Indian Press on Opposition during CAA Stir, Love Jihad and West Asia: New Age Islam's Selection, 12 December 2020
By
New Age Islam Edit Desk
12 December
2020
•
Uniting With Farmers Is Ok – Where Was Opposition During CAA Stir?
By
Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay
•
Love Jihad: Checks And Balances Needed
By
Chittarvu Raghu
•
India, And A West Asia In Flux
By
Vivek Katju
•
India Must Keep An Eye On Afghan Affairs
By
Vivek Katju
• Why
Joe Biden’s Choice For Us Defence Secretary Isn’t Just About China
By
Rajesh Rajagopalan
----
Uniting
With Farmers Is Ok – Where Was Opposition During CAA Stir?
By
Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay
11 Dec 2020
The
decision of the majority of opposition parties to support the ongoing farmers'
agitation stands in sharp contrast to their ambivalence during the agitation
against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), spontaneously started in December
2019.
For most of
the period when the agitation ran its course before the COVID-19 pandemic
provided the government an opportunity to subdue the protests, the opposition
parties acted like a deer caught in the headlights.
In
contrast, opposition parties had resoundingly opposed the three Farm Bills when
they were debated in Parliament earlier in 2020. Furthermore, they were quick
to back the peasants’ agitation that has led to the Centre-imposed rail
blockade of Punjab.
These
parties were, earlier this year, muted in their criticism of the government's
handling of communal riots in northeast Delhi and the systemic targeting of
members of minorities communities and civil society activists, many of whom are
still under detention.
Like the
present farmers' stir, the 2019 protests too had been started by disparate
groups and citizens who had little or no interest in entering electoral
politics, but were united by their opposition to the contentious citizenship
law.
The choice
of opposition parties to join forces with the protestors in this instance,
although they kept an arm’s length from the CAA stir, indicates that the bulk
of India’s opposition is unsure of criticising government decisions that are
ideological in nature.
This
reflects the success of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) over the past few
years to posit its political posture as the only one which is in national
interest.
After its
re-election in May 2019, the Modi government enacted a series of laws that
reflected its ideological positions. These included those on issues related to
citizens' right to fair trial, their power to question the State on issues
people consider critical, the relationship between the Indian Union and the
(now erstwhile) state of Jammu and Kashmir in today's context, besides those
pertaining to personal laws of minorities and linking religious identity with
Indian citizenship.
Amendments
in the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and the Right to Information
Act, the passage of the law criminalising instant divorce among Muslims, the
abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution (which stripped J&K of its
statehood) and the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Bill were these
measures which left the majority of the opposition in a dilemma, for they
feared further isolation from the sense of the majority community.
Consequently,
when citizens' groups and members of civil society began staging protests from
December 2019 across several states in the country – barring the left parties
and a handful of others who lent support to the anti-CAA agitators – most
opposition parties refrained from coming out in support of protestors.
Muted calls
of repealing the CAA was indicative of the BJP’s triumph in building a
narrative where frowning on democratic processes and the right to protest was
no longer considered politically inappropriate.
It is this
sentiment that results in viewpoints like the one articulated by NITI Aayog
CEO, Amitabh Kant that “too much of a democracy in India” makes “tough
(economic) reforms” very difficult in the country and this ostensibly acts as
an impediment to India's growth.
The
farmers' agitation as well as the anti-CAA stir are certain to be noted as
watershed protests by historians of the future. Eminent historian and public
intellectual Romila Thapar has stated in a recent interview that the sit-in at
Shaheen Bagh brought back “memories of the gatherings associated with the
anti-colonial national movement of the 1940s.”
The Shaheen
Bagh dharna was similar to the protests she referred to, because the
“anti-colonial mass movement had reached out to women as well.”
After a
long gap, women in contemporary India played a role that was not limited to
hugging trees, picketing liquor shops and wearing khadi. Instead, they were at
the forefront, “attending meetings and adding their voice to the protest.”
In
contrast, the farmers’ agitation is firmly led by men although women are
present in limited numbers and their roles are limited, especially on matters
related to the course of the agitation. The 'missing' women from this agitation
is somewhat like the Bharatiya Kisan Union agitation in 1988 when the sit-in at
Delhi's Boat Club paralysed the capital and coerced the government into making
concessions.
It reflects
the inability of most political parties to confront patriarchy which continues
seeing women as little more than mothers, sisters and wives of the leaders and
cadre.
The three
decades plus years that have elapsed since 1988 is also the period when the BJP
has emerged from being a marginal political player - with just members in Lok
Sabha – to the most dominant political party in India with a majority of its
own in the Lower House.
How BJP
Ensured That The Majority Of Opposition Became Diffident
Over these
years, the BJP and affiliated organisations have secured greater support for
their definition of Indian nationalism and the basis on which the nation and
Indian nationhood is to be marked.
In simple
terms, this means that the BJP has not just ensured greater adherence to the
tenets of Hindutva, but has also made the majority of opposition diffident when
it came to ideologically locking horns with the party.
Rahul
Gandhi told journalists after meeting President Ram Nath Kovind along with
other opposition leaders that the farm bills “were an insult to farmers” who
were “protesting in cold weather”.
Such sharp
words and concern were absent from the opposition vocabulary throughout the
anti-CAA stir and events that followed. It even cost them the support of
people, as reflected by the verdict in Bihar, where the Asaduddin Owaisi-led
AIMIM upset the RJD applecart in the Seemanchal region.
What
Opposition Parties Today Can Learn From VP Singh-Led Opposition In Late 1980s
After
having stayed away last year for fear of losing further ground, opposition
parties now sense an opportunity similar to what was seized by the VP Singh-led
opposition in the late 1980s. Back then, although political parties were kept
out of the farmers’ stir by Mahendra Singh Tikait, the post-1986 peasant
movement was heavily interlinked with the emergence of a new opposition
political conglomerate.
A tactical
alliance between all anti-Congress forces, including the BJP and the left
parties, led to the defeat of the Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress in 1989.
But while
three decades ago, both VP Singh and Tikait ensured that their agitations were
socially inclusive and gave ample space to Muslims and minority concerns (and
Dalits) on their bandwagon and charter, this is no longer being considered
imperative.
Furthermore,
as the absence, from the delegation to the President, of most of the twenty-odd
opposition parties who backed the farmers' demands because of alleged
Left-Congress hegemony showed, a rainbow alliance against the BJP is yet to
emerge as it had against Rajiv Gandhi.
-----
Nilanjan
Mukhopadhyay is an author and senior journalist based in Delhi. He has authored
the book ‘The Demolition: India at the Crossroads’ and ‘Narendra Modi: The Man,
The Times’. He covered the 1988 farmers’ siege of Delhi for The Sunday Mail
newspaper
https://www.thequint.com/brandstudio/pharmeasy-campaign-focuses-on-savings-and-convenience-in-india-during-pandemic
-----
Love
Jihad: Checks And Balances Needed
By
Chittarvu Raghu
12 December
2020
There is a
requirement to have a re-look into the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance
The
Governor of Uttar Pradesh (UP) recently promulgated an Ordinance called the
Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020.
It has been promulgated to provide for prohibition of unlawful conversions from
one religion to another by misrepresentation, force, undue influence, coercion,
allurement, by any fraudulent means or by marriage. The emphasis in the
Ordinance is on the prohibition of “unlawful conversion.” A conversion is
considered unlawful if it is due to allurement, coercion and so on and also by
marriage. An “unlawful conversion” is defined as one that is not in accordance
with the law of the land.
According
to the new law, a wo/man intending to convert to another religion needs to
inform the District Magistrate or Additional District Magistrate at least 60
days in advance and give a declaration that the decision is free from any
pressure or allurement and is being done by one’s free choice. Yet, another
declaration needs to be submitted within 60 days once the conversion takes
place. Only then will the person be able to attain a confirmation certificate
that the conversion is lawful. The District Magistrate’s Office has to exhibit
a copy of the declarations on the notice board of the office till the date of
confirmation of conversion.
However,
the UP Ordinance is silent with regard to the nature of the law governing conversions.
It does not provide any explanation and contemplates that whoever is involved
in the said unlawful conversion shall be punished with an imprisonment of not
less than one year, which may extend to five years. The accused person is also
liable to pay a fine. Though the punishment is one year to five years, the
Ordinance makes the offence cognisable and non-bailable and triable by the
court of sessions.
Generally,
in criminal cases the burden of proof lies with the prosecution but the
Ordinance imposes this burden upon the person who allegedly caused the
conversion. And wherever the conversion has been facilitated by any other
person, the burden of proof is on them too. It also contemplates that any
marriage, which was entered into for the sole purpose of unlawful conversion by
a man of one religion with a woman of another religion or vice-versa, either by
converting himself/herself before or after marriage or by converting the wo/man
before or after marriage, shall be declared void by the family court.
In case,
the couple is in an area where the family court is not established, the civil
court having jurisdiction in the area can try the case and declare the marriage
null and void. There need not be any independent adjudication with regard to a
declaration of any marriage as void as per any other law. However, the fact
remains that unless a nexus is established between a marriage and unlawful
conversion, Section six of the Ordinance, which contemplates marriage to be
declared as void by the courts, is not applicable.
The meaning
of conversion by marriage is also not explained in the Ordinance and it
contemplates conversion by marriage per-se unlawful. Generally two persons
belonging to different faiths can get married under the provisions of Special
Marriage Act. However, in some cases unless there is a conversion and both, the
bride and the bridegroom belong to the same faith, the marriage would not be
performed. Conversion would be a prerequisite in such cases. It cannot be said
that it is a conversion by marriage. The Ordinance also contemplates that once
the person who intends to change his/her religion has made the declaration
before the District Magistrate, an inquiry would be conducted by the police
with regard to “such an intention of a person to convert.” The report of the
police would be a major factor in deciding whether a person can change their
religion or not. It would also be instrumental in concluding whether the
conversion is illegal and thus, void.
The
Ordinance also contemplates a post-conversion procedure. It states that a
converted individual shall send a declaration to the District Magistrate and
appear for 21 days thereafter before him/her till the objections, if any,
received are decided by the District Magistrate. It also contemplates that if
the procedure is not followed the conversion becomes illegal and void.
Though the
Ordinance protects people from getting converted due to allurement, coercion
and so on, there is a scope for abusing the provisions by relying upon the
police enquiry report. The Ordinance is silent with regard to the action of the
District Magistrate vis-a-vis the police inquiry report. There is a requirement
to have a re-look into the provisions of the Ordinance for the purpose of
incorporating necessary checks and balances instead of placing more reliance
upon a police enquiry report.
However,
the UP Government’s anti-conversion move is not unique. In the past too,
several States in the country have passed what are referred to as Freedom of
Religion Acts or “anti-conversion laws”. These are mostly State-level laws that
are aimed to regulate involuntary religious conversions. Odisha was the first
State to pass such a law in 1967 and the most recent legislation was passed in
Jharkhand and Uttarakhand in 2017. Chhattisgarh, Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh
passed their “Freedom of Religion Act” in 2000, 2003 and 2006 respectively.
Taking a cue from the others, Rajasthan too passed a similar Bill in 2006. Arunachal Pradesh had already enacted one in
1979 and in 2002 Tamil Nadu passed the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Forceful
Conversion Act. The Supreme Court in the Reverend. Stainislaus Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh case upheld the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh and Orissa Act.
Significantly, Madhya Pradesh enacted the Madhya Pradesh Dharma Swatantraya
Adhinayam Act way back in 1968 and Odisha enacted the Orissa Freedom of
Religion Act in 1967.
The
provisions of both the Acts relating to prohibition of forcible conversion and
punishment were challenged before the respective High Courts and were carried
to the Apex Court. The Supreme Court had held that the freedom of religion
enshrined in Article 25 of the Constitution is not guaranteed in respect of one
religion only but covers all religions alike and it can be properly enjoyed by
a person if s/he exercises her/his right in a manner commensurate with freedom
of persons following other religions. It was further held that freedom for one
is freedom for the other, in equal measure, and there can therefore be no such
thing as a fundamental right to convert any person to one’s own religion. The
Apex Court upheld the provisions which prohibit forceful conversion in the
background of maintenance of “public order.” The Supreme Court also held that
if an attempt is made to raise communal passions, e.g. on the ground that
someone has been “forcibly” converted to another religion, it would in all
probability, give rise to apprehension of breach of public order, affecting the
community at large. However, the present Ordinance incorporates a new concept
of conversion by marriage. It presumes that every religious conversion is
illegal unless the procedure that has been laid down is followed. The term
“love jihad” has not been referred to in the Ordinance and its perusal shows
that the same is applicable to all religions. The word “allurement” has been
defined widely, which may ultimately be a playing field for the police during
its enquiry.
Article 25
of the Constitution of India contemplates that all people are equally entitled
to freedom of conscience, the right freely to profess, practice and propagate
religion. It means that the Constitution guarantees the right to practice,
propagate a religion and in the process a person may impress upon the other to
get converted or herself/himself change their religion.
The Ordinance comes into play when such a
conversion occurs due to the factors like allurement, coercion and so on. It is
inoperative while exercising freedom of conscience. The question is whether the
police are equipped sufficiently to conduct an enquiry into these aspects or
not, so as to come to a conclusion that the choice of conversion has been made
freely without any other factors. There would be a possibility of abuse of
processes and filing of criminal cases against those persons who propagate
their faith, on the ground that they have instigated the thought of conversion
in a person. However, a mere thought of conversion to another religion cannot
be made an offence unless it manifests into action.
-----
Chittarvu
Raghu is an Advocate in the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana High Courts)
https://www.dailypioneer.com/2020/columnists/checks-and-balances-needed.html
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India,
And A West Asia In Flux
By Vivek
Katju
December
12, 2020
India’s
interaction with West Asia and specifically with the Arab Peninsula has
witnessed substantial activity over the past three weeks. Prime Minister
Narendra Modi had a detailed telephonic conversation with the ruler of Qatar
Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani on December 8. External Affairs Minister S
Jaishankar visited Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the last week
of November. Army chief General MM Naravane began a visit to the UAE and Saudi
Arabia on December 9 and India and Israel held ‘foreign office consultations’
on December 7. This extent of activity in such a brief period reflects the
importance that India attaches to a region where it has great stakes. Equally,
it demonstrates the countries of the region place great significance to their
ties with India. It is noteworthy that these interactions have taken place at a
time of change in West Asia.
Some Arab
peninsula countries are re-orienting their foreign policies, giving up
long-held positions. In the middle of September, the foreign ministers of the
UAE and Bahrain met Israel’s prime minister at the White House in Washington to
sign documents establishing diplomatic relations between them and Israel. The
UAE went further than Bahrain to normalise ties with the Jewish state. The venue
of the meeting ensured the presence of President Donald Trump who naturally
took credit for this historic development. Bahrain and the UAE became the third
and fourth Arab states to turn their back on the traditional position of the
Arab states not to recognise Israel until a resolution of the
Israel-Palestinian dispute was reached—Egypt and Jordan were the first and
second Arab countries to establish ties with Israel in 1980 and 1994
respectively.
While Saudi
Arabia did not formally move to recognise Israel, it is widely believed that it
maintains below the surface links with it. As home of the holiest places of
Islam Saudi Arabia has traditionally enjoyed great status in the Muslim world.
In the past they were in the forefront of support for the Palestinian cause.
However, over the years the sectarian divisions in West Asia have, despite the
protestations of the regional countries to the contrary, reduced the priority
of the Palestinian problem. These sectarian conflicts have led the Sunni states
to feel threatened by Iran.
Israel too
considers Iran to be its principal enemy. It is clear that the common
perception of Iran being a great threat has drawn some of the Sunni Arab
peninsula countries towards Israel with the encouragement of the United States
especially under the Trump administration. This is because, for Trump, Iran is
a rogue state. He reversed his predecessor Barack Obama’s approach towards West
Asia. In exchange for Iran ostensibly giving up nuclear weapons Obama had given
up attempts to curtail Iran’s role in the region. Trump abandoned the Iran
nuclear deal and not only re-imposed sanctions on Iran but augmented them in
the hope that with increasing deprivation the Iranian people would become
hostile to the clerical order and that would pave the way for regime change in
the principal Shia state of the world.
As
Vice-President Joe Biden had supported President Obama’s West Asia policy. It
is now anticipated that he would seek to return to the Iran nuclear deal,
perhaps with some changes. That would lift the restraints on Iran’s regional
role and would change equations in the Arab peninsula. As it is the
difficulties that had existed between Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia
and the UAE on the other are in the process of being resolved. This rift had
led to Qatar getting close to Turkey and Iran. The emerging scene is therefore
going to be somewhat fluid in the Arab peninsula.
Amidst
these changes India’s position in West Asia and in particular in the Arab
peninsula continues to remain strong. It is perceived as a major global country
and the peninsula Arab states wish to develop comprehensive ties with it.
Wisely, India has refrained from getting caught in the contradictions of the
region by focussing on developing cooperative bilateral ties with all regional
countries. This was also reflected in the discussions which Modi, Jaishankar
and senior Indian officials recently had with their counterparts.
There are
some common themes in the discussions of the Indian leaders with their
counterparts in Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. These relate to cooperation in
hydrocarbons, trade, in respect of investments by these countries of their
surplus funds in India. These countries are also engaging with India in select
high technology areas. In addition, there is increasing interaction in the
defence field. It is here that the Indian army chief’s visit to the UAE and
Saudi Arabia assumes significance. This is particularly so for he is the first
Indian army chief to tour these countries. His visit will no doubt be closely
monitored by the regional and by India’s neighbours. It comes in the background
of difficulties in Pakistan’s ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This also
shows that notwithstanding the approach of the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation on certain sensitive issues pertaining to India many of its
member-states desire to enhance ties with it in crucial areas such as defence
and security.
India’s
latest official level talks with Israel reviewed the large and deep ambit of
cooperation between the two countries. This will deepen because of congruent
bilateral interests in many areas. There is special potential for mutual
benefit in high technology applications in agriculture and industry. While
upgrading its relations with Israel India has to maintain its traditional
positive ties with the Palestinians.
https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/india-and-a-west-asia-in-flux/
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India
Must Keep An Eye On Afghan Affairs
By
Vivek Katju
Dec 12,
2020
ON December
2, the two parties to the intra-Afghan dialogue worked out, in the words of
America’s special representative for Afghan reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, a
“three-page agreement codifying rules and procedures for their negotiations on
a political roadmap and a comprehensive ceasefire.” He added, “This agreement
demonstrates that the negotiating parties can agree on tough issues.”
Peace-making
negotiations can get bogged down in difficult procedural difficulties; that
would have been the case in this instance. The extent of these problems can be
gauged from the need to reconcile the vastly differing nomenclatures used in
the two separate ‘joint’ US-Afghan government and US-Taliban documents issued
on February 29 this year.
The US
declaration with the Afghan authorities was with “The Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, a member of the United Nations and recognised by the United States
and the international community as a sovereign state under international law….”
But the agreement with the Taliban stated that it was between the US and “The
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognised by the United States as
a state and is known as the Taliban….”
The Taliban
do not recognise the term Islamic Republic and nor do they accept the Afghan
government as a lawful authority. For the Afghan government, the Taliban are an
insurgent group and the use of the term Islamic Emirate would erode its
national and international legitimacy.
The
agreement on procedures has not been disclosed, but the two sides have been
able to find a way to address this thorny issue. One report indicates that they
agreed to drop their preferred formulations to proceed. If true, it does
reflect the government’s weakness and a climbdown from the formulation used in
its declaration with the US.
This also
demonstrates the reality that these talks are not between a government and a
weaker insurgent group but between, at best for the Afghan government, equals.
Kabul’s
weakness was indirectly admitted on December 2 by General Mark Milley, chairman
of the US joint chiefs of staff. In an interaction with a think tank, Miller
admitted that a ‘strategic stalemate’ had prevailed in Afghanistan for many
years with the Afghan government unable to defeat the Taliban, and the latter
not able to beat the Afghan authorities “as long as we were supporting the
government.”
Trump has
decided to reduce the US troop presence in Afghanistan by January 15, 2021, to
2,500 soldiers who would be based, according to Milley, in “a couple of larger
bases with several satellite bases.” US troops will continue to train Afghan
security forces and assist in its counter-terrorism efforts. Milley said that
after January 20, 2021, the US contingent’s mission will be decided by the
incoming administration; Biden would assume presidency on that day. It is
unlikely that he will seriously modify decisions relating to US army presence
or its role in Afghanistan, though he will accord greater salience to human
rights in the political system that is to eventually emerge from the
Taliban-Afghan government dialogue.
The Afghan
army has hardly succeeded in controlling violence and terrorist acts with the
present number of US soldiers; so, its ability to effectively deal with them
with a decline in US force levels will be further impaired; therefore, the
emphasis by the US and the Afghan governments to give priority to securing the
Taliban’s agreement to a ceasefire. That is reflected in the government team’s
demand in the talks currently under way in Doha on finalising the agenda.
The Taliban
are unlikely to go in for an enduring ceasefire unless the nature and shape of
power-sharing is finalised. That is the current focus of attention of the Kabul
political class too. President Ashraf Ghani has alienated a large number of its
prominent members. So, it is unlikely that he will have sufficient support for
Afghan national security adviser Hamdullah Mohib’s desire that the Taliban join
the government. Mohib recently said, “The Afghan government is negotiating with
the Taliban to find a political solution to include the Taliban in the government…”
The Taliban
would like an interim government in which it has, at least, an equal role. It
would not be bothered if the Islamic Republic’s Constitution puts constraints
in the making of such a government; nor, also would a large section of the
Kabul political class. The issue would be who would head such a set-up.
There are
many names doing the rounds in Kabul, some of well-known technocrats and
administrators, others of seasoned political figures. It will not be easy to
settle on a name without outside pressures — from the US on the Kabul political
forces and Pakistan on the Taliban. The US and other NATO countries have and
continue to lean on Pakistan to get the Taliban to adopt constructive
approaches. It has influenced the Taliban and would, therefore, expect that its
concerns relating to Afghanistan are taken on board by the US and NATO
countries. These include its views on India’s role in that country. Pakistan
has exaggerated ideas of India’s desire or ability to harm its interests from
Afghan territory, but the Pakistani security establishment is obsessed about
India’s presence and actions in that country.
India has
moved to reinforce its contacts with political leaders of the erstwhile
Northern Alliance; some have made publicised visits to Delhi. These include Dr
Abdullah, Uzbek leader Rashid Dostum and Ata Mohammad Nur, the influential
Tajik personality. It has also acknowledged the Taliban through its presence at
the start of the talks of the Afghan parties in Doha in September.
This is not
enough. It must shed its inhibitions and meaningfully engage the Taliban
despite its deep Pakistani connections. India has to keep an eye on Afghan
developments, for events are on the move even in these fading weeks of the
Trump administration.
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/india-must-keep-an-eye-on-afghan-affairs-183048
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Why Joe
Biden’s Choice For US Defence Secretary Isn’t Just About China
By
Rajesh Rajagopalan
11
December, 2020
US
President-elect Joe Biden’s choice of Lloyd Austin, an Army general who headed
the US Central Command, as the Secretary of Defense has raised concerns about
the Democrat’s foreign policy, especially towards the Indo-Pacific and China.
For a number of reasons, these concerns are overblown. The state of US-China relations
probably depend more on China than the US, but even more so on the underlying
conditions of international politics and the balance of power in the region.
While not inevitable, the overwhelming likelihood is of conflict between the US
and China, irrespective of who the US Defense Secretary is, or indeed, who the
US President is.
The cabinet
choices of incoming US administrations are always tricky because they have to
cater to different groups that make up the coalition that claim to have helped
win the election as well as different groups that the new administration will
need to depend on for future domestic political fights. This dynamic is
particularly important with Biden because his was a fairly narrow victory, in
which he squeaked through with margins of a few thousand votes in three
critical states, Arizona, Georgia and Wisconsin. Illustratively, in each of
these states, the third-placed Libertarian party won more votes than the
margin. While Biden has a significant lead in total votes cast nationally, this
is a meaningless number in the context of the US presidential election.
Even more
importantly, Biden could be the first Democratic Party president elected
without controlling both houses of Congress since 1885. This will be decided by
the two run-off Senate elections in Georgia, slated for early January. If the
Democrats lose even one of these, Republicans will have a clear majority in the
Senate. This will be a critical obstacle to Biden, especially since it is the
Senate that approves presidential appointments. But even if the Democrats win
both, there are continuing internal differences between various factions in the
party. Indeed, Biden may have picked Austin partly as a consequence of
opposition from the Left-wing of the Democrats to Michèle Flournoy, who was
initially considered the front-runner for the post. Moreover, Biden had
repeatedly promised ‘a cabinet that looked like America’, which is not easy
considering the demands from different groups. Biden’s justification for
picking Austin, which itself is an indictment of the internal disagreements
about the choice, emphasised that the US Army general “will be the first
African American to helm the Defense Department”.
A choice
with a reason
While
Biden’s choice is understandable because of these pressures, foreign policy
analysts have pointed to Austin’s lack of familiarity with China and the
Indo-Pacific, the looming security challenge that the US faces. China was not
even mentioned in Biden’s justification for Austin’s selection. These concerns
are growing because, in addition to not mentioning China, both Biden and Austin
used the older term ‘Asia Pacific’ instead of the more recent formulation,
‘Indo-Pacific’. It harks to the possibility that a Biden administration might
seek a new compact with China. This fits with the views of what Thomas Wright,
a close observer of US foreign policy trends, has characterised as ‘the
restorationists’ wing of Democratic foreign policy thinking. Biden picking John
Kerry for a newly created cabinet position as a ‘climate envoy’ may be another
indication of the ascendancy of the restorationists.
Still, the
concerns about the Biden administration’s China policy may be overblown. For
one, Biden clearly sees some of these appointments as a sop to the Left-wing
within the Democratic coalition, and it may not be an indicator that Biden will
seek an accommodation with China. More importantly, even if Biden were so
inclined, it is not entirely his choice to make. Whether there will be a
deepening conflict between the US and China is also dependent on Beijing’s
choices. China has been the driver of the increasingly tense international
condition, with its harsh ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’, its hostage-taking, and its
use of trade to coerce other countries near and far. None of this is a
defensive response to the conditions that China faces but an offensive tendency
that has many roots. One is China’s growing power. As countries become
stronger, the areas and issues they consider as vital to their national
security also expand. China is no different.
China’s
game too
In China’s
case, however, this natural expansion of interest is exacerbated by the
hyper-nationalism that the Chinese regime has fostered, an inclination that
makes the country emotionally brittle and defensive when there is no need to be
and thus prone to picking unnecessary fights. In addition, there is a
strategic-cultural element that makes China think it is a civilisational State
to which smaller neighbours must kowtow. Add to the mix Xi Jinping’s own messianic
view of China’s and his place in history. Much of this is already baked into
the situation and there is little that Biden can do about it, making the
likelihood of a conflictual US-China relations rather difficult to avoid, short
of a dramatic change within China itself.
It is, of
course, understandable that Biden might want to focus on the many domestic
problems that the US faces, including its economy. But what is equally true is
that no great power has willingly relinquished leadership because leadership
brings with it benefits that far outweigh the costs. Biden is likely to want to
further push US allies and partners on burden-sharing. This is something that
President Donald Trump did haphazardly but it has been a long-standing issue in
the US’ relations with its partners. But to expect that Biden will do more than
that will require an unlikely American exceptionalism in great power politics.
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Rajesh
Rajagopalan is a professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru
University (JNU), New Delhi. Views are personal.
https://theprint.in/opinion/why-joe-biden-choice-for-us-defence-secretary-isnt-just-about-china/564275/
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