By New Age Islam Edit
Bureau
20 October
2020
• Withdrawal of Tanishq Ad Indicates A Larger
Malaise in Our Society, Where the Love Jihad Bogey Runs Riot
By Zakia Soman
• It’s Bollywood; Religion Is Just Not Part Of
The Plot
By Anupama Chopra
• Pakistan Interested In Theatre, Not Popular
Welfare Or In Normalising Ties With India
By Vivek Katju
• Bangladesh’s Rise Is an Opportunity for
India, But Is Overshadowed By Negative Domestic Politics
By C. Raja Mohan
• Pakistan Army Emotionally Blackmails Its
Population with Its Own Idea of India
By Amarjit Singh
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Withdrawal of Tanishq Ad Indicates A Larger
Malaise in Our Society, Where the Love Jihad Bogey Runs Riot
By Zakia Soman
October 20,
2020
The
withdrawal of the Tanishq ad celebrating interfaith marriage and harmony is
symptomatic of the larger malaise that afflicts our society today. It
highlights yet another failure to act on part of the law and order machinery.
It makes a mockery of policies such as ease of doing business as one of our
biggest industrial houses is made helpless in the face of violent threats. It
signifies what a deeply patriarchal society we continue to be in the age of
internet. Lastly, it shows how helpless we, the citizens of India, are in the
face of rising fanaticism.
Critics
said it would have been OK if the ad had featured a Muslim woman married to a
Hindu man! Many politicians also seem to be caught up in medieval notions of
communities’ ownership over women. The actress and MP Nusrat Jahan was hugely
trolled for marrying her beloved who belongs to another faith. In the Hadiya
case, a Kerala court made constitutionally unacceptable and deeply patriarchal
observations while nullifying the marriage of a 26-year-old woman and handing
over her custody to her parents!
Responding
to a question in Parliament, the junior home minister has stated that there has
not been a single registered case of love jihad. And yet this bogey is deployed
time and again with impunity by those who have nothing substantial to offer to
the electorate. Going by the recent utterances of a senior minister, it is
scheduled to be the next election plank in Assam. It comes in handy to demonise
communities and polarise the social climate to gain votes. The beneficiaries
are those who are fond of labelling others as anti-national while they do
immense harm to the fabric of the nation.
Increasingly,
such politics is at loggerheads with the world view, ideas and practices of
many empowered Indians. Surely, the Tanishq ad must be backed by market
research to portray interfaith harmony as a cherished ideal of upwardly mobile
consumers. As the economy advances and the middle class expands, more and more
young Indians would acquire education, knowledge, newer experiences and come to
hold liberal views. More and more young women and men would study and work
together. Some of them may fall in love and marry even as they may continue to
practise their own religion individually.
Many
interfaith couples have come forward to share their stories of harmony post the
Tanishq episode. This would be the lived secularism of empowered modern day
Indians. Or are we now going to insist that young adults must check the
antecedents – religion, caste, sub caste, gotra etc – before falling in love?
Clearly, those raising this bogey know nothing about love. Nor are they aware
of the aspirations of young India.
The
question arises as to what is New India that the prime minister frequently
refers to. Is it an India where self-appointed guardians of religion won’t
allow a positive message of interfaith harmony being portrayed in an ad? Is it
an India where corporates or artists or young adults have to seek the
permission of hate-mongers to be able to live freely? We remember the bullying
by fanatical forces in the past. We remember events such as the ban on The
Satanic Verses, the hounding of MF Hussain and the arrests of cartoonists. The
government would do well to give protection to business entities and to all
citizens against such onslaughts. The bullies on social media and in society
cannot be allowed to hold everyone to ransom. They can’t be deciding which ad
or film can or cannot be released. Such a scenario would be a case of multiple
governance failures.
The Special
Marriages Act must be strengthened and popularised to enable Indian citizens to
marry as per their free choice. The problematic provisions of this law, such as
one month notice for objections by third parties, should be repealed. Clearly,
these provisions are violative of the constitutional principles of equality and
privacy. Young lovers being hounded by bigots out to protect community honour
must be given legal protection. The police must apprehend and jail those
lumpens who in the name of love jihad intervene in the private matter of
marriage between consenting adults.
Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao is amongst the flagship schemes of
the government. Clearly, the government must do more to protect the girl’s
right to autonomy over her life choices. And yes, she could be a girl from any
faith.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/withdrawal-of-tanishq-ad-indicates-a-larger-malaise-in-our-society-where-the-love-jihad-bogey-runs-riot/
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It’s Bollywood; Religion Is Just Not Part Of
The Plot
By Anupama Chopra
Oct 16,
2020
In
Mee Raqsam, released this August, a Muslim teen learns Bharatanatyam, a marker
of cinema’s inclusivity.
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“I can very
proudly say that I’m a part of this community,” actor Vikrant Massey said of
Bollywood, in an interview last month. “We are the most liberal, we are the
most democratic, we are the most inclusive society.” I’d agree.
The Hindi
film industry may be guilty of nepotism, elitism, sexism, colour-bias,
stereotyping and a dumbing-down of things, but the ecosystem has never been communal
or exclusionary. In the nearly 30 years that I have been a film journalist, I
can’t recall one conversation in which an artist or technician’s religion was
mentioned. Or hearing that anyone got or didn’t get a job because of it.
Diwali is
usually celebrated at parties thrown by both Aamir Khan and the Bachchans. I
remember the industry converging at a lavish Eid celebration at Shah Rukh
Khan’s house right after the release of Chennai Express. Many film families,
including Salman Khan’s, bring a Ganpati idol home during Ganesh Chaturthi.
Bollywood’s
is a syncretic culture. Which might be due more to pragmatism than
progressiveness. Everyone here is chasing the Holy Grail — a blockbuster — and
will work with whoever serves the cause. The supreme deity worshipped is the
box office.
Secularism
has a long history in the industry. In his biography, Sahir Ludhianvi: The
People’s Poet, author Akshay Manwani quotes the writer Khwaja Ahmad Abbas, who,
like Sahir, was part of the Progressive Writers’ Movement.
Abbas is
writing about a procession for communal harmony organised in Bombay on the eve
of Independence, in 1947. In the procession were members from 52 film industry
associations. As it moved from Gateway of India to Bandra, Abbas writes that
the procession passed “through exclusively Hindu and Muslim areas, thus
removing the unseen barriers that were dividing Bombay into little bits of
‘Hindu Bombay’ and ‘Muslim Bombay’.”
In the
procession, which Abbas describes as a ‘grand success’, were Prithviraj Kapoor
and his young sons Raj Kapoor and Shammi Kapoor, Balraj Sahni, Chetan Anand and
Dev Anand; in another truck rode the writers Kaifi Azmi, Sahir Ludhianvi and
Majrooh Sultanpuri.
A show of
strength like this seems impossible today. Bollywood is polarised along
political lines. The economic impact of the pandemic and almost four months of
battering following Sushant Singh Rajput’s tragic death have left the industry
fractured and devastated.
Conversations
are thick with dread and paranoia. But the essence of inclusion remains the
same. As Javed Akhtar said to me recently: “When it comes to movie-making,
communalism or regionalism or any bias will not work... They can’t afford to be
communal. Only those people who don’t have direct stakes can be communal.”
Is this
what makes the powers that be so nervous? Is that why there is such a focused
effort to muzzle artists with fear and trolling? Which has been effective, at
least for now. Artists are lying low because they are interested in telling
stories, not in getting caught in cultural crossfire that results in shrill
abuse on social media and calls for bans on the work they have created.
But in the
long run, this approach cannot work. Because film is a collaborative art built
on talent. In the film Mee Raqsam (released this August; directed by Baba Azmi,
presented by Shabana Azmi and dedicated to their father, Kaifi Saab, who was an
ardent advocate of India’s composite culture), the protagonist Salim puts it
eloquently. Defending the right of his teenage daughter to learn Bharatanatyam,
Salim says, “Kala ka koi mazhab nahin hota.” Exactly.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/bollywood/it-s-bollywood-religion-is-just-not-part-of-the-plot-says-anupama-chopra/story-9SxhxMxDArOvNpch8oQtkJ.html
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Pakistan Interested In Theatre, Not Popular
Welfare or In Normalising Ties with India
By Vivek Katju
Oct 20,
2020
Moeed
Yusuf, special assistant to the Pakistan PM ‘on national security division and
strategic policy planning’, gave a long interview to a well-known Indian TV
personality last week. Yusuf, an academic with a background, inter alia, in
India-Pakistan studies, has been in his job since December last year. Earlier,
he had a long stint with the US Institute of Peace, a US Congress funded
think-tank in Washington DC.
Yusuf had
sought an Indian media platform since some time to assert his establishment’s
propagandist views to an Indian audience. His offer was ignored till he was
interviewed recently. He used the interview to peddle the themes in a highly
offensive manner that Pakistan has been pursuing against India, especially
since the constitutional changes in J&K in 2019. These themes are: the
illegitimacy of the constitutional changes, allegations of India supporting
Pakistani Taliban and Balochi nationalist groups that Pakistan claims have
undertaken terrorist acts on its territory, the nature of the Sangh Parivar’s
ideology, which it claims is casting a malign shadow on the region, and Pakistan’s
adherence to the International Court of Justice’s ruling in the Kulbhushan
Jadhav case.
After
spouting venom against India on all these issues, Yusuf claimed that Pakistan
had received Indian messages expressing a desire to have a conversation between
the two countries. As he put it ‘…in the past year, we’ve got the messages
about a desire of (sic) conversation….’ He said Pakistan would like to first
ascertain ‘whether there is intent to talk to get somewhere’. He expressed the
apprehension that India only wished to talk to show the world that everything
is ‘settled’ between India-Pakistan. In addition, he laid down the condition
that talks would only take place if Kashmiris were a party to them. The
Ministry of External Affairs did well to set the record straight by
categorically denying that messages for talks were sent to Pakistan.
Yusuf is
being lauded in Pakistan for succeeding in strongly conveying ‘home truths’,
and at substantial length to India, and that too on an Indian programme. While
this may give the Pakistani establishment some satisfaction, will it succeed in
effectively pushing forward globally the Pakistani line on India? This is
doubtful, not only because the facts are at odds with Pakistani assertions, but
also because Pakistan lacks credibility on issues relating to terrorism, social
harmony and democratic values and on J&K-related issues as well. This also
applies to the follow-up on the Jadhav matter in the ICJ.
Pakistan
has, for long, emphasised that India is involved in sponsoring terrorism on its
soil through disaffected Pathans and Balochis. It wishes to do so to dilute the
international focus on Pakistani terror in its neighbourhood. The entire
purpose of the Jadhav abduction and putting him on display was to convince
global opinion that India was undertaking terrorist acts against Pakistan, but
it has simply made no headway in this propaganda exercise. Now, another attempt
has begun with direct allegations that Yusuf made in the interview, including
the charge that Indian representatives were in touch with the mastermind of the
horrific Army Public School terrorist attack in 2014. This particular reference
is an attempt to shift attention from the Mumbai attack and Pakistan’s
continuing sponsorship of terrorism through tanzeems like the LeT and JeM that
are based on its soil.
Pakistan’s
continuing anguish is that except for China, all major countries have not been
bothered by the J&K constitutional changes, and except for Turkey and
Malaysia, no important Islamic country has spoken against it. The Arab
peninsular states have ignored Pakistan’s desire for a meeting of the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation meeting at the foreign minister level on
Kashmir. The administrative steps that were taken in J&K after August 5,
2019, attracted adverse attention, but now that too has muted. It is unlikely
that any country will pay attention to the wild assertion that the Kashmir
situation is imploding. The Pakistani establishment has succeeded only in
instilling this belief in its country’s public for its own institutional
interests and to divert attention from the sharpening of the domestic political
situation.
Pakistan’s
claim that it has fulfilled ICJ’s order to ensure that consular access is given
to India to meet Jadhav is simply wrong. The meetings of consular officials and
their nationals in a foreign state’s custody cannot be monitored by officials
of the foreign state. If they are, the purpose of giving an opportunity to the
national to be able to talk to his government’s representatives freely and in
confidence is lost. The Jadhav case is before the Islamabad High Court, but its
judges too have not ordered such access, despite all their attempts to show
that they are acting impartially. It is impossible to believe that any
Pakistani court can show the courage to do justice in the Jadhav case;
certainly, the Pakistani judiciary’s track record is largely one of bending
before its country’s establishment.
Pakistan is
taking comfort in the unhappiness in some liberal global circles at the social
and cultural direction of the Modi government. It obviously wishes to align the
liberals’ criticism to its own stands on the J&K issue, and also on
terrorism. What Pakistan is overlooking is that there is, to put it mildly,
scepticism about its internal and external policy choices. This will be
enhanced by it giving a clean chit to China on that country’s treatment of
Uighur Muslims.
As long as
Pakistan does not change course fundamentally, it has no real future. The Yusuf
interview is a confirmation that the Pakistani establishment is interested in
theatre, not popular welfare or in normalising relations with India, despite
his repeated claims that it seeks peace with India.
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Vivek
Katju is Ex-secretary, Ministry of External Affairs
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/what-pakistan-really-wants-158279
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Bangladesh’s Rise Is An Opportunity For India,
But Is Overshadowed By Negative Domestic Politics
By C. Raja Mohan
October 20,
2020
The
International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook published last week
has triggered much outrage in India. The provocation was the IMF’s prediction
that Bangladesh’s per capita GDP will overtake that of India this year. The
projected difference is rather small — $1,888 to $1,877 — and unlikely to last
beyond this year. But it offered enough ammunition for a political attack on
the NDA government’s economic record.
There are
many reasons for anxiety about India’s economic slowdown in recent years. But
in using Dhaka’s impressive economic performance to attack Delhi’s, India is
missing the bigger story about the strategic consequences of Bangladesh’s
economic rise.
International
development institutions are convinced that the rest of the subcontinent and
developing countries around the world can learn much from Dhaka’s experience —
the so-called “Bangladesh model”. Our focus here is different. It is about the
regional implications of Bangladesh’s economic success — five of them stand
out.
First,
rapid and sustained economic growth in Bangladesh has begun to alter the
world’s mental maps of the subcontinent. Over the last five decades and more,
South Asia, for most purposes, has meant India and Pakistan. The other
countries were generally described as the “smaller” states of the region.
Bangladesh was never really small; its population today stands at about 160
million. It is demographically the eighth-largest nation in the world.
But it did
not seem to matter. The global interest, of course, was riveted on Pakistan —
its nuclear weapons, claims on Kashmir, wars with India, role in Afghanistan
and its cosy relationship with international terrorism. The economic rise of
Bangladesh is changing some of that. If there is no end to bad news from
Pakistan, Bangladesh provides a positive narrative about the subcontinent’s
prospects.
The second
implication is about the changing economic weights of Bangladesh and Pakistan
in South Asia. This year, Bangladesh’s GDP is expected to reach about $320
billion; the IMF did not have the 2020 numbers from Pakistan to report but in
2019, Pakistan’s economy was at $275 billion.
Even more
consequently, while Bangladesh continues to grow, the IMF suggests that
Pakistan’s economy will contract further this year. A decade ago, Pakistan’s
economy was $60 billion larger than Bangladesh. Today, Bangladesh’s weight is
bigger than Pakistan by the same margin.
A US dollar
today gets you 85 Bangladeshi taka and 162 Pakistani rupees. The trend line is
unlikely to change in the near future — for Bangladesh has controlled its
population growth and Pakistan has not. Dhaka has a grip over its inflation and
Islamabad does not.
There is no
question that Pakistan’s negative geopolitical weight in the world will endure,
thanks to its muscular foreign policies driven by the army. Bangladesh does not
have an atomic arsenal like Pakistan nor does it weaponise violent religious
extremism; but its growing economic muscle will help Dhaka steadily accumulate
geopolitical salience in the years ahead.
Third,
Bangladesh’s economic growth can accelerate regional integration in the eastern
subcontinent. Whether one likes it or not, the region’s prospects for a
collective economic advance are rather dim. Thanks to Pakistan’s opposition to
economic cooperation with India and its support for cross-border terror, the
main regional forum for the subcontinent, the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (Saarc), is in a coma.
Instead of merely
praying for the revival of Saarc, Delhi could usefully focus on promoting
regionalism among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. The BBIN sub-regional
forum — involving the four, activated in the middle of last decade — has not
advanced fast enough. It is time for Delhi and Dhaka to take a fresh look at
the forum and find ways to widen the scope and pace of BBIN activity.
Meanwhile, there is growing interest in Bhutan and Nepal for economic
integration with Bangladesh.
Fourth, the
economic success of Bangladesh is drawing attention from a range of countries
in East Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. The US, which
traditionally focused on India and Pakistan, has woken up to the possibilities
in Bangladesh. That the US Deputy Secretary of State, Stephen Biegun, travelled
last week from Delhi to Dhaka rather than Rawalpindi, says something about
Washington’s changing South Asian perspective. Bangladesh does not want to get
into the fight between Beijing and Washington, but the great power wooing of
Dhaka is bound to intensify in the new geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.
Finally,
the economic rise of Bangladesh could boost India’s national plans to
accelerate the development of its eastern and northeastern states. Consider
this: Bangladesh’s economy is now one-and-a-half times as large as that of West
Bengal; better integration between the two would provide a huge boost for
eastern India. So would connectivity between India’s landlocked Northeast and
Bangladesh.
Undoubtedly,
there has been some progress in strengthening economic ties and connectivity
between eastern India and Bangladesh in recent years. But so much more is
possible — those prospects are overshadowed by negative politics in India.
In Punjab,
the chief ministers of both Congress and Akali Dal have often demanded greater
economic engagement with West Punjab. This sentiment was reciprocated by the
Sharif brothers in Lahore, but crushed by Rawalpindi’s strong resistance. In
the east, Delhi and Dhaka are eager to promote greater cooperation; but there
has been little political enthusiasm in Kolkata. In Assam, the issue of
migration continues to impose major political constraints.
Prime
Minister Narendra Modi deserves much political credit for getting parliamentary
approval of the boundary settlement in 2015, despite the opposition in his own
party. The UPA government, which negotiated the boundary pact in 2011, could
not muster sufficient political support. Modi also accepted the 2014
international arbitration award on the maritime boundary dispute between India
and Bangladesh.
But the
very positive dynamic surrounding the bilateral relationship in Modi’s first
term has, unfortunately, acquired a negative tone in the second amidst the
poisonous rhetoric in India around the Citizenship Amendment Act. There is much
room for course correction in Delhi and to shift the focus from legacy issues
to future possibilities.
Bangladesh
is getting ready to celebrate the golden jubilee of its liberation from
Pakistan in March next year. Modi, who plans to join the celebrations, must use
the special occasion to jointly develop and pursue with Dhaka an ambitious
framework for shared prosperity. That would help India consolidate the golden
chapter in India-Bangla relations that Modi has sought to script with Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina.
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/international-monetary-fund-world-economic-outlook-gdp-bangladesh-india-economy-coronavirus-6792444/
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Pakistan Army Emotionally Blackmails Its
Population with Its Own Idea Of India
By Amarjit Singh
19 October
2020
The idea of
Pakistan rests on the elite Indian Muslims’ sense of being culturally and
historically distinct to Hindus of India. Muhammad Ali Jinnah conceived
Pakistan as an ideal democratic Muslim State and stated that the constitution
of Pakistan should embody the essential principles of Islam, because the
religion’s idealism preaches democracy, equality, justice and fair play to
everybody. Poet-philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal’s idea of Pakistan was not based
on a European model of a nation-State, but on “an acute understanding that
political power was essential to the higher ends of establishing God’s law.”
Over 70
years after its birth, the harsh realities of the ‘idea of Pakistan’, contrary
to the ideals of Jinnah, have emerged to make it a State which, in the words of
Hussain Haqqani, “is a volatile, semi-authoritarian, national security state,
which failed to run itself consistently and under constitutional order or rule
of law”. It has become a “greedy state, unsatisfied with the status quo”. The
Muslim League was oligarchic in nature and Pakistan’s elite embraced this
structure, thus becoming a feudal society. To be in politics, one has to be a
feudal lord, and to retain feudal lordship, one needs the protection or
blessings of the army. In Pakistan, the nexus between the politicians and
Generals is well established, and are easily interchangeable. Most Generals in
Pakistan, after retirement, hold key positions in the civil economy. The third
pole of power that has emerged is the fundamental Muslim clergy.
A few years
after coming into existence, Pakistan’s leadership had an idealist outlook but
with a Muslim ideology background. The failure of governance and deterioration
of the economy brought about a debate — ‘who is a better Pakistani?’ This
debate had to be away from the issue of governance or economy because the elite
and leadership of Pakistan had no laurels to boast of. So, it veered to decide
‘who is a better Muslim’. From Zia-ul-Haq onwards, all leadership played around
the sentiment of ‘a better Muslim’. In this process, the Muslim clerics gained
prominence because the leadership sought reassurance of their being a ‘better
Muslim’. From this rose fundamentalism. The clerics became a force to reckon
with, and created an army of devout Muslims from their madrassas that later
took shape as the jihadi movement and has culminated into terrorism.
Opposition
to India is a factor that has forever grown as a major sentiment in Pakistan,
benefitting these interest groups. There is inherent unification of the
Pakistani population on the subject of parity with India in all spheres. The
innate desire to wrest Kashmir from India overrides sanity and sagacity of
military strategy, which reflects in the initiation of four wars with India—
there is no victory to show but the distortion of history will continue to keep
the myth of infallibility of the Pakistan army alive. In the ‘idea of
Pakistan’, the term nationalism is defined by two factors — being Muslim and being
different from India in a better sense. Acquiescing to India in any sense is
tantamount to accepting that the ‘two-nation theory’, which forms the basis of
the ‘idea of Pakistan’, was incorrect in the first place.
Assault On Constitution
Pakistan’s
constitution was first approved in 1956, under Prime Minister Muhammad Ali, but
stood abrogated in 1958 after a military coup d’état. The country’s second
constitution, under General Ayub Khan, was approved in 1962. The revised
document institutionalised the intervention of the military in domestic
politics — the president or the defence minister of Pakistan must be a person
who had held the rank of Lieutenant-General in the army.
The 1962
constitution was suspended in 1969 when Gen Yahya Khan was appointed as the
chief martial law administrator. In 1970, there was a constitutional crisis,
which ultimately led to the separation of East Pakistan into an independent
state of Bangladesh. The 1969 constitution was abrogated in 1972. The 1973
constitution was the first in Pakistan to be framed by elected representatives
under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Unlike the 1962 constitution, it gave Pakistan a
parliamentary democracy with a very strong Islamic content. However, even this
couldn’t stop Pakistan’s coup-hungry Generals.
In 1977, a
military coup d’état was conducted by Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq,
which deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and imposed martial law. Then again, in 1999,
General Pervez Musharraf arrested Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and imposed
martial law till the time he appointed himself as the president of Pakistan.
There were unsuccessful coup attempts in 1951, 1980, and 1995 as well.
Amid this
continued struggle for power, violence has been a stark reality in the politics
of Pakistan. The country’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was shot dead,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged, his daughter Benazir was shot dead, Zia-ul-Haq
died under mysterious circumstances, and General Pervez Musharraf survived two
assignation attempts. The list of State leaders and clergy heads who have been
violently ‘eliminated’ is endless.
The Threat Perception Cycle
Pakistan
inherited 33 per cent of the British Army whereas it got 19 per cent of the
population and 17 per cent of the revenue base. The disproportional strength of
the army needed to be justified. So, the threat from India, Afghanistan, and
USSR was made larger.
The
oversizing of the initial threat perception, partly egged on by Western powers,
has shaped Pakistan as a security seeking State, giving unlimited powers to the
military. The fact that the Western powers were partly fighting the Cold War
through Pakistani territory and their army, led to the Pakistan Generals
internalising the Cold War as their own war. This belief rationalised their
involvement in Afghanistan and legitimised increasing the size of the army.
Pakistan’s
perceived threat to its existence from India on one side and Russia on the
other, coupled with its false narrative of playing a party to the West in its
the global war on terror, became a ‘justifiable’ reason for acquiring greater
capabilities for the army. All this came at the behest of Pakistan’s social
development and economy. The Pakistan army emotionally blackmails its
population. The Ayub Khan doctrine exemplifies this aspect as it states:
Pakistan
State is under siege constantly.
Pakistan
military is the only guarantor of Pakistan’s survival.
India is
Pakistan’s permanent enemy and, therefore, Pakistan has to outsmart India in
all spheres.
Pakistan
occupies a strategic location, and therefore, there will always be a power that
will be willing to underwrite Pakistan’s economy and military action (making it
a ‘Dependent State’ by design).
The Generations Of Pakistan Army Officers
The
Pakistan Army officers have had varied influences that have shaped their
ideology.
— The
British generation (1947-55): These officers received their initial
professional training in the British Indian Army and had served in combat by
the time of Partition. Some had received their training at Royal Military
College, Sandhurst, and some at the Indian Military Academy, Dehradun. Ayub
Khan belonged to the former group, and his friend and successor as
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, Mohammed Musa, to the latter. It is
often assumed that the Sandhurst-trained officers were superior soldiers.
However, there is substantial evidence to indicate that the IMA officers were
better qualified and more professional in their outlook. They shaped the Army
into a professional unit with a secular outlook aka the British Army.
— The
American generation 1955-71: After Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (later
Central Treaty Organisation, or CENTO) in 1955, the ‘American generation of
Pakistan Army officers’ were fully exposed to the American philosophy,
re-shaping its military strategy. The American generation had an exaggerated
estimate of their martial qualities, with some believing that one Pakistani
soldier equaled ten or more Indians. After long emphasising caution and the
conservation of men and material, Pakistanis were exposed to mechanisation, the
lavish use of ammunition, and an informal personal style. To be ‘modern’ was to
emulate the Americans in their breezy, casual, but apparently effective and
expensive ways. Local strategy gave way to global thinking and ‘grand strategy’
became the norm. This seriously distorted the army’s professionalism.
— The
Pakistani generation (post-1971): The
outstanding characteristic of those who joined the Pakistan Army in the
post-Bangladesh years was that they were the purist ‘Pakistani’ of all. They
were representative of a wider society and class, had less exposure to American
professional influence, and believed the US had let Pakistan down. They joined
the army when its reputation and prestige had plummeted, and their professional
careers and world outlook were shaped by the 1971 debacle. Zia’s emphasis on
Islam, in an already conservative society, encouraged Islamic zealotry in the
army. Zia’s second major contribution was the revival and legitimisation of
irregular or covert warfare and the rise of the Mujahideen.
— The
current generation: The next generation of officers comes from the middle-class
and have joined the Pakistan Army simply to improve their standard of living
and as a vehicle for social mobility and political power. Some of these
officers tasted power during the Zia years; others have managed to enter a
variety of civilian institutions — from airports to Pakistan’s power supply.
They consider themselves to be less well-off, but no less deserving than their
generational predecessors, and they appear to be as professionally competent,
but lack the elan of their predecessors.
Pakistan’s Penchant For Grand Strategy
Pakistan’s
strategic thinking has been greatly influenced by its association with the US.
Jinnah, before the formation of Pakistan, told the Life Magazine, stating that
it was his view that Pakistan’s geo-strategic location has made it imperative
for the US policy makers to forge an alliance with the country. The US needs
Pakistan more than Pakistan needs the US. He said that Pakistan is the pivot of
the world, placed on the frontier where the future of the world would revolve.
Jinnah also said that the rising US interest in countries along the Soviet
boundaries will be considered for military aid — “since Pakistan is not very
far from Russia, the US would build our Army and give us the arms to prevent
Russia from walking”. Then, true in his prediction, in 1947 came the Truman
Doctrine, a US policy pledging aid to nations threatened by Soviet
expansionism. Jinnah knew this through his genius or was party to this game
plan even before Partition.
Pakistan
inherited the nuances of the Great Game (Afghanistan) with the departure of the
British from the sub-continent. It converted this inheritance into a strategic
gold mine, which has kept it afloat with an un-proportionally strong army,
funded by a strategic need of the US. Pakistan has been involved with the US in
its global strategy and the US is constrained to involve Pakistan’s officials
in parts of its planning because the execution of this strategy lies in the
hands of the Pakistanis. This involvement has given the leadership of Pakistan
an exposure to the planning and conduct of grand strategy, and in the conduct
of large intelligence operations, especially in a proxy war, a war that is all
about credible denial.
Pakistan’s
leadership has developed a penchant to apply grand designs to all its
endeavors. The concept of Strategic Depth, global pivot, the 1965 war, the
Punjab insurgency, the designs in Kashmir and the Kargil war are all outcomes
of this exposure. The fifth generation of warfare is all about grand designs
and making people believe in the narrative. The inputs of this penchant for
grand strategy to its strategic culture have led to overreach in both military and
diplomatic alliances. The illusion of conducting a successful fifth-generation
war against its adversaries exists in the minds of the military officers. Now,
they have China on their side that balances the US. Pakistan is fully
exploiting the new Cold War that seems to be developing between China and the
US. Past experience with playing the buffer between the US and Russia will be
of great importance to Pakistan.
The Emotion Of Humiliation
According
to Dominique Moisi, (the author of The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of
Fear, Humiliation, and Hope Are Reshaping the World) humiliation means
remaining confined to a future that is in stark contrast to the glorified past.
Pakistan exemplifies an aspiration that has been lost. The strong revisionist nature
of the Pakistan leadership has glorified a history of victories that never was.
The humiliation in its unsuccessful search for parity with India is leading to
despair. The despair of the ‘if I can’t reach you, I will drag you down’ kind
can be noticed in Pakistan. This emotion, accompanied by hatred or anger, is
the main cause of terrorism.
In
Pakistan, there is an ingrained hatred and anger towards India (a key
ingredient for violence as per Carl von Clausewitz’s Trinity of War). The
emotion of humiliation disorientates the leadership of Pakistan from making
rational decisions. Suicidal tendencies and extreme impoverishment with a sense
of humiliation are ideal candidates for terrorism. The two — emotion of
humiliation amongst its leadership and the available recruits for terrorism —
make for a violent and unethical environment, which is regressive for
development. Somehow, rather than understanding the serious consequences of
distressing the society as a whole, the leadership in Pakistan is considering
this to be a strategic asset.
Revisionist Approach
Pakistan
does NOT seem to like its history. It refuses to acknowledge any history prior
to 1947 because it connects it with India. It has continuously attempted to
change its historical discourse through revising text-books, military
literature and a hostile media blitz. American political scientist C. Christine
Fair describes Pakistan as a persistent revisionist because the dynamics
between the army and domestic politics do not allow any change in current
policies even when there is positive evidence of its failure. There are serious
attempts to revise the status quo with India in its quest to attain parity. It
is aggressively pursuing expansionism in its policy towards Kashmir and
Afghanistan. Pakistan’s persistent revisionism has cost it dearly to the extent
that it has threatened the security of the State. The lessons of history are
being lost.
The whole
basis of a nation and a State are the people and their core beliefs. In
Pakistan, the army’s core beliefs are projected as nationalism and the people
have to conform. For prosperity, people must be happy and the army is there for
their security, to pursue economic development. In Pakistan, the prosperity of
the army is paramount and the people are working to secure its future.
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Major General Amarjit Singh, VSM (Retd)
commanded a Division in the Northern Sector. He writes on defence matters and
is a visiting faculty at Panjab University. Views are personal.
https://theprint.in/opinion/pakistan-army-emotionally-blackmails-its-population-with-its-own-idea-of-india/526013/
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