By
Asad Durrani
Jan 12,
2021
Khursheed
Ali Khan was no run-of-the-mill general. Behind a laissez-fair demeanour, he
was a serious practitioner of military art, with a sterling soldierly
character. In a war game, he tasked me with making a plan, but then I suggested
modify it to bring out a few lessons. Nothing unusual, except whenever a
visitor would pick holes in my design, K always clarified why it was forced
upon me.
As NWFP
governor, he asked me -- as I had recently left the service-- to outline a few
ideas on how to address some intractable issues. The paper I wrote was titled
“Three Ks that defy resolution”. These were Kabul, Kashmir and Karachi.
The K word
was to acknowledge the proposal’s sponsor. A quarter century may have elapsed,
but in a discussion the other day when similar subjects came up, I had to
revisit my old thesis. It was based on some ideas that we from the military
used to pester the political governments with, and having headed the National
Defence College, one believed our core issues needed a structured approach. The
concept was heavy on strategy and avoided concrete steps unless they were
required to illustrate an argument.
It was
really self-evident. Issues with a long gestation period -- all three Ks were
brewing for decades -- would need to be thought through for the long haul. Overtime,
there would be developments needing adaptation or modification of original
assumptions, even of plans.
In
Afghanistan, for instance; after the Soviet pull-out, infatuated with the
resistance we realised at great cost that the tribesmen may have pursued a
common agenda against the occupiers, but were now rivals for Kabul’s throne. A
historian in the decision-making echelons would have sounded the right alarm.
Genuine Afghan hands were strongly opposed to using unconventional warriors in
set-piece battles like Jalalabad, and later against the Northern Alliance.
When the
Taliban emerged as an anti-Mujahideen force, its momentum may have surprised
us; but not the old Communist cadres growing beards to drive militia tanks and
fly the helicopters.
Later we may
have factored in the role of spoilers, but our counter-measures were mostly
transactional. India’s Afghan strategy was, of course, Kautilyan, but because
of our neighbourhood advantage it could be contained. But our official sources
exaggerated it to the extent that paranoid Afghans were convinced our
involvement in Afghanistan was essentially to keep India out. After the Soviets
left, America’s interests were never aligned with ours. We still sucked up to
them-- and even believed post-9/11 that our bilateral ties were again
“strategic”.
Besides
improving ties with Iran and Russia, and keeping China and Turkey on board, we
did well to retain leverage with Taliban against great external pressure for
two decades and could thus bring them to the table whenever required. But we
now need some experts inAfghan psyche and those with credibility among the key
factions to steer the intra-Afghan dialogue, or to disengage from this messy
affair.
The Kashmir
imbroglio was no less complex. Surprised by the robustness of the popular surge
for independence in the early 1990s, we never really got a handle over the
multiple challenges such movements present --providing an effective political
umbrella; influencing the militancy so that it didn’t lead to any unintended
consequences; and creating the necessary rapport with resistance groups.
Finding the right mix of military and non-military prongs required a more
subtle direction than swinging between arming the resistance to abandoning it.
Engaging
India in the Composite Dialogue framework was wise, and there may have been
even some collateral benefit in Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s four-point salvo; but
if anyone believed Indians would voluntarily give up their position of
advantage, he should have his head examined. After August 5, 2019, the handling
of developments in the Valley clearly showed there were hardly any experienced
hands in our Kashmir policy cells, and our responses were therefore limited to
cartography and rewriting milestones.
I don’t
think I ever understood the rise and fall of Karachi, but it was quite clear
our once vibrant multi-ethnic megapolis was heading for an implosion – and all
of us with our eyes wide shut.
Even a
cursory look at this narrative suggests issues with roots in history, or simply
too complex, were beyond the depth of our state structures. On core issues, one
needed a core group to charter a course, steer its conduct, and adapt it to the
evolving environment.
A
bureaucratic or politically partisan system could not be entrusted with this --
not only because its key members were mostly on the move, but also as those at
the helm often force the pace to add a feather in their otherwise colourless
cap.
K took the
paper to BB --then in her second incarnation as PM --who didn’t seem terribly
pleased as with the Taliban now taking big strides in Afghanistan, she didn’t
want to share the spoils of the “victory” with a hybrid group that had the
Opposition on board.
Nevertheless,
she appointed a pretty clued-up security adviser, who all by himself had no sway
with the hands-on the Afghan wheel, which only moved in the military track.
Before that Nawaz Sharif had made it clear his Kabul policy would be conducted
by his kitchen cabinet, not the Afghan cell. Soon thereafter he outsourced the
Kashmir struggle to a private contractor. However, both mainstream parties had
a common approach on Karachi: break up the MQM and let the devil take the
hindmost.
It is of
course unfair to put all the blame for fly-by-night policies on political
leadership. Members of the Deep State were reluctant to permit any rank
outsiders, regardless of experience or expertise, in the decision-making
corridors. Who knows when a group, even if dominated by the civil and military
hierarchy, working under the chief executive and essentially in an advisory
role, would get enough traction due to its sound judgment. That could blow the
myth of the State’s claim to total wisdom.
No surprise
there. People in power are always protective of their turf. But the worst part
is that they seldom pick up the courage to tell their political masters, civil
or military, that most of our festering issues may not be fixed in an
estimative timeframe -- and therefore their management should take priority
over a wishful outcome.
A council
of wise men has always been a good idea since Plato’s days.
Original
Headline: The Three Ks: Some old ideas revisited
Source: The Asian Age
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