Sunnis. Sistani replied that he should say “anfusuna al-sunna” — the Sunnis,
who are us/a part of our own self.
It is
important to remember, as a young lawyer Asif Zaidi said to me, that the writ
petition is not just a religious attack but is also a political manoeuvre. Many
Muslims across the sectarian divide have come out to express their outrage
against the writ petition. Senior Muslim leaders of the BJP, including
Shahnawaz Husain, have condemned the petition. Even the most unobservant
Muslims have felt anger at his statements but I would urge all Muslims to see
this entire charade for what it is. It is important to remember the wider
political context in which this petition has been filed. Much depends on what
the courts do but we must remember that this is a strategy to divide people and
divert attention. Don’t let this strategy succeed.
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/quranic-verses-removal-sc-pil-shia-waqf-board-7236369/
-----
Muslim
Parties Contesting a Large Chunk of Seats as Part of A Larger Secular Alliance
By Asim
Ali
20.03.21
In three of
the five states going for polls in the latest round of elections, a Muslim
party would be contesting a large chunk of seats as part of a larger secular
alliance. In Assam (the Congress-Left-AIUDF alliance) and West Bengal (the
Congress-Left-ISF alliance), this represents an entirely new pattern of
political configuration, while in Kerala (the Congress-IUML alliance) this is
part of the long-established political norm. We are witnessing an interesting
paradox of an unprecedented acceptance of autonomous Muslim political parties
at the height of the Hindutva dominance of India.
What are
the driving forces of the diverse Muslim political parties of India? At the
outset, we can point to three fundamental political developments that have
structured Muslim party politics over the last two decades.
One, the
publication of the Sachar Committee report, which provided the political
vocabulary for Muslim parties to launch an attack on their secular competitors.
The damning picture of the social and economic backwardness of Muslims under
secular regimes constructed the legitimating framework for the organizing of
Muslims as a political bloc. It laid the rationale for a separate political
identity that could be formed in the modern terms of social justice and derived
itself from the constitutional promise of social and economic equality.
Two, the
rise of Hindutva as the dominant political force in the country, and the
concurrent decline in the political representation of Muslims. While Muslims
are rarely, if ever, fielded by the Bharatiya Janata Party, even secular
parties have cut down on their tickets to Muslims out of fear of Hindu
consolidation. In the most recent instance, the Trinamul Congress has cut down
its Muslim candidates by a third from 2016. Hindutva dominance has also created
a shared consciousness of oppression among Muslims cutting across regional,
caste, class and gender divides. This shared consciousness not just animated
the nationwide anti-CAA movement but has also helped a party like the AIMIM
expand its national footprint, as was witnessed in Bihar and Gujarat. However,
as the cold-blooded out-turfing of the AIMIM from the electoral arena of Bengal
by the ISF has demonstrated, Muslim politics is still largely conducted through
a regional idiom by state-based parties.
Three, the
weakness of former dominant secular parties has pushed them into a more
accommodationist stance with regard to autonomous political parties of the
states. It would have been unthinkable a decade back to imagine the staunchly
secular Left Front in alliance with a Muslim party in Bengal, or the Congress
in Assam allying with the same AIUDF it ruthlessly attacked under Tarun Gogoi.
Within this
analytically sprawling category of ‘Muslim parties’, we can draw out three
distinct strands of Muslim politics, which can help us understand both the
driving force of contemporary Muslim politics as well as gauge its possible
future courses.
The first
strand of Muslim politics is represented by the mainstream communitarian party
which mobilizes on the provision of public goods by being part of the governing
regime, exemplified by the Indian Union Muslim League. This form of Muslim
politics has been facilitated by the consociationalism of the politics of Kerala,
which integrates communitarian parties into two broad coalitions. The IUML has
played a critical role in state politics since the formation of the state in
1956, being part of coalition governments of both the Left parties and the
Congress. It has, in recent times, consistently won around twenty seats of the
state legislature with the help of some additional support base of its allies.
The resolute pragmatism of the IUML can be gauged from its stand on continuing
with the Congress alliance in the heated post-Babri Masjid phase, despite
facing an open rebellion by a faction which blamed the Congress for the
demolition of the mosque. The appeal of the IUML thus depends on its bargaining
powe with the ruling alliance in providing Muslims with representation in all
spheres of public life.
The second
strand of Muslim politics is represented by the isolationist identity-based
party wich mobilizes in opposition to the existing political system. The All
India United Democratic Front led by Badruddin Ajmal is a good example. The
party arose in the aftermath of the Supreme Court order in 2005 overturning the
Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983. The reversal of this
instrument — which lent a layer of legal protection to Bengali Muslims —
fuelled the anxieties of this community that the Congress could no longer
protect them, either from the violence of Assamese ethno-nationalists or from
the harassment of state officials. This type of party builds its popular base
by attacking its secular competitor and weaning away their support base. In its
first election in 2006, the AIUDF wrested ten Muslim-dominated assembly seats
from the Congress.
However,
there are limits to this exclusive identity-based mobilization. One, in the
absence of coalition partners, the party is susceptible to reverse communal
polarization of Hindu votes. The performance of the AIUDF in the 2016 assembly
elections and the 2019 Lok Sabha elections showed a marked downward trajectory
as the BJP ascended to pole position on the back of Hindu consolidation.
Second, the AIUDF is unable to present itself as a viable party of government
that can effectively bargain for public goods on behalf of its constituents.
This is particularly important for Muslim-dominated areas of lower Assam which
are marred by poverty, lack of educational facilities and under-development.
The coalition with the Congress indicates that the AIUDF is attempting a
transition from an isolationist identity-based mobilization to an IUML-like
political bargaining-based mobilization.
The third
strand of Muslim politics is represented by a new class of political parties
which have emerged against the backdrop of the Sachar Committee report. These
parties’ articulate Muslim identity in terms of socio-economic backwardness,
allying with other backward groups, and moving beyond the issues of security
and cultural recognition that formed the core of an earlier generation of
Muslim parties. The Uttar Pradesh-based Peace Party of India is a
quintessential exemplar of this politics, taking birth in 2008 just in the
aftermath of the release of the Sachar report. It quickly established a base
among the backward Ansari weavers of eastern UP, bagging four seats in the 2012
elections. Its surgeon founder, Mohammad Ayub, blasted secular parties for ignoring
the material needs of Muslims since Independence, claiming that the
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance “avoids even discussing the Justice
Sachar Committee report”. Meanwhile, he accused the Samajwadi Party leader,
Mulayam Singh, of mobilizing uslims by giving “inflammatory speeches in favour
of the Muslims” and provoking them into conflict. However, the eclipse of the
Peace Party post 2014 exposes the vulnerability of such parties to extreme
communal polarization. Recently, its leadership and support base in UP has been
appropriated by the more strident AIMIM.
The newly
formed Indian Secular Front can also be broadly seen as the lagged outcome of
this post-Sachar mobilization. The publication of the Sachar Committee report
had perhaps the greatest political ramifications in Bengal as it contributed to
the decisive shift of the Muslim vote away from the Left Front to the TMC.
Despit the careful nurturing of this Muslim vote by Mamata Banerjee, Bengali
Muslims continue to lag behind in social and economic indicators compared to
Muslims of other states. It is this opening that has been exploited by Pirzada
Abbas Siddiqui, whose focal point of attack on the TMC government remains the
socio-economic backwardness of Muslims. In order to underline its inclusive
credentials of social justice, the ISF has given ten out of its 21 seats to
backward-caste Hindus and adivasis.
The All
India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, which generates the most headlines of any
Muslim party, is a hybrid of all these three types of Muslim parties. In its
home state of Telangana, it enters a bargaining alliance with the ruling
Telangana Rashtra Samithi; in Parliament and other national forums, it
predominantly employs a Sachar Committee-derived vocabulary of social justice;
while in its election rallies in greenfield states it often falls back on hot-button
identity-based issues to outflank competing secular parties. Being the only
Muslim party to nurture national ambitions, it is extremely fleet-footed and
aware of different political contexts.
The
argument between secular and Muslim parties on the matter of who constitutes
the true representatives of Muslim citizens has been encoded in the very
foundation of our Republic. After all, the genesis of the Partition lay in the
unrelenting refusal of the Congress to legitimize an increasingly separatist
Muslim League as the voice and protector of the Muslims of British India. The
Congress, notwithstanding its overwhelmingly Hindu leadership, never conceded
on its cherished ideological principle of representing Indians of all religions
and ethnicities. The newly-found acceptance of autonomous Muslim parties within
an enlarged (and more nuanced) secular framework is thus a welcome signal of
the maturing of our secular imagination. It couldn’t have come at a more urgent
time.
https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/the-new-acceptance-of-autonomous-muslim-parties-is-welcome/cid/1810086
-----
Pakistan’s
Changing Idea of National Security
By Tara
Kartha
Mar 20,
2021
These are
stirring times in Islamabad, where the rich and the powerful gathered for the
first-ever Islamabad Security Dialogue (ISD) on March 17-18. In Pakistan, the
rich and the powerful are either politicians, businessmen or those in khaki, or
even all three. And since it is they who run the country, what they say usually
matters. The Dialogue was inaugurated by Prime Minister Imran Khan, while the
keynote address was delivered by army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa. Of the
two, it’s obvious who one would listen to. And it was quite something.
The ISD was
organised by the National Security Division, a body originally set up under
Nawaz Sharif to serve as the secretariat of the Cabinet Committee on National
Security which replaced the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Later called the
National Security Committee, it was notified as the ‘principal decision-making
body on national security’ in a move quite unlike the advisory role such bodies
have in most countries. That it included the service chiefs hardly needs to be
said.
At present,
the division is headed by a secretary-level officer. An added post in national
security bureaucracy is in the form of a special adviser to the PM, Moeed
Yusuf, an academic from the US, who has been in the news for possible
backchannel talks with India.
It is this
division which seems to have initiated the ISD, together with five leading
think-tanks of the country, the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies,
Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Institute of Strategic Studies, Institute
of Regional Studies and National Defence University's Institute of Strategic
Studies, Research and Analysis.
The idea is
aimed at bringing think-tanks and policy-makers together, in a praiseworthy
effort to benefit both. Bureaucracies the world over are not very different
from each other, particularly in South Asia, where there is usually a solid
brick wall between the two. The first move to break that wall is the first ever
advisory portal, an integrated platform to exchange ideas with universities,
think-tanks and the bureaucracies. The second was obviously to get the army
chief to lay down the proposals.
For
decades, Pakistan’s idea of national security was simply India, and anything at
all to do with what Delhi did anywhere. This permeated from top to bottom in
the bureaucracy, leading to a somewhat lazy and hazy thinking about what Pakistan’s
actual security constituted, even while outside experts pointed to a seriously
water-stressed country, disease, lack of access to health, apart from the
obviously unstable politics of extremism and intolerance.
This now
seems to be changing, just a little. It started at the beginning of this year.
In February, there was talk of Pakistan prioritising geo-economics over other
issues. That was echoed by Foreign Minister Qureshi soon after Khan’s visit to
Colombo where he rather surprisingly talked about Sri Lanka being part of CPEC.
Now at the ISD, PM Khan is talking of comprehensive security astonishingly,
saying that security is not just about defence. Unsurprisingly, he praised
China’s model, as he does at every forum available. Equally unsurprisingly, Kashmir
and self-determination went together, which doesn’t say very much of his
understanding of his country’s national security priorities.
But the
speech that has been uploaded in full is that of the army chief. And General
Bajwa has much to say. First, he says national security is not the preserve of
the armed forces alone. Then he places national security within ‘South Asia’,
as the least integrated of regions. Someone in the audience could ask, whose
fault that is, and the chief would have been hard put to answer. On Kashmir, he
simply says, “It is time to bury the past and move forward. But for the
resumption of the peace process or meaningful dialogue, our neighbour will have
to create a conducive environment, particularly in Indian-Occupied Kashmir.”
Nothing on UN resolutions, self-determination or the standard phrases!
If that’s
not astonishing enough, there is the offer of regional connectivity. That’s not
just about China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), though that is offered up
as an ‘inclusive, transparent’ project for global and regional participation,
particularly Afghanistan. What follows is best quoted in full. The General
says, “Let me also emphasise that while CPEC remains central to our vision,
only seeing Pakistan through the CPEC prism is also misleading. Our immensely
vital geostrategic location and a transformed vision make us a country of
immense and diverse potential which can very positively contribute to regional
development and prosperity.”
In simple
words, he’s offering up Pakistan as a node for regional connectivity. That’s
something for a country that has stonewalled the SAARC regional connectivity
proposals for years, refusing even the Motor Vehicles Pact that would have
allowed passenger and cargo movement across the region. This means that
Pakistan is ready for roads, railways and shipping to cross its territory into
the rest of the world, including India. That’s turning South Asian politics on
its head.
New Delhi’s
hardened security experts will pooh-pooh a proposal from an army chief who is
on extension, and will probably retire finally in November 2023, three years
after he actually ended his tenure. Others will say with more truth that
Pakistan is in a jam, given its crumbling economy, CPEC delays and a political
milieu that is challenging to say the least. But the army chief is still the
‘go-to’ person for all foreign officials, distinguished or otherwise. What he
says matters since he sits on top of the political food chain. It is as simple
as that. Delhi had better consider this connectivity push and its pros and cons
rather than dither about Bajwa’s hostile antecedents. Here is an opportunity.
Take it up. It might mean money, and a lot of it.
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/pakistans-changing-idea-of-national-security-227726
-----
Bajwa’s
Change Of Heart On India Isn’t Enough. All of Pakistani Military Must Be On
Board
By
Husain Haqqani
19 March,
2021
The call by
Pakistan Army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa on India and Pakistan to “bury
the past and move forward” is music to the ears of his country’s citizens who
have often been described as ‘traitors’ by the establishment for saying similar
things.
That
General Bajwa tied normalisation of India-Pakistan relations to “the resolution
of Kashmir dispute through peaceful means” and made no mention of jihadi
terrorism, makes it easy for Indian officials and commentators to shrug their
shoulders and say, “What else is new?” After all, negotiations must always be
preceded by trust between the parties and that is in short supply between India
and Pakistan.
The overall
tone of General Bajwa’s speech at the first-ever Islamabad Security Dialogue
represented a subtle change of priorities in Rawalpindi. The army chief made no
mention of Pakistan’s ideology, recognised the role of “politically motivated
bellicosity” in derailing rapprochement between India and Pakistan, and
acknowledged the primacy of “demography, economy, and technology.”
By refusing
to identify India as a permanent enemy or an ideological rival, General Bajwa
is trying to signal that he is the all-powerful military leader some in New
Delhi have been looking for, who could settle matters with India’s elected
leadership without fear of backtracking.
India’s
past experience with Pakistan’s military leaders has made the leadership in
Delhi particularly sensitive to intransigence in General Headquarters (GHQ),
Rawalpindi. Most Indian experts on Pakistan list past attempts to cut deals
with Pakistani generals, as well as civilians, to suggest that it might be a
futile exercise.
General
Bajwa is definitely different from his predecessors but that alone might not
convince sceptical Indians, given the history of the two countries’
relationship. He is not an Islamist ideologue like Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, nor
does he have Pervez Musharraf’s arrogance or risk-taking instinct. The current
army chief is more in the mould of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, a military man who
feels that he must do something for his country, which is unlucky in terms of
the quality of its political leaders. But General Bajwa seems aware of
Pakistan’s limitations in a way Ayub Khan was not.
Ayub and
Zia, the lost years
The Cold
War had given Ayub Khan overconfidence in Pakistan’s potential. He thought that
the United States and Britain were behind him, that he knew how to assemble a
team of Pakistan’s ablest, that he alone could unite the nation, and that he
had the formula to put Pakistan on the right track.
Ayub Khan
became army chief within four years of Pakistan’s creation. He influenced
governments from behind the scene between 1951 and 1958, and wielded
dictatorial powers from 1958 to 1969.
Ayub Khan
was invited to India’s Republic Day in January 1965. He sent his agriculture
minister instead because he was busy preparing for the war, which broke out a
few months later. His successor General Yahya Khan was in power at the time of
the 1971 war over Bangladesh.
After the
Simla Accord of 1972, there was some respite in India-Pakistan tensions during
the civilian rule of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. But once Bhutto was overthrown, his
successor, General Zia-ul-Haq insisted that the Simla Accord had been signed
under duress.
Zia
regularly entertained Indian journalists and Bollywood stars, speaking of his
desire for durable peace. But he planned and initiated the jihad in Kashmir
after receiving US support for anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahideen.
During the
decade of quasi-civilian rule after Zia, several rounds of talks yielded no
settlement. Pakistani politicians took turns in blaming each other for ‘being
soft on India’ and for not trying to secure Kashmir. Jihad in Kashmir
intensified.
General
Pervez Musharraf undermined Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s understanding with
Atal Bihari Vajpayee through his 1999 misadventure in Kargil. Once he assumed
total power, Musharraf pursued a two-pronged policy. He retained the jihadi
groups while engaging in back-channel diplomacy. Indian Ambassador Satinder K.
Lambah, who conducted the back-channel talks, believes that he had almost
concluded a comprehensive India-Pakistan peace agreement with Musharraf’s
negotiator, Tariq Aziz.
Musharraf’s
removal from office made that agreement void well before it could be signed or
made public. But the episode only added to Indian scepticism about back-channel
negotiations.
Bajwa’s
desires
For his
part, General Bajwa joined the army several years after Ayub Khan had gone but
seems to have fond memories of that era from his childhood. Pakistan functioned
relatively efficiently then, at least for its elites. Foreign leaders and
tourists could be seen visiting and respecting the country. International media
did not always mention Pakistan negatively. The country did not need to borrow
to pay off debts.
Much has
changed in Pakistan since General Bajwa’s childhood. The country lost half its
territory in 1971 but has quadrupled in population since then. Jihadi extremism
and Pakistan’s approach to securing advantage in Afghanistan and against India,
coupled with political uncertainty and economic mismanagement, has made the
country poorer and weaker.
General
Bajwa’s latest public comments only reaffirm what he has been saying in
private, including to Pakistan’s opposition leaders. He says he wants Pakistan
to become a normal country and understands that it would involve changing many
things. But he needs the cooperation and support of several internal and
external actors to succeed, which may not always be easy to get.
The army
chief has privately conveyed the desire for talks with India about
“non-interference in each other’s affairs and revival of bilateral dialogue.”
His proposal envisages a step-by-step process. The first step, a ceasefire
along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, has already been taken.
If India
restores statehood to Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan could declare it a
confidence-building measure and discuss a 20-year or so moratorium. That would
give Pakistan time to become normal and for India to continue to grow
economically.
In General
Bajwa’s narrative, he supported PM Sharif’s engagement with PM Narendra Modi
and the opening of Kartarpur Corridor, and can be trusted to negotiate with the
Modi government in good faith. He would like India and the world to look for
alternative explanations for the terrorist attack in Pulwama while giving him
credit for not escalating matters after India’s air strike at Balakot. But
sceptics would still ask how he might succeed in ending pervasive hostility,
built through decades of propaganda, where his predecessors failed.
After all,
there are only 19 months remaining in General Bajwa’s extended tenure. He could
always ask for another extension, which the law now allows as long as he does
not reach the age of 64. That could see him in office until November 2024.
Alternatively, he could ensure that his successor shares his views.
A cautious
hope
Could the
complex India-Pakistan relationship be settled in that timeframe even if
everyone trusted each other and there were no spoilers? In the past, Pakistani
leaders (including those who combined the positions of president and army
chief) found themselves out of office before their relatively late overtures to
India could reach fruition.
Moreover,
only a handful of Indian commentators buy the argument that better
India-Pakistan relations might wean Islamabad away from deeper alliance with
China or that India should re-engage with Pakistan just to test waters because
nuclear neighbours cannot afford to ignore each other.
From
India’s perspective, Pakistan has not dismantled its jihadi infrastructure and
has not punished groups and individuals responsible for terrorist attacks
targeting India. At a time when Pakistan’s economy is a mess and the country is
under international pressure on more than one count, there might be a
temptation to let Pakistan’s weaknesses run their course.
Many
Pakistani civilians, including this columnist, have written and spoken of the
need for normalisation of ties with India and ending support to jihadism as the
pre-requisites for Pakistan’s political stability and economic progress.
We have
paid a price for our stance and past military leaders have rushed to call us
names and accuse us of being foreign agents for deeply held convictions. It is,
therefore, encouraging to see that the army chief is articulating views similar
to ours for a change.
Outsiders
looking for signs of whether there will be a real change in the stance of the
Pakistan military, as an institution, should see if there is any diminution in
the tendency to look with suspicion upon advocates of fundamental change in the
country, especially normalisation of India-Pakistan relations.
https://theprint.in/opinion/bajwas-change-of-heart-on-india-isnt-enough-all-of-pakistani-military-must-be-on-board/624578/
------
Celebrate
the Spring Equinox as Navroz
By
Sheriar Nooreyezdan
March 19,
2021
New Year
celebrations are a universal festival and a medium of spreading goodwill.
Nature celebrates New Year, too! The
spring equinox – March 21– is the harbinger of a new season of sunshine and
warmth, bringing down the curtain on cold winters. Warm sunshine and fresh
spring air breathe new life into nature. Trees are garbed with delicate green
foliage; dormant plants spring forth and blossom into colourful and fragrant
flowers. Hibernating creatures emerge from their burrows to forage for food and
birds chirp gleefully welcoming the sun. As nature ushers in a new season of
sunshine and warmth, so do Baha’is and Zoroastrians celebrate the spring
equinox as their Navroz.
seasonal or
solar cycle in nature, so also the ‘soular’ cycle in the spiritual realm. As
spring renews life in nature, so does a divine springtime rejuvenate mankind.
As natural seasons follow in planned succession, so do spiritual seasons.
Whenever man is lost in the mire of materialism, a spiritual Sun rises in the
garb of a new manifestation of God to generate a new spirit in man and guide
him back to the path of spirituality.
History
records that during man’s darkest hours a Krishna, a Buddha, a Zoroaster,
Moses, Christ or Muhammad, appeared to lead him out of his gloom and depravity,
and instill in him noble and sublime attributes. As long as man has followed
the fresh guidance and obeyed divine laws of successive manifestations, he has
progressed, and his life has been fruitful. These periods in history have been
the summer seasons of unprecedented advancement, enrichment, and the
establishment of glorious civilisations. And when man has veered from
righteousness, he has brought on the spiritual autumn, followed by the cold
lifelessness of winter. These spiritual seasons conform to our Yugs. God’s
manifestation ushers in the Sat Yug of flowering faith, followed by declining
fervour through Dwapar, Treta and Kali Yugs. Having suffered the woes of Kali
Yug, the travails of purgation and cleansing, mankind prayerfully awaits the
dawn of Sat Yug. God has not forsaken His creation. The winter season of
materialism will assuredly be dispelled by the rising of the promised spiritual
Sun of a divine spring. The differently named avatar of all holy scriptures –
Kalki, Amitabha, Shahbahram, Messiah, Christ-returned, Qaim – is destined to
appear at the preordained time and place.
The Baha’i
community believes the promised manifestation has appeared and all scriptural
prophecies are fulfilled. Born in Persia, Baha’u’llah, the founder of the
Baha’i Faith, declared his mission in 1863.Today the rapidly globalising world
is gradually veering towards Baha’u’llah’s teachings on human rights, gender
equality, disarmament, universal peace, and a world government. His followers,
from every background of race, religion and nationality, claim they have not
converted to the Baha’i faith having abandoned ancestral beliefs. They state
they have investigated and recognised in Baha’u’llah the fulfilment of
prophecies of their respective scriptures. Is the Baha’i community a semblance
of the destined Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam of our sages? Has a New Age dawned in the
‘soular’ system? The affirmative answer
is in the Holy Scriptures.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/celebrate-the-spring-equinox-as-navroz/
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Unpleasant
Truth: Britain's Deep-Seated Racism
By Amit
Roy
20.03.21
My
favourite hymn is “Jerusalem” because of its evocation of “Englands green &
pleasant Land”. It is based on William Blake’s poem set to music by Hubert
Parry and orchestration by Edward Elgar. But now a scholarly new book, Green
Unpleasant Land: Creative Responses to Rural England’s Colonial Connections by
Corinne Fowler, professor of postcolonial literature at Leicester University,
argues that behind the beauty of rural Britain lies deep-seated racism.
“I could
have called it Green Unpleasant Land with a question mark,” she tells me. “But
I wanted to signal... disrupting our more traditional views of the countryside.
‘Green & pleasant Land’ is something which gives us a feeling of nostalgia,
of love for the countryside... I wanted to slightly trouble that feeling.
Hence, the provocative title. I’m looking afresh at the English countryside.
I’m trying to open up its histories of connection to the British Empire, to the
East India Company and to transatlantic slavery in particular.”
She points
out: “Despite Blake’s call to ‘love the human form/ in heathen, Turks or Jew’,
“Jerusalem” has been enlisted to support racially exclusive visions of rural
England as a space of whiteness. Historically, the countryside is a terrain of
inequalities, so it should not surprise us that it should be seen as a place of
particular hostility to those who are seen not to belong, principally Black and
Asian Britons.”
Fowler is
among the academics who brought out a National Trust report revealing that 93
of its properties were financed by the slave trade or colonial loot, mostly
from India. “It’s really important to correct that fallacy about the
colonisation of India in any way benefiting the Indian economy... it quite
clearly fleeced that economy in a way that was devastating,” she says. Fowler
has been denounced by right-wing tabloids and commentators for allegedly
denigrating Britain: “I get horrible threatening emails. I think I’ve just got
dragged into this culture war.”
Beauty
business
Listening
to Reita Faria last week on the BBC’s Witness History spot made me wonder
whether I shouldn’t return to university to do a PhD on the Indian beauty
business. It is worth recalling that Aishwarya Rai won the Miss World title in
1994, followed by Diana Hayden (1997), Yukta Mookhey (1999), Priyanka Chopra
(2000) and Manushi Chhillar (2017). Sushmita Sen won Miss Universe in 1994. But
the first Indian to win Miss World was Faria, a Goan girl from Bombay, in 1966.
Now 77, Faria, a retired doctor, and her husband and endocrinologist, David
Powell, live in Ireland. They have two daughters and five grandchildren.
She
travelled the world for a year as Miss World, including going to Vietnam with
Bob Hope to entertain the American troops. She was afraid that the Indian
government, which “didn’t support the American war in Vietnam”, might impound
her passport. Faria says about her unexpected 66-1 victory in London: “I was
proud for India — I wore the Indian sari for the entire year because I wanted the
image of India to be established at that point.” However, she was resolved not
to go into Bollywood but become a doctor, which she did by qualifying from
King’s College Hospital in London.
Does she
think there is a place for beauty contests in today’s world? Her reply: “I
don’t to be quite honest — it really has passed its sell by date in the sense
that the world has matured and there really is no fairy tale to anything
anymore.”
Scottish at
heart
It is worth
recording that Sirdar Iqbal Singh, who passed away, aged 91, on March 6, was
someone whom the Scottish people took to their hearts. He was born in Lahore in
1930, came to London in 1959, worked in a factory before making his money in
property, and moved to Scotland in the 1980s. He bought the deserted 100-acre
island of Vacsay in the Outer Hebrides, which he named after Robert Burns,
Scotland’s national poet. He had poems by Burns, including “Auld Lang Syne”,
translated into Punjabi, and wore blazers in the invented Singh tartan.
He was
nicknamed “Laird of Lesmahagow” by the Scottish media — laird refers to a
person who owns a large estate. I stayed one night in “Little Castle”, his
20-bedroom turreted mansion in Lanarkshire. Iqbal’s turban was always white, a
reflection of his deep faith. From his younger brother in London, Inder Singh
Uppal, I learn: “He used to spread a white sheet downstairs. When we asked why,
he said, ‘Don’t you know? Guruji comes at night.’”
Balanced
image
Bite-Sized
Books is an innovative publishing house which churns out short books on
contemporary issues. I contributed something to a book on Brexit once. Now my
good friend, Mihir Bose, has done a characteristically balanced biography,
Narendra Modi: The Yogi of Populism. It suggests that Modi’s populist policies
may have inspired Donald Trump and Boris Johnson to emulate him. Bose quotes
Ajit Gulabchand as saying Modi is “a very sincere man” who is “not corrupt”.
But a journalist from a leading paper, who tells the author, “There is hardly
any journalism happening now” and that “Modi’s government has cowed the media”,
asks not to be named: “No, no please do not.”
Footnote
A new set
of stamps from Royal Mail commemorating the legend of King Arthur takes me back
to learning Tennyson’s “Morte d’Arthur” at St Xavier’s in Patna. It depicts the
young Arthur being handed the Excalibur by the Lady of the Lake. Later, the
dying Arthur has the sword returned to the lake by a reluctant Sir Belvedere:
“But ere he dipt the surface, rose an arm/ Clothed in white samite, mystic,
wonderful,/ And caught him by the hilt, and brandish’d him/ Three times, and
drew him under in the mere.”
https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/britains-deep-seated-racism-reita-faria-on-bbcs-witness-history-sirdar-iqbal-singh-the-laird-of-lesmahagow-bite-sized-books/cid/1810090
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URL: https://newageislam.com/indian-press/indian-press-quranic-verses,-muslim/d/124588
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