By
New Age Islam Edit Desk
19 December
2020
• Pakistan Is Stuck In Time, As Far As International
Diplomacy Goes
By Bhopinder Singh
• Israel’s Poison Pill: Targeting Iranians for
Assassination Is a Way of Blocking Revival of the Iran Nuclear Deal
By Ramesh Thakur
• 1971: A Military Victory and the Birth of A Nation
By VK Singh
• For Long, Indian English Literary Establishment Has
Enforced A Culture That Can Only Be Called Brahminical
By Sumana Roy
• Bangla Connect: New Delhi Must Not Take Ties with
Dhaka for Granted
The Times of India Editorial
• The Delhi-Dhaka Bond
The Hindustan Times Editorial
• Erdogan’s Turkic Vision!
By Vivek Katju
----
Pakistan
Is Stuck In Time, As Far As International Diplomacy Goes
By
Bhopinder Singh
December
18, 2020
Pakistan is
stuck in time, as far as international diplomacy goes. The essential narrative,
expectations and language that define its sovereign aspirations have not
changed, despite the tectonic changes globally. Its famed and institutionalised
duplicitousness often tests the dexterity of its leadership, that necessitates
hopping from the aspired Pakistan of Qaid-e-Azam to the militaristic bluster of
its Generals, to the religious piety of its ubiquitous Mullahs.
This
schizophrenia is tantamount to the infamous Pakistani track of running with the
hare and hunting with the hound. The irony is writ all over as Prime Minister
Imran Khan cries himself hoarse complaining ‘Pakistan is the biggest victim of
terrorism’ just when he seeks to navigate Pakistan from getting ‘blacklisted’
for sponsoring terrorism, as per the global watchdog, FATF (Financial Action
Task Force). From ‘allies’ like the United States, ‘fraternal relations’ with
Saudi Arabia, ‘brotherly relations’ with Iran, to ‘inseparable brothers’ in Afghanistan
~ all are increasingly queasy for the gaps between what Pakistan says, implies
and finally does? This leaves the increasingly isolated and cash-strapped
Pakistan with the only option that asks for no corrective measures from the
shady Pakistani ways, that is China.
Flowery
descriptions like ‘Saudi Arabia’s closest Muslim ally’, ‘special relationship’
notwithstanding, nothing signifies the near-pariah regression for Pakistan like
the spurning of Islamabad by Saudi Arabia, which bears a symbolically venerated
relevance in the Ummah (Muslim world). This rebuff is especially significant
for a constitutional ‘Islamic Republic’ that vests its popular identity and
existential purpose in religiousity. But this fracture is a recent development,
as Saudi Arabia more than any other nation has supported Pakistan since its
independence. Riyadh openly sided with Islamabad in 1965 and 1971 and in the
1980s funded Afghan mujahedeen operations.
Pakistani
troops were sent to safeguard Saudi Arabia in the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia was
the only country to be taken into confidence before Pakistan conducted its
nuclear test. Both routinely posited Kashmir on the global centerstage ~
basically the Islamic world’s most affluent nation and arguably the most
militarily powerful (and only nuclear) nation converged on reciprocal
sensitivities, theatres and urgencies. However, the long-lasting honeymoon is
seemingly over.
Part of
this is attributable to the change of track under Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad
Bin Salman who seeks to go beyond exporting the ‘religio- oil’ admixture
towards a more sustainable-diversified economy, wherein larger markets like
India make more socioeconomic sense. Part also has to do with Pakistan trying
to outsmart the Saudis and their leadership within the Ummah, by cozying up to
the rival camp of the Turkey-Iran-Malaysia triad. In the evolving world,
sovereign positions and rallying cries are getting recalibrated with new
realities which require that countries renege on the past and appropriate the
‘new ask’. The Pakistani machinations that go into ‘terror support’,
religio-fundamentalism and nuancing Israel, are amongst some of the changing
tracks that have completely missed the Islamabad establishment ~ only to get a
rude wake-up call of the inevitable by getting disowned even by the likes of
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
In an
unprecedentedly cold and unforgiving move, the Saudis who had earlier extended
a bailout package of $6.2 billion for the desperately cash-strapped Pakistan
suddenly ‘stopped’ the said aid mid-course and sought earlier repayment. Unlike
the relatively light rebuke following Islamabad’s earlier refusal to be drawn
into Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, owing to combustive sectarian undercurrents
in Pakistan itself, this time the retaliation from Riyadh built up to become
relentless and unmistakable. A series of bilateral barbs had preceded the final
move of aid-stoppage, including the Saudis pressuring Pakistan from pulling out
of an international summit in Malaysia (showcased as an Turkey- Iran show),
Saudis showing disinterest in raking up Kashmir on cue from Pakistan, as also
tightening work imperatives for the 2.5 million Pakistani workers whose
remittances make for over 25 per cent of Pakistan’s foreign reserves.
The warning
like belligerence expressed by Pakistan’s foreign minister against Saudi Arabia
was to be the literal last nail in the coffin, and all subsequent reassurances
like ‘Pakistan stands shoulder- to-shoulder with the Kingdom’ notwithstanding,
the Saudis have maintained the early repayment displeasure. It is believed that
Egypt will increasingly replace Pakistan in providing the military wherewithal
for the Saudi kingdom.
Now, China
has agreed to ‘rebailout’ Pakistan with $1.5 billion immediately to repay the
$2 billion of Saudi Arabian debt, that has/will, become due by next month.
Coming as it does on the heels of Pakistan’s inability to get the $6 billion
IMF program restored, Islamabad is now solely banking on Beijing to avoid going
belly-up. In this deteriorated and isolated status for Pakistan, the
Turkey-Iran-Malaysia ‘alternative’ cannot compensate for the economic aid,
trade, energy-needs or the sheer scale of remittances, as generated by
Pakistan, from Saudi Arabia.
The
socio-economic-diplomatic vulnerability is getting temporarily addressed by
China, and the long-term consequences of sovereign surrender and stranglehold,
are guaranteed. The nature of Chinese support has also worryingly morphed from
promoting bilateral trade in local currencies to usage for paying other foreign
debt ~ a classic ‘debt-trap’ in the making that will make Pakistan completely
beholden to China.
Pakistan
has boxed itself into a corner with its bullheadedness to remain mired in the
past, when even those who instigated, supported and defined the definitive
narrative of the ‘past’, have moved on.
Getting
exposed and left to fend for itself by earlier ‘allies’ like the United States
(by calling out the Pakistani role in terror and thereafter stopping aid) could
be lazily contextualised to the latent street sentiment of the ‘Evil West’, but
explaining the break-up with the Arab sheikhdoms and Saudi Arabia in particular
will be a tall ask for the Pakistani establishment.
For now,
the Pakistanis are dutifully repaying the Saudi debt and unleashing a series of
rapprochement visits to Riyadh, but the reality of the only other person in the
form of a menacing Dragon in the room, remains. The fact that the principal
opposition in Pakistani politics currently is an old and trusted Saudi hand
i.e. Nawaz Sharif, makes it difficult for Imran Khan to cast any aspersions.
Only a
change of landscape with the incoming Biden administration or change of
government in Islamabad itself, can reset the free-fall towards becoming a
vassal state of China, as everyone else has left the building.
-----
Bhopinder
Singh is Lt Gen PVSM, AVSM (Retd) and former Lt Governor of Andaman &
Nicobar Islands and Puducherry
https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/inevitable-isolation-1502941366.html
-----
Israel’s
Poison Pill: Targeting Iranians for Assassination Is a Way of Blocking Revival
of the Iran Nuclear Deal
By
Ramesh Thakur
December
18, 2020
For Iran
2020 was bookended with two high-profile targeted assassinations. On 3 January,
the head of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force and
architect of Iran’s regional security apparatus Major-General Qassem Soleimani
was killed by a US drone strike near Baghdad airport en route to meeting Iraq’s
PM. It provoked a fierce debate on the legality of US action. In July Agnes
Callamard, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, formally
reported that with no evidence to support the charge of imminent attack planned
by Soleimani against US interests, the assassination was an “arbitrary killing”
in violation of international law.
The country
most famous – or notorious, depending on your point of view – for the use of
targeted assassination as an instrument of state policy, completely indifferent
to restrictions of international law, human rights law and humanitarian law, is
Israel. One of its highest priorities in recent years has been to protect its
nuclear monopoly in the Middle East and, to that end, prevent Iran from
developing the human, material and technical capabilities to acquire nuclear
weapons. Iran has been widely suspected of having had an active interest in
military dimensions of nuclear energy. Between 2010 and 2012, Israel
assassinated several Iranian nuclear scientists.
The Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated and signed in 2015 by Iran and the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany, and unanimously
endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 2231, upset Israel. The JCPOA
reversed and mothballed Iran’s suspected nuclear weapon gains, dismantled much
of its nuclear assets, put quantitative and qualitative limits on nuclear
materials and facilities, and imposed a stringent international inspection
regime in return for lifting of crippling sanctions. The deal was welcomed
around the world for having ended the twin threats of an Iranian bomb within a
12 month timeframe and a US military strike on Iran with incalculable
regionwide consequences. But Israel criticised the agreement for merely kicking
the can down the road and giving Iran the means to enrich itself before
resuming its search for the bomb. Because it was one of the Obama
administration’s signature foreign policy triumphs, President Donald Trump was
entirely sympathetic to Israel’s carping criticisms, supported by Saudi Arabia
as Iran’s chief Arab and Sunni rival for regional sway. The US pulled out of
the deal in May 2018. Iran retaliated by breaching limits on the purity and amount
of uranium enrichment.
With
Trump’s defeat by Joe Biden, and his stated commitment to restore the JCPOA,
the transition period gave Israel a narrow window of opportunity to mine the
path to its resuscitation. On 27 November Israel struck, assassinating top
nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in a daring ambush just east of Tehran.
The precise details of the hit remain unclear and, in a lesson for the Modi
government, Israel resolutely sticks to its policy of never commenting on an
intelligence operation or ‘surgical strike’, leaving it to its enemies to
attribute responsibility. Israel’s ability to eliminate high-value targets
inside enemy countries may make other senior scientists nervous but
Fakhrizadeh’s death won’t dent Iran’s nuclear activities.
The most
consequential impact will be to put towering roadblocks on the path to reviving
the JCPOA which Biden had made conditional on Iran’s return to compliance.
Tehran was presented with a lose-lose choice. Doing nothing in response to an
act of war damages its credibility, reputation and prestige domestically,
regionally and globally. Retaliating against Israeli or US assets risks a
counter-strike by Trump in the dying days of his presidency. On 2 December
Iran’s parliament enacted a new law. Unless sanctions are lifted within two
months, uranium enrichment will increase to 20%, with the ability to get the
bomb within six months, advanced centrifuges will be installed and
international inspectors expelled. President Hassan Rouhani had opposed the law
as “damaging for diplomacy”.
Welcome to
Middle East politics, President Biden.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/israels-poison-pill-targeting-iranians-for-assassination-is-a-way-of-blocking-revival-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal/
-----
1971: A Military
Victory and the Birth of a Nation
By VK
Singh
Dec 18,
2020
There was
deep resentment against the Pakistani establishment among the Bangla-speaking
people in East Pakistan, who had been treated as second-class citizens in their
own country. The Pakistani army decided to crush the voices of
self-determination through a crackdown called Operation Searchlight which
resulted in large-scale rape, murder and looting. The flood of refugees into
India meant another confrontation with Pakistan.
The sense of
urgency was heightened when a post at Dalu Haat (on the border of India and
East Pakistan in Meghalaya), used by refugees to cross over, was attacked by
Pakistani troops. The Border Security Force (BSF), despite significant
casualties, fended off the attack. After this, my unit was ordered to
immediately move into Meghalaya to look after the border from Baghmara to
Mahendraganj.
As an
intelligence officer (IO), I routinely went with the Mukti Bahini to register
targets. The Mukti Bahini initially comprised only students and non-military
personnel, had a limited leadership and was fearful of the Pakistani army. But
having trained with the Indian Army, it was successful in several missions.
In October,
we moved to Tripura and were tasked to clear the Belonia bulge. We were to
support the Mukti Bahini operating in East Pakistan as part of this. Amid
regular attacks by Pakistani artillery and Sabre aircraft, we, along with the
Mukti Bahini, gained control of the Belonia bulge by mid-November. We then
pulled back into what is now Trishna Wildlife Sanctuary. At the end of
November, the unit was tasked to plan a roadblock behind the forward defensive
line in an area 10-11 km in depth.
It was
believed that a Pakistani artillery regiment of 105 mm guns was positioned near
Parikot. I was to go behind enemy lines with a Mukti Bahini guide to get
information on the location of the guns, and also scout for locations where the
battalion could take up blocking positions to cut off the Chauddagram axis.
When we reached the enemy positions in Parikot, I could locate the sentries who
had to be tackled. However, this would entail the risk of being pursued by the
enemy once the bodies were discovered. Fortunately, as I was about to silence
the sentries, the guns fired, and this assisted in mapping their locations. My
team had around ten jawans and we had to make a 30-km dash back from enemy
territory before first light.
On December
3, war was officially declared with Pakistan. We received orders to make a
daylight attack on December 4 to capture Chauddagram, where the Pakistani
positions overlooked the road that went to Parikot and onwards north to
Chandpur. I was tasked to lead the assault, which seemed a rash idea as the
enemy could see us coming. We were met with heavy enemy fire and suffered
casualties. We had no choice but to wait out the counter-attack. On the morning
of December 5, we launched an attack on the Pakistani post which we captured.
We were
told to proceed to Mudaffarganj that was en route to Chandpur. We encountered
many Pakistani units as they tried to retreat to Chandpur. We captured a large
number of Pakistani officers and soldiers, a risky operation as they often
outnumbered us. We had to convince them that they were surrounded by a much
larger force. These prisoners of war were handed over to the divisional
resources tasked to handle them.
Mudaffarganj
presented another problem as the Pakistanis had surrounded that area and
inflicted casualties on 1/11 GR. Our unit surrounded the Pakistanis and our
firing broke their morale leading them to run away towards Chandpur. In the
morning, the corps commander arrived in a helicopter and told our unit to rush
to Chandpur as the Pakistanis were abandoning it. This called for innovation as
we had no transport. We rounded up everything that could move — fire engines,
garbage trucks, cars and cycles to assist in our dash. Using this unorthodox
method, we captured a large number of Pakistani troops.
From
Chandpur, we were ordered to join our brigade and move to Chittagong. I was to
move before the unit to carry out a reconnaissance mission. I decided to take a
shortcut and landed in Comilla town which had not yet been liberated. On
spotting my jeep, the locals started celebrating the liberation of the town.
Later, I
learnt of the risk taken as Comilla was still under Pakistani control. The move
to Chittagong had to be through the hill tract. I led the recce through hills
to find a route for the unit and brigade which followed the path by cutting
bushes to clear a lane. On December 16, we received news of the surrender at
Dhaka, came out of the jungles and moved into Chittagong where a surrender
ceremony took place.
A short
swift war, a manoeuvre on foot in which the Pakistani army was outclassed
tactically and strategically giving birth to a new nation — this victory has no
parallel in military history anywhere in the world.
-----
General
(retired) VK Singh is a former army chief and a union minister
https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/1971-a-military-victory-and-the-birth-of-a-nation/story-j08OainfDwS3aMJjt5zFNL.html
-----
For
Long, Indian English Literary Establishment Has Enforced a Culture That Can
Only Be Called Brahminical
By
Sumana Roy
December
19, 2020
A few
months ago, when the Bengal Chief Minister announced the creation of a Dalit
Sahitya Academy, many rushed to characterise it as another of Mamata Banerjee’s
“minority appeasing” policies. It was even turned into the likeness of a joke —
that there should also be a Brahmin Sahitya Academy, and so on. Raised by
parents who rarely discussed caste, and an education system that refuses to
engage with it except in a nominal way, I crossed over into adulthood without
the awareness of caste marking my thoughts, choices and decisions. All of this
would not need to be said if it hadn’t informed the reading choices of people
such as myself. It couldn’t be a coincidence, could it, that my favourite
writers in Bangla were upper-caste writers, usually Brahmin, or that Bangla
literature was Calcutta-centric? This, it seemed, was no different from WASP
literature providing the only understanding of the literary in the
Anglo-American world. By Brahminical, therefore, I mean an attitude, and,
consequently, an invisible structure that makes the normative seem normal, and
everything else just aberrations — the way, say, “General” seems to be normal,
and “SC/ST/OBC” exceptions, or heterosexuality taken to be the norm, and other
sexual orientations wayward.
That what
we assume as literary is partly a result of our location in the various social
structures we inhabit is never quite acknowledged. Just as having tea with salt
and butter in a Tibetan household does not quite feel like tea to my
sugar-and-milk-knowing tongue, anything outside the range of familiarity — of
its tone, register, aesthetics and politics — of the “literary” seems foreign,
even contraband, and is, thereby, rejected. This hierarchy, inevitably deriving
from arbiters who hold political and economic power, seems to decide what
constitutes physical beauty, the singing voice, correct pronunciation,
education, manners, handwriting, propriety, or even what constitutes food.
The
literary can behave like a gharana, and it is the nature of gharanas to keep
things unlike it outside its fold. The “literary” has been inevitably phallic.
It was this narrow sense of what constitutes the literary that Virginia Woolf
was challenging in A Room of One’s Own — of the genius, which we imagine as
inevitably male, and of “anon”, the anonymous (female) creator of primarily
oral literature; of the novel, that she asked women to make their own, because
it was still a new form, unlike others which had become solidified into male
genres. It was also to expand the idea of the literary that Rabindranath Tagore
argued for in his introduction to the stories for children in Thakurmar Jhuli.
There are two pieces of irony here: Tagore, now a totem of the literary, was
once rejected for not being literary enough by Calcutta University; his name,
turned into the adjective Rabindrik (“Tagorean”), has been used by the
establishment to keep out singers who are disobedient to the Visvabharati mode
of singing.
The career
of the “literary” has not been very different from the Brahmin’s protectionism
of the mantra, an inheritance kept out of the reach of the non-Brahmin. One of
the ways in which this has been done in the last hundred years is through
anthologies that create — and reiterate — the idea and the habitat of the
literary. Indian English poetry, as a field for instance, was created in the
same manner. Different as they might be in style and temperament, there is
something that is common to them — their metropolitan location. With the
exception of Jayanta Mahapatra, the poets in these anthologies are from the
metropole, so much so that it might seem that Indian English poetry was only a
Bombay phenomenon. The indifference of the anthologists to circles outside
their own, unless the poets had a reputation buttressed by the West, as in the
case of Mahapatra, who won a prize given by Poetry magazine, created an idea of
the Indian English poem that was influenced by the prevalent literary climate
in America and England.
The lack of
inclusion of the provinces, of poets whose writing had been formed by their
other languages, was responsible for a monolithic understanding of the Indian
English poem. To ask a question like “Why was there only a woman or two in
these anthologies?” is not to ask a question about representation. It is to
continue to argue, after Woolf, for increasing the perimeter of the “literary”
to include those whose writing have not been included in the idea of “literary
history”. The Indian English poem in these anthologies, male in form and tone
and urban in its sense of power, supplied the idea of the “Indian English poem”
for decades.
Like
inter-caste marriage that supposedly kept Brahmins pure, editors keep the
circle of contributors limited to family and friends. One only needs to pick up
an anthology of Indian English anything — essays, poems, stories — to confirm
how the literary is a baptised name for a family-and-friend enterprise, a taste
and manner that is feudal, and which its practitioners believe is superior to
those that have been excluded. What that has enforced is the idea of a literary
that is aspirational, not completely unlike a “posh accent”. The literary has
forced a homogenisation of literary production — everyone must write within its
aesthetic range to be considered literary writers. Reviewers, because they come
from the same class, become naturalised citizens of the world of literary
gatekeeping.
“Decolonising
the syllabus” is a demand to expand the idea of the literary, not in an
instrumental and bureaucratic manner, but of its monolithic real estate — it is
a rejection of its proprietorial and gatekeeping behaviour. What the “literary”
needs, however, is not the erasure of what once constituted it — as some cancel
culture advocates demand — but a far more inclusive accommodation of writing;
not a UN-like representative model of writers of various constituencies alone,
but of various kinds, manners, and forms of writing.
It is time
for the literary to lose its sacred thread.
------
Sumana
Roy is a poet and author.
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/read-without-the-sacred-thread-7110529/
------
Bangla
Connect: New Delhi Must Not Take Ties With Dhaka For Granted
The
Times of India Editorial
December
18, 2020
Coming a
day after the anniversary of Victory Day marking the surrender of Pakistani
forces in Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in
his virtual meeting with Bangladeshi premier Sheikh Hasina, emphasised that
Bangladesh was a major pillar of India’s Neighbourhood First policy.
India-Bangladesh ties have steadily grown over the last six years. This is
exemplified by increasing connectivity, investments and sub-regional
cooperation under the BBIN (Bangladesh Bhutan Indian Nepal) platform. Taking
this momentum further, the virtual meeting saw the two sides ink seven
agreements and revive the cross-border Chilahati-Haldibari rail link that was
snapped during the 1965 war with Pakistan.
The deals
include cooperation in hydrocarbons, Indian grants for high impact community
development projects in Bangladesh, cooperation in transboundary elephant
conservation, cooperation in agriculture, an MoU between museums and terms of
reference for a CEOs forum. All of this shows that India-Bangladesh ties today
have acquired a multi-dimensional character. And a large reason for this is
Hasina herself who is personally invested in the relationship with New Delhi.
However, China has been pushing hard to increase its footprint in Bangladesh as
exemplified by its $24 billion investment plans for Dhaka announced in 2016.
Bangladesh has also joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
At the same
time, Pakistan has been looking to revive its ties with Bangladesh after a
period of major diplomatic spat with Dhaka. Given this scenario, India
shouldn’t take its ties with Bangladesh for granted and remind Dhaka of the
perils of relying too much on Chinese largesse. Meanwhile, issues such as the
Citizenship Amendment Act and the National Register of Citizens have created a
highly negative impression in Bangladesh. Harping on them for hypothetical
domestic political gains can jeopardise ties with Dhaka and put unnecessary
pressure on Hasina. Relations with Bangladesh are a bright spot. Government
must take care to keep it that way.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-editorials/bangla-connect-new-delhi-must-not-take-ties-with-dhaka-for-granted/
------
The
Delhi-Dhaka Bond
The
Hindustan Times Editorial
Dec 18,
2020
India’s
relationship with Bangladesh is arguably its most consequential relationship in
the region. The 49th anniversary of diplomatic relations and the birth
centenary of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman is an opportune time to recognise how far
bilateral relations have progressed. Once derided as a basket case, Bangladesh
is now the fastest growing economy in South Asia; it surpasses India on many
development indicators; and it has overtaken Pakistan’s economy. Sustaining
relations with Bangladesh — which saw a turnaround of sorts under Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and Sheikh Hasina — has been an important element of
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “neighbourhood first” policy too.
Much of
what is going on today between the two countries, including the results of
Friday’s virtual summit, has been about converting goodwill into tangible
economic links and steadfast political relations. The two countries are now
reconnecting by rail, road and water in the way they were prior to 1965.
Conduits for trade and investment keep improving as the two agree to more infrastructure
and less red tape. Ms Hasina’s government has provided a model of security
cooperation. India should involve Bangladesh more in its global initiatives
such as Covid-19 and climate.
Both
countries should take some time to consider how to reconcile their domestic
political narratives. For example, immigration concerns would be best managed
through an agreement that accepts the reality of circular migration. Indian
visions of Bangladeshi hordes need to be replaced with a realisation that
migrants cross in both directions. Dhaka, in turn, needs to be more honest
about localised discrimination of minorities and the outward migration this has
engendered. Differences over the Citizenship (Amendment) Act arise from such
incomplete viewpoints. New Delhi has concerns about the Hasina government’s
policy of allying with Islamist groups to counterbalance other such groups.
This may be politically useful, but all such groups are cut from the same
anti-Indian cloth and share a desire to make Bangladesh a theological state.
Beijing will continue to expand its influence but as long as Dhaka does not
cross security redlines and keeps Delhi in the loop, the China factor can be
managed. If these larger meta-issues can be addressed over the coming years, in
part though domestic debate, the two countries can be assured of another
half-century of improving relations.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/editorials/the-delhi-dhaka-bond-ht-editorial/story-pVlB1Yhp0J9DAHA2xyzWXJ.html
-----
Erdogan's
Turkic Vision!
By
Vivek Katju
December
19, 2020
On December
10, Azerbaijan held a military parade to celebrate its victory in a six-week
war with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave in Azerbaijan. This round of
hostilities between the two countries began on September 27 with Azerbaijan
resorting to force to regain the territories around and within the enclave; it
had effectively lost these areas to Armenia in 1994. The war ended with a peace
agreement brokered by Russia on November 9 which went into effect a day later.
Under the agreement Armenia was compelled to cede those areas in
Nagorno-Karabakh and its surrounding areas which the Azerbaijan forces were
able to bring under their control. Both countries also agreed to the presence
of a Russian peace-keeping force along the line of contact.
Armenia and
Azerbaijan were constituent states of the Soviet Union and with its collapse in
1991 emerged as sovereign countries. Nagorno-Karabakh has a Christian
population which had wanted to join with Armenia but Azerbaijan did not let it
go; the enclave is surrounded by Azeri territory. The Arminian people are
Christian and share close linkages with those of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan
has intimate ties with Turkey. Its majority population is Turkic speaking and
considers itself part of the wider and historical Turkish world. In the complex
politics of the Caucasus, Turkey is totally aligned with Azerbaijan while Iran
broadly supports Armenia though an overwhelming majority of the Azerbaijan
population are Shia Muslims. Iran has a very significant population of Azeri
origin. They live in the north-west region of the country, adjoining Azerbaijan
and the Aras river forms a boundary between Iran and Azerbaijan. Consequently,
Iran has always been very sensitive to any call that can be interpreted as
seeking to impart a separatist sentiment in its Azeri population. It is worth
also mentioning that Iran has ethnic Armenians among its citizenry too.
Azerbaijan
invited Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the victory parade. This was
to acknowledge the full material and diplomatic support extended by Erdogan to
Azerbaijan during the war. Indeed, without that help Azerbaijan could not have
made the impressive gains it achieved. On its part Turkey made no attempt to
mask its joy in Azerbaijan’s success. Erdogan visited Azerbaijan for the
parade. During the visit he made a speech in which he recited verses from an
Azeri poem. One of its verses was ‘They separated the Aras river and filled it
with rocks and rods. I will not be separated from you. They have separated us
forcibly’. The verse is an obvious reference and lament to the presence of the
Azeri ethnic group in different countries.
Iran’s
social media erupted in anger at what was perceived to be Erdogan’s attempt to
erode Iran’s territorial integrity by inciting Iran’s population of Azeri
descent. The Turkish President was lampooned and reminded of the fate of Saddam
Hussein who had attacked Iranian territorial integrity when he launched a war
in 1980 which lasted eight years and extracted a terrible human toll till peace
and status quo was restored. The Iranian parliament passed a unanimous
resolution to condemn Erdogan’s attempt against Iran’s territorial integrity.
The Iranian foreign minister tweeted that “No one can talk about our beloved Azerbaijan”
and the foreign ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to protest against
Erdogan’s reciting the verse. Turkey’s response was strong. It objected to the
targeting of its President and called in the Iranian ambassador to lodge a
strong protest. It clarified that Erdogan did not refer to Iran at all nor was
it his intention to take a negative position against Iran’s territorial
integrity.
Within a
couple of days though both governments moved to contain the situation for their
interests coincide on a number of regional issues. Their foreign ministers
spoke to clarify their stands and clearly the Iranian government accepted
Turkish explanations because Iranian President Hassan Rouhani told the media on
December 14 “In my opinion, with the explanations (Turkish officials) gave, we
can move beyond this issue but the sensitivity of our people is very
important”. He added, “Based on my past knowledge of Mr Erdogan, it is very
unlikely that he had any intention of insulting our territorial integrity. He
always recites poetry in his speeches”.
While
Rouhani has decided to overlook Erdogan’s poetry recital the fact is that the
Turkish leader is vigorously seeking to revive pan-Turkic sentiments among the
Turkic speaking people in Central Asia. He has now been at the helm in his
country for eighteen years and during this period he has changed its domestic
direction including, significantly, taking it away from the secularism of the
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. In July this year he
decided to restore Islamic prayers at the Hagia Sophia which had been stopped
in 1935. The Hagia Sophia was one of Christianity’s most famous and sacred
churches and fell to the Ottoman Turks when they captured Constantinople in
1453. It was used as a mosque but its loss was never forgotten by the eastern
Christian world. Thus, Ataturk’s decision to give up prayers and make it into a
museum was a major gesture to the Christian world and especially to Europe.
Ataturk
wanted to modernise Turkey and make it European in character. However, on their
part the Europeans never accepted Turkey despite decades of Turkish attempts.
Now Erdogan is emphasising Turkey’s Islamic and Ottoman personalities. On both
counts he is treading on many toes—as this episode shows—but he is not bothered
because he is convinced that he is a man of destiny.
https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/erdogans-turkic-vision/
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