Pakistan’s Karma Coming Back to Haunt It: New Age Islam's Selection, 28 February 2017
New Age Islam Edit Bureau
28 February 2017
• Pakistan’s Karma Coming Back to Haunt It
By Sushant Sareen
• The Great Game In Afghanistan
By Harsha Kakar
• Man Of Rhetoric: Why Trump Won’t Comment On Indian Techie’s Murder
By Rezaul H Laskar
• Pragmatism Rules New Ties with Israel
By FPJ Bureau
• In Pakistan, It’s Middle Class Rising
By S. Akbar Zaidi
Compiled By New Age Islam Edit Bureau
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Pakistan’s Karma Coming Back to Haunt It
By Sushant Sareen
Feb 28, 2017
The recent wave of terror attacks, which the Pakistanis claim have been planned by terrorists based in remote, lawless and ungoverned areas of eastern Afghanistan, is a classic case of what goes around comes around. For over four decades now, Pakistan has used and continues to use its Pashtun tribal belt which borders Afghanistan as a base camp for all sorts of despicable jihadists to carry out their operations in Afghanistan. Now, it appears, Pakistani jihadists have set up bases in those very parts of Afghanistan which ironically enough were destabilised by the Pakistanis through these very same jihadists. Like they say, Karma is a bitch and the Pakistanis are learning this the hard way. Perhaps, if the Pakistanis learned the right lesson – there are consequences, many of them unintended, of inimical actions against others – things could start to improve. The problem, however, is that the Pakistanis generally end up learning the wrong lesson and do stuff which will only make things worse for them.
After the latest upsurge in terror attacks, the Pakistanis turned their ire on the hapless Afghans who are themselves struggling against the Islamist terrorists, many of whom continue to function as ‘strategic assets’ of Pakistan. Immediately after the attack in Lahore, the Pakistanis closed their border with Afghanistan and stopped all movement of goods and people. A couple of days later, following the attack on the Sufi Shrine in Sehwan, Sindh, Afghan diplomats were summoned by the Pakistan Army and handed a list of 76 terrorists who are supposed to be operating from inside Afghanistan. For their part, the Afghans pushed back and handed their list of 85 terrorists who have received sanctuary in Pakistan (including the who’s who of the Taliban and Haqqani Network) and asked Pakistan to move against 32 terrorist camps in Pakistani territory.
Summoning of the Afghan diplomats to the GHQ was clearly a violation of all diplomatic protocol. But this is hardly surprising considering the Pakistanis treat Afghanistan as a vassal state or as a conquered fifth province of Pakistan. No wonder then that the Pakistanis seem to have extended the infamous colonial era black law called Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) to browbeat and even bludgeon the Afghans into submission. The FCR, which remains in force in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan allows Pakistani authorities to administer collective punishment on entire populations and forcibly displace people, destroy their homes and hearths, and detain people indefinitely without any due process. Something similar is being done with the Afghans.
For over two weeks now, a virtual blockade has been imposed on Afghanistan. All border crossings which are used by the Afghans for their transit and trade purposes through Pakistan have been shut. Thousands of people have been stranded and thousands of trucks, many of them carrying perishable goods, are stuck. This is the Pakistani version of collective punishment being meted out to the Afghans. Although the Afghans have been diversifying their trade and transit by using the Iranian route – Iran has displaced Pakistan as Afghanistan’s largest trade partner – there are many Afghans who still use the Pakistani routes for a variety of reasons. International law disallows Pakistan from closing these routes but clearly Pakistanis feel they can blithely dispense with niceties of international law. While the Pakistanis claim that the border has been closed for security reasons, this step doesn’t make any sense in light of the fact that over the last few months they have introduced strict regulations to control movement of goods and people along the Afpak border.
Apart from the blockade, the Pakistanis are also believed to have carried out military operations against alleged terror bases inside Afghanistan. Although the Pakistanis have used the expression ‘along the Afghan border’, there are hints that they actually carried out Special Forces operations inside Afghan territory. The Pakistanis have also admitted to have used long-range artillery to shell some of the alleged terror bases inside Afghanistan and there are suggestions that aerial bombardment was also carried out across the Durand line. All these attacks are a clear violation of Afghan sovereignty and quite rightly the Afghans have termed these attacks ‘aggression’ and have promised to respond. Of course, given their limitations, there isn’t very much that Afghan forces can do to pay back the Pakistanis in the same coin. This is precisely the sort of hostile action from Pakistan that was feared by the former Afghan president Hamid Karzai when he insisted on security guarantees from the US in the Bilateral Security Agreement between the two countries. The Americans however only committed that they ‘shall regard with grave concern any external aggression or threat of external aggression’ and agreed to work together with the Afghans to develop ‘an appropriate response’ in the event of external aggression. Clearly, the recent actions of the Pakistanis can be used by the Afghans to invoke these watered down commitments given by the US, and test the Americans’ resolve in defending Afghanistan.
The Americans and its allies must do everything possible to protect Afghanistan from unilateral action by Pakistan, which is not only foisting an undeclared war on the Afghan state through its proxies, but has also now started to send in regular troops into Afghan territory under the utterly false and self-serving pretext that the Pakistani jihadists are operating from Afghanistan with the assistance of the Afghan state. The fact of the matter is that the areas where Pakistani jihadists have set up base are hardly under the control of the Afghan state – the Pakistanis themselves have done everything possible to undermine the Afghan state in these areas over the last decade and a half, and even longer. For Pakistan to now demand action from the Afghans is rather rich. Interestingly, more than the writ of the Afghan state, it is the writ of Pakistan’s strategic allies – Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network (HN) – that runs over most of these areas. But instead of pressuring them, the Pakistanis are blaming the Afghan government. This is in large part to deflect blame from the deep state in Pakistan which continues to support and provide sustenance to these ‘strategic assets’. But it is also being done because blaming the Afghan intelligence agency NDS and India’s R&AW is helpful in winning public support within Pakistan as well as prevent any major public outcry demanding action against the Taliban and HN.
But all the stuff that Pakistan blames the Afghans for can very easily be defended by the Afghans by throwing back in Pakistan’s face arguments that the Pakistanis have made to deny their complicity or justify their inaction against terrorists operating against India and Afghanistan from Pakistan- controlled territory. For instance, the Pakistanis have often told India that people who infiltrate the LoC travel scores of miles of Indian territory and so should be apprehended by Indian forces. The same can now be said for the terrorists who cross the Durand line to strike in Lahore or Sehwan or Peshawar. Similarly, if the Pakistanis feel that Afghan inability to act against Pakistani jihadists justifies cross-border operations by Pakistani forces, the same logic can be used by India in PoK, and by the US and Afghan forces in Pakistani territory where despite evidence of training camps no action is taken by the Pakistani forces. Again, just as the Pakistanis refuse to act against Taliban bases in their territory because of strategic reasons, the same argument can be thrown in their face by the Afghans. One could go on and on to give examples of how every specious logic and every false argument that the Pakistanis made in the past to India and Afghanistan, can today be flung at them.
If the menace of terrorism has to be defeated, then it is imperative that countries like Pakistan which have spawned this beast, make a clean break with it. Mere point-scoring or indulging in blame-games isn’t going to help very much. Continuation of pernicious policies that have made the ground fertile for terrorists is only going to make things worse. Clearly, Pakistan’s karma is coming back to haunt it. Without a complete overhaul of Pakistan’s strategic policy paradigm, what Pakistan sends around, will continue to come around to cause grievous harm to Pakistan itself.
Source: freepressjournal.in/analysis/sushant-sareen-pakistans-karma-coming-back-to-haunt-it/1026348
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The Great Game in Afghanistan
By Harsha Kakar
February 28, 2017
Afghanistan’s geo-strategic importance is well established. It borders nations of the Central Asian Republics (CAR), Iran, Pakistan and China. Iran and Turkmenistan (part of CAR) have the second and third largest reserves of natural gas, which the West seeks to tap. Afghanistan’s rugged terrain and fierce tribal loyalties ensured that it was never completely subdued by any power. Among those who tried were Alexander the Great, Britain, Russia and the US. Afghanistan thus gained the moniker ‘graveyard of empires’.
The US entered the country to avenge 9/11. The defeat of the Taliban under the aegis of a US-led offensive was thought to be a turning point for the country. However, it was not to be. The Taliban received support and sanctuary in Pakistan and continued to battle the US-led coalition. Despite having remained ensconced for over 15 years, the US still cannot claim victory and withdraw with honour. Unable to defeat the Taliban and knowing success is unlikely with financial costs burgeoning, it planned a tactical withdrawal. It presently maintains a force with a larger training element and limited operational role.
The US’ relationship with Pakistan since its entry into Afghanistan has witnessed ups and downs. Perceptions in the US vary from continuing to engage Pakistan in the hope that it would ultimately curb the Haqqani network and the Taliban, to employing economic and diplomatic leverage to compel it to act.
Pakistan on the other hand has always considered Afghanistan as its backyard and resented any Indian involvement there. Further, with an anti-Pak government in Kabul, its strategic leverage cannot exist. None of the US strategies have so far worked. Both terror groups still possess safe sanctuaries and get support from the ‘deep state’. Recently a group of US think tanks strongly recommended that the US administration be more firm with Pakistan, if it wishes to witness a sense of peace in the region.
The war in West Asia led to the expansion of the ISIS into Afghanistan. It began enhancing its cadre strength by inducting disgruntled members of the Pakistan Taliban (TTP) and nationals returning from Syria belonging to CAR and Russia. To further complicate the issue, Taliban declared war on the ISIS. This decision compelled powers in the region to change their perception and consider the Taliban as the lesser of the two evils, simply because it remains focused only on Afghanistan, without any territorial ambitions, and counters the ISIS. Individual national interests of major powers have begun to dominate the security situation in Afghanistan.
Russia, Pakistan and China, formed an alliance and held discussions on Afghanistan’s future, ignoring the nation itself and other stake holders. They preferred supporting the Taliban to the extent of even considering removing some of its leaders from the UN’s designated list of terrorists. Their latest conference in Moscow included India, Iran and Afghanistan, ignoring the US, which continues to operate in the country. The conference aimed at seeking options to counter the ISIS threat. Of the group of six, four (China, Russia, Pakistan and Iran) consider Taliban as the lesser evil and are in parleys with them. Such interference in Afghanistan has converted it into the latest international playground.
Afghanistan and the US have no option but to battle both Taliban and ISIS to ensure survival of the nation state. Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran are willing to let Taliban control part of the country or be a part of the government so long as it keeps ISIS at bay. For India, Taliban is the larger threat, as it has Pakistan’s support. Further, it would never permit India to play a dominant role in the country. India is presently secure from the ISIS threat with Pakistan remaining a buffer state.
For Russia, ISIS expansion in Afghanistan, if unchecked, would threaten it and CAR countries as there are Chechen, Uzbek, Tajik and Kazakh fighters operating as part of it. History is also known to repeat itself. Russia was compelled to withdraw from Afghanistan because of support provided to the Taliban and al Qaida by the US and Pakistan. Presently by supporting the Taliban, possibly even with weapons, it highlights a similar bleak future for the US.
China is concerned with the presence of East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) fighters in the ISIS, who could enhance the ongoing militancy in Xinjiang province. Thus, it is willing to support the Taliban, if it continues to oppose the presence of the ISIS. Iran has its own reasons for supporting the Taliban. It is insecure with an ISIS build up close to its borders and keen to counter US presence in the region. Playing a strategic game, it supports Kabul with development funds as also the Taliban, thus ensuring whichever government occupies the seat in Kabul, it would remain Iran friendly. Simplistically put, individual perceptions dominate the Afghan scenario.
The West, India and Afghanistan would never support this initiative as it goes against their principles. Europe is facing the brunt of Afghan refugees and adhering to this concept would only enhance their problems and increase internal differences. Therefore, the thinking of this grouping is doomed to fail in the international fora. However, nothing can prevent individual nations from continuing their parleys with the Taliban for securing their own national interests.
The sudden interference in internal matters of Afghanistan by powerful nations would only embolden Pakistan to continue with its support to the Haqqani network and the Taliban. It would also justify their policy of ‘good versus bad terror’ groups. Further, as the 2017 summer offensive of the Taliban is expected to get underway in coming months, it would be Pakistan’s population that would face the brunt.
It is now upto the Trump administration to adopt a firm policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan as also reach an agreement with Russia to ensure the degradation of the Taliban first and ISIS later. It has been decades since the Afghan turmoil began and it is time for the nation to witness a semblance of peace and stability.
Source: thestatesman.com/opinion/the-great-game-in-afghanistan-1488225343.html
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Man of Rhetoric: Why Trump Won’t Comment On Indian Techie’s Murder
By Rezaul H Laskar
Feb 27, 2017
A reveller dressed as US president Donald Trump is pictured at the traditional carnival parade in Duesseldorf, Germany.(AP)
Forty-two. That’s the number of times President Donald Trump has posted from his two Twitter accounts since Indian engineer Srinivas Kuchibhotla was shot and killed in an apparent hate crime in Kansas.
In those tweets, Trump has tackled a range of issues, from his usual fulminations against “fake news” from The New York Times to ending job-killing regulations to seven people killed in gun violence in Chicago’s deadliest day of the year so far.
But there wasn’t a single word on Kuchibhotla, 32, attacked by a man who reportedly yelled “get out of my country” before he began firing.
Nor should we expect anything from Trump, what with White House spokesman Sean Spicer saying it would be “absurd” to link the engineer’s death to the president’s anti-immigrant rhetoric.
In an era of “America first”, this is the new normal. A president obsessed with how the US media depicts him, even on comedy shows such as Saturday Night Live, had little to worry about as the shooting didn’t get wall-to-wall coverage in America.
And it’s rather obvious from media reports that Trump really doesn’t read much, leave alone the possibility of him reading the Indian media’s coverage of the shock and outrage at the death of Kuchibhotla.
At a time when Trump is talking about bringing jobs offshored by American firms back home and reviewing visa programmes such as the H-1B, under which Kuchibhotla and his colleague Alok Madasani were in the US, it’s hardly likely that he would be talking about the rights of foreign workers.
And despite Trump’s talk of “we love India”, let’s not forget he hasn’t even spoken on the anti-semitism that is sweeping the US.
The only silver lining here is that despite Trump’s divisive rhetoric both during and after his explosive campaign, there are still ordinary folks in the US such as Ian Grillot, who are willing to do the right thing.
Source: hindustantimes.com/opinion/man-of-rhetoric-why-trump-won-t-comment-on-indian-techie-s-murder/story-JxSL4OZpH5c522ZXW0zJrI.html
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Pragmatism Rules New Ties with Israel
By FPJ Bureau
Feb 27, 2017
MERCIFULLY for Modi and the NDA government, the current mess created by the Islamic State has shifted attention away from the Israel-Palestine dispute and left India with an excellent manoeuvring space.
It is heartening that India has cleared a mega deal for the Army worth ? 17,000 crore to acquire the Medium Range Surface to Air Defence Missile (MR-SAM) system from Israel. It is evidence of Prime Minister Narendra Modi elevating the strategic dimension of the India-Israel partnership by bringing their relationship out from “under the carpet.” Earlier Indian governments were unduly shy of being seen to be entering into deals with Israel for fear of the Muslim vote bank in the country. The air-defence system developed jointly by the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Israeli Aircraft Industry can shoot down enemy aircraft, drones, surveillance aircraft and AWACS planes at the strike range between 50 km to 70 km in the sky and will help the country in filling gaps in air defence. As per the proposal cleared by the government, the Army will induct over five regiments of the MR-SAM missile which will have around 40 firing units and over 200 missiles of the system. The delivery of the first system for the Army units will begin in 72 months of the signing of the contract and they would be ready for deployment in field areas by the year 2023.
The two countries are jointly developing similar systems for the Air Force and the Navy. The Air Force had got clearance for its MR-SAM programme in 2009 and the deliveries will begin after delays in the project. The Navy programme is known as Long Range Surface to Air Missile system (LR-SAM) and would be set on its warships. Hyderabad-based Bharat Dynamics Limited will produce the missiles of the system while many other Indian industries like Bharat Electronics Ltd, Larsen and Toubro, and the Tata group will contribute in the production for many systems and sub-systems in it. A new production facility to deliver 100 missiles a year has been established for such type of long and medium range surface-to-air missiles at BDL. The Army will deploy these air defence systems to provide protection to vital assets and points across the country. The systems will be developed in India and will have 80 per cent indigenous content.
The two countries are also in an advanced stage of negotiations for the purchase of two more long-range Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The CCS had approved the deal for additional AWACS last year that is expected to cost ?7,500 crore. India now operates three Phalcon AWACS with Israeli radars mounted on Russian IL-76 transport aircraft, under a $1-billion tripartite deal with Russia, signed in 2003. Russian officials said at recent Aero India that India had ordered two IL-76 aircraft to be converted to AWACS. Officials said they were hopeful of a deal during Mr. Modi’s visit, and added that discussions were on for additional long-range drones.
India and Israel have indeed stepped up their defence cooperation since the NDA government came to power. Modi’s close ties with Israel can be traced to the period when he was the chief minister of Gujarat. Israel emerged as a key player in helping Gujarat achieve impressive economic growth under Modi, who often charted policy initiatives independent from the Congress-led UPA government at the Centre. Although the Modi government has asserted that India’s policy with regard to the Palestinian issue has not undergone any fundamental change, Modi’s engagement with the Palestine Authority has been limited. Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Israel in November 2014 was a landmark visit in the sense that it was confined to Israel only. The omission of the Palestinian Authority from Rajnath’s tour was interpreted as the Modi government’s intent to break with the tradition of clubbing high-level official visits to Israel with visits to Palestine and Jordan. But the old policy staged a comeback soon out of political expediency and the Modi government began to balance India’s commitments vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine. Swaraj visited Palestine and Jordan, along with Israel, on her January 2016 trip. While in Ramallah, she emphasised that India’s support for Palestinians remained “undiluted.” President Pranab Mukherjee also went to Jordan and Palestine along with Israel in October 2015. In fact, he became the first foreign head of state to stay overnight in Ramallah.
Mercifully for Modi and the NDA government, the current mess created by the Islamic State has shifted attention away from the Israel-Palestine dispute and left India with an excellent manoeuvring space, as most of the regional players are too busy with infighting and combating the jihadist juggernaut to seriously lose sleep over the first-ever visit to Israel by an Indian Prime Minister. With Modi set to visit Israel in June, a new impetus to Indo-Israeli ties is expected from the visit. While defence ties are the kingpin in the relationship, counter-terrorism, trade, and the exchange of technology have also emerged as areas of cooperation. There is collaboration too in space research. A new partnership is indeed in the making.
Source: freepressjournal.in/analysis/pragmatism-rules-new-ties-with-israel/1025623
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In Pakistan, It’s Middle Class Rising
By S. Akbar Zaidi
February 28, 2017
The general perception still, and unfortunately, held by many people, foreigners and Pakistanis, is that Pakistan is largely an agricultural, rural economy, where “feudals” dominate the economic, social, and particularly political space. Nothing could be further from this outdated, false framing of Pakistan’s political economy. Perhaps the single most significant consequence of the social and structural transformation under way for the last two decades has been the rise and consolidation of a Pakistani middle class, both rural, but especially, urban.
Class Categories Transformed
As academics know, signifiers of social categories such as “class” are no longer fashionable and we work in an environment which no longer theorises about classes of any kind. The political category of class has been replaced by numerous other categories such as “institutions” and other more generic and broader substitutes.
This is particularly the case in Pakistan, where while there is much literature on Pakistan’s over-determined military, there is some on the judiciary, media, gender, but little research and academic engagement with the social and structural transformation which results in how the nature of class composition has changed over time. The previous, more simplistic and simplified class categories such as feudals, industrialists, and “the working class” have not only been transformed but are also now even more problematic. In this academic environment, where there is little research of core social categories, trying to identify and calculate the size of the middle class becomes particularly difficult.
While a definition, and hence estimation of Pakistan’s middle class, or middle classes, has not been easy, the term has acquired much prominence in social and anecdotal references. Increasing references to the middle class — durmiana tubqa — both as a political category but also as an economic one, occur more regularly in the media. Often, Pakistan’s middle class is referred to by the consumer goods that it has increasingly been purchasing, from washing machines to motorcycles. But more importantly, the term is used for those having an active political constituency and presence. In many ways, the terms used in India after Narendra Modi’s 2014 election, of an “aspiring” or “aspirational” class — also somewhat vague but nevertheless signifying some political and developmentalist notion — have also found some currency in Pakistan.
Attempts to quantify Pakistan’s middle class, largely based on income and the purchase of consumption goods, show that as many as 42% of Pakistan’s population belong to the upper and middle classes, with 38% counted as “the middle class”. If these numbers are correct, or even indicative in any broad sense, then 84 million Pakistanis belong to the middle and upper classes, a population size larger than that of Germany and Turkey. Anecdotal evidence and social observations, supplemented by estimates other than what people buy, would also support the claim that Pakistan’s middle class is indeed quite formidable.
Girls Shining
Data based on social, economic and spatial categories all support this argument. While literacy rates in Pakistan have risen to around 60%, perhaps more important has been the significant rise in girls’ literacy and in their education. Their enrolment at the primary school level, while still less than it is for boys, is rising faster than it is for boys. What is even more surprising is that this pattern is reinforced even for middle level education where, between 2002-03 and 2012-13, there had been an increase by as much as 54% when compared to 26% for that of boys. At the secondary level, again unexpectedly, girls’ participation has increased by 53% over the decade, about the same as it has for boys. While boys outnumber girls in school, girls are catching up. In 2014-15, it was estimated that there were more girls enrolled in Pakistan’s universities than boys — 52% and 48%, respectively. Pakistan’s middle class has realised the significance of girls’ education, even up to the college and university level.
In spatial terms, most social scientists would agree that Pakistan is almost all, or at least predominantly, urban rather than rural, even though such categories are difficult to concretise. Research in Pakistan has revealed that at least 70% of Pakistanis live in urban or urbanising settlements, and not in rural settlements, whatever they are. Using data about access to urban facilities and services such as electricity, education, transport and communication connectivity, this is a low estimate. Moreover, even in so-called “rural” and agricultural settlements, data show that around 60% or more of incomes accrue from non-agricultural sources such as remittances and services. Clearly, whatever the rural is, it is no longer agricultural. Numerous other sets of statistics would enhance the middle class thesis in Pakistan.
Rise Of The ‘Youthias’
It is not only in economistic, or more specifically, consumerist, terms that the middle class has made its presence felt, but also politically. The “Naya Pakistan” of today is dominated by middle class voices and concerns. The “youthias”, as they are called, a political category of those who support Imran Khan and his style of politics, are one clear manifestation of this rise, as is the large support in the Punjab of Nawaz Sharif and his Punjab Chief Minister brother, Shahbaz Sharif. The developmentalist agenda and the social concerns of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government which is ruled by Imran Khan’s party, and those in the Punjab where the Sharif family dominates, are representative of this new politics. Free laptops, better governance, more information technology, better schooling, better urban health facilities, jobs for the educated youth, the right to information, and so on, represent government initiatives to appease this political category.
Vague, expectational foundations from Europe and other western countries, that the middle class is necessarily democratic, tolerant and secular, have all come undone by events in recent years. The expectation that the middle class is necessarily “liberal” no longer stands.
In the case of Pakistan, on account of many decades of a forced Islamisation discourse, backed up by Saudi funding and growing Jihadism, one might argue that Pakistan’s middle class is “Islamist”, very broadly defined, and also socially conservative and intolerant, pro-privatisation and pro-capital. Yet, social and structural transformation, from Internet access to girls’ education and social media activism, also results in trends that counter such strict formulations. While still probably socially conservative, contradictory counter-narratives would suggest that there is a large noticeable tension which exists within this category of the middle class which questions a simple categorisation of its ideological moorings.
A Politics Hardly Progressive
It would be trite, though not incorrect, to argue that Pakistan’s middle class is in an ideological ferment and transition, but its aspirations do not extend to groups and social classes outside its own large category. They are not interested in the working classes or their issues, they are comfortable making economic and political alliances with large capitalist landowners and industrialists, many of whom have close links with the military. At present, the politics of this middle class is a far cry from even a soft version of the term “progressive”. It is the multiple fractions within the middle class which have been dominating the political and developmentalist agenda in Pakistan. It is going to be the contradictions within this middle class which will now set the future course for Pakistan’s economy and its politics. Perhaps from the fringes of this middle class, one could possibly expect the emergence even of progressive forms of politics.
S. Akbar Zaidi is a political economist based in Karachi. He teaches at Columbia University in New York, and at the IBA in Karachi.
Source: thehindu.com/opinion/lead/in-pakistan-its-middle-class-rising/article17378526.ece
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