By
Husain Haqqani
14 August,
2020
Pakistan’s
army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, is set to visit Saudi Arabia in an
effort to end the recent tiff between the partner countries. Foreign minister
Shah Mehmood Qureshi had brought disagreements between Riyadh and Islamabad out
in the open by issuing an ultimatum demanding the Saudis call a meeting of the
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation on the Kashmir issue.
File photo of Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan | Facebook/ImranKhan
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Pakistan
has been dependent on Saudi Arabia for years, seeking economic bailouts and
jobs for unskilled workers whose remittances help Islamabad’s perennial balance
of payments difficulties. But now, miffed Saudis are asking for the immediate
return of short-term loans and have dragged their feet over completing an oil
deal that ensures flow of oil to Pakistan on concessional terms.
General
Bajwa’s intervention to stop the drift in ties affirms the realisation that
Pakistan simply can’t afford to alienate the Saudis. Why, then, did Qureshi
engage in anti-Saudi rhetoric that was unsustainable? To understand that
requires an examination of the overly simplistic populism of Prime Minister
Imran Khan and his backers, and the fantasy of many Pakistanis about an altered
global order, with Pakistan at its centre.
Another
Great Game
For
decades, especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, retired
Pakistani generals and civilian writers on strategic issues have spoken about a
‘new Great Game’ in South and Central Asia that would make Pakistan a
geopolitical ‘pivot’.
This was an
adaptation of British geographer Halford Mackinder’s heartland theory,
submitted in 1904 when Pakistan did not exist, the United States was not yet a
superpower, and airpower or the military applications of satellite and cyber
technologies could not be imagined.
Pakistan’s
pre-9/11 involvement in Afghanistan, its support for jihadi militants as an
instrument of asymmetric warfare, and its close ties with China were all
explained as part of the grand strategy to capitalise on Pakistan’s strategic
location and make it a bigger player on the world stage.
Some
Americans dismissed it as ‘a grand illusion’, especially in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, which forced Pakistan to seek an alliance with the United
States once again. But the theory of Pakistan’s inevitable greatness,
notwithstanding its economic problems and its constant dependence on outside
powers, has persisted among Pakistanis.
Pakistan
At the Centre
The impending
withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, the prospect of a return to power of
the Taliban, and the commitment of an economically stronger China, have all
played a role in cementing the view that Pakistan would emerge as a key player
in a new global order.
According
to this outlook, Pakistan benefits from the impending decline of the United
States and the rise of China as a global superpower. The China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) might add to Pakistan’s debt but it also attaches
Pakistan and China at the hip. And the two countries share hostility towards
India, a country the US and other Western nations see as an ally in their
imminent confrontation with an aggressive, totalitarian China.
Believers
in Pakistan’s inevitable strategic salience expect that after Afghanistan, the
US will also withdraw gradually from the Middle East. In their imagination,
Pakistan would then be China’s link to the Middle East, making it Beijing’s
go-to satrap in tapping Middle East oil and securing Gulf shipping lanes.
The hope is
that Pakistan can then fulfil its old dreams of exercising paramountcy over
Afghanistan, resolving disputes with India (including Kashmir) on its terms,
and finding its rightful place as the Muslim world’s natural leader and sole
nuclear weapons power.
Such
fanciful thinking is championed by several influential voices, including Prime
Minister Imran Khan and his followers. Their allies in Pakistan’s deep state
and permanent establishment see value in these ideas for building a more
positive national narrative. But they are probably a little more pragmatic in
understanding the gap between hopes and reality.
A New
Ertugrul
These days,
Pakistan’s television commentators frequently talk about the country’s
forthcoming grand role in a China-Russia-Turkey-Iran-Pakistan alliance that is
destined to defeat the US-Israel-India partnership. Iran’s ambassador to
Pakistan has encouraged discussions about this five-country alliance, ignoring
the various issues that might hinder cooperation among this diverse grouping.
It is not
unusual to read in a Pakistani newspaper about the post-Covid world order that
would be based on the dreams of Pakistani Islamo-nationalists.
The
rhetoric in Pakistan is not dissimilar to the neo-Ottoman bombast of Turkey’s
Islamist President, Recip Tayyip Erdogan, which ignores Turkey’s currently weak
economic prospects.
Imran Khan
is a huge Erdogan fan and purveys pan-Islamism as the panacea, not only for
Pakistan but for the entire ummah.
Pakistan
has long embraced pan-Islamism, but it was more a device to address the
identity crisis of a nation that was carved out only 73 years ago and conceived
just shortly before that. Most Pakistani leaders understood the limits of
Islamic unity and allied with the West for economic and security reasons. But
Imran Khan seems to believe his own rhetoric.
The
cricketer-turned-politician has encouraged Pakistanis to watch a Turkish drama
serial Ertugrul, supposedly based on the life of the father of the Ottoman
dynasty’s founder, Osman.
Historic
records about Ertugrul are scant but the show’s producers and story writers
have stretched the few sketchy historic references into a 150-episode period
drama.
The show
portrays its hero as a great Muslim warrior who overcomes external enemies and
domestic traitors to emerge victorious in an early phase of what Erdogan once
described as the ongoing “struggle between the crescent and the cross.”
It seems
that Imran Khan shares Erdogan’s vision, with the additional twist of putting
Pakistan in a more important role in bringing down the West in addition to
winning its own battles against Hindu India.
A
Make-Believe World
No one
should be fooled by Imran Khan’s external Westernisation to think that his
description in parliament of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden as a ‘martyr’ was
a slip of tongue. It reflects a worldview that has significant support among
Pakistanis.
In this
backdrop, Imran Khan and his followers do not see Saudi Arabia’s current leader
crown prince Mohammed bin Salman as an ally in their Islamist Neo-Ottoman
fantasy world, which they hope to create with China’s help.
The Saudis
now oppose the Islamist ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, maintain good relations with
India, and are not willing to engage in knee-jerk opposition of Israel. That
upsets Imran Khan as much as it offends Erdogan.
Khan
engaged with the Kingdom because of Pakistan’s transactional needs, just as he
temporarily took off his anti-American cloak to befriend President Donald
Trump. But in his heart, and that of most of his supporters, lies the desire
for a make-believe global order in which China dominates the world but allows
Muslims to remain ascendant in their heartland.
The Uyghurs
of China may have a thing or two to teach Pakistan’s armchair jihadis about
China’s tolerance for Islam and Muslims. But for now, Khan’s eyes are closed
and his foreign minister’s grandiloquence at its peak.
Meanwhile,
reality requires that General Bajwa continue to engage in damage control
missions like the one he is undertaking to Riyadh now.
Husain
Haqqani, director for South and Central Asia at the Hudson Institute in
Washington D.C., was Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008-11.
His books include ‘Pakistan Between Mosque and Military,’ ‘India vs Pakistan:
Why Can’t we be Friends’ and ‘Reimagining Pakistan.’ Views are personal.
Original
Headline: Bajwa may be trying to smooth things with Saudis, but Imran Khan
dreams of Neo-Ottoman world
Source: The Print
URL: https://newageislam.com/current-affairs/pakistan-giving-saudi-arabia-ultimatums/d/122621