By Ayesha Siddiqa
25 January,
2021
It was in
August 2018 that Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, banged his
fist on the table to announce that, henceforth, the country’s foreign policy
will be made at the Foreign Office. He intended to post career diplomats in
foreign missions not just as an expression of control but also to encourage
them. In early 2018, even the Inter-Services Intelligence, or the ISI, had
discovered through a study of the Foreign Office that diplomats were
demotivated because of political appointments in the department, especially at
higher ranks. However, within two years, the foreign minister had to reverse
his policy experiment — there are now quite a few retired military officers
serving as Pakistani ambassadors in the capitals of the world. A career
diplomat in Riyadh was recently shown the door even before the end of his term
and replaced with a retired three-star, Lt General Bilal Akbar.
File
image of the Pakistani military establishment, headed by Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa
| @OfficialDGISPR | Twitter
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While the
change denotes issues with a hybrid regime, it also indicates GHQ Rawalpindi’s
urgency in bringing the country’s Middle East policy under its control. More
importantly, it is about managing relations with the US via the Middle East.
There are critical matters that Rawalpindi needs to communicate privately with
both Washington and Riyadh — recognition of Israel being one of them. This
could possibly be one of the reasons why Lt General Akbar — an officer who owes
his promotion to the position of a three-star in December 2016 to General Qamar
Javed Bajwa, and hence, the Pakistan Army chief’s man — was sent to Saudi Arabia.
Though the rumour mill in Pakistan does not consider the posting beyond an
issue of appeasing an aggrieved General, it is claimed that Akbar was a
contender for the army chief’s position in 2020 but was moved out of the way to
ensure Bajwa’s extension. Currently, he is being dispatched as a confidant to
take care of the Pakistan-Saudi bilateral relationship. Even if there was any
grievance in Akbar’s mind, for now, it has been well taken care of. The
military’s own socio-cultural system tied with punishments and rewards is
beneficial to any chief.
Despite the
fact that ties between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan seem to have nosedived in the
past year-and-a-half, the bilateral relations are not a thing of the past, nor
has the strategic significance reduced. Notwithstanding that both the Saudi
Crown Prince and Prime Minister Imran Khan have vented out their sharp
disagreement, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and General Qamar Javed Bajwa have
remained engaged.
Pakistan Has Fresh Agenda With Saudi, Beyond
Kashmir
In
Islamabad, it is no more about the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) or
Saudi Arabia playing a role in Kashmir. Pakistan has long known it can’t expect
a lot from Riyadh on this issue besides some resolutions. However, the
recognition of Israel has emerged as a new common cause, a matter on which
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are tied, as if by an umbilical cord. Both cannot
move forward without the other. One will not do it unless the other does it.
Although
MbS is keen to have diplomatic ties with Israel, he needs another significant
Muslim State that does not recognise the Jewish State to do the same. There is
sufficient evidence to suggest that the Pakistan Army was keen to go ahead on
the matter. The fact that some of the journalists and propagandists closely
associated with the armed forces, such as Kamran Khan, Mubashar Luqman and
Ahmed Qureshi, spoke in favour of recognising Israel could never have happened
without instructions to signal the Benjamin Netanyahu government and build a
favorable opinion inside the country. That Rawalpindi even got a rabid
religious cleric like Maulana Sherani to give a statement in support of the
Israel idea indicates that the State was making its preparations. Nonetheless,
as sources argued, it was Prime Minister Imran Khan who not only refused but
also got Shah Mahmood Qureshi to oppose the idea, because it would be
politically costly for the PTI leader. The cost of recognising Israel for any
political leader in Pakistan is prohibitive, but more so for Khan. I remember a
former naval chief once lecturing me about how because of the PM’s first
marriage with Jemima Goldsmith, Khan was an Israeli plant.
The prime
minister is not necessarily independent of the military but there are instances
when he exercises his own will, especially when it pertains to his survival.
Bajwa does not intend to throw him out, or wouldn’t punish him for such
disagreement but it seems he has decided to directly watch over the affairs
with Riyadh.
To US via Israel
For
Pakistan, developing ties with Israel is important, especially after the change
of government in Washington. Donald Trump’s Middle East peace plan aimed at
securing Israel’s legitimacy among Muslim countries. With Pakistan, Tel Aviv
too can make gains such as partnering with a State in Iran’s immediate
neighbourhood, especially when the two neighbouring militaries have a history
of suspicion dating back to the 1980s. Despite the military establishment
making tremendous efforts in the past two to three years to contain sectarian conflict
inside Pakistan, which is one of the major issues with Tehran, the suspicion
and resentment between the two countries remain. After change in the US, the
three stakeholders – Netanyahu, MbS, and Bajwa-led Army — find themselves on
the same page: President Joe Biden will support the peace deal but not as
vehemently and one-sidedly as Trump, or at least not without expecting some
concessions for the Palestinians.
While
opening possibilities for Palestinians is a good idea, there is a far bigger
advantage for Pakistan if it makes the move now, when recognition of Israel is
more challenging — it could, therefore, bring greater dividends. Netanyahu and
MbS will also have to struggle more. Thus, an impetus may have to be created
among the three stakeholders. Pakistan and Israeli armed forces are already in
contact, particularly due to them operating on the same side during the recent
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
What Pakistan Gains
Pakistan Sees Three Major Gains In Cooperating
With Israel.
First, it
is interested in buying military technology that it may not get from the US but
could from Tel Aviv as a political dividend. It is claimed that Saudia or
Israel itself could reward Pakistan by paying for military hardware. Second,
Rawalpindi does not want to entirely surrender Israel to India. It’s the same
way it thinks about the US. The idea isn’t to draw a wedge between Delhi and
Tel Aviv which Pakistan understands it cannot. If Israel develops stakes in
Pakistan, it could at some future point be used for conversation with India or
to keep an eye on it. It’s just like when India started to build relations with
Saudi Arabia after 1997/98, the former head of the ISI, Lt General Asad
Durrani, who also served as ambassador in Riyadh, was of the view that Pakistan
did not necessarily see it as a disadvantage. In a conversation with me he said
that while Pakistan could not stop Riyadh from building terms with Delhi for
economic reasons, Islamabad could at some point use it to its benefit. Third,
there is an appreciation in Pakistan’s strategic circles regarding the
influence of the Jewish lobby in the US that Rawalpindi wants to use to its
advantage.
The issue
here is not about challenging the India-US relations, which Pakistan
understands nothing much can be done about, but it doesn’t want Delhi’s voice
to be the only one that falls in Biden’s ears. Moreover, both Islamabad and
Rawalpindi want to keep a steady relationship with Washington that can be used
from time to time, especially in negotiating with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) or continuation of the military-to-military relationship.
Notwithstanding Pakistan’s strategic ties with Beijing, it does not want to be
entirely in China’s camp.
Links with
Washington are already not under the purview of the Foreign Office. Sources in
Islamabad and Washington suggest that a lot of the real communication takes
place between Rawalpindi and the State Department directly, circumventing
Pakistan’s mission in the US capital, which is left to deal with a lot of
day-to-day functioning. The same is likely to happen in Riyadh.
Pakistan
has certainly missed the moment, yet again, when it could have developed ties
with Israel. However, the sharp divide between the military establishment, and
the civilian government that is fast losing control of critical foreign policy
issues is not a good sign. A political government, which is not ready to take
responsibility for this policy means it will be unable to sell it to its
constituents and the society at large. A policy of recognition that it pursued
covertly or sprung at people as a surprise will have unpleasant consequences,
especially for a society like Pakistan, which was educated for decades about
Zionist-Jews being the worst enemies and a major source of all security threat
to the country. A policy for which no one takes responsibility is always
dangerous.
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Ayesha Siddiqa is research associate at SOAS, London, and author of
‘Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy’. Views are personal.
Original Headline: Pakistani General as Riyadh
envoy brings Middle East policy under army. Eyes on Israel
Source: The Print
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