By
Andrew McGregor
February 9,
2012
Executive Summary:
A year
after the eruption of Libya’s spontaneous revolution, there are few signs of
progress towards establishing internal security or a democratic government.
Real power lies in the hands of well-armed militias with little inclination to
disarm or demobilize and the ruling Transitional National Council (TNC) has been
reduced to holding its meetings in secret to avoid bottle-throwing,
grenade-hurling demonstrators. Amidst this turmoil come increasingly louder
demands for a Shari’a regime as the old regime’s looted armories and former
soldiers fuel new insurrections in the Sahel/Sahara region. Even as neighboring
Mali descends into a new round of rebellion that threatens to become an all-out
civil war, Niger and Algeria are struggling to find ways to break the wave of
violence at their borders.
The
alarming developments on the Libyan periphery inspired a special two-day
meeting of foreign ministers and intelligence chiefs from Mali, Algeria
Mauritania and Niger in Nouakchott in late January. These officials also
invited their counterparts from Nigeria and Burkina Faso to discuss the rising
“terrorist threat” in the Sahel/Sahara region and the possibility of ties
between AQIM and Nigeria’s Boko Haram militants (AFP, January 23; PANA, January
24; Nouvel Horizon [Bamako], January 24).
Some
observers have noted a change in Tuareg tactics in the current rebellion in a
switch from their usual adherence to guerrilla methods to attacks in strength
and attempts to seize and hold settlements in northern Mali. The effort to
carve out a new Azawad nation may well be fuelled by the rebels’ possession of
superior weaponry obtained during the Libyan collapse (Le Republicain [Bamako],
January 30). The assaults on small towns in the north may be a means of testing
the strength of the Malian army before the Tuareg rebels mount attacks on
larger centers like Gao and Timbuktu.
However,
not all Mali’s Tuareg fighters have joined the insurrection. Malian military
operations in the north are currently under the command of Colonel al-Hajj
Gamou, a loyal Tuareg officer who has served in the Malian army since 1992. A
loyalist unit of Tuareg in Kidal Region led by Muhammad ag Bachir has also
backed government security forces by arresting a number of individuals
suspected of supporting the MNLA, including Colonel Hassan ag Fagaga, a veteran
Tuareg rebel leader who had threatened to restart the Tuareg insurgency if
Bamako did not fulfill the conditions laid out in the 2008 Algiers Accord
(Jeune Afrique, January 24; El Khabar [Algiers], July 15, 2010; see also
Terrorism Monitor, September 2, 2010).
Other former Tuareg members of the Libyan military resettled at Menaka
were reported to have joined in efforts to repulse the MNLA attack of January
17(Jeune Afrique, January 24).
The
rekindling of the Tuareg insurrection in Mali appears to be provoking a
resurrection of the notorious Ganda Koy and Ganda Iso militias, loosely
organized self-defense units formed from the black African communities
(primarily Songhai and Fulani) in the largely Tuareg and Arab northern
provinces of Mali, a development that threatens to turn the northern conflict
into a more general civil war. The Bérabiche Arabs of northern Mali are also
reforming their militias, which have cooperated with government offensives
against Tuareg rebels in the past (Le Combat [Bamako], January 31).
The
Response from Algiers
Algeria
responded to the Tuareg attacks in Mali by raising its security alert to the
highest level. Algiers has long been unhappy with Mali’s failure to secure its
northern regions, which now provide bases for the Saharan offshoot of the
Algerian-based al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Ilaf.com, January 20; al-Quds
al-Arabi, January 20). Le Pouvoir, the Algerian political/military/business
elite that controls most aspects of Algerian life, fears instability above all
else and has tried to shut down any effort within Algeria to emulate the
revolutionary unrest in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. A series of so-far
uncoordinated riots in Algerian cities has no doubt alarmed Algeria’s elite.
Algiers fears that this wave of unrest is intended to pave the way for foreign
intervention in North Africa, but many Algerians worry that the government’s
inability to extinguish AQIM’s low-level insurgency is a means of justifyingLe
Pouvoir’s tight grip on Algerian politics and maintaining high levels of
spending in the military and security services.
Unable to
rein in AQIM, Algiers has chosen to fight AQIM’s shadow, sentencing the
commander of AQIM”s Sahara/Sahel branch, Abd al-Hamid Abu Zeid (a.k.a. Muhammad
Ghidr) to life in prison, a sentence applied in absentia. Abu Zeid is the
leader of the Tariq Ibn Ziyad unit of AQIM, which uses kidnappings and murder
as their main tactics. Another Algerian court is still hearing the in absentia
case against AQIM commander Mokhtar Belmokhtar for the deaths of two Algerian
soldiers (NOW Lebanon, January 22).
Algeria,
which played an important part in resolving previous Tuareg insurrections in
Mali, has indicated that it views AQIM and the MNLA rebellion as “two different
issues” and has undertaken mediation efforts between the rebels and Bamako.
Prior to the outbreak of the latest Tuareg rebellion, Algeria attempted to aid
Malian counterterrorism efforts by sending a small group of military trainers
to provide instruction in anti-terrorist techniques (L’Aube [Bamako], December
22). However, the recent withdrawal of Algerian military trainers from Mali and
a freeze on further shipments of military equipment was intended by Algiers to
force a political settlement to the current conflict (El Khabar [Algiers], January
28). An MNLA spokesman said that the Tuareg attack on Tessalit came only after
Algerian military personnel were withdrawn as the attackers did not wish to
involve Algeria in the fighting (Reuters, January 27). Algeria is also aware of
other less obvious threats to Mali’s security and recently shipped 3,100 metric
tonnes of food to address Mali’s increasing difficulty in feeding its
population (L’Independant [Bamako], January 31).
Algeria is
facing parliamentary elections in May in which Algerian Islamists are expected
to do well as an alternative to the existing power structure under which
unemployment and housing shortages have flourished (Reuters, January 31).
The
Response from Bamako
With
presidential elections on their way in April, President Amadou Toumani Touré
appears to be ready to apply the military option to the Tuareg problem,
particularly since he must now deal with the Tuareg insurgents without recourse
to the mediation of the late Colonel Qaddafi. Bamako also appears prepared to
take extraordinary measures to save the situation in the north. Mohamed Ould
Awainatt, a member of northern Mali’s Arab community and one of the main
suspects on trial in the notorious 2009 Boeing 727 shipment of cocaine to
northern Mali that ended with the traffickers torching the aircraft, was
suddenly and quietly released from detention on January 19. His release in a
case that severely embarrassed Mali was reportedly obtained as the result of a
demand from a group of young Arabs the government of Mali was trying to enlist
in the fight against their Tuareg neighbors (22 Septembre [Bamako], January 23;
AFP, January 23).
In Timbuktu
there are constant rumors of an imminent attack on the city and widespread fear
of a Tuareg attack on the city’s Arab community (L’Independent [Bamako],
January 24; Le Pretoire [Bamako], January 30). In the capital of Bamako there
is talk of Western conspiracies, French “hatred” of independent Mali, malicious
plots devised by Mauritanian generals and the alleged operations of foreign spies
working hand-in-hand with al-Qaeda to divide Mali. Some Malian media sources
have suggested that France and possibly other Western nations had persuaded
many Tuareg fighters to abandon Qaddafi’s forces during the Libyan uprising
with promises of support for an independent Azawad (Nouvelle Liberation
[Bamako], January 24; L’Aube [Bamako], December 22, 2011). Local media is
almost unanimous in its calls for a hardline approach to the latest Tuareg
rebellion, with one columnist even advocating the use of nuclear weapons in
Mali’s barren north (Le Pretoire [Bamako], January 30;L’Aube [Bamako], January
30; Le Potentiel [Bamako], January 31).
Libyan
Arms Flow in All Directions
The
availability of looted Libyan arms may allow new armed groups to form in West
Africa with greater ease than usual. One such group may be the Jamaat Tawhid
wa’l-Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa -
MOJWA), led by Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (a.k.a. Abu Qumqum) and dedicated to
the spread of Shari’a throughout West Africa. According to a video released by
the movement, MOJWA broke away from AQIM due to the domination of the
movement’s leadership by Arab militants from Mauritania and Mali. MOJWA appears
to be a black African Muslim reaction to the traditional domination of all
al-Qaeda branches by Arab Muslims, and their video has a specifically African
character by using Hausa and English as well as Arabic to praise a number of
important West African Muslim empire builders of the 19th century (AFP, December
22). In a video released in early January, Kheirou said his movement had
declared “war on France, which is hostile to the interests of Islam” (AFP/NOW
Lebanon, January 3). Though the group has only carried out one kidnapping
operation so far, the spread of Salafi-Jihadist militancy into relatively
unaffected West African Muslim communities would be an alarming development.
Just by kidnapping European aid workers from a Polisario camp of West Saharan
refugees in Algeria, MOJWA has helped inflame the difficult security situation
in the region. Polisario operatives are now searching for Kheirou and his three
European hostages.
In light of
the tense political situation in Egypt, news that Egyptian border guards had
prevented smugglers from bringing a shipment of machine guns, sniper rifles and
ammunition into Egypt through the Libyan Desert was an disturbing development
in Egypt’s unfinished revolution (MENA [Cairo], January 24; January 18).
Conclusion
The West’s
poorly considered support of a spontaneous Libyan rebellion lacking common
aims, ideology or even basic organization has secured the present reality.
Clearly, the restoration of security in Libya is an essential first step in
stabilizing the region. Unfortunately, the ability of Libya’s Transitional
National Council to either project force or promote conciliation seems to be
diminishing rather than increasing. If Libya is unable to make progress on
disarmament and unification issues, the stage may be set for the emergence of a
strongman ready to enforce his will on Libya, perhaps in the form of an
ambitious young colonel with fresh ideas about remaking the Libyan state…but
then we’ve already been down that road. Nonetheless, both the West and Africa
must now confront the security fallout from the rash decisions made a year ago.
Andrew McGregor is Director of Aberfoyle
International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues
related to the Islamic world.
Source: The Jamestown Foundation
URL: https://newageislam.com/current-affairs/pandemonium-libya-part-2-gaddafi’s/d/6621